Undercover buyer’s export statement and contextual cues suffice for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A): Sixth Circuit affirms export-enhancement, invited-error bar to acceptance-of-responsibility challenge, and within-Guidelines sentence in United States v. Darvell Jackson

Undercover buyer’s export statement and contextual cues suffice for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A): Sixth Circuit affirms export-enhancement, invited-error bar to acceptance-of-responsibility challenge, and within-Guidelines sentence in United States v. Darvell Jackson

Introduction

In United States v. Darvell Jackson (No. 24-3990, 6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2025) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 168-month sentence imposed on a defendant who pleaded guilty to multiple federal firearms offenses, including conspiracy counts and unlawful possession of machineguns and a firearm with an obliterated serial number. The panel (Judges Moore, Clay, and White; opinion by Judge Helene N. White) addressed three principal issues:

  • Whether the district court properly applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A) for possessing or transferring a firearm with reason to believe it would be transported out of the United States;
  • Whether the district court erred in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1); and
  • Whether the 168-month sentence was substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The Sixth Circuit held that the export enhancement applied because an undercover agent explicitly told Jackson he trafficked firearms into Canada and then used a hidden compartment to store guns Jackson sold him; Jackson’s PSR did not dispute these facts. The court also held that Jackson’s acceptance-of-responsibility claim was barred by invited error (his counsel expressly agreed no reduction applied), and that the bottom-of-Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable given the court’s deterrence rationale, consideration of pending state charges, and reasoned treatment of Jackson’s youth and background.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A): Affirmed. The government met its burden by a preponderance. The undercover agent’s statement that he trafficked guns to Canada—combined with Jackson’s observation of a hidden compartment used in the vehicle during a subsequent sale—gave Jackson “reason to believe” the firearms would be transported out of the United States. This conclusion was bolstered by Jackson’s failure to dispute the PSR’s recitation of these facts.
  • Acceptance of responsibility: No relief. Jackson’s counsel at sentencing explicitly agreed there was “no objection” to the lack of a reduction; the court treated this as a concession. On appeal, that amounted to waiver or invited error, reviewable only for manifest injustice—which was not shown.
  • Substantive reasonableness: Affirmed. The district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence (168 months, the bottom of the range) after explaining that specific and general deterrence were paramount, properly considering pending state charges, pretrial conduct, criminal history, and Jackson’s youth and family background (including the age-based policy statement at U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1). The court adequately addressed disparities and individualized factors.

Case Background

A grand jury charged Jackson and six codefendants with fourteen firearms offenses, six of which pertained to Jackson: conspiracy to possess a machinegun (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(o), 924(a)(2)); conspiracy to deal in firearms without a license (§§ 371, 922(a)(1)(A), 924(a)(1)(D)); three counts of unlawful possession of a machinegun (§ 922(o), 924(a)(2)); and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (§ 922(k)). Jackson pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.

The government’s proffer, which Jackson accepted at the plea hearing, established a series of undercover buys:

  • June 12, 2023: Jackson sold two pistols, one with a machinegun-conversion device (MCD);
  • June 13, 2023: Jackson sold two more pistols, one with an MCD; he observed the buyer use a hidden vehicle compartment;
  • June 22, 2023: Jackson sold two pistols, one with an obliterated serial number;
  • June 24, 2023: Jackson sold a rifle and two standalone MCDs.

The PSR also reported that, during the June 12 transaction, an undercover agent said he trafficked firearms into Canada, and on June 13 Jackson saw the agent stow purchased firearms in a hidden compartment. At sentencing, Jackson’s lone objection targeted the export-related enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A). The district court overruled that objection and calculated a Guidelines range of 168–210 months. Because the longest statutory maximum on any single count was 120 months, the court imposed 120-month concurrent terms on four counts and 48-month concurrent terms on two counts, to run consecutively to the first group, for an aggregate of 168 months. The court also ordered that twelve months of the federal sentence would run partially consecutively to any future state sentence arising from conduct while on pretrial release.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s approach to “reason to believe” and the export enhancement drew on intra- and inter-circuit authority:

  • Burden and standard: The government must prove enhancements by a preponderance (United States v. Parkey, 142 F.4th 866, 869 (6th Cir. 2025), citing United States v. Byrd, 689 F.3d 636, 640 (6th Cir. 2012)). The Sixth Circuit reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its Guidelines interpretation de novo (United States v. Taylor, 85 F.4th 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2023)).
  • “Reason to believe” calibration: In United States v. McKenzie, 33 F.4th 343, 347–48 (6th Cir. 2022), the court equated “reason to believe” to probable cause or even a lower standard such as reasonable suspicion, insisting it does not require more than probable cause. The panel imported this understanding to the export context and invoked District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018), for probable cause as a “probability or substantial chance.”
  • Persuasive out-of-circuit cases on export enhancement:
    • United States v. Mendoza, 556 F. App’x 326, 327 (5th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Pratts, 610 F. App’x 953 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), upheld the enhancement where the undercover buyer or informant expressly stated the guns were going to Mexico and the defendant acknowledged or proceeded.
    • United States v. Ilarraza, 963 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2020), affirmed the enhancement based on the defendant’s own statements about export to the Dominican Republic, supplemented by corroborating circumstances (payments from Santo Domingo).
    • United States v. Mujaahid, No. 21-2494, 2023 WL 4417356 (2d Cir. July 10, 2023), highlighted the timing of knowledge; uncertainty existed when the export remark came after the transfer, but later transactions cured the gap. The panel noted no such timing problem here; the PSR suggested the Canada statement preceded the June 12 sale.
  • Related “reason to believe” cases (unlawful use/transfer enhancements): The Sixth Circuit has allowed common-sense inferences from statements and context:
    • United States v. Torres, 644 F. App’x 663, 667 (6th Cir. 2016) (street-level cash sales, buyer requests for “dirty” guns, talk of resale “down by the border” supported enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5)).
    • United States v. Turner, 698 F. App’x 803, 806–07 (6th Cir. 2017) (volume, desire for “dirty” guns, clandestine sale context supported enhancement).
    • United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 912 (6th Cir. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256 (2017) (endorsing common-sense inferences at sentencing).
  • Reliance on undisputed PSR facts: The court underscored that a district judge may accept any undisputed PSR portion as fact. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3); United States v. Harris, 790 F. App’x 673, 676 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Brandon, 736 F. App’x 573, 575 (6th Cir. 2018)). Counsel’s strategic choice not to call witnesses or seek testimony from the undercover agent left the PSR account intact (United States v. Brown, No. 22-5010, 2022 WL 17336091, at *3 & n.2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2022), citing United States v. Armstrong, 920 F.3d 395, 399–400 (6th Cir. 2019)).
  • Sentencing entrapment/manipulation: The Sixth Circuit has not recognized either theory as a basis for relief; thus there could be no plain error on an unpreserved claim (United States v. Jackson, No. 24-3304, 2025 WL 552827, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2025); United States v. Parker, No. 24-1159, 2025 WL 1136318, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025), quoting United States v. Price, 901 F.3d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Johnson, 95 F.4th 404, 416 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2619 (2024)). Other circuits reserve such relief for “extraordinary misconduct” (e.g., First Circuit: United States v. Perez-Vasquez, 6 F.4th 180, 204 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Benito Lara, 56 F.4th 222, 226 (1st Cir. 2022); Second Circuit: United States v. Davidson, 165 F.3d 15, 1998 WL 777766, at *4 (2d Cir. 1998) (table); Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Gallardo, 977 F.3d 1126, 1144 (11th Cir. 2020)).
  • Acceptance-of-responsibility waiver/invited error: The panel treated counsel’s explicit agreement that no § 3E1.1 reduction applied as waiver or invited error, reviewable only for manifest injustice—and found none (United States v. Jett, No. 24-1667, 2025 WL 2837885, at *9 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2025); United States v. Carter, 89 F.4th 565, 568–70 (6th Cir. 2023)). As is typical, the court declined to entertain an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal (United States v. Embry, 644 F. App’x 565, 573 (6th Cir. 2016), citing United States v. Ferguson, 669 F.3d 756, 762 (6th Cir. 2012)).
  • Substantive reasonableness: Within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable (United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753–54 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Christman, 607 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 2010)). The standard asks whether the sentence is greater than necessary under § 3553(a) (United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2010)). The court may consider pending charges in positioning a sentence within the range (United States v. Alford, 332 F. App’x 275, 284–85 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Culberson, No. 24-1061, 2025 WL 1166895, at *4 n.1 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025); United States v. Werman, 828 F. App’x 316, 319 (6th Cir. 2020)). On disparities, the aim is to avoid unwarranted differences among similarly situated defendants (United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2007), quoting United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 495–96 (6th Cir. 2006)); within-range sentences above median/average can be reasonable if explained (United States v. Foster, No. 23-3400, 2024 WL 1134685, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 2024)).

Legal Reasoning

1) The export enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A)

The Guidelines add four levels if a defendant “possessed or transferred any firearm ... with reason to believe that it would be transported out of the United States.” The court adopted the Sixth Circuit’s general construction of “reason to believe” (from McKenzie) to mean at least probable cause—or even a lesser standard like reasonable suspicion—focusing on practical, common-sense inferences from statements and context.

Two facts—undisputed in the PSR—were central:

  • During the June 12, 2023 sale, the undercover agent stated to Jackson and a codefendant that he trafficked firearms into Canada;
  • During the June 13 sale, Jackson observed the agent place the purchased firearms into a hidden compartment in the vehicle.

The court deemed these facts sufficient under even de novo review to establish a “probability or substantial chance” of export. The panel analogized to Mendoza, Pratts, and Ilarraza, where explicit statements by a buyer or the defendant regarding export destinations supported the enhancement. The court acknowledged that other cases involved more circumstantial detail, but concluded there is no authority requiring more than a buyer’s statement—especially where, as here, contextual cues corroborate the statement and the defendant does not dispute the PSR’s account. The panel also rejected a semantic quibble about the vehicle “hidden compartment” (the government’s memorandum omitted the word “hidden”), finding no meaningful inconsistency with the PSR.

Notably, the panel emphasized Jackson’s failure to develop the record: he neither contested the PSR’s recitation nor sought testimony from the undercover agent. Under Rule 32 and Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court could accept the PSR’s undisputed assertions as fact.

2) Sentencing entrapment/manipulation

Jackson argued, for the first time on appeal, that the undercover agent’s Canada comment amounted to sentencing entrapment or manipulation by “manufacturing” the enhancement. The panel rejected the claim on multiple grounds:

  • Unpreserved and not plain error because the Sixth Circuit has not recognized either doctrine as a basis for relief;
  • Even in circuits that recognize the doctrines, Jackson’s facts do not approach the “extraordinary misconduct” typically required; and
  • His own conduct showed indifference to where the guns would go (his only question to the buyer was whether he was law enforcement), undermining any notion that he was predisposed to commit only less serious, domestic trafficking.

3) Acceptance of responsibility

At sentencing, defense counsel expressly agreed there was “no objection” to the absence of a two- or three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court treated that as a concession. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit deemed the issue waived or invited error and reviewed only for manifest injustice—finding none. The panel declined to entertain an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal, consistent with the general practice of reserving such claims for collateral review.

4) Substantive reasonableness

The district court imposed 168 months—the bottom of the Guidelines range—using partially consecutive terms because the single-count maxima (120 months) could not reach the total punishment. The court emphasized deterrence for both Jackson and others, considered Jackson’s pretrial conduct (positive drug tests and missed check-ins), noted pending state charges but treated them with caution (acknowledging the presumption of innocence and possible dismissal), and explained why a below-range variance was unwarranted notwithstanding Jackson’s youth and difficult upbringing.

The court carefully addressed age and background under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1’s current policy language on “youthfulness” and risk factors (environment, adverse childhood experiences, substance use, education, familial relationships). It found Jackson’s circumstances “not ideal” but not “horrific,” observed a limited juvenile record, and concluded that the later serious escalation in conduct weighed against a downward variance. On disparities, the court considered average and median sentences but explained why Jackson’s criminal history, undeterred conduct, and relative danger warranted the sentence chosen. The Sixth Circuit found no abuse of discretion.

Impact

Although unpublished and non-precedential in the Sixth Circuit, this decision supplies persuasive guidance on several recurring sentencing issues in firearms cases:

  • Export enhancement proof. The panel signals a practical, low threshold for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A): a buyer’s explicit statement of export intent, corroborated by contextual indicators (e.g., a hidden vehicle compartment), can suffice—especially when the defendant does not contest PSR facts. Prosecutors should ensure such statements and contextual cues are memorialized in reports or recordings; defense counsel should timely dispute PSR assertions and, where appropriate, request an evidentiary hearing to test timing, content, and credibility.
  • “Reason to believe” standard. By importing McKenzie’s probable-cause-or-less framework, the court confirms that the enhancement does not require certainty or direct proof of actual export. Reasonable inferences from statements and context are enough.
  • Entrapment/manipulation challenges. The Sixth Circuit remains skeptical; absent preservation and extraordinary facts, such claims are unlikely to succeed. Defense counsel should preserve these theories in the district court with a developed factual record if they will be pursued.
  • PSR practice matters. The court’s reliance on undisputed PSR facts is a stark reminder: unchallenged statements in the PSR can carry decisive weight. Use Rule 32 to force resolution of factual disputes and consider calling key witnesses when enhancement-driving facts are contested.
  • Acceptance-of-responsibility concessions. Explicit agreements at sentencing can foreclose appellate review under waiver/invited error doctrines. Counsel should be careful not to concede the absence of a § 3E1.1 reduction unless strategically unavoidable.
  • Within-Guidelines deference. The opinion illustrates the resilience of within-range sentences on appeal when the district court articulates case-specific deterrence goals, addresses youth/mitigation under § 5H1.1, and responds to disparity arguments.
  • Structuring sentences across counts and future state terms. The district court’s use of consecutive terms to reach the Guidelines “total punishment,” and its decision to run a portion of the federal sentence consecutively to a future state sentence, reflects accepted practice under federal law when explained on the record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Reason to believe” vs. knowledge. The enhancement does not require proof that the defendant knew the guns would be exported. It is enough if the facts give a reasonable person a substantial chance or probability to believe export will occur—akin to probable cause.
  • PSR (Presentence Investigation Report). The PSR is prepared by probation and summarizes offense conduct, criminal history, and guideline calculations. If a defendant does not object to a PSR factual statement, the court may accept it as true at sentencing.
  • Hidden compartment significance. A concealed storage space used immediately after a sale can signal smuggling or efforts to evade detection, supporting inferences about illicit transport, including export.
  • Sentencing entrapment vs. manipulation.
    • Entrapment at sentencing: the government induces a more serious crime than the defendant was predisposed to commit.
    • Manipulation: government conduct improperly inflates sentencing exposure. In most circuits recognizing these doctrines, relief requires “extraordinary misconduct.” The Sixth Circuit has not recognized either doctrine as a basis for relief.
  • Waiver vs. invited error vs. forfeiture.
    • Waiver/invited error: the defendant affirmatively agrees with the court’s ruling; appellate review is generally foreclosed absent manifest injustice.
    • Forfeiture: the defendant fails to object; appellate courts review for plain error.
  • Within-Guidelines presumption. In the Sixth Circuit, a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable on appeal, though the presumption can be rebutted with a showing that the § 3553(a) factors were misapplied.
  • Youth and § 5H1.1. The Guidelines expressly recognize youth and associated risk factors as potential grounds for a downward departure—if supported by the record. Courts retain discretion to deny a variance when other factors predominate.

Conclusion

United States v. Darvell Jackson clarifies, in persuasive but unpublished form, how the Sixth Circuit approaches the export enhancement in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A). An undercover buyer’s explicit statement of ongoing export activity, coupled with contextual signals like a hidden compartment—and left undisputed in the PSR—will typically clear the “reason to believe” threshold, which the court aligns with probable cause or a similar, commonsense standard.

The decision also reinforces two durable appellate principles: (1) explicit concessions at sentencing can bar later review under invited-error doctrine, as happened with Jackson’s acceptance-of-responsibility claim; and (2) a well-explained, within-Guidelines sentence—grounded in deterrence, individualized assessment of youth and background, and careful treatment of comparisons and pending charges—will be difficult to overturn as substantively unreasonable.

For practitioners, the opinion is a practical roadmap. Prosecutors should document export-intent statements and surrounding circumstances. Defense counsel should contest PSR assertions that drive enhancements, develop the record with testimony when needed (including on the timing of any export statements), preserve any entrapment/manipulation arguments, and avoid inadvertently waiving § 3E1.1 issues. District courts, for their part, will find in this case a set of reasons the Sixth Circuit views as sufficient to sustain both the export enhancement and a within-range sentence over a suite of appellate challenges.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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