Corroborated Hearsay + Marital Privilege as “Interest of Justice” Good Cause Under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) in Supervised-Release Revocations

Case: United States v. Camillo (No. 25-1472)  |  Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit  |  Date: January 27, 2026

1. Introduction

Antonio Camillo appealed the revocation of his supervised release after the District of Massachusetts found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he committed Massachusetts vandalism (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 126A) by forcibly kicking open an apartment door and damaging the door frame.

The appeal raised two recurring supervised-release questions:

• Confrontation / hearsay: whether revocation was impermissibly based on allegedly unreliable hearsay from a non-testifying witness (Camillo’s wife, Karina Rajotte), purportedly violating Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) and due process.
• Sufficiency of proof of the state offense: whether the government proved vandalism’s elements—particularly malice or wantonness, ownership (“property of another”), and damage.

The First Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that (1) the district court did not rely solely on hearsay and (2) the Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing was satisfied because the witness’s absence was justified (marital privilege) and her statements were reliable, especially given police corroboration.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit held that the district court neither abused its discretion nor clearly erred in revoking supervised release. It rejected Camillo’s claim that revocation rested only on unreliable hearsay, noting the district court credited the responding officer’s firsthand observations of damage that corroborated the account. It further held that the evidence established vandalism under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 126A by a preponderance of the evidence, including intent and the requisite mental state (malice and/or wantonness), and that the “property of another” element was met without any requirement to prove a particular owner so long as the property was not Camillo’s.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Millette (standard of review for revocation; legal questions de novo; factual findings clear error; abuse-of-discretion framework). The court used Millette to anchor the appellate posture and to stress how hard it is to overturn revocation findings on appeal.
• United States v. Matos (defining clear-error review as “exceedingly deferential”). The opinion employed Matos to reinforce that credibility and fact-finding are primarily for the district court.
• United States v. McCullock (abuse of discretion only when no reasonable person could agree). McCullock supplied the “definite conviction” threshold for reversal.
• United States v. Rondeau and United States v. Frederickson (tension in the Circuit on whether sufficiency-type challenges to supervised-release violations are reviewed de novo or for clear error). The panel acknowledged the tension but declined to resolve it because Camillo’s claim failed under either standard—an increasingly common appellate move that preserves flexibility while avoiding an unnecessary doctrinal commitment.
• United States v. Franklin (revocation hearings: Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply; no Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right; limited Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) right; “testimonial” nature irrelevant). Franklin provided the key doctrinal frame: revocation is not a criminal trial, but due process imposes a calibrated confrontation protection through Rule 32.1.
• United States v. Mulero-Díaz (Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) “limited” confrontation right unless court finds “interest of justice” does not require appearance). Mulero-Díaz supplied the textual rule and the “interest of justice” gateway.
• United States v. Fontanez (balancing test: weigh reliability of hearsay against government’s reasons for absence; “good cause” concept). Fontanez structured the required district-court analysis for admitting hearsay in revocation proceedings.
• United States v. Marino (reliability supported by consistent articulation). Marino was used to validate reliance on statements consistent across time and form.
• United States v. Dudley (reliability strengthened by independent corroboration; also cited for guidelines framework in revocation). Dudley reinforced that corroboration can make hearsay sufficiently reliable for revocation and also contextualized the post-revocation guideline ranges.
• United States v. Whalen (appellate deference to credibility findings; “cold record” limitation). Whalen supported the panel’s refusal to second-guess the district court’s reliability and credibility determinations.
• United States v. Abercrombie (revocation standard: preponderance of the evidence). Abercrombie underscored the comparatively lower proof burden relative to “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• United States v. Teixeira (district court need not address “every jot and tittle” of evidence when finding a violation). Teixeira was invoked to defeat Camillo’s complaint that the government did not sufficiently “emphasize” ownership at the hearing and that the court did not explicitly parse every element at length.
• United States v. Vasquez-Landaver (revocation violation grades; referencing United States v. Teixeira and the Guidelines). This supported the opinion’s brief classification discussion (Grade C) and highlighted the Guidelines’ policy-statement architecture for revocation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C): Why the hearsay was admissible

The opinion’s core evidentiary move is to separate two ideas Camillo tried to fuse: (1) whether revocation was based solely on hearsay, and (2) whether any hearsay admitted satisfied Rule 32.1’s due-process balancing.

• Not “solely hearsay”: The panel emphasized that the district court “in substantial part” credited Officer O’Connor’s firsthand observations: the door frame was “cracked and broken.” This direct evidence mattered because it independently established damage and corroborated how it occurred.
• Balancing performed as required: Under United States v. Franklin / United States v. Fontanez, the court must balance (a) the releasee’s interest in confrontation against (b) the government’s good cause, including the reliability of the hearsay and the reason the witness is absent. Here, the district court explicitly found:
  • Good cause / “interest of justice”: Rajotte had invoked marital privilege and declined to testify in state court; the district court concluded “it’s in the interest of justice” she not appear. Camillo did not challenge that determination on appeal—leaving only reliability to contest.
  • Reliability: Rajotte’s account was consistent across the police report and a sworn January 28 affidavit and was corroborated by the officer’s observations of damage at the scene. Consistency (United States v. Marino) and corroboration (United States v. Dudley) were thus doing the heavy lifting.
• Motive-to-lie arguments were insufficient: The panel treated Camillo’s claimed bias/motive theories as inadequate to overcome a supported reliability finding, especially given corroboration. It relied on deference principles (United States v. Whalen) and noted that the Confrontation Clause does not apply in revocation proceedings (United States v. Franklin), so disputes about “testimonial” statements did not change the analysis.

B. Proving Massachusetts vandalism by a preponderance

The court then addressed whether the record supported the elements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 126A: intentional injury/defacement/destruction of the property of another, done “willfully and maliciously or wantonly.”

• Ownership (“property of another”): The panel clarified the element is satisfied by proving the property was owned or possessed by someone other than the defendant—not by proving a specific owner as a standalone requirement. The police report, admitted into evidence, identified the owner (the Caleb Foundation). Moreover, Camillo never claimed the door was his property.
• Damage: Officer O’Connor saw the broken/cracked frame; that observation was enough to show injury/marring/destruction for revocation purposes.
• Intent + mental state (malice/wantonness): The district court found the damage was intentional and that the conduct was willful with malice and also wanton. The panel endorsed those findings as supported by the circumstances: kicking in a locked door with enough force to break the frame after being excluded from the apartment. Even if malice were debated, the wantonness finding independently supported the element, and Camillo did not meaningfully contest that alternative basis on appeal.

3.3. Impact

• Practical Rule 32.1 guidance for domestic-incident revocations: The case reinforces a workable template for revocation courts confronting unavailable intimate-partner witnesses: if the witness is absent for a recognized reason (here, marital privilege) and their account is reliable through consistency plus corroboration (e.g., officer observations), Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) permits admission without live testimony.
• Corroboration matters as much as the statement: The opinion illustrates that revocation outcomes often turn on “hybrid proof”—some hearsay narrative plus non-hearsay corroboration (physical evidence observed by police). That reduces appellate vulnerability to “solely hearsay” challenges.
• Element-proof expectations are calibrated to revocation: By reaffirming the preponderance standard (United States v. Abercrombie) and rejecting hypertechnical “ownership” arguments, the decision signals that revocation litigation will focus on common-sense proof of “property of another” and culpable damage rather than trial-level formalities.
• Doctrinal issue left open: The court again noted, but did not resolve, the circuit’s tension on the standard of review for sufficiency-type challenges in revocation (United States v. Rondeau vs. United States v. Frederickson). Future litigants may still press for clarification, but Camillo shows the court will often avoid the question when the record is strong.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release revocation: A post-prison monitoring term can be revoked if the judge finds a condition was violated. The consequence can be additional imprisonment and a new term of supervision.
• Preponderance of the evidence: The government must show something is more likely than not (greater than 50% likelihood), not “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Hearsay in revocation hearings: Unlike trials, hearsay can be admissible because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply; however, Rule 32.1 gives a limited right to confront adverse witnesses, subject to an “interest of justice” exception.
• Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing: The judge weighs (a) how important confrontation is for fairness (often tied to how reliable the hearsay is) against (b) why the witness cannot/should not appear (good cause).
• Marital privilege (in this context): A spouse may decline to testify against the other spouse in certain proceedings. When that privilege is invoked, it can supply a concrete reason for the witness’s nonappearance at a revocation hearing.
• “Malice” vs. “wantonness” under the cited model instruction: Malice involves cruelty/hostility/revenge; wantonness is reckless indifference to the likelihood of substantial property damage. The vandalism statute is satisfied by “maliciously or wantonly.”
• Clear error / abuse of discretion: Appellate courts give substantial deference to trial judges on factual findings and case management; reversal requires a strong showing that the finding or decision was not reasonably supported.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Camillo confirms that supervised-release revocations can rest on a combination of (i) corroborated hearsay and (ii) firsthand police observations without violating Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C), particularly where the adverse witness is absent for a recognized reason such as invocation of marital privilege. The decision also underscores that, for Massachusetts vandalism in the revocation setting, the “property of another” element does not demand proof of a particular owner so long as the property is shown not to be the defendant’s, and that forceful entry causing observable damage readily supports findings of intentional conduct and wantonness (and, on these facts, malice as well). In the broader supervised-release landscape, Camillo strengthens the evidentiary and procedural pathway for revocations arising from domestic incidents where live victim testimony is unavailable but reliable, corroborated accounts exist.