United States v. Barnes: Limits on Withdrawing Guilty Pleas for Alleged Plea‑Stage Ineffective Assistance and Deference to Sentencing Findings

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Franchot Barnes, No. 25‑1076 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), addresses two recurring problems in federal criminal practice:

How far a defendant may go in using a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to remedy alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations; and
The degree of deference owed to a district court’s Guidelines enhancements and drug-quantity findings in a complex drug conspiracy case.

Barnes was charged through three successive superseding indictments arising out of a cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy. He ultimately entered an open plea (a guilty plea without a plea agreement) to the third superseding indictment, which carried a significantly higher mandatory minimum and Guidelines exposure than the first indictment. After seeing a presentence report (PSR) with a much higher than expected advisory range, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming prior counsel mishandled an earlier Rule 11 plea offer and failed to effectuate his desire to plead earlier to a more favorable indictment.

The district court denied the motion without a hearing and later imposed a 324‑month sentence, at the low end of the Guidelines range. On appeal, Barnes challenged:

The denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and
The procedural reasonableness of his sentence, focusing on:
- the court’s treatment of an alleged sentencing disparity with a co-defendant,
- a firearm enhancement,
- an obstruction-of-justice enhancement, and
- the drug-quantity calculation.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in full. The opinion is not recommended for publication, but it provides a useful synthesis of existing law and practical guidance on how defendants should (and should not) litigate plea-withdrawal motions premised on ineffective assistance, and on how sentencing courts may address disparity arguments and apply Guidelines enhancements in drug cases.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Indictments and Plea Negotiations

Barnes was charged in a multi-defendant drug conspiracy. The charging documents evolved over time, a common feature in large narcotics cases:

First superseding indictment: charged Barnes with conspiracy to distribute and attempted distribution of more than 500 grams of cocaine, carrying a five-year mandatory minimum.
Second superseding indictment: added methamphetamine allegations, raising the mandatory minimum from five to ten years.
Third superseding indictment: increased Barnes’s cocaine quantity from 500 grams to over 5 kilograms, further increasing sentencing exposure.

According to Barnes’s appellate counsel, the government offered an early Rule 11 plea agreement shortly after Barnes was first charged, which allegedly:

would have removed at least one charge; and
included a favorable sentencing recommendation.

Barnes claimed he wanted to accept that offer, but his first lawyer advised against it due to forfeiture concerns. Barnes further asserted that he instructed counsel that he wanted to plead guilty “open”—that is, to plead guilty without a plea agreement—to the first superseding indictment. However, no plea was entered at that time, and whatever Rule 11 offer existed appears to have lapsed before second counsel entered the case.

As the case progressed and the charges became more serious, Barnes eventually retained a third attorney, who advised him to enter an open plea to the third superseding indictment, the most severe version of the charges.

B. The Change-of-Plea Hearing

At the Rule 11 hearing, the district judge:

explained the penalties associated with the charges in the third superseding indictment, including drug quantities and mandatory minimums;
fielded Barnes’s detailed questions about the change from “500 grams or more” in an earlier indictment to “five kilos or more” in the current one;
heard Barnes acknowledge that he had wanted to plead guilty earlier to an indictment with a five-year mandatory minimum but had deferred based on counsel’s advice.

Despite expressing some frustration (“I don’t have a choice. I guess I have to plead guilty.”), Barnes:

stated unequivocally that he wished to plead guilty;
confirmed his understanding of the charges, penalties, and rights waived; and
did not assert innocence or any desire to go to trial.

The district court conducted a “thorough” Rule 11 colloquy and accepted the plea as knowing and voluntary.

C. Motion to Withdraw the Plea

After the probation office prepared an initial PSR showing a much higher-than-expected Guidelines range, Barnes moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Importantly:

He did not seek to reclaim his right to a jury trial.
Instead, he asked to be permitted to plead guilty:
- to the alleged original Rule 11 plea agreement; or
- to the first superseding indictment.
He framed his argument largely as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding counsel’s plea advice and failure to effectuate his earlier desire to plead.
He did not submit an affidavit describing the alleged plea offer, his directions to counsel, or the advice he received.
He did not explicitly request an evidentiary hearing, other than saying that he “would testify” if one were ordered.

The district court, applying the Rule 11(d)(2)(B) “fair and just reason” standard and the usual multi-factor test, denied the motion without holding a hearing.

D. Sentencing

At sentencing, the district court:

found an offense level of 39 and a criminal history category of III, yielding a Guidelines range of 324–405 months;
based that offense level on:
- a drug weight of between 15 and 50 kilograms of cocaine;
- a two-level dangerous-weapon enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); and
- a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
rejected Barnes’s request for a downward variance based in part on alleged disparity with co-defendant Jomo Grady, who received 210 months.

The court imposed a 324-month sentence—the bottom of the Guidelines range.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Judge Larsen, joined by Judges Batchelder and Gilman) affirmed on all issues.

A. Plea Withdrawal / Ineffective Assistance

The ineffective-assistance claim was held premature for direct appeal because the record was insufficiently developed; such claims are usually reserved for post-conviction (e.g., § 2255) proceedings.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in:
- declining to hold an evidentiary hearing, given Barnes’s failure to submit affidavits or detailed proffers; or
- concluding that Barnes failed to show a “fair and just reason” to withdraw his guilty plea under Rule 11(d)(2)(B).
Key factors against withdrawal included:
- a 179-day delay between the plea and the motion, apparently triggered by an unfavorable PSR;
- Barnes’s failure to assert innocence;
- his education and prior criminal-justice experience; and
- the thorough, patient Rule 11 colloquy.

B. Sentencing – Procedural Reasonableness

Co-defendant disparity: The court held that the district judge adequately considered and responded to Barnes’s argument comparing his sentence to co-defendant Grady’s, distinguishing Wallace and Guerrero, where judges had failed to acknowledge similar arguments.
Firearm enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(1)): Affirmed. Barnes constructively possessed a firearm located in a kitchen drawer at a house he co-owned and used for drug trafficking; its proximity to cocaine and large drug transactions made the connection to the offense reasonably foreseeable.
Obstruction-of-justice enhancement (§ 3C1.1): Affirmed. Barnes’s efforts to sell the Braile Street house and hide jewelry in Los Angeles—both after law enforcement activity and indictment—supported a finding that he attempted to thwart forfeiture, constituting obstruction.
Drug-quantity determination: Affirmed. The court upheld the finding that text and phone references to small integers (e.g., “one”, “four”) meant kilograms rather than ounces, reaching at least 18 kilograms based on expert testimony, intercepted calls, pricing, and actual seizures.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Plea Withdrawal and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Direct Appeal vs. Post-Conviction for Ineffective Assistance

The court began by emphasizing a familiar principle: ineffective-assistance claims are generally not decided on direct appeal because the trial record is usually insufficient.

United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996): Ineffective assistance claims “are best brought” in post-conviction proceedings so that the parties can develop an adequate record.
United States v. Hall, 200 F.3d 962 (6th Cir. 2000): An exception applies when the record is adequately developed to decide the claim.
United States v. Carson, 32 F.4th 615 (6th Cir. 2022): An evidentiary hearing may create a sufficient record to resolve an ineffective-assistance claim in the context of a plea-withdrawal motion.

In Barnes, the record was notably thin:

No affidavit from Barnes.
No written documentation of the alleged plea offer.
No detailed description of what precisely counsel advised or failed to do.

Barnes’s counsel merely represented (based on conversations with Barnes) that there had been a Rule 11 offer and that prior counsel’s advice had been deficient. That kind of unsworn, non-specific summary is not enough to depart from the usual rule favoring post-conviction litigation of ineffective-assistance claims.

Thus, the Sixth Circuit held the ineffective assistance component premature and declined to resolve it on direct appeal. The suggestion is clear: if Barnes wants to pursue such a claim, the appropriate vehicle is likely a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, supported by affidavits and, if warranted, an evidentiary hearing.

2. Standard for Withdrawing a Guilty Plea

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing if he can show a “fair and just reason” for the request. Sixth Circuit law frames this inquiry through seven non-exhaustive factors, outlined in United States v. Goddard, 638 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2011):

Time elapsed between plea and motion to withdraw;
Reason for not moving to withdraw earlier;
Assertion (or lack) of innocence;
Circumstances of the plea itself;
Defendant’s nature and background;
Prior experience with the criminal justice system;
Prejudice to the government if withdrawal is allowed.

Goddard frames the purpose of Rule 11(d)(2)(B) in restrictive terms:

“[The rule is] designed to allow a hastily entered plea made with an unsure heart and confused mind to be undone, not to allow a defendant to make a tactical decision to enter a plea, wait several weeks, and then obtain a withdrawal if he believes that he made a bad choice in pleading guilty.”

This characterization is central to the court’s treatment of Barnes’s motion; his change of heart emerged only after receiving an unfavorable PSR, a classic example of the “buyer’s remorse” problem Rule 11(d) is meant to guard against.

3. Application to Barnes: Why the Motion Failed

The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that the seven factors “weigh decisively against Barnes”.

Time delay (179 days): Almost six months passed between the plea and the motion to withdraw. The court noted that it has “often upheld” denials of motions to withdraw where less than six months separated the two events (citing United States v. Ellis, 470 F.3d 275, 281 (6th Cir. 2006)). The fact that the motion appeared triggered by the PSR supports the inference of mere regret rather than unfairness at the time of plea.
Lack of earlier motion / tactical nature: Barnes offered no persuasive explanation for why he waited until after seeing the PSR. His strategy—seek to resurrect an earlier, more favorable charging posture or a lapsed plea—looked like an attempt to negotiate backwards, not to undo a confused or involuntary plea.
No assertion of innocence: Barnes never claimed he was innocent. In fact, he repeatedly said he wanted to plead guilty to “the crime he committed” and continued to disclaim any interest in a jury trial even when asking to withdraw his plea. That undercut any suggestion that the plea was the product of confusion or coercion.
Circumstances of the plea: The district court conducted a “thorough” Rule 11 colloquy, addressed Barnes’s questions about drug quantities and penalties, and ensured he understood the difference between earlier and current indictments. Barnes’s expressions of reluctance were characterized as ordinary regret rather than legal defect in the plea process.
Background and prior experience: Barnes had a college education and prior familiarity with the criminal justice system. These factors suggested he could understand the proceedings and ramifications of his choices.
Prejudice to the government: The district court could reasonably infer some degree of prejudice after a long delay and changed positions, though the Sixth Circuit’s analysis centers mainly on the first six factors, which already weighed heavily against withdrawal.

In short, the court saw Barnes’s motion as precisely what Goddard warns against: a post‑PSR tactical attempt to improve his bargaining position after a fully valid plea.

4. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying an Evidentiary Hearing

The appellate court also upheld the district court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The standard of review is abuse of discretion (citing United States v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1987) and United States v. Watkins, 815 F. App’x 22 (6th Cir. 2020)).

Critical to this holding:

Barnes never requested a hearing outright in his motion; he simply indicated that he would testify “if” the court ordered a hearing.
He failed to file an affidavit or particularized proffer of facts regarding the alleged plea offer or counsel’s advice.

The Sixth Circuit captured the problem sharply: the district court was not required “to cash Barnes’s promissory note for testimony he was unwilling or unable to place in a sworn affidavit or even proffer in any detail.” Without concrete, sworn assertions, the court had no obligation to convene a hearing in hopes that some theory might materialize.

The opinion thereby underscores a practical rule: if a defendant wants an evidentiary hearing on plea-withdrawal or ineffective assistance, he must put specific, sworn facts on the table. Generalized allegations or second-hand representations by counsel are not enough.

B. Sentencing: Procedural Reasonableness

1. Framework for Procedural Reasonableness

The court applied the standard described in United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018). A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court:

properly calculates the Guidelines range;
treats the range as advisory;
considers the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a);
avoids impermissible factors;
bases the sentence on facts not clearly erroneous; and
adequately explains the chosen sentence.

Barnes’s challenges all targeted these components, especially the adequacy of explanation and the factual determinations underlying enhancements and drug weight.

2. Co-Defendant Sentencing Disparity

Barnes argued that his 324‑month sentence was unjustified given that co-defendant Jomo Grady received only 210 months. He invoked § 3553(a)(6), which instructs courts to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.

Two precedents frame this issue:

United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2007): § 3553(a)(6) is primarily concerned with national disparities among similarly situated federal defendants, not disparities among co-defendants in a single case.
United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2010): While § 3553(a)(6) doesn’t require courts to equalize co-defendants, judges may consider such disparities and must at least show they have considered a non-frivolous argument on the point.

The Sixth Circuit recently reinforced this in an unpublished decision, United States v. Guerrero, 2024 WL 3427204 (6th Cir. 2024), vacating a sentence where the district court failed to acknowledge a co-defendant disparity argument at all.

By contrast, in Barnes the district court:

explicitly stated that it had sentenced both Barnes and Grady, knew their PSRs and offense levels, and that they were “different”;
told defense counsel to “talk about [your] client,” signaling that it had already evaluated the co-defendant comparison;
later returned to the point when imposing sentence, explaining that:
- it had carefully tracked the roles and sentences of all participants in the drug trafficking organization, including sentences imposed by other judges; and
- in particular, it had “considered [the] Grady sentence” at 210 months, but Grady had “different factors,” including the absence of obstruction, gun, and premises enhancements.

The Sixth Circuit held this explanation sufficient under Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), which allows a sentencing judge to be brief so long as the record shows meaningful consideration of the arguments:

“Although the judge might have said more, where the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, the law does not require[] the judge to write [or speak] more extensively.”

Thus, Barnes clarifies that:

a district court need not dwell at length on co-defendant disparities; but
it must at least indicate that it has considered such an argument and has a reasoned basis for treating co-defendants differently.

3. Dangerous Weapon Enhancement – U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)

The district court applied a two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1), which adds two levels “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” in connection with the drug offense.

The Sixth Circuit relied on its recent decision in United States v. Brown, 131 F.4th 337 (6th Cir. 2025), to restate the governing test:

The government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that:
- the defendant actually or constructively possessed the weapon, and
- the weapon was possessed during “relevant conduct” of the offense.
Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it is “clearly improbable” the weapon was connected to the offense. (See also United States v. Catalan, 499 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2007).)

Where firearm possession is based on a co-conspirator’s conduct, Brown requires proof that:

the possession was within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity;
in furtherance of that activity; and
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.

The factual record in Barnes included two firearms:

one at a house on Sandalwood Drive, where cash deliveries were made; and
one at the Braile Street house, which Barnes co-owned with his mother and used as a base of drug operations.

The PSR and Government focused on the Braile Street gun as the basis for the enhancement. The Sixth Circuit interpreted the sentencing transcript as treating the Sandalwood gun only as “supportive evidence” that Barnes knew firearms were part of the operation, not as an independent basis for the enhancement. The appellate court therefore evaluated the enhancement solely in light of the Braile Street firearm.

On those facts:

Barnes had constructive possession of the Braile Street firearm because:
- he co-owned the property;
- he operated his drug operation from there; and
- the gun was found in a kitchen drawer, in the same area where cocaine was stored.
The court cited United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450 (6th Cir. 1991), which holds that dominion over the premises where an item is found can establish constructive possession.
The firearm’s presence in a drug house, alongside significant cocaine activity, made its connection to the offense reasonably foreseeable and functionally in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court emphasized:
- a seizure of two kilograms of cocaine, bought for $65,000, transported from Braile Street a week before the search;
- the close proximity in time and space between the cocaine and the loaded handgun; and
- the well-established principle that firearms often provide protection for major drug traffickers (citing Brown).

The Sixth Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that § 2D1.1(b)(1) applied. Barnes failed to carry his burden to show it was “clearly improbable” that the firearm was connected to his drug activities.

4. Obstruction-of-Justice Enhancement – U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

The Guidelines impose a two-level enhancement where:

“the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction” and the conduct is related to that offense or a closely related one.

See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 & cmt. n.9 (defendant is responsible for his own conduct and certain conduct he “aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused”).

The Sixth Circuit discussed standards of review for this Guideline, acknowledging its own “mixed messages” (citing United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Jackson, 154 F.4th 422 (6th Cir. 2025)). But it ultimately found the enhancement valid under even the most stringent (de novo) review of law-to-fact application, while reviewing historical fact findings, including intent, for clear error.

The district court relied on two main episodes:

Attempts to sell the Braile Street house:
- On July 6, 2023—the same day police executed a search warrant at Braile Street—Barnes listed the property for sale at $115,000.
- He relisted it in September for $145,000; two days after the indictment was unsealed, he dropped the price to $80,000 “cash only.”
- Because he co-owned the property with his mother, Barnes traveled from California to Michigan on September 25 to execute a power of attorney, enabling his mother to sell the house without him. He did this after the indictment was unsealed but more than two weeks before he turned himself in.
Depositing jewelry in Los Angeles:
- After the indictment was unsealed and before he traveled to Michigan, Barnes deposited his jewelry with a jeweler in Los Angeles.
- This was “out of the ordinary,” undocumented, and allowed co-conspirators to retrieve jewelry to purchase drugs.

The district court concluded, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that these acts showed Barnes was “clearly trying to hide assets so that they [would] not [be] subject to forfeiture”—an attempt to obstruct or impede the administration of justice.

Barnes argued that:

his initial listing of the house predated the unsealing of the indictment, suggesting innocent motives; and
his co‑ownership of the property with his mother lessened his culpability.

The court found these contentions insufficient to overturn the district court’s intent finding. Importantly:

Even the first listing came a week after a two-kilogram cocaine seizure tied to the house and on the very day of the search warrant execution.
Subsequent price drops and the “cash only” listing occurred after indictment and strongly suggested an urgent effort to liquidate the property outside the forfeiture process.
Barnes’s travel to Michigan to sign the power of attorney—combined with his misleading statement that he had traveled solely to “turn [him]self in” when he actually waited more than two weeks to do so—reinforced the inference of obstructive intent.

Thus, the Sixth Circuit held there was no clear error in finding that Barnes willfully attempted to frustrate forfeiture and thereby obstructed the administration of justice. Notably, the Guidelines do not require that the obstruction succeed; an attempt is enough.

5. Drug-Quantity Findings

Drug quantity is a critical driver of the offense level in drug cases. Here, the district court attributed between 15 and 50 kilograms of cocaine to Barnes, leading to a base offense level that, combined with enhancements, yielded offense level 39.

Under United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2010), drug-quantity determinations are findings of fact reviewed for clear error. The Sixth Circuit will uphold such findings if they are plausible in light of the record as a whole, even if the evidence could support a different interpretation.

Barnes challenged three aspects of the drug quantity calculation, but the appellate court focused on only one, because the other two were unnecessary to reach the 15‑kilogram threshold:

The district court assumed certain referenced quantities in texts and calls were kilograms rather than ounces.
The district court attributed six kilograms seized from co-defendant Ivan Williams to Barnes.
The district court used the value of jewelry as a proxy for drug quantities.

Because the court concluded that the text-message conversation quantities alone reached 18 kilograms, it declined to address the arguments concerning Williams’s six kilograms or the jewelry.

As to the texts and calls:

In one message, Barnes told his associate to “save one for R.J.”
In another, the associate reported that “Sweets wants to purchase four.”

The key interpretive question was whether these single-digit integers referred to kilograms or ounces. The district court:

conducted a “careful” review of each communication;
relied heavily on the testimony of government expert Agent Falletich, who interpreted the conversations as kilo-level transactions;
noted that quantities discussed in calls (e.g., “two,” “six”) lined up with actual seizures of 2 kg and 6 kg, respectively, shortly after the calls;
found that the price discussions and collateral arrangements (e.g., a $24,500 drug debt and a Rolex used as “insurance” for “two little pieces”) were economically consistent with kilogram-level rather than ounce-level deals.

Using that framework, the district court identified at least 18 kilograms from the communications. The Sixth Circuit found this interpretation eminently reasonable and thus not clearly erroneous.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion relies on several legal concepts that can be obscure. These are worth restating in more accessible terms.

1. Superseding Indictments

A superseding indictment is simply a new charging document that replaces an earlier indictment. It may:

add or remove charges;
change the factual allegations; or
adjust quantities (e.g., drug amounts) or statutory penalties.

Once a superseding indictment is filed, it generally supersedes (replaces) the prior one for purposes of prosecution.

2. Rule 11 Plea Agreement vs. Open Plea

A Rule 11 plea agreement is a formal, written agreement between the defendant and the government that may:
- dismiss certain charges;
- recommend a particular sentence; or
- stipulate facts relevant to the Guidelines.
It is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c).
An open plea is when the defendant pleads guilty without any agreement with the prosecutor. The judge alone then determines the appropriate sentence within the statutory and Guidelines framework.

3. Withdrawing a Guilty Plea

Before sentencing, a defendant may attempt to withdraw a guilty plea, but:

He must show a “fair and just reason.”
The inquiry is not about whether the defendant now regrets the decision, but whether something was fundamentally unfair or mistaken at the time of the plea (e.g., confusion, coercion, gross misinformation).
The court looks at multiple factors, including how long the defendant waited and whether he claims innocence.

4. Standards of Appellate Review

Abuse of discretion: Deferential. The appellate court asks whether the district court’s decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. Used for plea-withdrawal rulings and many sentencing decisions.
Clear error: Even more deferential. The appellate court will not disturb factual findings unless it is “left with the definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made—despite some supporting evidence.
De novo: Non-deferential. The appellate court decides the issue anew, especially for pure questions of law.

5. Constructive Possession

A person can be deemed to possess a gun or drugs even if they are not physically holding them, if:

he has control over the place where they are located (e.g., the house is his); and
he has the power and intention to exercise control over them.

This is called constructive possession.

6. Relevant Conduct and Co-Conspirator Liability

For Guidelines calculations, a defendant is accountable not just for his own acts, but also for relevant conduct, including reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (e.g., drug quantities moved by a close associate at the defendant’s direction).

7. Obstruction and Forfeiture

Obstruction of justice does not only mean lying in court. It can also include:

destroying evidence;
tampering with witnesses; or
taking steps to hide or transfer assets to prevent them from being seized (forfeited) by the government.

The attempt to obstruct—such as hurriedly selling a drug house for cash after a search warrant and indictment—is enough to trigger the § 3C1.1 enhancement.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. For Plea Practice and Ineffective Assistance Claims

Although unpublished, Barnes reinforces several practical lessons for defense counsel and defendants:

Document plea discussions: If a defendant later claims that counsel mishandled a plea offer, courts will look for documentation—emails, letters, contemporaneous notes, or at least sworn affidavits—describing:
- the existence and terms of the offer;
- what advice counsel gave; and
- what the defendant would have done with proper advice.
Develop the record before challenging counsel on direct appeal: Without an affidavit or evidentiary hearing, appellate courts almost always deem ineffective-assistance claims premature.
Plea withdrawal is not a tool to renegotiate after an unfavorable PSR: The case aligns with Goddard in limiting the use of Rule 11(d)(2)(B) to situations of genuine unfairness at the time of the plea, not post hoc dissatisfaction.
If you want a hearing, ask for it clearly and support it: Courts are not obligated to order an evidentiary hearing based on vague promises that the defendant “would testify” if given the chance.

B. For Sentencing – Co-Defendant Disparities

Barnes situates itself between two poles:

On one side, Wallace and Guerrero, which condemn complete judicial silence in response to disparity arguments.
On the other, Rita, which allows judges to be concise in their explanations so long as the record reveals reasoned consideration.

The opinion underscores that:

district judges should at least acknowledge and briefly address co-defendant disparity arguments; and
a short, fact-based explanation (e.g., differences in enhancements or roles) can suffice.

C. For Firearm and Obstruction Enhancements in Drug Cases

The case reinforces several sentencing themes in drug conspiracy prosecutions:

Firearms and drug houses: Where a defendant controls a residence used for major drug trafficking, the presence of a loaded firearm in close proximity to drugs supports a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, even without evidence that he was physically holding the weapon.
Obstruction-by-forfeiture: Rapid asset maneuvers after a search or indictment—especially cash-only sales at below expected value, coupled with concealment of valuables—can be found to be obstruction of justice.
Deference to district court fact-finding: The opinion exemplifies how hard it is to overturn a district court’s carefully explained factual findings on appeal under the clear-error standard.

D. For Drug-Quantity Determinations

Barnes also highlights accepted methods for estimating drug quantity:

interpreting coded language in texts and calls with the help of experienced agents;
using actual seizures to “calibrate” ambiguous terms (“two” in a call followed by a two-kilogram seizure, etc.); and
examining drug pricing and collateral arrangements to determine whether quantities must be in kilograms, not ounces, to make economic sense.

This illustrates the substantial leeway district courts enjoy when extrapolating drug quantities from circumstantial evidence in large conspiracies.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Barnes does not chart entirely new legal territory, but it consolidates and clarifies several important principles:

Plea withdrawal: To withdraw a guilty plea based on alleged ineffective assistance in plea negotiations, a defendant must provide a developed factual record and satisfy the demanding “fair and just reason” standard. Mere disappointment with a later PSR is not enough.
Ineffective assistance on direct appeal: Absent an evidentiary hearing or detailed affidavits, such claims almost invariably belong in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal.
Sentencing process: The decision reaffirms the deferential review of:
- district court handling of co-defendant disparity arguments, so long as they are acknowledged and explained;
- firearm and obstruction enhancements supported by logical inferences from the record; and
- drug-quantity determinations based on expert interpretation of coded communications and corroborating seizures.

For practitioners, Barnes serves as a cautionary example on the necessity of early, well-documented plea advice and as a reminder that post‑plea strategy hinges on building a concrete record, not on generalized complaints. For courts, it affirms a robust, but not unlimited, deference to trial-level judgments in both the plea and sentencing phases of federal criminal cases.