United States v. Boone: Applying § 2G2.2 with “Great Care” and a Flexible Paroline Restitution Analysis in a Non‑Precedential Summary Order

I. Introduction

In United States v. Boone, Nos. 25‑272‑cr (L), 25‑544‑cr (CON), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a non‑precedential summary order dated December 19, 2025, affirmed a 168‑month sentence and restitution awards totaling $66,500 arising from child‑pornography offenses. The case presents two principal issues:

Whether the defendant’s below‑Guidelines prison sentence was substantively unreasonable, particularly in light of the controversial child‑pornography guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, and the defendant’s mental‑health treatment needs under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D); and
Whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing restitution awards above the statutory minimum of $3,000 per victim under 18 U.S.C. § 2259, consistent with the Supreme Court’s framework in Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014).

Although the order expressly states that it has no precedential effect, it is nevertheless citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1 and is important as a persuasive application of existing law in two highly litigated areas:

sentencing in child‑pornography cases under § 2G2.2 and United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010); and
restitution for child‑pornography victims under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 and Paroline.

The Second Circuit’s reasoning provides useful guidance for district courts and practitioners on how to:

use the child‑pornography Guidelines “with great care” without mechanically applying enhancements; and
structure restitution awards that reasonably reflect a defendant’s “relative role in the causal process” of a victim’s losses without needing a rigid, factor‑by‑factor mathematical calculus.

II. Background and Procedural History

The defendant, Lawrence Boone, pleaded guilty in the Northern District of New York (Chief Judge Brenda K. Sannes) to seven counts involving the receipt, distribution, and possession of child pornography. Based on the presentence report and the district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 (the child‑pornography guideline), a Guidelines range was calculated that the court itself later found to be “greater than necessary” to accomplish the purposes of sentencing.

Chief Judge Sannes ultimately imposed:

a 168‑month (14‑year) term of imprisonment, which the Second Circuit characterizes as a below‑Guidelines sentence; and
$66,500 in restitution, consisting of eight awards to different identified victims, each ranging from $5,000 to $10,000—i.e., all above the statutory minimum of $3,000 per victim mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B).

On appeal, Boone raised two substantive challenges:

His prison term was substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), especially because the district court allegedly relied too heavily on enhancements “inherent” in child‑pornography offenses under § 2G2.2 and failed adequately to tailor his sentence to his need for specialized mental‑health treatment under § 3553(a)(2)(D).
The restitution awards above $3,000 were excessive and did not adequately reflect his “relative role” in causing the victims’ losses, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B) and Paroline.

The Second Circuit (Judges Cabranes, Parker, and Lohier) rejected both arguments and affirmed.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

A. Sentencing: Substantive Reasonableness of the 168‑Month Term

The Second Circuit framed the substantive reasonableness inquiry as a single question:

“[S]ubstantive reasonableness reduces to a single question: whether the [d]istrict [c]ourt abused [its] discretion in determining that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors supported the sentence imposed.”
— United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2008)

The court rejected Boone’s two principal sentencing theories:

Mechanical reliance on § 2G2.2 enhancements. Boone, relying on Dorvee, argued that his sentence was essentially dictated by a mechanical application of child‑pornography enhancements that are “inherent” to the offense (for example, use of a computer, large number of images, etc.). The Second Circuit disagreed, noting:
- Dorvee does not require courts to disregard the § 2G2.2 enhancements, citing United States v. Lawrence, 139 F.4th 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2025); and
- the district court applied § 2G2.2 and § 3553(a) with “great care,” recognized that the Guidelines range was “greater than necessary,” and imposed a reduced, below‑Guidelines sentence.
Failure to ensure “the most effective” mental‑health treatment. Boone argued that § 3553(a)(2)(D) required the court to impose a sentence that would provide him with specialized mental‑health treatment “in the most effective manner.” The Second Circuit held:
- Section 3553(a) requires the court to consider the need for medical or correctional treatment, not to adopt any specific treatment plan or sentence length;
- the district court explicitly weighed Boone’s mental‑health needs, imposed a below‑Guidelines sentence in part for that reason, and recommended BOP mental‑health treatment; and
- the court also appropriately balanced those concerns against “the serious nature of [Boone’s] offense” and the need for deterrence.

Finding no abuse of discretion under this deferential standard, the Second Circuit held that the 168‑month sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

B. Restitution: Above‑Minimum Awards Under § 2259 and Paroline

Boone also challenged the eight restitution awards exceeding the $3,000 statutory minimum per victim set by 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B). The court reviewed the restitution order for abuse of discretion, citing United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2011).

Boone argued that:

the district court did not sufficiently ensure that the amounts reflected his “relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim[s’] losses,” as required by § 2259(b)(2)(B); and
the Government had not provided estimates for each of the Paroline factors, making the restitution awards allegedly unsupported.

The Second Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that the district court:

correctly calculated each victim’s “amount of losses”;
assessed Boone’s “relative causal significance” by considering:
- the number of images and videos of each victim Boone possessed; and
- the number of prior defendants who had already contributed to the victim’s losses;
ensured that each victim’s aggregate recovery did not exceed the victim’s total losses; and
reasonably set awards between $5,000 and $10,000, which were neither token nor excessively “severe” in light of Boone’s role as a possessor of the images.

The court emphasized that Paroline does not provide a “precise algorithm” and does not require consideration of every enumerated factor. It suffices that the district court analyzes the most relevant factors in the record and arrives at a non‑arbitrary, reasonable approximation. On that basis, the restitution order was affirmed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Sentencing under § 2G2.2 and § 3553(a)

1. The Substantive Reasonableness Standard and Jones

The court’s opening citation, United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2008), is a cornerstone of Second Circuit sentencing jurisprudence. Under Jones and related cases:

Appellate review of a within‑ or below‑Guidelines sentence is for abuse of discretion—a standard that is highly deferential to the district court’s judgment;
Substantive reasonableness focuses on the length of the sentence and whether it is shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law in light of § 3553(a); and
The reviewing court asks whether the district court’s balancing of the statutory factors was within the range of permissible decisions.

This framework heavily favors affirmance where:

the district court articulated its § 3553(a) analysis; and
no major factor was ignored or given irrational weight.

In Boone, the Second Circuit repeatedly underscores that the district court acted with “great care,” which is practically a signal that the appellate court views the sentencing reasoning as firmly within the permitted range.

2. Dorvee and the Critique of § 2G2.2

Boone’s primary sentencing argument draws on United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010). In Dorvee, the Second Circuit:

criticized U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 as non‑empirical and prone to produce irrational results, with offense levels driven up by enhancements that appear in the vast majority of child‑pornography cases (e.g., use of a computer, large volume of images);
warned against mechanical application of these enhancements, which can yield advisory ranges that approach or exceed the statutory maximum even for typical offenders; and
vacated as substantively unreasonable a Guidelines‑driven sentence that failed to account for these features.

This line of critique has since formed the backbone of many defense challenges to severe child‑pornography sentences, especially when the district court appears to give near‑dispositive weight to § 2G2.2’s enhancements.

However, Dorvee did not hold that § 2G2.2 must be ignored. Instead, it cautioned that courts should:

recognize the guideline’s limitations and the risk of over‑punishment; and
apply the § 3553(a) factors independently, not as a mere rubber stamp of the Guidelines range.

3. Lawrence and the Clarification that Enhancements Need Not Be Disregarded

The panel in Boone relies on United States v. Lawrence, 139 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2025), to restate and clarify the proper reading of Dorvee:

Dorvee does not require district courts “to disregard” the § 2G2.2 enhancements for such crimes. — Lawrence, 139 F.4th at 122 (quoted in Boone).

Thus, the correct post‑Dorvee approach is:

District courts may apply all applicable § 2G2.2 enhancements; but
They must do so non‑mechanically, mindful of their near‑ubiquity and the resulting inflation of the advisory range; and
They must ultimately test the Guidelines range against § 3553(a)’s “sufficient but not greater than necessary” standard.

In Boone, the panel concludes that this is exactly what Chief Judge Sannes did.

4. The District Court’s “Great Care” and Below‑Guidelines Sentence

The key to the Second Circuit’s affirmance lies in the district court’s demonstrated care:

The court calculated the Guidelines range using § 2G2.2 and its enhancements, thus honoring the requirement that a sentence start with a correct Guidelines calculation.
It then considered the § 3553(a) factors and explicitly concluded that the resulting range was “greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing.”
Based on that analysis, it imposed a below‑Guidelines sentence of 168 months.

The Second Circuit analogizes this approach to the sort of great care Dorvee urged:

[T]he District Court appears to have applied § 2G2.2 and § 3553(a) with “great care” rather than indiscriminately, Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184, to determine that the applicable Guidelines range was “greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing.” (App’x 100.)

Because the district court:

did not blindly apply § 2G2.2;
recognized the advisory nature and potential severity of the range; and
meaningfully adjusted downward in light of § 3553(a),

the appellate court found the sentence squarely within the realm of substantive reasonableness.

5. § 3553(a)(2)(D) and Mental‑Health Treatment

Boone’s alternative argument focused on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D), which directs sentencing courts to consider:

“the need for the sentence imposed … to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”

Boone contended that the district court erred by not crafting a sentence that maximized his access to “specialized mental health treatment” in “the most effective manner.” The Second Circuit rejected this in two important steps:

Obligation to consider, not to optimize. The court emphasized that § 3553(a) requires only that the sentencing court consider specified factors, including treatment needs; it does not create an enforceable right to a sentence that is calibrated to guarantee (or even to promote) optimal treatment.
Record showed adequate consideration. The district court:
- explicitly discussed Boone’s mental‑health needs;
- cited them as part of the rationale for imposing a below‑Guidelines term;
- recommended that the Bureau of Prisons provide Boone with mental‑health treatment; and
- balanced those needs against the seriousness of the offenses and the needs for deterrence and public protection.

Thus, the panel concluded: “No more was required.” That succinct statement provides an important clarification for future litigants: § 3553(a)(2)(D) is a consideration, not a trump card. Courts must address treatment needs, but they are not required to subordinate punishment, deterrence, or protection of the public to the goal of treatment.

B. Restitution Under § 2259 and Paroline

1. Statutory Background: 18 U.S.C. § 2259

Section 2259 governs mandatory restitution in cases involving sexual exploitation of children. For child‑pornography victims, the statute, as relevant here:

requires the court to award mandatory restitution to each identified victim;
sets a statutory minimum of $3,000 per victim (18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B)); and
directs the court to ensure that:
- each victim’s total recovery does not exceed her “full amount of losses” (§ 2259(b)(2)(A)); and
- restitution from any single defendant reflects “the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s losses” (§ 2259(b)(2)(B)).

These provisions were shaped by the Supreme Court’s decision in Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014), which interpreted and effectively restructured how restitution must be assessed in child‑pornography possession cases.

2. Standard of Review: Aumais and Deferential Oversight

Citing United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2011), the Second Circuit reiterates that restitution orders are reviewed “deferentially” and that reversal is warranted only for abuse of discretion—a particularly forgiving standard where the district court has engaged, as here, in a nuanced factual and legal analysis.

3. The Paroline Framework

In Paroline, the Supreme Court confronted the question: how much restitution should a single possessor of a child‑pornography image pay, given that:

the victim’s total losses are enormous and cumulative (therapy, lost income, emotional damage, etc.); and
thousands of individuals may possess and distribute the same image, making each one only a partial cause of the aggregate harm.

The Court rejected two extremes:

making a single possessor liable for all of the victim’s losses; and
limiting restitution to a de minimis or purely symbolic amount.

Instead, it adopted a proximate‑cause and relative‑responsibility approach: each defendant must pay an amount that reasonably reflects his relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses.

The Court listed a non‑exhaustive set of factors that “could” bear on that determination:

the number of past defendants found to have contributed to the victim’s losses;
reasonable predictions of the number of future offenders likely to be caught and convicted;
any reasonably reliable estimate of the broader number of offenders involved;
whether the defendant reproduced or distributed images of the victim;
whether the defendant had any connection to the initial production of the images;
how many images of the victim the defendant possessed; and
other facts relevant to the defendant’s relative causal role.

Critically, the Court cautioned that Paroline did not adopt a “precise algorithm” and recognized that the exercise “cannot be a precise mathematical inquiry.” The district court is to arrive at a reasonable approximation, informed by—but not shackled to—these factors.

4. Application in Boone: Focusing on the “Most Relevant” Factors

In Boone, the district court appears to have undertaken a detailed Paroline-style assessment for each of eight identified victims. The Second Circuit highlights three aspects of that analysis:

Calculation of each victim’s total losses. The district court first determined the “amount of [each] victim’s losses,” as required by § 2259 and Paroline.
Assessment of Boone’s “relative causal significance.” The court then considered:
- the number of images and videos Boone possessed for each victim; and
- the number of prior defendants who had already been ordered to pay restitution to each victim.
These correspond to Paroline factors (1), (6), and (7)—past defendants, quantity of images, and other relevant facts.
Ensuring no over‑recovery. Finally, the court made sure that each victim’s aggregate recovery—counting all restitution orders from all defendants—did not exceed the full amount of that victim’s losses, as required by § 2259(b)(2)(A)–(C).

Based on these considerations, the court set individual restitution awards between $5,000 and $10,000—substantially above the $3,000 floor, yet far below the victims’ total losses. The Second Circuit noted that:

victims for whom Boone possessed more than one video, and
the victim with the greatest total losses

received the higher awards, indicating a concrete, fact‑sensitive effort at apportionment.

5. Rejecting the Demand for a Factor‑by‑Factor Quantitative Showing

Boone argued that the Government failed to produce estimates for every Paroline factor and that the restitution awards were therefore unsupported. The Second Circuit firmly rejected this, relying on Paroline itself:

Paroline explicitly disclaimed a “precise algorithm” and did not require rigid consideration of every enumerated factor.
Instead, it left room for judicial judgment, recognizing that reliable estimates for some factors (for example, total number of worldwide offenders) may be unavailable.

The panel concludes that the district court’s focus on:

the quantity and type of images (including whether Boone produced, reproduced, or distributed them); and
the number of prior restitution orders to each victim

was sufficient. These were the “most relevant” factors given the evidence in the record.

The court acknowledges that the resulting awards do not map “linearly” to either:

the number of images Boone possessed per victim; or
the total amount of each victim’s losses.

However, it emphasizes that restitution “cannot be a precise mathematical inquiry.” What matters is that:

the awards are reasoned and non‑arbitrary;
they are not “token”; and
they are not so high as to be “severe” or disproportionate to Boone’s role as a possessor (and, for some victims, distributor or reproducer) of images.

On this record, the Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion.

C. The Nature of Summary Orders and Their Persuasive Effect

The opening paragraphs of the order contain a standard disclaimer:

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.

Yet, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1:

summary orders filed on or after January 1, 2007, may be cited in any federal court;
they are not binding precedent but can be used for their persuasive value and for purposes such as issue preservation, consistency, or illustrating how the court applies certain doctrines; and
any party citing such a summary order must serve a copy on any party not represented by counsel.

Thus, although Boone does not create new binding law, it clarifies and illustrates how the Second Circuit currently understands and applies:

Dorvee and Lawrence in the context of § 2G2.2;
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) mental‑health considerations; and
Paroline and § 2259’s restitution framework.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Substantive vs. Procedural Reasonableness

Procedural reasonableness concerns the process: Did the court correctly calculate the Guidelines range, treat the Guidelines as advisory, consider the § 3553(a) factors, and explain its reasoning?
Substantive reasonableness, at issue here, asks whether the length of the sentence is justified in light of the statutory factors. A sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it is so long (or short) that it falls outside the broad “range of permissible decisions.”

2. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 and “Inherent” Enhancements

Section 2G2.2 is the sentencing guideline for non‑production child‑pornography offenses (possession, receipt, distribution). It contains multiple specific offense characteristics—enhancements that increase the offense level for features such as:

use of a computer;
number of images (with tiered increases as the number grows);
material depicting prepubescent minors; and
distribution of images.

Because modern child‑pornography offenses almost always involve computers and large numbers of images, many of these enhancements are effectively “inherent” to the crime, appearing in most cases. Dorvee criticized this because it balloons the Guidelines range regardless of individualized culpability.

In Boone, the Second Circuit accepts the use of these enhancements but requires that they be applied with “great care” and then adjusted as needed through a fact‑sensitive § 3553(a) analysis.

3. Abuse of Discretion

“Abuse of discretion” is a deferential standard of appellate review. A district court abuses its discretion if:

it bases its decision on an error of law;
relies on clearly erroneous factual findings; or
reaches a conclusion that is outside the range of reasonable choices given the facts and the law.

Under this standard, the appellate court is not free to substitute its own judgment merely because it might have chosen a different sentence or restitution amount.

4. § 3553(a)(2)(D): “Most Effective” Treatment

Section 3553(a)(2)(D) is sometimes misunderstood because it uses the phrase “in the most effective manner.” In context, this language:

requires courts to consider the need to provide treatment effectively; but
does not guarantee a treatment‑oriented sentence or require the court to optimize the sentence for therapeutic purposes.

A court satisfies § 3553(a)(2)(D) if it takes treatment needs into account when deciding on a sentence. In Boone, this was done by:

discussing Boone’s mental‑health issues;
reducing the sentence below the Guidelines in part because of those needs; and
recommending mental‑health treatment in the Bureau of Prisons.

5. Proximate Causation and “Relative Role” in Restitution

In restitution cases like this:

Proximate cause means that the defendant’s conduct must have a sufficiently direct relationship to the victim’s losses to justify holding the defendant financially responsible.
Because child‑pornography victims’ injuries are cumulative and compounded by many offenders over time, each possessor or distributor is just one contributor to the harm.
Paroline and § 2259 therefore require that a defendant’s restitution obligation reflect his “relative role in the causal process”—that is, a reasonable share of the overall harm attributable to him.

This is not a precise science. Courts approximate based on available information, such as:

How many images of the victim the defendant possessed;
Whether he distributed or produced the images;
How many other offenders have already been held accountable; and
The total size of the victim’s losses.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

1. Sentencing in Child‑Pornography Cases Post‑Dorvee

Although non‑precedential, Boone reinforces several practical points about sentencing in child‑pornography cases in the Second Circuit:

§ 2G2.2 remains usable but must be applied with care. Courts may apply the guideline and its enhancements, but must recognize its tendency to over‑punish typical cases and should freely consider below‑Guidelines sentences where appropriate.
Defendants cannot rely on Dorvee to nullify the guideline entirely. The clarification in Lawrence, embraced here, undercuts arguments that enhancements “inherent” to the offense must be ignored or given no weight.
Below‑Guidelines sentences are strongly insulated on appeal. Because the district court here:
- correctly calculated the range;
- found it “greater than necessary”; and
- imposed a below‑Guidelines sentence with a reasoned § 3553(a) explanation,
the Second Circuit saw no basis to disturb the sentence.

For defense counsel, Boone confirms that:

arguments should focus on persuading the district court at the sentencing stage, rather than anticipating relief on appeal; and
Dorvee is most powerful when it is used to encourage a careful, individualized analysis and variance, not to demand categorical rejection of Guideline enhancements.

2. Mental‑Health Treatment Arguments under § 3553(a)(2)(D)

Boone sends a clear message on treatment‑based sentencing arguments:

The court’s duty is to consider the need for treatment, not to guarantee or maximize it.
Recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons and modest variances based on treatment needs will usually suffice to show adequate consideration.
Absent a complete failure to address the issue, appellate courts will be reluctant to find an abuse of discretion solely on the ground that the sentence could have been more treatment‑friendly.

3. Restitution in Child‑Pornography Cases After Paroline

On restitution, Boone offers these practical implications:

Courts may go well above the $3,000 minimum. Where the evidence supports it, and where the defendant’s contribution to the victim’s harm is significant, awards in the $5,000–$10,000 range (or higher) per victim are likely to be upheld.
Not every Paroline factor must be estimated. District courts do not need exact numbers for:
- total worldwide offenders; or
- future offenders likely to be caught,
so long as they reasonably rely on the factors for which data exist and explain their reasoning.
Non‑linear apportionment is permissible. Courts may vary award amounts among victims even where the number of images or prior defendants does not track exactly. What is required is a reasonable explanation consistent with the factual record.
Ensuring no over‑recovery is critical. Courts must ensure that total restitution to any one victim across all cases does not exceed the victim’s full losses. Doing so fortifies the order against appellate attack.

For prosecutors, this decision underscores the value of:

assembling evidence on each victim’s total losses;
tracking prior restitution awards; and
documenting how many images/videos of each victim the defendant possessed, reproduced, or distributed.

For defense counsel, it warns that:

appeals that demand a fully quantified, factor‑by‑factor Paroline analysis are unlikely to succeed if the district court explained its reasoning and used the most salient available data; and
arguments that restitution must be mathematically exact or linearly proportional will face an uphill battle.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Boone is a non‑precedential summary order, but it offers a clear and coherent application of important doctrines in federal sentencing and restitution law.

On the sentencing side, the Second Circuit:

reaffirms that Dorvee does not invalidate § 2G2.2 or its enhancements but instead requires their careful, non‑mechanical use; and
clarifies that § 3553(a)(2)(D) obliges courts to consider mental‑health and other treatment needs, not to craft a sentence that maximizes or ensures a particular treatment regimen.

On restitution, the decision:

illustrates a faithful application of Paroline and § 2259’s relative role in the causal process standard; and
confirms that courts may impose above‑minimum restitution awards based on a reasonable assessment of a defendant’s share of the harm, without a rigid, mathematical formula or complete data on every theoretical factor.

Taken together, Boone underscores the Second Circuit’s overarching approach: strong deference to district courts that engage seriously with the Guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors, and the Paroline restitution framework, coupled with a clear rejection of formalistic or algorithmic demands not required by statute or Supreme Court precedent.

Note: This commentary is for informational and analytical purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.