United States v. Brown: Clarifying the “Imminence” Test for §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) Firearm-in-Connection Enhancements

Introduction

In United States v. Gabriel Brown, No. 23-13804 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2025) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit revisited three familiar yet frequently litigated sentencing and constitutional questions:

Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)—the federal felon-in-possession statute—remains constitutional after Bruen and Rahimi.
Whether prior Georgia cocaine convictions remain “controlled substance offenses” under U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(a)(3) when cocaine has since been administratively rescheduled by the State.
Whether the four-level “in connection with another felony” enhancement in §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies when the defendant fires at a vehicle that is leaving the scene and later claims self-defense.

Gabriel Brown, having pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon, received a 70-month sentence. On appeal he attacked both the conviction and the sentence. The appellate panel (Judges Jordan, Luck, and Carnes) rejected each challenge, generating an instructive discussion—especially on the imminence requirement for self-defense in the context of §2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

Summary of the Judgment

Conviction affirmed: §922(g)(1) remains constitutional; Rozier and the 2025 decision in Dubois remain binding.
Base-offense-level ruling affirmed: Brown’s prior cocaine convictions continued to qualify as “controlled substance offenses” because cocaine was controlled at the time of each state conviction.
Four-level enhancement affirmed: Firing at a stationary car facing away from the defendant constituted aggravated assault under Georgia law; the claim of self-defense failed because the threat was not “imminent.”

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010)
– Upheld §922(g)(1) against Second-Amendment attack; still good law post-Bruen.
United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), vacated and reinstated at 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025)
– Held that the controlled status of a substance is measured when the state conviction was entered.
United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2019)
– Addressed categorical-matching for Georgia drug statutes; distinguished by the panel.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) & United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
– Supreme-Court holdings on the Second Amendment; neither overruled Rozier within Eleventh-Circuit doctrine.
Georgia authority: Gobert v. State, 311 Ga. 305 (2021)
– Clarifies that self-defense fails where the victim is fleeing and no longer poses an imminent threat.

Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutionality of §922(g)(1)

The Court treated Brown’s facial attack as squarely foreclosed by circuit precedent. The panel held it was bound by Rozier and the post-Bruen reaffirmation in Dubois. Under Eleventh-Circuit law, felon disarmament remains “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” satisfying Bruen’s analytic framework.

2. Prior “Controlled Substance Offenses”

Brown argued that because Georgia subsequently rescheduled cocaine, his old convictions should no longer trigger §2K2.1(a)(3). The panel relied on Dubois’ temporal rule: the focus is the state law “when the defendant was convicted,” not at federal sentencing. Accordingly, each cocaine conviction (2007, 2009) still counted, keeping the base offense level at 22. No plain error existed because Brown conceded the facts and controlling precedent.

3. Four-Level “In-Connection” Enhancement (§2K2.1(b)(6)(B))

The enhancement requires: (i) use or possession of a firearm, (ii) in connection with another felony. The “other felony” here was Georgia aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. §16-5-21), punishable by >1 year. Brown fired four shots at a car. The key question became whether self-defense negated the felony predicate.

The district court found no “imminent” threat because the car was (a) stationary at an intersection, (b) facing away, and (c) leaving the property. Citing Gobert, the panel held those facts defeated self-defense under Georgia law. Accordingly, shooting at the vehicle was an unjustified aggravated assault, satisfying the enhancement. Clear-error review governed and the appellate court found the district court’s factual conclusions “plausible in light of the record as a whole.”

Impact of the Decision

Imminence Standard Refined: The case furnishes a fact-specific template for trial courts assessing self-defense claims at sentencing. If the putative aggressor is fleeing or otherwise not presenting an immediate hazard, §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) will likely apply.
Temporal “Status-of-the-drug” Rule Cemented: Although Dubois set the principle, Brown reinforces it against alternative arguments, signaling that offenders cannot escape controlled-substance predicates by pointing to later legislative or administrative reclassifications.
Second Amendment Contours Unchanged: The Eleventh Circuit continues to treat felon prohibitions as constitutionally sound, limiting the reach of Bruen.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§2K2.1(a)(3) “Controlled Substance Offense”: A prior drug conviction that (1) was punishable by more than one year and (2) involved manufacturing, importing, exporting, distributing, or possessing with intent. In the Eleventh Circuit, look to the drug’s status when the state conviction occurred.
§2K2.1(b)(6)(B) Enhancement: Adds four offense levels if the firearm “facilitated or had the potential to facilitate” another felony. The second felony can be entirely uncharged.
Aggravated Assault (Georgia): Assault with a deadly weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury. Punishable by 1–20 years.
Imminent Threat (Self-Defense): Under Georgia law, the risk of harm must be immediate and impending. A fleeing or retreating aggressor normally eliminates imminence.

Conclusion

United States v. Brown strengthens three doctrinal pillars within the Eleventh Circuit:

Felon-in-possession prosecutions remain secure after Bruen/Rahimi.
Sentencing courts look backward—to the date of conviction—when deciding if a drug offense is “controlled.”
Self-defense fails, and §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies, where the target is leaving and no longer poses an imminent threat—thereby sharpening the imminence requirement for future defendants invoking self-defense at sentencing.

Practitioners should heed the Court’s fact-centric approach. Claims of justification must articulate why deadly force was necessary at the exact moment it was used. Absent that showing, firearm-in-connection enhancements will survive appellate scrutiny, as they did here.