United States v. Borrero: Application of Maiorana’s Oral-Pronouncement Rule and Endorsement of Standard Condition Six for Supervised Release

I. Introduction

In United States v. Borrero, No. 24-942 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2025) (summary order), the Second Circuit addressed two recurring supervised release issues:

1. What a sentencing court must do at the sentencing hearing to validly impose “standard conditions” of supervised release; and
2. Whether “standard condition six” (authorizing home/field visits by probation officers and seizure of contraband in plain view) is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, unsupported, or duplicative of a separate search condition.

The case arises from a violent nine-day spree of armed robberies and carjackings in Connecticut by defendant-appellant Christian Borrero, who pleaded guilty to two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and received the statutory minimum of 14 years’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, Borrero focused not on the prison term but on the conditions that would govern his conduct after release.

Although the court’s disposition is a summary order (and thus nonprecedential under the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1), it is an important application of several recent precedents—especially United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th 306 (2d Cir. 2025), and United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024)—and it provides practical guidance to sentencing courts and practitioners on supervised release pronouncements and on the scope of standard condition six.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Conduct

The factual backdrop is drawn from the Presentence Report (PSR) adopted by the district court without objection:

• Over roughly nine days in the summer of 2022, Borrero committed a series of armed robberies and carjackings:
  • Robbed a Citgo gas station at night using a pistol;
  • Four days later, carjacked a pizza delivery driver at gunpoint, then used that vehicle to rob a 7-Eleven;
  • Three days later, drove his mother’s car to a Shell station, robbed it while armed and masked, and stole the cash register;
  • When that car broke down, stole a Toyota from a woman in her driveway;
  • Used the stolen Toyota to rob an Xpress Mart at gunpoint.
• Police arrested Borrero in his apartment, where they found two firearms, one of them stolen.
• Borrero also had a history of illicit drug use.

He pleaded guilty to two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), exposing him to mandatory consecutive terms.

B. The Sentence and Conditions of Supervised Release

The district court (Dooley, J.) imposed:

• Imprisonment: The mandatory minimum 14-year term;
• Supervised release: 5 years, with:
  • Five mandatory conditions (prescribed by statute);
  • “All of the standard conditions” of supervised release;
  • Five special conditions.

Two aspects of the supervised release conditions are central to the appeal:

1. Drug-treatment condition:
   • Oral pronouncement: The court directed that Borrero “participate in a program recommended by the Probation Office and approved by the Court for substance abuse treatment,” which “will be outpatient or inpatient.”
   • Written judgment: Required him to participate in an outpatient program only, without mentioning a possible inpatient option.
2. Standard conditions (based on U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)):
   • The written judgment included 12 of the 13 guideline “standard conditions,” omitting only the “risk notification” condition in § 5D1.3(c)(12).
   • Among them was standard condition six, requiring Borrero to “allow the probation officer to visit [him] at any time at [his] home or elsewhere” and to “permit the probation officer to take any” contraband “in plain view.”

At the hearing, however, the court had simply said it was imposing “all of the standard conditions” without orally specifying or expressly incorporating by reference a particular written list.

C. The Appeal

On appeal, Borrero argued:

1. The standard conditions in the written judgment must be vacated because the district court did not adequately describe or adopt them at sentencing, as required by United States v. Maiorana.
2. The drug-treatment condition should be enforced as orally pronounced (inpatient or outpatient), not as limited to outpatient in the written judgment; or else the inconsistency must be resolved.
3. Standard condition six is:
   • Vague and overbroad;
   • An improper delegation of judicial authority to the probation officer;
   • Unsupported by his history and offense conduct; and
   • Duplicative of the separate “special” search condition that allows searches based on reasonable suspicion.
4. He also briefly challenged a restitution-related special condition, but the panel deemed that argument inadequately developed and therefore waived under Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Disposition

The Second Circuit (Menashi, Lee, and Nathan, JJ.) held:

• Standard conditions and drug-treatment condition vacated and remanded:
  • Under Maiorana, the district court must orally pronounce or explicitly incorporate by reference specific supervised release conditions.
  • Because the district court did not adequately adopt the standard conditions at sentencing, and because the parties agreed that remand was required, the court vacated the standard conditions and remanded for the district court to reconsider and, if appropriate, reimpose them in compliance with Maiorana.
  • Given that remand was already necessary, the panel also vacated the drug-treatment condition so the district court could clarify whether to impose the inpatient-or-outpatient regime pronounced orally or the outpatient-only regime reflected in the written judgment.
• Challenge to standard condition six rejected on the merits:
  • Notwithstanding the Maiorana remand, the panel elected to provide “guidance on remand” (citing United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007)).
  • It held that standard condition six is valid: it is not vague or overbroad, does not improperly delegate judicial authority, is supported by Borrero’s history and offense conduct, and is not duplicative of the special search condition.
• All other arguments rejected, including the underdeveloped restitution-condition challenge, which was treated as waived.

Thus, the court affirmed in part (upholding the sentence and the validity of condition six) and vacated and remanded in part (for reimposition, or not, of the standard conditions and the drug-treatment condition).

IV. Legal Framework

A. Supervised Release Conditions: Mandatory, Standard, and Special

Federal supervised release is governed principally by 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and the Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.1–5D1.3. Conditions fall into three categories:

1. Mandatory conditions (e.g., no new crimes, drug testing in some cases) are required by statute and must be imposed in all cases where supervised release is ordered.
2. Standard conditions are recommended in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c) to facilitate supervision (e.g., reporting to probation, restrictions on leaving the district, honest communication with the probation officer, etc.). They are not technically mandatory but are routinely imposed unless the court chooses otherwise.
3. Special conditions are tailored to the defendant’s circumstances (e.g., substance abuse treatment, search conditions, mental health treatment, occupational restrictions). They must be “reasonably related” to statutory purposes and “no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary.”

In Borrero, the dispute centered on standard condition six in § 5D1.3(c)(6), and on one special drug-treatment condition.

B. Oral Pronouncement vs. Written Judgment

A key constitutional and procedural principle is that the defendant has the right to be present when the sentence is imposed. The “real” sentence is therefore what is orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing in the defendant’s presence. The written judgment must accurately memorialize that sentence; it may not add new conditions or alter the substantive terms.

In United States v. Maiorana, the Second Circuit articulated a clear rule for supervised release conditions:

a sentencing court must, “as part of the pronouncement of the sentence in the presence of the defendant during the sentencing proceeding, expressly adopt or specifically incorporate by reference particular conditions that have been set forth in writing and made available to the defendant in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a notice adopted by the court.”

This means:

• The court may not simply rely on a later written judgment to add conditions;
• It must either state each condition on the record or clearly incorporate a specifically identified written list that the defendant had an opportunity to review (e.g., “the 13 standard conditions set forth in § 5D1.3(c) of the Guidelines”).

C. Standard Condition Six and Probation Officer Visits

Guidelines § 5D1.3(c)(6) (standard condition six) provides that the defendant must:

allow the probation officer to visit [him] at any time at [his] home or elsewhere; and permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of [his] supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

This condition sits at the intersection of supervised release law and Fourth Amendment principles. Courts distinguish between:

• “Home/field visits”—probation officers showing up at a defendant’s home or other location to check on compliance and to observe what is in plain view; and
• “Searches”—more intrusive actions, such as rummaging through drawers, searching electronic devices, or conducting full-scale searches of a residence or person, which typically require at least reasonable suspicion when authorized as a probation condition.

In Borrero, there was a separate special condition authorizing reasonable-suspicion-based searches. Standard condition six was more limited: it allowed unannounced visits and seizure of contraband in plain view only.

V. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Application of Maiorana: Oral Pronouncement of Standard Conditions

The panel applied Maiorana to Borrero’s case. At the sentencing hearing, the district court said it was imposing “all of the standard conditions,” but did not:

• Recite the text of those conditions; or
• Explicitly incorporate by reference a specific written list (such as “the standard conditions set forth in § 5D1.3(c) of the Guidelines” or in a standing district court order).

Under Maiorana, this is insufficient. Because the conditions were not properly pronounced or adopted in Borrero’s presence, the written judgment cannot supply them after the fact.

Recognizing this, the government agreed that remand was required for the district court to re-evaluate and, if desired, reimpose the standard conditions in compliance with Maiorana. The panel therefore:

• Vacated the standard conditions of supervised release in the written judgment; and
• Remanded for the district court to decide whether and how to reimpose them in a manner consistent with Maiorana, citing United States v. Halls, No. 22‑360, 2025 WL 2793376 (2d Cir. Oct. 1, 2025), which similarly applied Maiorana.

This reinforces that, after Maiorana, district courts must be meticulous at the sentencing hearing:

• They cannot rely on generic phrases like “all the standard conditions” without clearly indicating what exactly is being imposed and where those conditions are set forth;
• They should ensure that the defendant has seen the proposed conditions (e.g., in the PSR) and has had an opportunity to object before they are incorporated.

B. The Drug-Treatment Condition: Oral vs. Written Discrepancy

There was a textual conflict between:

• What the district court said at sentencing (treatment could be “outpatient or inpatient”); and
• The written judgment (requiring only “outpatient” treatment, with no inpatient option).

Ordinarily, such conflicts are resolved in favor of the oral pronouncement, because that is the controlling sentence. However, instead of simply declaring that the oral version controls, the panel invoked a prudential approach:

• Since a remand was already necessary under Maiorana with respect to the standard conditions, it was “prudent” to vacate the drug-treatment condition as well and allow the district court to clarify and explicitly decide which version to impose on remand.
• The panel cited United States v. Confredo, 1 F. App’x 68, 71 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001), and United States v. Thomas, 299 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2002), for the proposition that when a case is already being remanded, it is appropriate to let the district court clearly state “exactly which conditions of release it intends to impose.”

The effect is:

• The drug-treatment condition is vacated, not simply “corrected” by the appellate court;
• On remand, the district court will make an explicit, on-the-record choice: outpatient-only treatment, outpatient-or-inpatient treatment, or some other formulation, with a clear explanation if necessary and with the opportunity for objections.

C. The Court’s Rejection of Challenges to Standard Condition Six

Although standard condition six technically falls within the scope of the Maiorana remand, the panel elected to address Borrero’s substantive challenges to that condition to provide “guidance on remand” (citing United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 2007)). It reviewed the imposition of this condition for abuse of discretion (citing United States v. Carlineo, 998 F.3d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 2021)) and found none.

1. Vagueness and Overbreadth

Borrero argued that condition six is:

• Vague—because “at any time” and “at home or elsewhere” allegedly give no meaningful limits or guidance; and
• Overbroad—because it authorizes visits without temporal or spatial restrictions.

The panel rejected both arguments:

• On vagueness:
  • The language has a “straightforward meaning”: the probation officer can visit “any time at any place.”
  • The court cited the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Muñoz, 812 F.3d 809, 821 (10th Cir. 2016), which held that this interpretation is simply the correct one and does not render the condition vague, and the Eleventh Circuit’s United States v. Etienne, 102 F.4th 1139, 1146 (11th Cir. 2024), which noted that “the term ‘visiting’ is not vague.”
• On overbreadth:
  • The Sentencing Commission specifically considered narrowing standard condition six in 2016 but decided not to, recognizing that “adequate supervision of defendants may require probation officers to have the flexibility to visit defendants at off-hours, at their workplaces, and without advance notice” (citing United States v. Payton, 959 F.3d 654, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2020)).
  • The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Ortiz, 843 F.3d 294, 297 (7th Cir. 2016), similarly noted that because release will occur years in the future, it is impossible to pre-specify particular permissible visit locations; flexibility is necessary.
  • The Second Circuit emphasized that supervision’s purpose—ensuring compliance and detecting violations—would be undermined if officers could visit only at prescribed times and places; courts “have therefore resisted restricting Standard Condition Six” (quoting United States v. Schofield, No. 23‑CR‑481, 2025 WL 416873, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2025)).

The panel further linked this flexibility to prior Second Circuit precedent treating probation officers as the court’s “eyes and ears” in the field. In United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024), quoting United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d Cir. 2002), the court recognized that supervising officers must have “considerable investigative leeway” to monitor compliance. That rationale supports broad authority to conduct suspicionless visits and observe what is in plain view.

2. Alleged Excessive Delegation to the Probation Officer

Borrero claimed that condition six improperly delegates sentencing power to the probation officer by allowing the officer to decide when and where to conduct visits.

The Second Circuit distinguished between:

• Delegation of the terms of the sentence (which is impermissible); and
• Delegation of the implementation and supervision of an already-defined sentence (which is permissible).

Relying on Carlineo, the court reiterated that probation officers may not “fashion a sentence’s terms,” but they may “supervise and execute a sentence.” Decisions about the schedule, timing, or duration of visits are classic supervision details, not new sentencing conditions.

Thus, condition six does not unlawfully delegate judicial power; it simply authorizes the probation officer to implement court-ordered supervision.

3. Nexus to Borrero’s History and Offense Conduct

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), supervised release conditions must be:

• Reasonably related to the defendant’s history, characteristics, and the nature of the offense; and
• No greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary.

The panel found that standard condition six was well supported in light of Borrero’s background:

• He committed multiple armed robberies and carjackings over a short period.
• Police found the guns he used for those crimes in his apartment.
• He had a history of illicit drug use.

Given these facts, the court concluded there was a sound basis for active supervision to:

• Monitor for renewed criminal activity;
• Detect any illegal possession of firearms; and
• Ensure compliance with conditions related to drug use and other restrictions.

The panel cited Reyes and Schofield to support the principle that robust on-the-ground monitoring is appropriate—indeed, often necessary—for higher-risk individuals whose prior conduct involved serious violence and weapons.

4. Alleged Duplication with the Special Search Condition

Borrero also argued that standard condition six was redundant because a separate special condition already authorized searches of his person, residence, or vehicle based on “reasonable suspicion” of contraband or evidence of a violation.

The court rejected this characterization, citing Muñoz, 812 F.3d at 822, which recognized that standard condition six and search conditions are not overlapping in scope:

• Standard condition six:
  • Authorizes unannounced visits by the probation officer at any time and place;
  • Allows seizure of contraband only when it is in plain view during such a visit;
  • Does not authorize a full-scale search of the home, person, or property.
• Special search condition:
  • Can authorize a more invasive search (e.g., opening drawers, looking through containers) of the person, residence, or vehicle;
  • Requires a heightened standard—typically reasonable suspicion—because of the greater intrusion on privacy.

In Oliveras, the Second Circuit emphasized that:

• “A home visit is far less intrusive than a full-scale probation search,” and
• Conditions allowing suspicionless visits are compatible with the principle that full searches require at least reasonable suspicion.

Thus, the two conditions are complementary, not duplicative. Standard condition six authorizes monitoring at a relatively low level of intrusion; the special search condition authorizes deeper intrusion when justified by reasonable suspicion.

D. Waiver of the Restitution-Condition Challenge

In a brief aside, the court noted that Borrero raised, but did not meaningfully develop, a challenge to a special condition related to restitution. Citing Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 95 (2d Cir. 2009), the panel reiterated that:

“[M]erely mentioning the relevant issue in an opening brief is not enough; issues not sufficiently argued are in general deemed waived and will not be considered on appeal.”

This underscores an important appellate practice point: arguments must be adequately briefed—with legal analysis, record citations, and developed reasoning—or they will be treated as waived.

VI. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Second Circuit Decisions

• United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th 306 (2d Cir. 2025)
  • Establishes that supervised release conditions must be expressly pronounced or specifically incorporated by reference at sentencing.
  • Applied in Borrero to require vacation and remand of the standard conditions.
• United States v. Halls, No. 22‑360, 2025 WL 2793376 (2d Cir. Oct. 1, 2025)
  • A recent case applying Maiorana, cited to support vacatur and remand where standard conditions were not properly adopted on the record.
• United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024)
  • Affirms that probation officers act as the “eyes and ears” of the court and require significant investigative leeway.
  • Distinguishes relatively nonintrusive “home visits” from more intrusive searches that require reasonable suspicion.
  • Used in Borrero to justify standard condition six and to explain why suspicionless visits are permissible even when searches require reasonable suspicion.
• United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d Cir. 2002)
  • Earlier Second Circuit authority on the scope of probation searches and the need for reasonable suspicion for more invasive searches.
  • Supports the analytical framework distinguishing visits from searches.
• United States v. Carlineo, 998 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 2021)
  • Clarifies the limits of delegating sentencing authority to probation: officers may supervise and implement a sentence but may not define its substantive terms.
  • Relied on to reject the argument that standard condition six improperly delegates judicial power.
• United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007)
  • Allows the Second Circuit, when remanding, to address “issues calling for guidance on remand.”
  • Provides the doctrinal basis for deciding the validity of condition six even though the case was being remanded under Maiorana.
• United States v. Confredo, 1 F. App’x 68 (2d Cir. 2001) and United States v. Thomas, 299 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2002)
  • Stand for the practice that when remanding for other reasons, the appellate court may invite the district court to clarify or reconsider specific sentencing conditions.
  • Used in Borrero to justify vacating and remanding the drug-treatment condition.
• Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2009)
  • Articulates the rule that issues “merely mentioned” but not developed in an opening brief are deemed waived.
  • Applied to reject Borrero’s cursory challenge to a restitution condition.

B. Other Circuits and District Courts

• United States v. Muñoz, 812 F.3d 809 (10th Cir. 2016)
  • Interprets standard condition six and upholds it against a vagueness challenge, reasoning that its plain meaning is clear and that its breadth is inherent in its text.
  • Cited to support the conclusion that “at home or elsewhere” and “at any time” are not vague.
• United States v. Etienne, 102 F.4th 1139 (11th Cir. 2024)
  • Notes that “visiting” is not a vague concept and supports the proposition that standard condition six is adequately definite.
• United States v. Payton, 959 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2020)
  • Describes the Sentencing Commission’s 2016 decision to retain standard condition six in its broad form after considering but rejecting proposed narrowing language.
  • Used in Borrero to show that the condition’s breadth is a deliberate policy choice to facilitate effective supervision.
• United States v. Ortiz, 843 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2016)
  • Explains that the practical realities of supervision—especially the uncertainty of when and where a defendant will live and work years in the future—make it impractical to pre-limit visit locations.
• United States v. Schofield, No. 23‑CR‑481, 2025 WL 416873 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2025)
  • Observes that restricting standard condition six to certain times or locations would “frustrate the purpose of supervision.”
  • Cited approvingly to justify the broad scope of condition six.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Supervised Release

Supervised release is a period of monitoring by a probation officer that follows a prison term. It is not parole (early release from prison); rather, it is a distinct portion of the sentence imposed by the judge at sentencing. If a defendant violates conditions of supervised release, the court can:

• Modify or add conditions;
• Extend the term (within statutory limits); or
• Revoke supervised release and impose additional prison time.

B. “Standard” vs. “Special” Conditions

• Standard conditions are a default set of rules recommended in the Sentencing Guidelines for most defendants (e.g., report to probation, truthfulness, no contact with certain people, etc.).
• Special conditions are tailored to the individual’s circumstances (e.g., treatment programs, restrictions on computers, curfews, search conditions).

Both kinds must comply with statutory requirements: they must be reasonably related to legitimate sentencing goals and not impose more liberty deprivation than necessary.

C. Oral Pronouncement vs. Written Judgment

• The oral pronouncement at sentencing, with the defendant present, is the actual sentence.
• The written judgment is supposed to record that sentence accurately.
• If there is a conflict, the oral pronouncement usually controls; a written judgment cannot add new conditions that were not properly imposed at sentencing.
• Maiorana emphasizes that conditions must be expressly imposed or clearly incorporated by reference during the hearing, not silently added later.

D. Vagueness and Overbreadth in Conditions

• A condition is vague if people of ordinary intelligence cannot tell what is required or forbidden, or if it invites arbitrary enforcement because it is too imprecise.
• A condition is overbroad (in the supervised release sense) if it restricts more liberty than reasonably necessary to achieve its legitimate goals.

In Borrero, the court held that standard condition six is neither vague (its meaning is clear: probation officers may visit at any time and place and seize contraband in plain view) nor overbroad (its breadth is justified by the need for flexible, effective supervision).

E. Delegation to Probation Officers

Judges cannot delegate their core sentencing authority—i.e., they cannot let probation officers define new conditions or decide whether to impose a condition at all. However, once the judge has set the conditions, probation officers may:

• Decide day-to-day implementation details (e.g., scheduling visits, choosing the specific treatment provider, arranging home visits);
• Monitor compliance and report violations.

That kind of delegation is permissible and necessary for the system to function. Carlineo and Borrero both draw this line.

F. “Plain View” and “Reasonable Suspicion”

• Plain view: If a probation officer is lawfully present (e.g., during a home visit authorized by a condition), they may seize contraband they see without conducting a deeper search (e.g., a gun sitting on a table).
• Reasonable suspicion: A lower standard than probable cause; it requires specific, articulable facts indicating that a person is engaged in criminal activity or violating conditions. Many search conditions require reasonable suspicion before an officer may conduct more intrusive searches (e.g., opening drawers, searching devices).

Standard condition six authorizes presence and plain-view seizures. The separate special condition in Borrero authorizes more intrusive searches upon reasonable suspicion.

G. Abuse of Discretion Review

When reviewing supervised release conditions, appellate courts generally use an abuse of discretion standard. A district court abuses its discretion if:

• It relies on an incorrect legal standard,
• It makes a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts, or
• Its decision falls outside the range of permissible options.

In Borrero, the Second Circuit held that imposing standard condition six was well within the district court’s discretionary range.

H. Summary Orders and Precedential Effect

The Second Circuit’s disposition in Borrero is a summary order. By rule:

• Summary orders do not have precedential effect.
• They may be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, but only as persuasive authority, not binding precedent.

Nonetheless, because Borrero applies binding precedents like Maiorana and Oliveras, and provides detailed reasoning, it will be influential in practice, especially in the District of Connecticut and within the Second Circuit more broadly.

VIII. Practical Implications and Future Impact

A. For District Judges and Probation Offices

1. Pronouncement of Conditions Must Be Precise and Explicit
   After Maiorana and its application in Borrero, district judges in the Second Circuit should:
   • Either recite each supervised release condition on the record, or
   • Expressly incorporate “the standard conditions in § 5D1.3(c),” “the conditions listed in the PSR at page X,” or an equivalent, clearly identified written list that is in the record and has been provided to the defendant.
   • A vague reference to “all the standard conditions” without identifying which list is being used may invite appeal and remand.
2. Avoid Oral–Written Mismatches
   The discrepancy between outpatient-only and outpatient-or-inpatient drug treatment illustrates a common problem. To avoid such conflicts:
   • Courts and probation should ensure that the written judgment matches the oral pronouncement exactly;
   • Draft judgments (or templates) should be carefully cross-checked against the transcript or sentencing script.
3. Standard Condition Six Is Strongly Supported
   The panel’s detailed rejection of vagueness, overbreadth, and delegation challenges—backed by multi-circuit and Sentencing Commission authority—makes clear that:
   • Standard condition six is presumptively valid; and
   • District courts can comfortably continue to impose it, especially in cases involving violence, weapons, or drugs.

B. For Defense Counsel

• Object at Sentencing: If counsel believes certain conditions are unwarranted or overbroad, they should object on the record at sentencing, not just on appeal. This is especially important where the conditions appear only in a PSR or standing order.
• Ensure Client Has the Written List: Counsel should make sure the client has actually seen and understands the list of proposed conditions being incorporated by reference.
• Targeted, Fact-Specific Challenges Are More Promising: Generic attacks on standard condition six as inherently vague or overbroad are unlikely to succeed in light of Borrero and the cited cases. More promising avenues may involve:
  • Arguing that a particular special condition is not reasonably related to the defendant’s case;
  • Demonstrating that a condition creates a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary in the specific factual context.
• Fully Brief All Issues: The waiver finding under Gross v. Rell reinforces that appellate challenges must be thoroughly developed, with citations and analysis, not merely mentioned.

C. For Prosecutors

• Support Clear Pronouncements: The government should encourage sentencing courts to follow Maiorana by providing draft condition language or explicitly referencing the Guidelines or a standing order on the record.
• Defend Condition Six on Established Grounds: In opposing challenges, prosecutors may rely on:
  • The Sentencing Commission’s express decision to retain condition six in broad form;
  • Cross-circuit consensus upholding its text;
  • Decisions like Oliveras, Reyes, and now Borrero, recognizing its role in effective supervision.

D. Broader Doctrinal Impact

While nonprecedential, Borrero:

• Solidifies the practical reach of Maiorana: any failure to clearly adopt conditions at sentencing can result in vacatur and remand, even where neither side objected contemporaneously, particularly where both parties agree a remand is appropriate.
• Aligns the Second Circuit with a growing cross-circuit consensus that:
  • Unannounced home/field visits with plain-view seizures are compatible with the Fourth Amendment and the statutory supervised-release scheme;
  • More intrusive searches require additional justification such as reasonable suspicion, typically via a separate special condition.
• Signals that standard condition six will remain a durable feature of federal supervision, especially for defendants with violent or weapons-related offense histories.

IX. Conclusion

United States v. Borrero reinforces two central propositions in Second Circuit supervised release jurisprudence:

1. Oral Pronouncement Rule (via Maiorana): Supervised release conditions—standard and special—must be clearly imposed at the sentencing hearing, either by explicit recitation or by specific incorporation of a written list that the defendant has seen. Written judgments cannot silently add or alter conditions.
2. Endorsement of Standard Condition Six: The Guidelines’ standard condition six, authorizing unannounced probation visits “at any time at [the defendant’s] home or elsewhere” with seizure of contraband in plain view, is valid. It is not vague, not overbroad, not an improper delegation, and not redundant of reasonable-suspicion-based search conditions.

On remand, the district court in Borrero’s case must:

• Reconsider and, if appropriate, reimpose the standard conditions in strict compliance with Maiorana; and
• Clarify and explicitly impose the drug-treatment condition it intends, resolving the outpatient vs. inpatient ambiguity.

Although this decision appears as a summary order, its reasoning is detailed, grounded in binding circuit precedent, and supported by cross-circuit authority and Sentencing Commission policy. It thus provides a clear roadmap for how supervised release conditions should be imposed, reviewed, and structured in the Second Circuit going forward, and it strongly signals that broad, flexible supervision mechanisms—particularly standard condition six—will withstand general constitutional and statutory challenges.