This portion of the opinion underscores that in fraud schemes:

• A participant cannot escape liability merely because another conspirator presses the button that triggers a wire transfer.
• As long as the use of an interstate wire is reasonably foreseeable within the scheme’s ordinary operation, each knowing participant may be held liable for substantive wire-fraud counts tied to those transmissions.

3. The Zero-Point Offender Reduction (U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1)

a. The text and the dispute

The “zero‑point offender” guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, effective November 1, 2023, offers a two‑level reduction for first‑time, non‑violent offenders who satisfy a list of enumerated criteria. One of those criteria, at the time of Robertson’s sentencing, read:

(10) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848.

Robertson received a two‑level leadership enhancement under § 3B1.1(c), but was not charged with or found to be part of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE). He argued the “and” was conjunctive: he was disqualified only if both conditions were met. Because only one applied (leadership), he contended he remained eligible for the zero‑point reduction.

The government countered that § 4C1.1 sets out affirmative eligibility criteria that the defendant must all satisfy; failure to satisfy either element of (10) (no leadership and no CCE) is disqualifying.

b. The First Circuit’s reading: “and” within an eligibility checklist

The panel sided with the government, joining an emerging national consensus. The key steps:

• § 4C1.1(a) begins: “If the defendant meets all of the following criteria … decrease the offense level by 2 levels.”
• Criterion (10) is one of those required criteria. The court paraphrased the structure:
  • A defendant must show that he did not receive a leadership adjustment and was not engaged in a CCE. If he received a leadership enhancement or engaged in a CCE, he fails criterion (10) and is ineligible.
• The Sentencing Commission’s November 2024 amendment split subsection (10) into two separate disqualifiers – one for leadership, one for CCE – and stated it was to “clarify” what had always been intended. That post‑hoc clarification carried interpretive weight.
• Most importantly, the court relied on Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024), where the Supreme Court interpreted a similar structure in the “safety valve” statute. Pulsifer held that a defendant must not have any of three disqualifying criminal history features to qualify; “and” within the list of disqualifiers did not require that all three be present for exclusion.

Applying Pulsifer’s logic, the First Circuit characterized § 4C1.1(a) as an eligibility checklist: the defendant must satisfy every criterion; failing any one (including leadership) is enough to lose the reduction.

c. Law of the case and intervening authority

Robertson argued that because the same district judge had already granted Griffin a zero‑point reduction despite his leadership enhancement, the law‑of‑the‑case doctrine barred a different outcome for Robertson.

The panel rejected that contention:

• The government raised Pulsifer at Griffin’s sentencing but conceded its objection was untimely there; Probation, however, amended Robertson’s PSR in light of Pulsifer before his sentencing.
• Intervening Supreme Court authority – even if not squarely on point – is a classic exception to law-of-the-case principles. Once Pulsifer clarified the interpretive framework, the district court was free to apply it to Robertson even if it erred in Griffin’s favor.
• Relatedly, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) requires sentencing under Guidelines “in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced,” and courts must correctly apply them to each defendant individually. A mistaken windfall for one codefendant does not entitle another to the benefit of the same mistake.

d. Impact and practice points

For the First Circuit, any defendant who receives an aggravating‑role enhancement under § 3B1.1 is categorically ineligible for the zero‑point offender reduction, regardless of CCE involvement. Practical consequences:

• Defense strategy should focus on defeating any leadership/organizer/manager enhancement at sentencing if § 4C1.1 relief is important.
• There is no room, in this circuit, to argue that leadership alone does not bar zero‑point status under the pre‑November 2024 text.
• Courts may correct their approach in later sentencings based on new appellate or Supreme Court decisions, even if co‑defendants previously received more favorable treatment under now‑clarified law.

4. Leadership and Abuse-of-Trust Enhancements for Public Officers

a. Leadership enhancement (§ 3B1.1(c))

Robertson challenged his two‑level “leader/organizer/manager/supervisor” enhancement, arguing that:

• Only Griffin truly led the scheme; Robertson was at most a follower.
• His only arguable supervisory act – directing Kelley to shred documents – was post‑offense obstruction already captured by a separate obstruction enhancement and thus could not also support leadership.

The First Circuit emphasized several points:

• A leadership enhancement requires evidence that the defendant, in committing the offense, exercised control or organizational authority over at least one other participant, including:
  • Recruiting or selecting participants,
  • Directing their conduct,
  • Approving or reviewing fraudulent documentation, and
  • Acting as an intermediary in the chain of decision‑making.
• The district court relied on a composite of facts – not solely the shredding directive:
  • Robertson was sergeant and second‑in‑command of TPS, with formal authority.
  • He “helped put the team together” and ensured only “trustworthy” members participated, keeping “outsiders” off the fraud team.
  • Troopers testified that Robertson instructed them on how to complete forms and they submitted false timesheets to him for approval.
  • He personally participated in the fraud throughout its duration.
• Sentencing courts may consider the defendant’s relevant conduct, not just the formal elements of conviction, when assessing role. Post‑offense actions like document destruction can shed light on a supervisory role within the scheme, though here they were not the sole basis for the enhancement.

The panel thus found no clear error in labeling Robertson a manager/supervisor.

b. Abuse-of-trust enhancement (§ 3B1.3)

Robertson also challenged the two‑level “abuse of a position of trust” enhancement, arguing:

• DOT and MSP did not treat him as a fiduciary over grant funds;
• He had no special access beyond his own timesheets; and
• The government’s theory would make almost every fraud defendant an abuser of trust.

The First Circuit reaffirmed settled law:

• Police officers “occupy a position of public trust within the meaning of the Guidelines because they exercise significant discretion.” (Flecha‑Maldonado and related cases.)
• The inquiry is twofold:
  1. Did the defendant hold a position of public or private trust?
  2. Did he use that position in a significant way to facilitate or conceal the offense?
• As second‑in‑command of TPS – the unit that applied for, allocated, and in some cases directly used federal highway‑safety funds – Robertson plainly held such a position.
• He leveraged that role to:
  • Control which troopers participated,
  • Shape and approve grant‑funded overtime activity, and
  • Order a subordinate to destroy grant‑related records in violation of retention rules.

The court distinguished United States v. George, which dealt with when an employee of a government contractor (not a public official) can be deemed to occupy a position of trust vis‑à‑vis the government. Here, a direct public official was diverting public grant money, analogous to a bank executive misusing bank funds, a classic example in § 3B1.3’s commentary.

The panel also reiterated that § 3B1.3 does not require a formal fiduciary relationship in the civil‑law sense; it targets positions with discretionary authority enabling and facilitating crime, not just technical fiduciaries.

5. Sentencing Disparities and the “Apples to Apples” Requirement

a. The evidentiary burden on defendants

Both defendants argued their sentences created unwarranted disparities relative to other Massachusetts troopers convicted in overtime‑fraud prosecutions. The First Circuit articulated and applied a demanding evidentiary standard for such arguments:

• A defendant invoking § 3553(a)(6) must provide the sentencing court with enough detail to allow a meaningful “apples to apples” comparison with proposed comparators.
• Essential details include:
  • The offenses of conviction (not just that they involve “overtime fraud”),
  • Guidelines offense levels and criminal history categories,
  • Loss amounts and how they were calculated,
  • Adjustments (role, obstruction, acceptance, etc.),
  • Cooperation or plea agreements, and
  • Key factual distinctions (duration of scheme, number of victims, ancillary crimes such as tax fraud).
• The district court is not obliged to scour dockets or assemble this background on its own; the party‑presentation principle governs sentencing just as it does trial.

In Robertson, the defense presented only a chart of names, case numbers, and sentences, asserting by fiat that they were similar overtime‑fraud cases. Under González‑Rivera and Rodríguez‑Adorno, this “barebones” showing was insufficient. The district judge’s statement that she did not “have those other cases” or know “what their evidence was” reflected a legitimate evidentiary gap, not a refusal to consider disparities.

b. The panel’s cautionary note on tone

Although the court found no procedural error, it expressed evident discomfort with aspects of the sentencing colloquy:

• The judge said she “take[s] issue” with comparisons to other judges and cases and cited her decades of experience as a reason to dismiss disparity arguments.
• The panel emphasized that experience does not relieve a sentencing judge from the statutory duty to consider § 3553(a)(6) when properly presented, and that dismissive language risks signaling indifference to that duty.

While not outcome‑determinative here, the admonition is a strong reminder that district judges must be open to principled disparity arguments and should avoid rhetoric suggesting that comparative sentencing analysis is unwelcome.

c. Griffin’s disparity argument and material distinctions

Griffin supplied significantly more detail than Robertson, including guidelines ranges and some factual context for other trooper cases, making an “apples to apples” inquiry possible. Nonetheless, the court held that his 60‑month sentence was not substantively unreasonable because of several material differences between him and his proposed comparators:

• He alone faced:
  • A conspiracy charge, which multiplied the apparent loss by involving multiple participants and years.
  • Additional federal tax‑fraud and private‑school wire‑fraud counts.
  • A four‑level leadership enhancement.
  • A longer temporal span (three‑year scheme, the longest among comparators).
• Unlike many comparators, he did not fully cooperate and instead went to trial on a substantial portion of the charges.
• Some proposed comparators pled in state court or under different federal charges, making cross‑jurisdiction comparisons less probative; § 3553(a)(6) focuses primarily on national federal uniformity, not parity across state‑federal boundaries.

The court concluded that these distinctions “suffice to explain the divergence,” defeating his disparity claim.

6. Restitution under the MVRA: Joint and Several Liability

Robertson argued that the district court should:

• Apportion DOT’s loss among participants based on relative culpability; and
• Investigate whether DOT or the Commonwealth had already recovered some portion of the grant funds, to avoid a “windfall.”

The First Circuit’s analysis was orthodox MVRA doctrine:

• When multiple defendants contribute to a victim’s loss, a court may either:
  • Apportion restitution based on culpability/ability to pay, or
  • Impose joint and several liability for the full loss amount.
• This is a discretionary choice; in conspiracy cases, joint and several liability is especially common and appropriate.
• The court must order restitution in the “full amount of each victim’s losses” as proven, without regard to the defendant’s ability to pay.

Here:

• The government established DOT’s loss from improper overtime payments as $142,774.77.
• Robertson offered only speculative assertions about possible prior recoveries; he did not present concrete evidence or request a continuance to develop it.
• The district court reasonably accepted the trial evidence and imposed joint and several liability with Griffin.

The panel acknowledged the district court’s misperception that restitution could later be modified, but found no prejudice because the court clearly believed the government had already met its burden at sentencing, and statutory mechanisms for post‑judgment adjustment are narrowly limited.

7. Guidelines Issues for Griffin

a. Using “gain” as a proxy for “loss” in Belmont Hill aid

Because Belmont Hill officials could not say how much financial aid would have differed had Griffin reported accurate income, actual “loss” to the school was indeterminate. Probation and the district court therefore treated the full amount of aid ($176,700) as “gain that resulted from the offense” under § 2B1.1(b)(1) n.(B).

The First Circuit:

• Noted that using “gain” as a substitute for “loss” is allowed only in “limited scenarios,” but is permissible where loss cannot reasonably be determined.
• Applied the Alphas burden‑shifting framework:
  1. The government (or PSR) may use the face value of fraudulent benefits as a starting point for loss/gain.
  2. The burden then shifts to the defendant to offer evidence separating legitimate portions from fraudulent portions.
  3. The sentencing court, on a fully developed record, determines the final figure by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Found that Griffin:
  • Did not present a concrete alternative amount;
  • Offered only generalized testimony that some aid might have issued anyway; and
  • At one point asserted that the “answer is zero” because the government supposedly failed to meet its burden, an assertion inconsistent with Alphas.

The panel reasoned that treating the entire aid amount as “gain” was a reasonable estimate in the Guidelines context, and that a loss/gain figure of zero would “not even remotely approximate” the seriousness of a multi‑year financial‑aid fraud.

b. Grouping TPS and Belmont Hill fraud counts (§ 3D1.2(d))

Griffin argued that TPS fraud (against DOT) and Belmont Hill aid fraud (against a private school) involved different victims, acts, and harms, and thus should not be grouped for Guidelines purposes. Separate grouping would have reduced the aggregated loss and lowered his offense level.

The First Circuit, however, applied its existing precedent:

• § 3D1.2(d) instructs that offenses whose guideline ranges are based “largely on the total amount of harm or loss” and that are sentenced under certain enumerated guidelines “are to be grouped.”
• Both TPS and Belmont Hill fraud counts were sentenced under § 2B1.1, which appears in the § 3D1.2(d) table as a guideline that must be grouped.
• In United States v. Zanghi, the First Circuit held that counts sentenced under guidelines listed in the same row of the § 3D1.2(d) table are “automatically” grouped.
• Sentencing Commission commentary provides an example where mail‑fraud and wire‑fraud counts from “various schemes” with a “monetary objective” are grouped together.

Although other circuits, notably the Second Circuit in Lenoci, have taken a more nuanced approach that examines whether different schemes truly involve “substantially the same harm,” the First Circuit considered itself bound by Zanghi under the law‑of‑the‑circuit doctrine. The court held that when counts are sentenced under § 2B1.1, grouping is mandatory under § 3D1.2(d), irrespective of different victims or schemes.

The upshot is a robust presumption in this circuit that all § 2B1.1 fraud counts in a single case are grouped and that aggregate loss from both public‑grant fraud and private‑aid fraud will be combined for offense‑level purposes.

8. Forfeiture and the Meaning of “Traceable To”

a. Statutory framework

The critical doctrinal innovation in Griffin concerns criminal forfeiture of Belmont Hill financial aid under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which reaches:

Any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of [various statutes, including wire fraud].

Section 981(a)(2) defines “proceeds” differently depending on the nature of the underlying offense:

• § 981(a)(2)(A) – for “illegal goods, illegal services, unlawful activities, and telemarketing and health care fraud schemes” – defines proceeds as any property “obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of the commission of the offense,” and property “traceable thereto.”
• § 981(a)(2)(B) – for “lawful goods or lawful services that are sold or provided in an illegal manner” – uses a net proceeds definition (gross receipts minus direct costs).

In either case, § 983(c)(1) places the burden on the government:

the burden of proof is on the government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.

b. The First Circuit’s “traceable to” analysis

The panel assumed – and Griffin did not contest – that Belmont Hill financial aid constituted “proceeds” of wire fraud. The dispute centered on whether the entire $176,700 was “traceable to” the offense.

The government’s theory was stark: Griffin misrepresented income on financial‑aid forms; the school awarded $176,700; therefore, the entire sum was proceeds “traceable to” fraud and forfeitable.

The First Circuit rejected this uncompartmentalized approach, drawing on:

• United States v. George, which held forfeiture requires that the property be obtained as “fruit of the charged crime.”
• Seventh Circuit’s United States v. Hodge, which vacated forfeiture of an entire spa’s revenues where some portion likely derived from legitimate massages rather than prostitution, and the district court had not tried to determine what fraction was tied to unlawful services.
• Second Circuit’s United States v. Torres, which upheld forfeiture of the discrete amount saved by rental-subsidy fraud because the PSR (undisputed by the defendant) quantified the exact reduction attributable to the fraud.

From these cases and the statutory language, the court distilled a core principle:

• For forfeiture, the government must prove by a preponderance that the amount sought is property “directly or indirectly obtained as fruit” of the offense.
• When some portion of a payment or benefit may have been lawfully obtainable even without the fraud, only the incremental portion – the amount that “would not have been obtained but for” the offense – is “traceable to” the crime.
• If the record reflects real uncertainty about how much of the benefit was caused by fraud (as Belmont Hill officials testified here), courts cannot simply declare the entire sum forfeitable.

In Griffin’s case:

• Belmont Hill’s financial‑aid officials testified they could not say whether, or by how much, the aid award would have differed had Griffin reported his true income.
• The district court made no attempt to determine what portion of aid was attributable to the misrepresentations, instead ordering forfeiture of the entire amount.

The First Circuit held this was error:

• It is not enough that the fraud occurred during the period aid was awarded; the government must show that each dollar forfeited was obtained “as a result of” the offense.
• “The difference matters”: Without distinguishing between legitimately and illegitimately obtained aid, the government has not carried its burden under § 983(c)(1).

c. Distinguishing Guidelines “gain” from forfeitable “proceeds”

An apparent tension arises because the court allowed the full $176,700 as “gain” for Guidelines purposes but vacated the same amount as forfeitable proceeds. The panel addressed this implicitly by highlighting:

• Different burdens and frameworks:
  • For § 2B1.1 loss/gain, the court uses a “reasonable estimate,” and Alphas shifts the burden of production to the defendant to show legitimate components once the government/PSR offers a prima facie figure.
  • For forfeiture, the government shoulders the burden throughout to prove by a preponderance that the property is “subject to forfeiture,” with no analogous burden‑shifting.
• Different purposes:
  • Guidelines loss/gain is a rough, advisory metric for assessing offense seriousness and relative culpability; it feeds into an overall offense level that is only one step in the § 3553(a) sentencing process.
  • Forfeiture is a direct, mandatory deprivation of specific property; it “confiscate[s] assets used in or gained from certain serious crimes” and “helps ensure that crime does not pay.” Because it attaches to concrete dollars or assets, precision as to causation is more important.

Thus, a figure that is a reasonable estimate for advisory sentencing purposes may be too crude to support confiscation of actual property under § 981 when its connection to criminal conduct is uncertain.

d. Remand instructions and constraints on punitive overreach

The panel vacated the Belmont Hill forfeiture component and remanded with clear marching orders:

• On remand, the government must demonstrate what portion of the financial aid is in fact “traceable to” Griffin’s misrepresentations – i.e., aid he would not have received had he told the truth.
• If the government cannot reliably “separate wheat from chaff” and the district court, applying the standard announced, is not satisfied, no forfeiture is appropriate on that theory.

The court also expressed concern that the government had originally sought both restitution and forfeiture for the same aid amount, but:

• Belmont Hill did not want restitution and did not assert that it would have denied aid but for the fraud, leading the court to decline restitution.
• Yet the government nonetheless pursued the identical sum as forfeiture.

The panel reminded that restitution (compensatory) and forfeiture (punitive/disgorgement) are distinct remedies. Forfeiture “serves no remedial purpose”; it punishes and deters but “cannot be imposed upon innocent owners.” That function does not justify treating as “proceeds” amounts the victim plainly might have awarded even in the absence of fraud.

Going forward in the First Circuit, this decision:

• Strengthens the requirement that forfeiture orders be tightly tethered to actual increments of gain caused by fraud.
• Constrains prosecutorial efforts to equate large, partially legitimate payments or benefits with forfeitable “proceeds” without proof of the fraud‑dependent difference.
• Will be particularly salient in contexts like:
  • Student‑aid fraud,
  • Healthcare billing with mixed legitimate/illegitimate claims,
  • Government‑contract overbilling, and
  • Any scheme where fraudulent misstatements influence a discretionary benefit that could partially have been granted even on truthful disclosures.

IV. Simplifying Some Complex Concepts

1. Waiver vs. Forfeiture under Rule 12(b)(3)

• Forfeiture: You had a right, failed to assert it in time, but the appellate court can still review for “plain error” in egregious cases.
• Waiver (here): Rule 12(b)(3) says certain motions must be made before trial; if not, and you cannot show “good cause,” you do not just lose plain‑error review – the issue is treated as affirmatively relinquished. The appellate court will not consider it at all.

In Griffin, the as‑applied vagueness challenge falls into this latter category: raised too late, no good cause, permanently off the table.

2. Zero-Point Offender (§ 4C1.1) as an Eligibility Checklist

Think of § 4C1.1 as a 10‑item checklist:

• If – and only if – you can check “yes” on every single box (no violence, no weapons, no leadership role, no serious priors, etc.), you get the 2‑level reduction.
• Leadership and CCE are not cumulative requirements the government must both prove to exclude you; they are conditions you must both avoid to get in the club.

3. “Loss” vs. “Gain” vs. “Proceeds Traceable To”

• Loss (Guidelines § 2B1.1): Attempts to quantify how much the victims lost (actual or intended). It is a coarse proxy to gauge seriousness. Courts may use estimates and burden‑shifting.
• Gain (Guidelines § 2B1.1 n.(B)): When loss is too hard to measure but the defendant clearly obtained something of value, courts can use the defendant’s gain as a stand‑in for loss.
• Proceeds traceable to (forfeiture § 981): The specific property or dollars that flowed from the crime. The government must prove that those dollars would not have been received (directly or indirectly) but for the crime.

In short:

• Guidelines loss/gain is about sentencing salt – how serious was this, roughly speaking?
• Forfeiture is about taking back specific spoils – which dollars, exactly, came from the crime?

4. Joint and Several vs. Apportioned Restitution

• Joint and several: Each defendant is liable to the victim for the full loss. The victim can collect all from one, some from another; disputes between defendants are between themselves.
• Apportioned: The court splits the loss, e.g., defendant A owes 60%, B owes 40%, based on relative culpability or ability to pay.
• Under the MVRA, the judge has wide discretion to choose either, especially in conspiracy cases where harms are not easily separable.

V. Broader Impact and Takeaways

1. Forfeiture in Mixed-Legitimacy Benefit Cases

Griffin is a leading First Circuit statement that:

• Forfeiture cannot treat any payment received during a fraudulent relationship as 100% tainted.
• Where some portion of a benefit (financial aid, subsidies, reimbursements) might have been obtained honestly, the government must quantify the fraud‑dependent increment or accept that some or all of the benefit is not forfeitable.

This will likely reshape government strategy in:

• College and private-school financial aid fraud cases,
• Healthcare and insurance frauds with mixed claims,
• Public‑benefits fraud (e.g., housing vouchers, SNAP) where eligibility might exist but benefit levels are influenced by misstatements.

Expect more expert testimony and documentary analysis at sentencing on what would have happened under truthful disclosures, and more litigation around counterfactuals in forfeiture hearings.

2. Sentencing in Public-Corruption and Grant-Fraud Cases

The opinion reinforces several themes in public‑corruption/grant‑fraud sentencing:

• Leadership and abuse‑of‑trust enhancements apply readily to public officers with supervisory duties over grant‑funded programs. Police ranks and command roles remain potent aggravators.
• Internal policy laxity is not a defense. Even if an agency historically tolerated loose timekeeping or informal overtime practices, federal fraud statutes turn on deception and unauthorized gain, not on strict compliance with internal SOPs.
• “Just following orders” is not compelling where subordinates themselves recognized the wrongfulness of the practice and where the defendant exercised supervisory authority.

3. Clarity on New Guidelines: Zero-Point Offender and Grouping

• The First Circuit is firmly aligned with other circuits and the Commission that leadership and CCE independently disqualify defendants from zero‑point treatment under § 4C1.1.
• In this circuit, all § 2B1.1 fraud counts are grouped under § 3D1.2(d), even when involving different victims and schemes. Defense counsel hoping to segregate distinct fraud episodes to limit aggregate loss will have an uphill battle unless and until the circuit revisits Zanghi.

4. Sentencing Disparity Arguments: The Need for a Record

The decision offers concrete guidance to defense practitioners:

• Do not assume that naming other cases and sentences suffices. Courts will not reconstruct Guideline calculations or cooperation histories for you.
• Build a record with:
  • PSRs or sentencing memoranda from comparator cases (if obtainable),
  • Specific offense levels/loss figures,
  • Role/obstruction/acceptance enhancements or reductions,
  • Cooperation statuses, and
  • Citations to transcript excerpts demonstrating comparable conduct.
• Be prepared to distinguish differences openly. As Griffin’s case illustrates, if the defense itself highlights differences (e.g., extra tax counts, leadership), those may doom the disparity argument.

5. Procedural Discipline: Raising Constitutional Challenges Early

By characterizing belated vagueness challenges as waived rather than forfeited, the First Circuit:

• Raises the stakes of pre‑trial motion practice.
• Incentivizes exhaustive early litigation of as‑applied constitutional issues, even when some factual development might be helpful.
• Signals that creative statutory and constitutional theories should be advanced at the indictment stage or risk total loss on appeal.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Griffin is a dense, wide‑ranging opinion tying together law of fraud, sentencing, and forfeiture in the context of a high‑profile public‑corruption prosecution. While most of the panel’s holdings hew closely to existing doctrine – rejecting sufficiency challenges, affirming leadership and abuse‑of‑trust enhancements, enforcing the MVRA’s breadth, and demanding rigor from sentencing‑disparity arguments – the decision meaningfully advances First Circuit law in two areas:

• Zero‑point offender eligibility: The court firmly adopts, in light of Pulsifer and a clarifying amendment, the view that § 4C1.1’s disqualifiers function as an eligibility checklist: any aggravating‑role enhancement is independently disqualifying, a reading that will affect many first‑time white‑collar and public‑corruption defendants.
• Forfeiture of mixed‑legitimacy benefits: Most significantly, the panel vacates a large forfeiture order on the ground that the government did not carry its statutory burden to show that financial‑aid dollars were “proceeds traceable to” wire fraud, as distinct from aid that might have been awarded on truthful information. This insistence on tying forfeiture to the increment of gain causally attributable to wrongdoing – and distinguishing that inquiry from Guidelines gain – will reverberate in fraud and public‑benefits prosecutions throughout the circuit.

For practitioners, the case is a reminder that:

• Internal agency practices cannot shield plainly deceptive conduct from federal fraud statutes.
• Sentencing advocacy requires detailed factual development, not broad analogies to other cases.
• And when the government seeks to strip a defendant of property as “proceeds” of crime, it must show, with real evidence, that those dollars truly came from criminal acts – not from what might just as easily have been legitimately obtained.