Uniform State Sentencing Caps and Municipal Home-Rule: Operational Preemption in People v. Michelle (Camp & Simons)

I. Introduction

The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Michelle, 2025 CO 64 (consolidating the cases of Aleah Michelle Camp and Danielle Ashley Simons), establishes a major structural rule governing the relationship between state criminal sentencing law and the criminal ordinances of home-rule municipalities.

At the core of the opinion is a straightforward but powerful holding: when a municipal ordinance and a state criminal statute prohibit identical conduct, the municipality may not authorize penalties that exceed the state’s sentencing caps for the corresponding offense.

The case arises out of challenges to municipal prosecution and sentencing schemes in the Cities of Westminster and Aurora. After the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 21-271 (“the Misdemeanor Reform Act”), state law substantially reduced maximum sentences for many low-level non-felony offenses, including theft and trespass. Many home-rule cities, however, left intact municipal codes authorizing far harsher punishments—up to 364 days in jail and fines of $2,650—for the very same conduct now classified under state law as lower-level misdemeanors or petty offenses.

Faced with municipal prosecutions carrying substantially higher exposure than state charges for the same acts, defendants Camp (Westminster theft) and Simons (Aurora trespass and motor vehicle trespass) petitioned for relief under Colorado Appellate Rule 21. They argued that the state’s new sentencing caps preempted municipal punishments where the municipal ordinance mirrored the state offense.

The Supreme Court used these cases to:

Reaffirm the doctrine that low-level criminal regulation is a matter of mixed statewide and local concern;
Apply Colorado’s three-part preemption framework (express, implied, and operational conflict preemption); and
Articulate a clear “identical conduct” rule limiting municipal sentencing authority where the state has set specific maximum penalties for the same conduct.

The resulting precedent significantly reshapes the landscape for municipal criminal ordinances in Colorado and clarifies how far home-rule cities may go in imposing criminal punishments parallel to state law.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Issues Presented

Whether, after the Misdemeanor Reform Act, home-rule municipalities may impose maximum penalties that exceed the sentencing caps in:
- § 18-1.3-501(1)(a.5), C.R.S. (2025) (misdemeanor caps), and
- § 18-1.3-503(1.5), C.R.S. (2025) (petty offense caps),
when the municipal ordinance corresponds to a state offense prohibiting identical conduct.
Whether such municipal sentencing schemes are preempted by state law under Colorado’s home-rule and preemption framework.

B. Holding

The Court holds:

When a municipal ordinance and a state statute prohibit identical conduct, the municipal penalties for such conduct may not exceed the corresponding state penalties for that conduct. Municipalities may prosecute such ordinance violations, but they may not impose penalties above the state sentencing caps for the corresponding offenses.

More specifically:

The regulation and punishment of low-level criminal conduct is a matter of mixed statewide and local concern.
There is no express or implied legislative intent to preempt municipal regulation in this area generally.
However, where a municipal ordinance authorizes penalties that exceed the state sentencing caps for identical conduct, the ordinance is operationally preempted because it “authorizes what state law forbids” and materially impedes the state’s interest in uniform sentencing.

As a result:

Camp and Simons may be prosecuted in municipal court for their alleged ordinance violations.
But they may not be subjected to imprisonment or fines in excess of the caps that would apply to the corresponding state offenses.
The Court makes the rules to show cause absolute and remands both cases to the municipal courts for further proceedings consistent with this limitation on potential penalties.

C. Key Doctrinal Rule Announced

The new central doctrine can be summarized as:

Identical Conduct Rule for Sentencing Caps: Where a home-rule municipality enacts a criminal ordinance that prohibits the identical conduct covered by a state misdemeanor or petty offense, the municipality’s maximum authorized sentence (jail and fine) for that conduct cannot exceed the state maximum sentence for the corresponding offense.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Misdemeanor Reform Act (SB 21-271)

In 2021, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 21-271, the “Misdemeanor Reform Act,” which:

Condensed misdemeanor classifications from three levels into two;
Condensed petty offenses from two levels into one; and
Substantially reduced penalties for numerous non-felony offenses, including theft and trespass.

Relevant statutory changes include:

§ 18-1.3-501(1)(a.5):
- Class 1 misdemeanor: up to 364 days jail, $1,000 fine, or both;
- Class 2 misdemeanor: up to 120 days jail, $750 fine, or both.
§ 18-1.3-503(1.5):
- Petty offense: up to 10 days jail, $300 fine, or both.
Theft – § 18-4-401:
- Theft under $300 is a petty offense;
- Theft of $300–$999.99 is a class 2 misdemeanor.
Trespass statutes:
- Second degree criminal trespass of a motor vehicle – § 18-4-503(1)(c), (2)(b) – class 2 misdemeanor;
- Third degree criminal trespass – § 18-4-504(1), (2) – petty offense.

The opinion notes that the Misdemeanor Reform Act was crafted to promote “consistency and certainty in sentencing,” and that the Governor’s directive to the CCJJ explicitly emphasized:

Ensuring statewide consistency in sentencing;
Mitigating the effects of disparate discretion; and
Limiting incarceration for low-level offenses to only the most serious cases.

B. In re People v. Camp (Westminster)

Camp was charged in Westminster municipal court with theft under § 6-3-1(A)(1) of the Westminster Municipal Code (theft of less than $1,000).
The ordinance’s elements mirror the state theft statute, § 18-4-401(1)(a): knowing obtaining/exercising control over another’s thing of value, without authorization or by threat or deception, with intent to permanently deprive.
Westminster later clarified that the alleged stolen value was less than $300—conduct that would constitute a petty offense under state law with a maximum of 10 days jail and $300 fine.
But the Westminster penalty provision (§ 1-8-1(A)) authorized up to 364 days in jail and a $2,650 fine for theft under $1,000—significantly higher than the state caps.

Camp moved to dismiss, arguing:

Regulation of theft is at least a matter of mixed state and local concern; and
Post-Misdemeanor Reform Act, Westminster’s penalties conflict with state sentencing caps and are preempted.

The Westminster Municipal Court:

Denied the motion;
Relied on:
- Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 (home-rule powers);
- Quintana v. Edgewater Municipal Court, 498 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1972); and
- City of Aurora v. Martin, 507 P.2d 868 (Colo. 1973),
to support municipal authority to regulate low-level theft and to differ in penalties from the state, at least for non-felonies.
Emphasized § 18-4-401(8), which grants municipalities “concurrent power” to prohibit theft where the value is less than $1,000.

Camp was convicted after trial. Before sentencing, she sought relief under C.A.R. 21 from the Colorado Supreme Court.

C. In re People v. Simons (Aurora)

Simons was charged in Aurora with:
- Motor vehicle trespass under § 94-83 (Aurora City Code); and
- Trespass under § 94-71(a)(6) (Aurora City Code).
The municipal elements align with state offenses:
- Motor vehicle trespass aligns with second degree criminal trespass of a motor vehicle, § 18-4-503(1)(c) – class 2 misdemeanor.
- Municipal trespass aligns with third degree criminal trespass, § 18-4-504(1) – petty offense.
Under state law:
- Class 2 misdemeanor: up to 120 days jail, $750 fine;
- Petty offense: up to 10 days jail, $300 fine.
Under Aurora’s penalty provision (§ 1-13(a)), both offenses carried up to 364 days jail and a $2,650 fine.

Simons moved to dismiss in both cases, arguing that Aurora’s penalties were preempted because they conflicted with the Misdemeanor Reform Act’s sentencing caps. The Aurora Municipal Court:

Denied the motions;
Relied on Martin and People v. Wade, 757 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1988), to hold that differing municipal sentencing schemes are within home-rule powers;
Emphasized § 13-10-113(1)(a), which generally authorizes municipal courts to impose up to 364 days jail and $2,650 fines for ordinance violations; and
Concluded the Misdemeanor Reform Act, which did not mention municipal violations, did not alter this authority.

Before trial on either case, Simons petitioned the Supreme Court for C.A.R. 21 relief. Those two proceedings (24SA308 and 24SA309) were consolidated.

D. Exercise of Original Jurisdiction (C.A.R. 21)

Under C.A.R. 21, the Court’s review is extraordinary and discretionary. It exercised original jurisdiction because:

Camp and Simons risked serving most or all of any imposed sentences before a direct appeal could be resolved—making traditional appellate remedies inadequate and creating risk of irreparable harm.
The issue is both novel and recurring, as evidenced by a prior grant of review in City of Rifle v. Mobley (later dismissed as moot).

IV. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Doctrinal Framework: Home-Rule and Preemption

1. Home-rule municipalities and mixed concerns

Article XX, § 6 of the Colorado Constitution grants home-rule cities expansive authority to legislate on matters of local concern, including:

Enacting ordinances; and
Establishing municipal courts with power to impose criminal penalties for ordinance violations (art. XX, § 6(c), (h)).

At the same time, the General Assembly—under Articles III and V—possesses broad authority to define crimes and set penalties at the state level.

Where a subject is:

Purely local, home-rule ordinances trump conflicting statutes.
Purely statewide, state statutes trump conflicting ordinances.
Mixed local and statewide concern, both may regulate, but state law preempts any conflicting local law.

The classification question—statewide, local, or mixed—is the first step in any Colorado preemption analysis.

2. The four-factor “concern” test

Following Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 2013 CO 9, and City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil & Gas Association, 2016 CO 29, the Court considers:

The need for statewide uniformity of regulation;
The extraterritorial impact of local regulation;
Whether the matter has traditionally been regulated by the state or local governments; and
Whether the Constitution specifically commits the matter to state or local control.

After weighing these, the Court determines whether the subject of sentencing for low-level criminal conduct is of statewide, local, or mixed concern.

B. The Court’s “Mixed Concern” Determination

1. Need for statewide uniformity

The sentencing caps in §§ 18-1.3-501(1)(a.5) and 18-1.3-503(1.5) demonstrate a clear state interest in uniform maximum penalties for misdemeanors and petty offenses. The Misdemeanor Reform Act, drafted in response to the Governor’s directive, reflects a policy choice to:

Standardize low-level sentencing statewide; and
Limit incarceration for minor offenses.

Yet, the Court notes that:

There is no general constitutional requirement that municipal and state sentencing schemes always align; and
Prior decisions (particularly Martin) recognize that municipalities may, in some contexts, impose penalties different from the state’s.

Thus, while uniformity is important, it is not dispositive. The Court declines to hold that uniform sentencing is required in all respects—only that uniformity matters where the specific conflict at issue arises.

2. Extraterritorial impact

The Court finds a meaningful extraterritorial impact:

Both Camp and Simons reside outside the prosecuting cities (Thornton resident charged in Westminster; Littleton resident charged in Aurora).
The penalties they face are much greater than they would face under state law for identical conduct—up to 364 days in jail and a $2,650 fine, versus 10 or 120 days and $300 or $750 in fines.
Allowing each city to impose an independent, harsher sentencing scheme for conduct the state has uniformly reclassified and capped would create a “patchwork” of penalties across the state.

This “ripple effect” on state residents outside the municipality supports treating the subject as at least partially of statewide concern, consistent with Webb and Ibarra.

3. Historical regulation by state and local governments

Historically, both the state and municipalities have regulated low-level criminal conduct and imposed penalties, going back to at least the late nineteenth century. The opinion cites:

19th-century statutes defining crimes and authorizing fines and imprisonment; and
Cases recognizing municipal authority to regulate public order and disorderly conduct-type offenses (e.g., Hughes v. People, 9 P. 50 (Colo. 1885)).

Although municipal ordinance violations were once treated as “civil” or quasi-criminal, City of Canon City v. Merris, 323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958), clarified that incarceration for ordinance violations is a criminal sanction. Thus, both levels of government have a long history of regulating and punishing low-level crime.

This points toward a mixed concern.

4. Constitutional allocation of authority

The Constitution does not assign exclusive control to either level of government:

The General Assembly, under Articles III and V, defines state crimes and penalties.
Article XX, § 6(c), (h) gives home-rule municipalities power to enact ordinances and enforce criminal penalties via municipal courts.

Because both state and local governments are constitutionally empowered in this domain, the matter is again best characterized as one of mixed statewide and local concern.

5. Conclusion on classification

The Court reaffirms and extends its earlier holdings in Martin and Quintana:

The establishment of penalties for low-level criminal conduct is a matter of mixed statewide and local concern.

Once the subject is classified as “mixed,” preemption principles apply: state law prevails over conflicting municipal provisions.

C. The Three Forms of Preemption

Relying on Colorado Oil & Gas Association and Bowen/Edwards, the Court reiterates that:

Express preemption: The legislature clearly and explicitly states an intent to override local regulation.
Implied preemption (field preemption): The legislature intends to completely occupy a regulatory field, leaving no room for local regulation.
Operational conflict preemption: The local law’s “operational effect” conflicts with the state’s law—specifically, when “effectuation of a local interest would materially impede or destroy a state interest.” A classic test: the local law “authorizes what state law forbids” or “forbids what state law authorizes.”

The Court finds:

No express preemption—the Act does not explicitly forbid municipal regulation of low-level crimes or sentencing.
No implied (field) preemption—the General Assembly did not evince an intent to occupy the entire field of low-level sentencing.
But an operational conflict exists where municipal penalties exceed the state’s specific caps for identical conduct.

D. Operational Conflict: “Authorizes What the State Forbids”

The main doctrinal move in this opinion is the application of operational conflict preemption to maximum penalty disparities for identical conduct.

1. State interests: Setting uniform maximum penalties

Sections 18-1.3-501(1)(a.5) and 18-1.3-503(1.5) set upper limits for:

Class 1 and 2 misdemeanors; and
Petty offenses.

These provisions, and the legislative history, reveal a strong state interest in:

Uniform, consistent maximum penalties statewide;
Constrained use of incarceration for low-level offenses; and
Reducing disparities across jurisdictions.

The Court treats these sentencing caps as affirmative policy choices that the state has an interest in protecting.

2. Municipal penalties: Exceeding state caps for the same offense

In both Westminster and Aurora:

The municipal ordinance tracks the elements of a state offense; and
The municipal penalty far exceeds the state cap the legislature has set for that offense.

For example:

Camp’s alleged conduct (theft under $300) is a state petty offense (max 10 days/$300), but Westminster authorizes up to 364 days/$2,650.
Simons’s alleged conduct (motor vehicle trespass and simple trespass) corresponds to a class 2 misdemeanor and a petty offense, yet Aurora authorizes up to 364 days/$2,650 for each.

By authorizing penalties higher than the state’s caps, the municipalities:

Permit levels of punishment that state law affirmatively forbids for that exact conduct; and
Undermine the state’s policy choice to cap punishment for these offenses at significantly lower levels.

3. Why legislative silence on preemption is not dispositive

Westminster and Aurora argued that:

The Misdemeanor Reform Act does not mention municipal ordinance violations; and
It did not amend the general municipal sentencing statutes (§ 13-10-113(1)(a), § 31-16-101(1)(a)) or the theft/trespass statutes’ references to concurrent municipal power.

The Court responds that:

Silence on municipal preemption is relevant to express/field preemption, but not required for operational conflict preemption.
Operational conflict analysis focuses on whether the local law actually undercuts a concrete state interest by authorizing what state law forbids.

Thus, the question is not whether the legislature intended to preempt municipal sentencing, but whether the municipal laws as applied “materially impede” the state’s sentencing policy.

4. The key rule: Municipal penalties cannot exceed state caps for identical conduct

The Court concludes:

When municipal and state law prohibit identical conduct, a municipal penalty that exceeds the penalties permitted by the state necessarily “authorizes what state statute forbids.” In doing so, it materially impedes the state’s interest in consistent and uniform maximum penalties and is operationally preempted.

Therefore:

Municipalities remain free to:
- Prosecute ordinance violations; and
- Set sentencing schemes for non-identical or uniquely local offenses.
But they may not authorize penalties beyond the state caps when the ordinance corresponds to a state misdemeanor or petty offense prohibiting identical conduct.

E. Treatment and Distinction of Prior Precedents

1. Quintana v. Edgewater Municipal Court (1972)

In Quintana, the Court held that a municipal shoplifting ordinance was invalid because it covered theft in amounts that could constitute felonies—a domain reserved exclusively to state district courts. The case:

Confirmed municipalities’ concurrent power over non-felony theft, but
Emphasized that municipalities cannot regulate felonies.

The current opinion explains that:

Neither Westminster nor Aurora is attempting to regulate felony-level conduct.
Quintana did not address whether municipalities could impose harsher penalties than the state for non-felony conduct.

Thus, Quintana does not control the present sentencing-cap issue.

2. City of Aurora v. Martin (1973)

In Martin, the Court upheld a municipal assault and battery ordinance even though the state statute carried a greater penalty. The Court found:

No express or implied legislative intent to preempt local regulation;
No operational conflict, because the ordinance did not authorize what state law forbade or forbid what state law allowed; and
Mere differences in penalties (with the state being harsher than the city) were not enough to establish conflict, at least outside the felony context.

In Michelle, the Court distinguishes Martin on two key grounds:

In Martin, the municipality imposed a lesser penalty than the state—the city did not authorize any punishment that the state itself had made unlawful.
Here, the municipalities impose greater penalties than what state law allows for the same conduct.

Therefore:

While Martin holds that differing penalties alone are not automatically preempted, it also confirms that the crucial inquiry is whether the ordinance “authorizes what the state forbids, or forbids what the state has expressly authorized.” In Michelle, that test is satisfied because the municipal sentences exceed state maximums.

3. People v. Wade (1988)

In Wade, a defendant convicted of violating a Denver unsafe-vehicle ordinance received one year of probation, exceeding the then-maximum jail term for that offense. The lower court reversed, reasoning that Denver’s sentencing had to follow the state’s “philosophy in sentencing.” The Supreme Court:

Reversed and upheld Denver’s authority to fashion its own sentencing system for ordinance violations under article XX;
Rejected the idea that municipalities must adhere to the state’s overall “philosophy” of sentencing.

The Michelle opinion says Wade does not control here because:

Wade concerned probation terms and high-level “philosophy,” not a direct conflict with an express statutory maximum sentence;
Nothing in Wade suggested municipalities may authorize punishments that the state has explicitly capped for a specific category of conduct.

Thus, Wade affirms municipal flexibility within the bounds of state-law constraints; it does not license exceeding express state caps for identical offenses.

4. Webb v. City of Black Hawk, Colorado Oil & Gas Association, and Bowen/Edwards

The Court’s analysis of operational conflict heavily relies on recent preemption jurisprudence:

Webb: Struck down a local bicycle ban that conflicted with state law permitting bicycles on roads; announced the “authorizes what the state forbids/forbids what the state authorizes” test.
Colorado Oil & Gas Association: Applied the three-category preemption framework; emphasized that operational conflict is about whether local regulation materially impedes state interests.
Bowen/Edwards: Clarified the difference between implied field preemption and operational conflict, and recognized partial preemption (“to the extent” of actual conflict).

Michelle extends this line of cases into the criminal sentencing context, applying the same framework used in land use, oil and gas, and transportation cases to municipal criminal ordinances.

F. The Scope and Limits of the Holding

1. Partial, not total, preemption

The Court is explicit that home-rule ordinances are only preempted “to the extent” they conflict with state law. Accordingly:

The municipal offenses themselves (theft, trespass, motor vehicle trespass) are valid exercises of concurrent authority.
The prosecutions of Camp and Simons may proceed.
Only the portions of the municipal sentencing schemes that authorize penalties exceeding state caps for identical conduct are invalid.

The remedy is thus to limit potential municipal sentences, not to dismiss charges or invalidate the ordinances wholesale.

2. Municipal sentencing caps where no state counterpart exists

The Court draws an important distinction:

When a municipality regulates conduct for which there is no identical state misdemeanor or petty offense, the general municipal caps in §§ 13-10-113(1)(a) and 31-16-101(1)(a) control, allowing up to 364 days jail and $2,650 in fines.
The state’s misdemeanor and petty offense caps (the Misdemeanor Reform Act) do not limit municipal sentencing when there is no identical state counterpart.

The restriction applies only where:

The municipal ordinance and state statute prohibit identical conduct; and
The state has set specific maximum penalties for that conduct.

3. Interaction with § 18-4-401(8): Concurrent theft jurisdiction

Westminster argued that § 18-4-401(8)—stating that municipalities “shall have concurrent power to prohibit theft, by ordinance, where the value of the thing involved is less than [$1,000]”—insulates its sentencing scheme from preemption. The Court rejects this:

Section 18-4-401(8) codifies the longstanding rule that municipalities may regulate non-felony theft.
It does not authorize municipalities to disregard state sentencing caps for degrees of theft as set in §§ 18-1.3-501(1)(a.5) and 18-1.3-503(1.5).

The key point:

Concurrent power to prohibit conduct is not the same as power to impose any penalties irrespective of state ceilings. Municipalities may prosecute non-felony theft, but when the same conduct is covered by a state offense with a defined maximum penalty, municipal sentences cannot exceed that maximum.

4. Traffic offenses and § 42-4-110(2)

The municipalities raised a parade-of-horribles argument: if municipal sentences for low-level offenses must always mirror state law, this could conflict with the statutory framework for traffic regulation in § 42-4-110(2). The Court dismisses this concern as inapposite because:

The conduct at issue here (theft and trespass) is governed by Title 18, not Title 42.
The Court’s holding is expressly tied to offenses where there is an identical state misdemeanor or petty offense and a specific statutory sentencing cap for that conduct.

The opinion thus leaves room for existing traffic-related allocations of authority to remain untouched.

G. Impact and Implications

1. For home-rule municipalities

This decision requires home-rule municipalities across Colorado to re-examine their criminal codes and penalty provisions:

Where municipal ordinances track the elements of state misdemeanors or petty offenses, cities must ensure that:
- Their maximum jail terms do not exceed the state caps (120 days or 10 days, as applicable); and
- Their maximum fines do not exceed the state caps ($750 or $300, as applicable).
If municipal codes currently authorize up to 364 days in jail and $2,650 fines for such offenses, those maximums are now unenforceable to the extent they exceed state maxima.
Municipalities remain free to:
- Retain broader sentencing authority for ordinances that do not have an identical state counterpart; and
- Define unique local offenses tailored to community needs, provided no conflict arises with state law.

2. For defendants and defense counsel

The opinion has immediate practical effects:

Defendants charged with ordinance violations matching state misdemeanors or petty offenses can insist that their maximum municipal exposure is capped at the corresponding state level.
Defense counsel must now:
- Compare municipal ordinance elements to state statutory elements; and
- Argue that any municipal sentence above the state maximum is invalid under People v. Michelle.

This also affects plea bargaining strategy: the threat of substantially higher municipal penalties may no longer be lawfully used to leverage pleas where the conduct is identical to a state offense.

3. For prosecutors and judges

Municipal prosecutors and judges must:

Identify whether each charged ordinance corresponds to a state misdemeanor or petty offense prohibiting identical conduct.
Apply the state sentencing caps as absolute ceilings for jail and fines in such cases, regardless of the broader range provided in the municipal code or in § 13-10-113(1)(a) and § 31-16-101(1)(a).
Distinguish cases where:
- No identical state offense exists (full municipal sentencing authority remains); versus
- An identical state offense and cap exist (municipal sentencing constrained by state caps).

4. Broader structural significance

The decision:

Strengthens the role of state sentencing policy as a floor and ceiling for low-level offenses where the state has chosen to define and limit penalties;
Cabins the ability of home-rule cities to “re-criminalize” or re-escalate the punishment for conduct that the state has deliberately downgraded; and
Serves as a template for future preemption disputes where local ordinances parallel state regulatory schemes but impose more severe consequences.

It also demonstrates that Colorado’s preemption framework—developed largely in civil regulatory contexts (land use, oil and gas, transportation)—applies equally and robustly in the criminal law sphere.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Home-rule municipality

A home-rule municipality is a city that has adopted a home-rule charter under Article XX of the Colorado Constitution. Home-rule status gives such cities broad authority over “local and municipal matters,” often allowing them to legislate even in ways that conflict with state statutes on purely local issues. But where matters are of statewide or mixed concern, state law can supersede conflicting local ordinances.

2. Mixed statewide and local concern

An issue is of mixed concern when both:

The state has substantial interests (for example, uniform standards across Colorado), and
The municipality has legitimate local interests (for example, day-to-day policing and public safety within its boundaries).

In matters of mixed concern, both levels of government may regulate, but: if a conflict arises, state law prevails.

3. Preemption and operational conflict

Preemption occurs when state law overrides or invalidates local law. The relevant form here is operational conflict preemption, which exists when:

Applying both the state law and local ordinance is impossible or unworkable, or
The local law “authorizes what the state forbids” or “forbids what the state authorizes,” thereby undermining state policy.

In this case, the state forbids sentences above certain maximums for specific offenses. Municipal ordinances that authorize sentences above those maximums for the same conduct therefore “authorize what the state forbids” and are preempted.

4. “Identical conduct”

The Court’s rule is triggered only when the municipal ordinance and the state statute prohibit identical conduct. In practical terms, this means:

The elements of the municipal offense and the state offense line up: same actus reus (act), same mens rea (mental state), and same prohibited result or circumstance;
Differences in wording may be tolerable if they do not change what conduct is criminalized in substance.

If the municipal ordinance defines a different or broader/narrower offense than any state misdemeanor or petty offense, the state sentencing caps in §§ 18-1.3-501(1)(a.5) and 18-1.3-503(1.5) likely do not apply, and municipalities may rely on the general municipal caps.

5. Sentencing caps

Sentencing caps are statutory maximum jail terms and fines the legislature permits for each classification of offense. They:

Do not determine the actual sentence in any particular case, but
Limit the trial court’s discretion to go beyond a legislatively set upper boundary.

In Michelle, these caps are more than procedural—they are expressions of statewide sentencing policy that municipal governments cannot negate for conduct defined by the state.

6. Original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21

Original jurisdiction means the Supreme Court hears a case directly rather than on appeal from a lower appellate court. Under C.A.R. 21:

Relief is extraordinary;
Typically granted only when:
- No adequate appellate remedy exists;
- A party may suffer irreparable harm; or
- The case raises an issue of significant public importance not yet resolved.

Because Camp and Simons could realistically serve most or all of their sentences before any appeal could be decided, and because the preemption question is novel and recurring, the Court accepted direct review.

VI. Conclusion

People v. Michelle crystallizes a crucial boundary in Colorado’s home-rule framework: while cities retain broad authority to define and punish low-level criminal conduct, that authority does not extend to authorizing punishments that the state has chosen to cap for the same conduct.