Introduction

In United States v. Davis, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of a federal prisoner’s third motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The case presents a timely application of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2023 revisions to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (the policy statement governing compassionate release), and it addresses four recurring grounds defendants often raise: COVID‑19‑related medical risk, harsh pandemic conditions of confinement, youthful‑offender considerations, and family caregiving needs.

The court’s decision reinforces several points that will guide future compassionate‑release litigation in the Tenth Circuit:

• COVID‑19 medical risk can be “extraordinary and compelling” only if there is a current outbreak at the facility or an ongoing declared public health emergency, and the risk cannot be timely mitigated (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)).
• Claims about harsh pandemic conditions do not, without more, match the gravity of enumerated compassionate‑release reasons.
• Non‑retroactive changes in law or non‑retroactive guideline amendments—such as the 2024 “youthful offender” considerations in § 5H1.1—cannot themselves constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons, except in the narrow circumstance of § 1B1.13(b)(6) (unusually long sentence plus 10 years served and a subsequent change in law causing gross disparity).
• Caregiver claims require proof that the defendant is the only available caregiver; and where the proposed care recipient has passed away, the claim is moot.

The parties are the United States (Appellee) and Mark R. Davis (Appellant), who was convicted by a jury in 2012 of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, aiding and abetting a 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) firearm offense, and aiding and abetting felon‑in‑possession under § 922(g) with an ACCA enhancement under § 924(e), and sentenced to a total of 360 months’ imprisonment. His projected release date is February 6, 2037.

Summary of the Opinion

Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of compassionate release. The court concluded that none of Davis’s asserted grounds—(1) medical risk from COVID‑19 in light of his health conditions, (2) unduly harsh prison conditions during the pandemic, (3) the Sentencing Commission’s new “youthful offender” policy as a reason to revisit sentence enhancements tied to youthful conduct, and (4) family circumstances involving his ailing grandmother—amounted to “extraordinary and compelling” reasons under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

On medical risk, the court held that the amended § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D) requires a current outbreak at the facility or an ongoing declared public health emergency; neither existed. On harsh conditions, the court held the alleged hardships were not “similar in gravity” to enumerated categories and noted that Davis was receiving treatment for his mental-health diagnoses. On youthful‑offender arguments, the non‑retroactive 2024 amendments to § 5H1.1 could not supply “extraordinary and compelling” reasons, and they were anyway inapplicable because Davis’s federal offense occurred at age 33 and his prior convictions were state offenses. On family circumstances, the caregiving claim was moot because Davis’s grandmother had passed away. The court agreed that, even taken together, the asserted reasons fell short.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027 (10th Cir. 2021): Establishes abuse‑of‑discretion review for compassionate release denials and the definition of abuse (incorrect legal conclusion or clearly erroneous fact finding). The panel used this standard to frame its review and found no abuse.
• United States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2013): Quoted for the abuse‑of‑discretion standard, reinforcing the deferential posture on appeal.
• Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011): Cited for the “rule of finality” in federal sentencing and the narrow exceptions in § 3582(c). This underscores that compassionate release is an exception and must be strictly applied.
• United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2021): Summarizes the three statutory steps of § 3582(c)(1)(A) (extraordinary and compelling reasons; consistency with applicable policy statements; and § 3553(a) factors). The court proceeded on the first step and, consistent with McGee, affirmed without needing to reach the others.
• United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2021): Authorizes denial if the defendant fails any one of the three § 3582(c)(1)(A) requirements, without addressing the others. The panel relied on this to affirm solely on the absence of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons.
• United States v. Walker, 918 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2019): Used to deem waived an argument raised perfunctorily—here, Davis listed rehabilitation as a ground but offered no developed argument on appeal.
• Jordan v. U.S. Department of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2011): The panel invoked the principle that an appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if the district court did not expressly address that specific ground (used for the “harsh conditions” argument).
• United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 2009): The court liberally construes pro se filings but will not act as the litigant’s advocate. This cabined how the court read Davis’s submissions.

The revised policy statement U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (as of 2023) is central. The court treated it as the “applicable policy statement” for defendant‑initiated motions, and it anchored the analysis of medical risk, catchall “other reasons,” family circumstances, and the carve‑out regarding non‑retroactive changes in law. The court also referenced the 2024 amendment to § 5H1.1 (youthful offender) to explain why it could not aid Davis.

Legal Reasoning

1) COVID‑19 Medical Risk and the 2023 Policy Statement

The Sentencing Commission’s 2023 revision to § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D) tightened the path for disease‑based compassionate release. To show extraordinary and compelling reasons due to infectious disease risk, a defendant must now establish all three elements:

• The defendant is housed in a facility affected by an ongoing outbreak or at imminent risk of one, or there is an ongoing declared public health emergency; and
• Given the defendant’s personal health risk factors and custodial status, he faces increased risk of severe complications or death from exposure; and
• The risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner.

Applying that standard, the court assumed arguendo that Davis’s medical conditions might increase risk but held he failed the threshold facility/public‑emergency element. The record showed only three active COVID‑19 cases at FCI Williamsburg as of January 21, 2025, and there was no ongoing federal, state, or local public health emergency (the federal COVID‑19 PHE ended May 11, 2023; South Carolina’s emergency had expired years earlier). Without a current outbreak or declared emergency, the medical‑risk rationale did not qualify.

2) Harsh Pandemic Conditions and the Catchall Provision

Davis argued that lockdowns and restrictions led to severe anxiety attacks and harsh conditions. The court analyzed this under § 1B1.13(b)(5), the catchall that allows “other” reasons similar in gravity to the enumerated categories in § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4) (serious medical conditions, advanced age with deterioration, specified family circumstances, or abuse by correctional staff).

The court acknowledged Davis’s mental‑health diagnoses but noted that (i) he was clinically stable on prescribed medications, (ii) the Bureau of Prisons was providing treatment, and (iii) some diagnoses predated COVID‑19. On this record, the asserted hardships were not comparable in gravity to the policy’s enumerated categories. Thus, the claim did not meet the “extraordinary and compelling” threshold under the catchall.

3) Youthful‑Offender Arguments and Non‑Retroactivity

Davis sought to leverage newly amended “youthful offender” considerations in U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 (effective November 1, 2024) to argue that his sentence was improperly enhanced due to prior youthful conduct. The court rejected this argument on two independent grounds:

• Timing and non‑retroactivity: The district court ruled before the amendment’s effective date; more fundamentally, § 1B1.13(c) states that a change in law or a non‑retroactive guideline amendment cannot be considered to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason, except as provided in § 1B1.13(b)(6).
• Substantive inapplicability: The guideline addresses considerations for federal sentencing and does not retroactively govern prior state convictions; Davis’s federal offense conduct occurred at age 33—beyond the “mid‑20s” youthful‑offender frame recognized by § 5H1.1; and the suggestion that he would have received a federal departure because of the age at which he committed prior state offenses is too speculative.

The decision implicitly underscores the narrowness of § 1B1.13(b)(6) (the “unusually long sentence” provision), which requires the defendant to have served at least 10 years and a subsequent change in law to create a gross disparity with the sentence that would be imposed today. Davis did not bring himself within (b)(6), and the panel treated § 5H1.1 as outside the ambit of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons in this posture.

4) Family Circumstances: “Only Available Caregiver” and Mootness

Under § 1B1.13(b)(3), certain family circumstances can be extraordinary, including incapacitation of a grandparent if the defendant is the only available caregiver (§ 1B1.13(b)(3)(D)). The district court found Davis failed to show he was the “only” available caregiver; a family’s “strong preference” for his caregiving is not enough.

On appeal, however, the court did not have to weigh that sufficiency because Davis’s grandmother had passed away during the pendency of the case, rendering the claim moot. Because the court could no longer afford effective relief on that asserted ground, it could not serve as a basis for compassionate release.

5) Combination of Circumstances

Even considering the asserted grounds collectively under § 1B1.13(b)(5), the court held the aggregate did not reach the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons. Per McGee, that finding alone warranted affirmance; the court did not need to proceed to the § 3553(a) analysis or the “consistency with policy statement” step because the first prong was not satisfied.

Impact and Implications

Although nonprecedential, Davis offers practical and persuasive guidance on the application of the 2023 policy statement:

• COVID‑19 claims face a higher bar. After the end of federal and state COVID‑19 public health emergencies, defendants must show a current outbreak at their facility or a newly declared emergency. Generalized risk or underlying conditions, without facility‑specific outbreak evidence and unmitigable risk, will rarely suffice.
• Conditions‑of‑confinement claims are constrained. Allegations of restrictive housing, programming curtailment, or psychological strain from lockdowns must be tied to medical circumstances of comparable gravity to enumerated categories, or to inadequacies in treatment of a serious medical condition. Otherwise, such claims do not fit § 1B1.13.
• Non‑retroactive changes in law and guideline amendments will not, standing alone, open the compassionate‑release door. Section 1B1.13(c) is explicit. The main exception is § 1B1.13(b)(6), which is narrow: the defendant must have served at least 10 years, identify a subsequent change in law that would produce a gross sentencing disparity, and fit the “unusually long sentence” frame. Routine non‑retroactive policy updates—such as § 5H1.1’s youthfulness considerations—generally cannot support release.
• Family caregiving requests demand concrete proof. Showing that the defendant is truly the only available caregiver is essential; preferences of family members will not suffice. Moreover, courts will treat these claims as moot if the proposed care recipient dies or circumstances otherwise change such that relief would be ineffectual.
• Aggregation will not rescue weak claims. Combining several insufficient reasons does not necessarily produce an extraordinary and compelling whole; courts will assess whether the combination is similar in gravity to the enumerated categories.

For practitioners, Davis suggests evidentiary best practices:

• For disease‑risk claims: provide up‑to‑date, facility‑specific outbreak data; tie the defendant’s documented conditions to CDC‑recognized severe‑risk factors; and explain why available mitigation (vaccination, boosters, treatment, masking, housing) is inadequate.
• For mental‑health‑based arguments: document diagnoses, treatment history, any deterioration, and any inadequacy in BOP care that substantially diminishes self‑care or poses imminent harm.
• For caregiver arguments: supply sworn statements, medical records on the care recipient’s incapacitation, and proof ruling out all other caregivers (relatives, community services).
• For change‑in‑law arguments: analyze § 1B1.13(b)(6) carefully; quantify gross disparity and show 10 years served; avoid reliance on non‑retroactive amendments outside (b)(6).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Compassionate Release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)): A narrow statutory exception allowing courts to reduce a prison sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” after the prisoner exhausts administrative remedies and if the reduction is consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements and § 3553(a) factors.
• U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023 Policy Statement): Defines categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” including (1) specified medical circumstances, (2) age‑related deterioration with a substantial portion of the sentence served, (3) certain family caregiving needs, (4) abuse by correctional staff, (5) a catchall for reasons similar in gravity to these, and (6) an “unusually long sentence” paired with a subsequent change in law leading to a gross disparity after 10 years served. Subsection (c) bars relying on non‑retroactive changes in law/amendments as extraordinary and compelling, except for the (b)(6) carve‑out.
• Catchall Provision (§ 1B1.13(b)(5)): Allows courts to recognize other circumstances as “extraordinary and compelling” only if they are similar in gravity to the enumerated categories—this is not an open‑ended equitable grant.
• Standard of Review (Abuse of Discretion): The appellate court defers to the district court unless it applied the wrong legal standard or made clearly erroneous factual findings.
• Mootness: A claim becomes moot if subsequent events prevent the court from granting effective relief—for example, if the proposed care recipient in a family‑care claim passes away.
• Non‑Retroactivity: Changes in law or guideline amendments that are not retroactive generally cannot justify revisiting a final sentence via compassionate release, absent the specific “unusually long sentence” exception.
• Rehabilitation Alone: By statute (28 U.S.C. § 994(t)) and policy, rehabilitation by itself cannot be an extraordinary and compelling reason, though it can be relevant to the overall assessment once some qualifying reason exists.

Conclusion

United States v. Davis fortifies the post‑2023 framework for compassionate release in the Tenth Circuit. It holds that:

• COVID‑19‑based medical arguments must satisfy § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)’s current‑outbreak or ongoing‑emergency requirement and demonstrate an unmitigable risk; generalized pandemic concerns and manageable conditions do not suffice.
• Harsh conditions of confinement during the pandemic, without more, are not “similar in gravity” to the enumerated categories.
• Non‑retroactive guideline amendments—including the 2024 “youthful offender” considerations in § 5H1.1—cannot supply “extraordinary and compelling” reasons, except within the narrow “unusually long sentence” carve‑out in § 1B1.13(b)(6), which was not implicated here.
• Family circumstance claims require proof that the defendant is the only available caregiver; moreover, such claims can become moot if the care recipient dies.

The decision reaffirms that defendants must meet the Sentencing Commission’s now‑comprehensive policy statement to clear the “extraordinary and compelling” threshold; failing that single step is dispositive. For litigants, Davis serves as a practical roadmap for the evidence and arguments needed—and those that will not carry the day—under the current compassionate‑release regime.