United States v. Guzman: No Fourth-Amendment Standing for Occupants of Condemned or “Substandard” Property

1. Introduction

In United States v. Guzman, No. 24-2122 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2025), the Tenth Circuit confronted a recurring question at the intersection of criminal procedure, property law, and municipal code enforcement: does a person who is invited by the owner to live on property that has been formally condemned (or, in Albuquerque’s terminology, declared “substandard”) still enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion? The court answered “No.”

The appellant, Raul Guzman, was a homeless individual allowed by the property owner to reside in a camper trailer parked behind two boarded-up buildings. City code officials and police officers entered the lot to inspect for housing-code compliance, opened the trailer door without a warrant, detained Mr. Guzman, and seized a revolver seen in plain view. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, Guzman moved to suppress the gun on Fourth-Amendment grounds. The district court denied the motion for lack of “standing” (i.e., a legitimate expectation of privacy). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, crystallising a new rule for the circuit:

When municipal notices expressly prohibit any person from residing or remaining on a condemned or substandard property, an individual who nevertheless stays on the premises—even with the owner’s consent—has no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore lacks Fourth-Amendment standing to challenge a governmental search.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Issue: Whether Raul Guzman had a legitimate (objectively reasonable) expectation of privacy in a camper trailer situated on property that the City of Albuquerque had posted as “substandard, unsafe to occupy,” thereby giving him Fourth-Amendment standing to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless entry.
Holding: He did not. Even assuming a subjective expectation of privacy (because the owner invited him), that expectation was not one “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” in light of conspicuous municipal notices forbidding any residence or overnight presence on the property.
Disposition: The panel (Matheson, Bacharach, McHugh, JJ.) affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and the resulting conviction.
Alternate Grounds: The district court had also found several warrant exceptions (plain-view, protective sweep, etc.) applicable, but the Tenth Circuit found it unnecessary to reach those points once standing was denied.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Relied Upon

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) – Declared that Fourth-Amendment rights are personal; wrongful presence defeats an expectation of privacy.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) – Refined the two-part “subjective/objective” test originally articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz.
Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395 (2018) – Reaffirmed that even someone with “possession and control” (e.g., a car thief) may lack a reasonable expectation of privacy when presence is wrongful.
United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986) – Held that squatters in a cave on federal land had no privacy expectation.
United States v. Creighton, 639 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2011) – Guests who know (or should know) of occupancy violations cannot claim privacy.
Municipal precedent: Albuquerque Uniform Housing Code § 14-3-5-6, explicitly criminalising presence on property with posted “substandard” notices absent written permission.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel employed the canonical two-step analysis:

Subjective Expectation – Acknowledged. Guzman testified he intended the trailer as his private living space and the owner verbally consented. The district court credited this testimony for purposes of argument.
Objective Reasonableness – Denied. The dispositive facts were:
- Bright-yellow municipal posters on the buildings stated in bold, legible print: “No person shall reside in this structure or on this property ….”
- Guzman admitted under oath he read and understood the signs.
- The Albuquerque Housing Code makes violation a misdemeanor.
By choosing to remain, Guzman was, in the court’s words, “wrongfully” present—akin to a trespasser or squatter—even if the owner acquiesced. The owner’s consent cannot override a lawful governmental order directed to health and safety. Therefore, society would not accept Guzman’s privacy claim as reasonable.

Importantly, the panel confined its analysis to Guzman’s knowledge at the time he formed the expectation; it did not impute to him esoteric knowledge of the Code’s text, only what the conspicuous postings communicated. This objective focus also sidestepped any murky constitutional challenge to the City’s authority—an argument Guzman waived by not raising it below.

3.3 Impact on Future Cases and on the Law

Practical Consequences

Heightened Clarity for Law Enforcement. Officers entering condemned premises for code compliance now have strong Tenth-Circuit precedent that occupants typically lack Fourth-Amendment standing.
Landowners’ Consent Insufficient. Even a bona fide owner cannot confer Fourth-Amendment protections where municipal safety orders forbid occupancy. This will limit suppression motions by invitees, licensees, or tenants in similar settings.
Homelessness/Property-Code Interplay. The case adds bite to local ordinances that criminalise continued residence in unsafe structures, potentially affecting homeless populations that rely on informal permission.
Federal Prosecutions. The ruling offers prosecutors a threshold standing argument—often easier than litigating exigency, plain-view, or consent exceptions.

Doctrinal Significance

Extends Ruckman from pure trespass situations to “code-based trespass”—occupancy that is statutorily wrongful even if relationally consensual.
Aligns the Tenth Circuit with the Third and Ninth Circuits’ no-standing decisions in supervised-release and restraining-order contexts (Cortez-Dutrieville, Schram).
Clarifies that municipal postings alone can provide sufficient notice; separate personal service or formal eviction is unnecessary for the “wrongfulness” inquiry.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Fourth-Amendment “Standing” – Not about Article III; instead, a defendant must show a personal right was invaded. It requires (1) a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) one society accepts as reasonable.
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (Katz Test) – What you actually expect vs. what is socially legitimate. Breaking posted rules typically defeats legitimacy.
“Wrongful Presence” – Presence that violates law or order (e.g., trespass, code violation, restraining order). If wrongful, privacy claims fail.
Municipal Condemnation/Substandard Notices – Civil enforcement mechanism allowing a city to declare buildings unsafe and order them vacated. Violation is often a misdemeanor; notices are posted on-site.
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree – Evidence obtained directly or indirectly from illegal government action must be suppressed. Because Guzman lacked standing, the tree was never “poisonous.”
Plain-View Doctrine (mentioned but not reached) – Officers may seize evidence if lawfully present and the item’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Guzman pushes the Fourth-Amendment boundaries outward for law-enforcement activity on condemned or code-deficient property. The Tenth Circuit firmly held that government postings rendering occupancy illegal strip invitees of any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy—owner consent notwithstanding. For criminal defendants, the decision underscores the necessity of establishing both lawful and factually exclusive occupation when asserting Fourth-Amendment rights. For municipalities and police, it confirms that properly issued and conspicuously posted code-enforcement notices can serve as a robust shield against suppression challenges. Looking forward, the case will likely be cited in disputes involving homeless encampments, disaster-red-tagged structures, and any premises where safety regulations clash with informal living arrangements.