United States v. Glass: The Fourth Circuit Reaffirms the High Bar for Omission‑Based Franks Challenges to Digital Child Pornography Warrants

I. Introduction

In United States v. Jessie Leroy Glass, Jr., No. 24‑4193 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), the Fourth Circuit (Judge Wilkinson writing, joined by Judges Gregory and Berner) affirmed a conviction arising from the discovery of extensive child sexual abuse material (“CSAM”) on the defendant’s electronic devices.

The opinion addresses three distinct issues:

1. A Fourth Amendment challenge under Franks v. Delaware to warrants authorizing the search of Glass’s home and electronics, premised on alleged reckless omissions in the supporting affidavits;
2. A Double Jeopardy challenge to three separate counts of receipt of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2);
3. A challenge to a $5,000 special assessment imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 2259A.

The core significance of the case lies in its robust reaffirmation of the “very high” evidentiary and materiality thresholds for omission‑based Franks challenges, especially in the context of digital CSAM investigations initiated by domestic informants. The court also clarifies how multiple receipt counts can coexist without violating double jeopardy and how sentencing courts may satisfy § 2259A’s analytical requirements by integrating them into their broader § 3553(a) and § 3572 analyses.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. The Initial Report and Investigation

In late 2019, Glass’s second wife, April, contacted law enforcement and reported that Glass had “a massive amount of child porn saved on his phone.” She provided:

• The email address and suspected password for his Google Photos account;
• Specific information that he stored CSAM in the account’s trash bin;
• Descriptions of devices he owned and where they could be found; and
• Fears of violent retaliation by Glass or his father if her cooperation became known.

Detective Jason Lowrance followed up. April later met in person with Officer Heather Brown in Virginia, where she:

• Reported seeing at least fifty images of CSAM on Glass’s phone, including recent images;
• Gave graphic, detailed descriptions of several videos and images, including abuse of infants and a prepubescent girl;
• Explained that Glass used social media to solicit sexual images from young girls; and
• Identified particular devices and their likely locations within Glass’s residence.

Lowrance also ran criminal history checks:

• On April: he discovered a pending misdemeanor larceny charge (shoplifting at Walmart) and another contemporaneous shoplifting investigation.
• On Glass: he found two prior investigations involving alleged child pornography:
  • 2012: Glass’s first wife reported seeing him view CSAM. Glass was indicted for two counts of forcible sodomy of a minor. One count was dismissed by the prosecution; the other ended in acquittal at a bench trial.
  • 2016: April’s mother gave police images of CSAM that April said she found on Glass’s phone. Officer Brown investigated, found April credible and Glass not credible, and kept the case open for over a year. Ultimately she closed it only because no North Carolina authority would take the case, not because she disbelieved the allegations.

Lowrance also personally knew of a 2017 investigation, triggered by April’s report that Glass had tablets “full of child porn.” Police:

• Received Glass’s consent to question him and search the home;
• Found no CSAM in the home;
• Obtained and searched a tablet via warrant, also without finding CSAM; and
• Closed the case as “unfounded,” a disposition used whenever officers could find no evidence that a reported crime occurred.

B. The Warrants and Searches

On the basis of his investigation, Lowrance drafted:

1. An affidavit seeking a warrant to search Glass’s home for electronic devices and storage media, and
2. A subsequent affidavit to search Glass’s cell phone once it had been obtained from his person.

The affidavits:

• Recounted April’s 2019 report and specific Google Photos login information and “trash bin” usage;
• Detailed April’s graphic descriptions of CSAM and her in‑person interview with Officer Brown;
• Described Glass’s use of social media to obtain images from minors;
• Identified specific devices in the home (including “two laptops at [Glass’s] residence”); and
• Disclosed that Glass “had been investigated in Virginia for similar reports in 2012 and 2016.”

The affidavits did not disclose:

• The 2017 investigation that ended with an “[u]nfounded” disposition;
• That the 2016 investigation originated with April (via her mother) and that it resulted in no arrest;
• That April was an estranged spouse who desired divorce and alimony and had clashed repeatedly with Glass; or
• Her then‑pending misdemeanor larceny charge and other shoplifting investigation.

A North Carolina superior court judge issued the warrants. The home search yielded multiple devices, and Glass voluntarily turned over a cell phone found on his person at work. Forensic analysis of the devices revealed:

• A phone that had accessed 395 unique CSAM images and a website with hundreds of shared CSAM videos;
• Another phone containing 72 unique CSAM images.

C. Charges, Suppression Motion, Trial, and Sentence

A federal grand jury indicted Glass on:

• Three counts of receipt of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), and
• One count of possession of child pornography involving a prepubescent minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2).

Glass moved to suppress all evidence seized via the warrants, arguing that under Franks v. Delaware, the affidavits recklessly omitted information that would have undermined April’s credibility and therefore probable cause.

The district court conducted a Franks hearing, receiving testimony from:

• Detective Lowrance;
• Officer Brown; and
• The officer who had marked the 2017 investigation as “unfounded.”

The district court denied suppression on two independent grounds:

1. Glass did not prove that Lowrance intentionally misled the magistrate or recklessly omitted information; rather, at most he made “honest mistake[s],” insufficient to meet Franks’ perjury/recklessness standard.
2. Even if all of the omitted information had been included, the affidavits would still have established probable cause; the omissions, singly and collectively, were immaterial.

At trial, the jury convicted Glass on all four counts. The district court:

• Imposed concurrent 15‑year prison terms on each count;
• Imposed lifetime supervised release;
• Ordered $6,000 restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2); and
• Imposed a $5,000 special assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 2259A, payable in $50 monthly installments after release, with potential for later modification.

On appeal, Glass raised:

1. The Franks/search warrant issue;
2. A Double Jeopardy Clause challenge to the three receipt counts; and
3. A procedural challenge to the § 2259A assessment.

III. Summary of the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed in all respects.

A. Fourth Amendment / Franks Holding

The court reaffirmed:

• The strong “preference for warrants” and the correspondingly deferential approach to reviewing warrant affidavits;
• The limited and “narrow” nature of Franks challenges; and
• The even higher burden imposed when the attack is based on omissions, rather than affirmative misstatements.

Applying these principles, the court held:

• April’s detailed, first‑hand descriptions of CSAM; her face‑to‑face interview; her device/location information; and Glass’s prior similar investigations collectively established probable cause;
• The non‑disclosure of the 2017 “unfounded” investigation, the 2016 case details, April’s estrangement, and her shoplifting matters did not undermine probable cause;
• Those omissions were not shown to be intentional or reckless; and
• Even if included, they would not have “defeat[ed] a probable cause showing.”

The court emphasized that law enforcement affidavits are drafted in the “midst and haste” of investigations and that officers are not expected to catalog every potentially impeaching detail about an informant.

B. Double Jeopardy Holding

Glass argued that the three receipt counts punished him multiple times for the same offense. Reviewing for plain error (because he had not raised the issue below), the court rejected this claim.

Looking to “the entire record,” not just the indictment’s language, the court found:

• The indictment charged different date ranges for the receipt counts;
• The evidence showed three distinct CSAM video downloads on different occurrences (two on February 3, 2020, separated by 25 minutes; one on February 4, 2020);
• Each video was a separate file; and
• The prosecutor in closing argument expressly linked each file to a specific count.

Thus, the convictions did not amount to multiple punishments for the same offense.

C. § 2259A Special Assessment Holding

Finally, the court upheld the $5,000 § 2259A assessment. It held that the district court:

• Expressly considered all 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in imposing the prison sentence;
• Also considered Glass’s income, earning capacity, and the burden of financial penalties, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a);
• Adopted the presentence report’s detailed financial and personal background analysis; and
• Imposed a modest assessment relative to the statutory maximum ($122,000 in this case).

The court concluded that even though the sentencing judge referenced § 2259A only briefly, the “record as a whole” showed adequate consideration of the required factors.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Fourth Amendment and Franks v. Delaware

1. The Constitutional and Doctrinal Framework

The opinion begins by situating the case within the core purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The court underscores:

• The generalized rule that searches for evidence require a warrant: Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
• The historical evil of “general warrants” and “writs of assistance,” as highlighted in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
• The function of warrants in interposing “judicial impartiality” and “informed and deliberate determinations” between executive officers and private citizens, as discussed in Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951), and Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).

The court reiterates that the Supreme Court has consistently shown “a strong preference for warrants,” citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984), and that this preference translates into a caution against “overly scrutinizing” supporting affidavits (Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).

This doctrinal backdrop serves two purposes:

1. To emphasize that encouraging officers to seek warrants is a structural Fourth Amendment priority; and
2. To justify a forgiving, common‑sense reading of affidavits rather than a hyper‑technical or hindsight‑driven critique.

2. The Franks Standard, Including Omissions

Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), a defendant may obtain suppression of evidence obtained via a warrant if he proves:

1. The affidavit contained false statements (or omissions) made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth; and
2. With those falsehoods excised (or the omissions added), the remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause.

The Fourth Circuit restates that a defendant is “generally not entitled to challenge the veracity of a facially valid search warrant affidavit,” quoting United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011). The Franks exception is “narrow.”

Importantly, the court reiterates that this doctrine extends to omissions:

• If an affiant “omitted material facts that when included would defeat a probable cause showing,” and
• The omission was designed to mislead or made with reckless disregard for whether it would mislead,

the warrant falls under Franks. This principle comes from United States v. Tate, 524 F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir. 2008).

However, the court emphasizes a critical distinction: omission-based challenges require an “even higher evidentiary burden” than challenges based on affirmative falsehoods (United States v. Moody, 931 F.3d 366, 374 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990)). The rationale:

• Affiants cannot realistically include “every piece of information gathered in the course of an investigation.”
• Line‑drawing about what to exclude is inevitable and, absent clear bad faith or recklessness, should not invalidate warrants.

3. Application to the Glass Affidavits

a. Strength of the Information that Was Included

The court highlights the substantial indicia of reliability in April’s allegations:

• Detail and specificity. April not only claimed to have seen CSAM but provided specific, graphic descriptions of images and videos, including the nature of the acts, ages of victims, and objects (e.g., a bag over an infant’s head).
• Basis of knowledge. The court cites Gates for the notion that an informant’s “basis of knowledge” is key. April had direct, first‑hand observation of Glass’s phone, not hearsay or rumor.
• Face‑to‑face identification. April met in person with Officer Brown, strengthening credibility because officers can gauge demeanor and the informant can be held accountable (United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 2000)).
• Corroborating details about devices and access methods. She provided login credentials, explained that images were stored in the Google Photos “trash bin,” and described devices and their home locations.
• Prior similar investigations. The affidavits disclosed that Glass had been investigated for “similar reports” in 2012 and 2016, establishing a pattern (United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 699‑700 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Given this robust showing, the court concludes that, “as written,” the affidavits supported probable cause to search both the phone and the residence. Notably, the court rejects Glass’s argument that allegations involving a mobile phone do not justify a home search, distinguishing out‑of‑circuit cases (United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2017); United States v. Mora, 989 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2021)) on the ground that here:

• The affidavits established that Glass actually possessed such devices; and
• They specifically identified laptops in the home that could reasonably house related CSAM (United States v. Grinder, 808 F. App’x 145, 147 (4th Cir. 2020), distinguishing Griffith).

b. The Omitted Information, Taken Piece by Piece

The court then examines each omission invoked by Glass.

1. The 2017 “unfounded” investigation.
   The defense characterized this as the “most significant” omission. The court, however, notes:
   • “Unfounded” was just a system disposition used when officers could not find any evidence of the reported crime, not a determination that the complainant lied;
   • It involved alleged CSAM on easily concealable devices; the absence of evidence two years earlier does not logically undercut April’s 2019 allegations;
   • In fact, disclosure might have strengthened probable cause by showing Glass had been the subject of three separate CSAM investigations over five years (Bosyk, 933 F.3d 319, 327 (4th Cir. 2019), noting that CSAM offenders often employ sophisticated concealment).
2. Details of the 2016 investigation and non‑prosecution.
   Again, the court holds that the absence of charges or prosecution does not undermine the informant’s credibility:
   • Cases are dropped for many reasons unrelated to truthfulness (resources, jurisdiction, evidentiary limitations);
   • Non‑disclosure of the exact source (April via her mother) does not materially alter the probable cause calculus where current, specific allegations are so strong.
3. April’s estranged‑spouse status and marital conflicts.
   The court views this as inferable from the affidavit itself:
   • They shared the same last name;
   • April knew intimate details of his phone use and residence;
   • She had “left” him recently, suggesting a breakup of a close relationship.
   Even if expressly disclosed, marital strife does not by itself undermine credibility, citing United States v. Hodges, 705 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1983), which rejected the notion that an ex‑girlfriend’s ill will made her per se unreliable.
4. April’s petty larceny and shoplifting investigations.
   Although shoplifting “involves dishonesty” (United States v. Amaechi, 991 F.2d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 1993)), the court finds no reason to infer that a Walmart shoplifter would concoct complex, graphic CSAM allegations against her spouse. The disparity in the nature and gravity of the misconduct diminishes the impeachment value (Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1987)).

c. Materiality and the “Not a High Bar” Standard for Probable Cause

The court then turns to the second prong of Franks: materiality. Here, the governing standards are:

• Probable cause is a “flexible, common‑sense standard” that asks only whether there is a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place (Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality); Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).
• It is “not a high bar” (Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)).
• The law explicitly rejects requiring anything close to “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” (Gates, 462 U.S. at 235).

Applying this framework, the court holds that even if all the omitted information had been added:

• April’s highly detailed, first‑hand, face‑to‑face report;
• The corroboration via specific devices and login access;
• And the history of similar complaints/investigations;

would still easily clear the “practical, nontechnical probability” threshold (Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). The omitted facts might “somewhat reduce” her reliability in theory, but not enough to negates probable cause.

d. Intent or Recklessness

The panel also adopts the district court’s conclusion that Lowrance’s omissions were, at most, negligent “honest mistake[s]” and not intentional or reckless. While the appellate opinion does not delve deeply into standard of review, it effectively credits the district court’s factual findings after a Franks hearing and treats the omissions as routine triage rather than deceptive curation.

This reinforces a practical message: merely showing that the affiant could have included more impeaching details—or that defense counsel would have preferred they be included—is far from enough. The omission must be both:

• Deliberate or reckless in misleading the magistrate, and
• Material enough that its inclusion would defeat probable cause.

B. Double Jeopardy and Multiple Receipt Counts

1. Legal Framework

The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants from:

• A second prosecution after acquittal;
• A second prosecution after conviction; and
• Multiple punishments for the same offense (North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).

This case implicates the third protection: multiple punishments. The question is whether the three receipt counts are, in fact, the “same offense.” The Fourth Circuit follows its own precedent in United States v. Schnittker, 807 F.3d 77, 82 (4th Cir. 2015), which holds that to decide whether several counts punish the same offense, courts must examine “the entire record,” not just the wording of the indictment.

Because Glass failed to raise the argument below, the court applied plain-error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), requiring:

1. Error;
2. That is plain (clear/obvious);
3. That affects substantial rights; and
4. That seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

2. Application to the Three Receipt Counts

The indictment charged:

• Count 1: Receipt “[o]n or about February 4, 2020;”
• Count 2: Receipt “[b]etween on or about January 8, 2020, and February 4, 2020;”
• Count 3: Receipt “[b]etween on or about January 8, 2020, and on or about February 5, 2020.”

On their face, those date ranges overlap, creating a theoretical risk that all three counts might be based on the same conduct. But the Fourth Circuit looks beyond the text to:

• Evidence at trial that Glass downloaded three distinct videos: one at 8:51 p.m. on February 3, another about 25 minutes later, and a third on February 4.
• Testimony that each video was a separate digital file.
• The prosecutor’s closing argument, which expressly matched each file to a specific count.

This record, the court holds, dispels any doubt: each count punishes a separate instance of receipt. The court contrasts this with United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1 (10th Cir. 2013), where:

• The indictment’s date ranges were identical for both counts;
• The evidence did not separate the counts by distinct images or events; and
• Both sides told the jury that the counts were based on the same conduct.

In Benoit, the Tenth Circuit found a double jeopardy violation. In Glass, by contrast, the record affirmatively demonstrates that each count was anchored to different files and different receipt events. Therefore, there was no error, much less plain error.

3. Practical Charging and Trial Implications

The holding sends several signals:

• To prosecutors: When charging multiple receipt counts for CSAM, it is safer practice to tie each count to specific images/files, dates, or events, and to make that linkage explicit at trial.
• To defense counsel: A double jeopardy argument premised on overlapping date ranges alone is unlikely to succeed if the record otherwise segregates the conduct tied to each count.
• To trial courts: While the Fourth Circuit did not require file‑name‑based specificity in the indictment (as Glass urged), it implicitly endorses trial records and arguments that clearly differentiate counts to avoid post‑hoc double‑jeopardy challenges.

C. The § 2259A Special Assessment

1. Statutory Requirements

18 U.S.C. § 2259A authorizes an assessment “not more than $35,000” for certain child‑exploitation offenses, including the receipt counts here. When imposing an assessment, the court:

• Must consider the § 3553(a) factors (generally applicable sentencing considerations); and
• Must consider the fine‑related factors in § 3572.

Key § 3553(a) factors include:

• The nature and circumstances of the offense;
• The defendant’s history and characteristics;
• The need for the sentence to reflect seriousness, provide just punishment, afford deterrence, and protect the public; and
• The kinds of sentences and ranges available.

Relevant § 3572(a) factors include:

• The defendant’s income, earning capacity, and financial resources;
• The burden that payment will impose on the defendant;
• The need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains; and
• Other matters of justice and deterrence.

2. The District Court’s Explanation

The sentencing judge:

• Stated on the record that he had considered “all” the § 3553(a) factors when determining the prison sentence;
• Emphasized the seriousness of the offense, need for deterrence, and protection of the public, especially given that Glass violated pretrial and presentence release conditions by acquiring unmonitored devices and accessing pornography (including CSAM);
• Discussed Glass’s age, military service, and health problems, among other personal characteristics;
• Adopted the presentence report (PSR) without change, which:
  • Detailed Glass’s financial history and earning capacity (including income of over $74,000 in 2021);
  • Addressed his indigency status for another assessment statute; and
  • Discussed sentencing options and related burdens.
• Noted that Glass had limited future earning potential but still concluded he “could and should be able to pay some assessment” under § 2259A;
• Imposed a $5,000 assessment, payable in $50 monthly installments after release, with the possibility of adjustments “as warranted.”

3. The Fourth Circuit’s Review

Glass argued that the district court did not explicitly walk through § 3553(a) and § 3572 in the context of the § 2259A assessment itself. Relying on Chavez‑Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1967 (2018), and Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007), the Fourth Circuit held that:

• The record need only demonstrate that the judge considered the parties’ arguments and had a “reasoned basis” for the decision;
• Courts are not required to “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” (United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006)); and
• Because the same considerations relevant to incarceration (seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, characteristics) also inform the assessment, the sentencing transcript suffices to show proper consideration.

The relatively modest assessment—far below the $122,000 total maximum available in Glass’s case—reinforces the reasonableness of the court’s exercise of discretion.

V. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

A. Probable Cause

“Probable cause” is a threshold concept: law enforcement must show enough factual basis to convince a reasonable person that there is a fair chance that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.

• It is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
• It does not require certainty or even a preponderance of evidence.
• Courts look at the “totality of the circumstances,” not isolated facts in a vacuum.

In warrant cases, judges consider the affidavit as a whole, asking: given what is presented, is it reasonable to think the search will uncover evidence?

B. Franks Challenges (Affidavit Misstatements/Omissions)

A Franks challenge is a mechanism to attack the validity of a search warrant after the fact. It is not enough to show that the affidavit was incomplete or even mistaken. The defendant must show:

1. Bad faith or recklessness: The affiant either lied or showed a reckless disregard for the truth—such as cherry‑picking facts in a seriously misleading way.
2. Materiality: If the lies are removed (or omitted facts are added), the remaining affidavit would not support probable cause.

For omissions specifically, the bar is even higher, because:

• Officers cannot type out the entire investigative file; and
• Professional judgment is needed about what to include and what to leave out.

In Glass, the court concluded both that:

• The omissions were not shown to be intentional or reckless attempts to mislead; and
• Even if they had been included, probable cause would remain intact.

C. Material Omissions vs. Non‑Material Background

A “material” omission is a missing fact so significant that, if known, the judge would likely not have found probable cause. Many pieces of background information—like an informant’s minor criminal record, previous unproven complaints, or personal animus—may be useful for cross‑examination later but are not automatically “material” in the Franks sense.

In this case:

• The court treated April’s larceny charge and prior shoplifting as weak impeachment, given the very serious and detailed nature of her CSAM allegations;
• The prior “unfounded” investigation was explained as a failure to find evidence at that time, not proof that April lied; and
• Marital acrimony was considered a predictable consequence of such allegations—not a reason to presume fabrication.

D. Double Jeopardy and “Same Offense”

The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents:

• Re‑trying someone after an acquittal or conviction; and
• Imposing multiple punishments for the same criminal act.

In multiple‑count indictments (as in CSAM cases), the key question for “multiple punishments” is whether each count targets a distinct criminal incident or whether several counts effectively punish a single act. Courts:

• Interpret the statute’s “unit of prosecution” (for § 2252A, each separate act of receipt can be a separate offense);
• Examine the indictment, evidence, and trial arguments to see whether each count is tied to distinct images or events.

In Glass, the court concluded that each receipt count represented a different video downloaded at a different time, which is permissible.

E. Special Assessments vs. Restitution vs. Fines

Federal sentencing can involve several types of financial obligations:

• Restitution (e.g., § 2259): Payments meant to compensate identified victims for their losses.
• Fines (§ 3571 et seq.): Traditional financial penalties paid to the government.
• Special assessments (§ 2259A): Additional, offense‑specific amounts, often meant to support victim assistance funds or reflect the special seriousness of certain crimes.

While distinct in purpose, fines and special assessments both trigger consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay and the same general sentencing factors. Courts must ensure that the overall financial burden is reasonable in light of the defendant’s resources and earning capacity.

VI. Impact and Broader Legal Significance

A. Franks Challenges in Digital CSAM and Domestic‑Informant Cases

The most important aspect of Glass is its concrete application of Franks to digital CSAM investigations initiated by an estranged spouse with some criminal baggage and a history of prior unproven complaints. The court’s message is clear:

• The combination of detailed, first‑hand, face‑to‑face allegations and a documented pattern of similar complaints over time can provide powerful probable cause, even if prior investigations did not result in charges.
• Law enforcement officers are not required to preemptively disclose every prior failed investigation or minor offense of the informant in the warrant affidavit, so long as their omissions are not intentionally or recklessly misleading.
• “Unfounded” or unprosecuted prior investigations are not automatically exculpatory; they may be neutral—or even slightly inculpatory—depending on context.

For defense lawyers, this opinion underscores the difficulty of prevailing on omission‑based Franks motions in the Fourth Circuit. To succeed, they would need:

• Evidence of conscious or reckless manipulation of the narrative in the affidavit, and
• Omissions so significant that, if disclosed, a reasonable magistrate would likely have denied the warrant.

B. Scope of Home Searches Based on Digital CSAM Allegations

By distinguishing Griffith and Mora, the opinion clarifies that:

• Where officers have specific reason to believe a suspect actually owns and uses certain devices (cell phones, laptops) and that CSAM may be stored thereon, a warrant may reasonably extend to the home where those devices are kept.
• The presence of multiple devices at a residence—especially laptops and other storage media—renders it reasonable to search the home even if the triggering allegations first arise from a mobile phone.

This reinforces the principle that CSAM offenses, by their nature, almost always involve multiple devices and storage locations; thus, home searches will often be supported by probable cause once a credible witness describes CSAM on any device in the suspect’s possession.

C. Double Jeopardy and Charging Strategy in CSAM Cases

The decision provides guidance on structuring multiple receipt counts:

• Prosecutors should ideally tie each receipt count to a specific file or download event, especially when the date ranges overlap.
• Trial presentations and closing arguments should explicitly link distinct files to individual counts to create a clean record.
• Defense counsel should scrutinize the record for ambiguity; but where the government has neatly separated factual bases for each count, double jeopardy arguments will likely fail.

Given the heavy penalties associated with each count of CSAM receipt, this clarification matters significantly for both plea negotiations and trial strategy.

D. § 2259A Assessments and Sentencing Practice

The Fourth Circuit’s treatment of § 2259A confirms a forgiving standard for sentencing explanations:

• A court need not provide a standalone, factor‑by‑factor explanation just for the assessment.
• It is sufficient if the overall record shows that the judge considered the defendant’s finances, earning capacity, and the § 3553(a) goals when imposing the assessment.
• Substantial reliance on an adopted PSR is acceptable, as long as the PSR addresses financial realities with some specificity.

The decision also illustrates that courts may balance:

• Past earning capacity (e.g., $74,000 earned in a recent year);
• Future limitations (age, health, incarceration); and
• The relative modesty of the assessment versus the statutory maximum.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Glass is a comprehensive reaffirmation of several important principles in Fourth Circuit criminal law:

• The “high bar” for omission‑based Franks challenges: Warrants supported by detailed, first‑hand informant reports, particularly when corroborated by prior similar investigations and concrete device/location information, will rarely be invalidated merely because the affiant left out impeachment‑style background facts about the informant.
• The pragmatic, flexible notion of probable cause: Courts resist parsing affidavits with hyper‑technical hindsight; instead, they look for a practical probability that evidence will be found, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Double jeopardy limits on multiple counts: Where each count is anchored to a distinct digital file and receipt event, overlapping date ranges in the indictment do not in themselves create a constitutional problem, especially when the record clarifies the separateness of each incident.
• Sentencing transparency for § 2259A assessments: District courts can satisfy statutory requirements by integrating assessment considerations into their broader § 3553(a) and § 3572 analyses and by relying on a thorough PSR, without a separate extended colloquy focused solely on the assessment.

For practitioners in the Fourth Circuit, Glass serves as a cautionary precedent: challenges to digital‑era CSAM warrants, particularly those supported by detailed domestic informant reports, will face substantial headwinds unless the defense can show clear, material deception in the warrant application. At the same time, the opinion offers valuable guidance on structuring CSAM indictments and sentencing records to withstand appellate scrutiny.