Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Benezet Consulting LLC v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 26 F.4th 580, 584 (3d Cir. 2022): Establishes the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing permanent injunctions, framing the deferential lens through which the magistrate judge’s order was assessed.
• Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993): The Supreme Court’s four-factor “excusable neglect” test—prejudice, length of delay, reason for delay, and good faith—guided the assessment of plaintiffs’ late submission of proposed injunction terms.
• Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 784–85 (3d Cir. 2010): Reinforces the district court’s broad discretion in applying Pioneer to late filings/extensions in light of case-specific context and prejudice (or the lack thereof).
• Mallet & Co., Inc. v. Lacayo, 16 F.4th 364, 379 (3d Cir. 2021): Articulates the “context-based” approach to Rule 65(d) specificity; the required level of detail depends on the nature of the subject matter and the risk of confusion.
• Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476–77 (1974): Explains Rule 65(d)’s purpose—to prevent uncertainty over what conduct is enjoined, given the serious consequences of contempt.
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e): A certified class’s claims “may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.” Central to rejecting Ironbound’s mootness argument.
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), (d)(1) and (d)(2): Requires injunctions to describe restrained/required acts in reasonable detail and identifies who is bound (the parties, their officers/agents, and those in active concert).
• 28 U.S.C. § 636(c): Parties’ consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction for entering the injunction and managing settlement approval.
• 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1): Appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders granting injunctions.
• 49 C.F.R. § 376.1 et seq.: Federal truth-in-leasing regulations governing carrier-operator lease terms; the violated provisions included § 376.12, referenced (though mis-cited once as § 367.12) in the injunction.

Legal Reasoning

1) Settlement-in-Principle Did Not Extinguish Class Injunctive Relief

Ironbound argued that a 2023 settlement mooted the need for injunctive relief. The panel rejected that on multiple grounds:

• The district court had already granted summary judgment on the injunctive claim in 2021 and determined that a permanent injunction was warranted. Any later settlement occurred against that backdrop, i.e., after the court had resolved entitlement to injunctive relief.
• The parties’ May 2024 status report confirmed there was no meeting of the minds on the injunctive terms. An oral settlement is enforceable only if it addresses all material terms; here, injunctive relief remained contested.
• Critically, because the class had already been certified under Rule 23(b)(2), Rule 23(e) required court approval for any settlement affecting the class’s claims. Without approval, there was no operative settlement that could moot the injunction motion or negate the prior ruling.

The same logic defeated Ironbound’s related request that the injunction motion be denied as moot once the parties filed a proposed settlement for approval; until the court approves a certified class’s settlement under Rule 23(e), the underlying class claims—particularly those already adjudicated—remain live.

2) Excusable Neglect for Late Submission of Proposed Injunction Terms

Plaintiffs missed the 10-day window the district court set in 2021 to supply proposed injunction language. The magistrate judge later permitted the late filing and entered the injunction. On appeal, Ironbound contended the judge failed to properly apply Pioneer.

The Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion. Although the analysis was succinct, the magistrate judge considered all four Pioneer factors and reasonably concluded an extension was warranted. The opinion highlights:

• Prejudice: Minimal to none. The 2021 order had already granted injunctive relief in principle; Ironbound had long been on notice that an injunction would issue.
• Length and impact of delay: Three years is significant in the abstract, but the practical impact was mitigated by the 2021 ruling and ongoing litigation/mediation.
• Reason for delay and control: Plaintiffs’ failure was oversight, a classic excusable-neglect scenario when countervailing prejudice is lacking and the court had already determined relief would be granted.
• Good faith: No suggestion of bad faith in the record.

Citing Drippe, the panel emphasized that extensions and excusable neglect determinations are highly contextual; here, the unique procedural history made the extension reasonable.

3) Rule 65(d) Specificity and Harmless Drafting Errors

Ironbound argued the injunction lacked the specificity Rule 65(d) requires. The court reaffirmed its “context-based” approach from Mallet & Co., which calibrates the needed detail to the subject matter and the risk of confusion. The court identified two challenged features and found neither defective:

• Regulatory Miscitation: The injunction once cited 49 C.F.R. § 367.12 instead of § 376.12. The panel deemed this a trivial scrivener’s error unlikely to confuse any party in this case; Ironbound’s ability to identify and correct it in briefing confirmed the point.
• “Who Is Bound” Language: The injunction bound Ironbound and “its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors and assigns.” Far from overbroad, this clarified coverage consistent with Rule 65(d)(2), which binds parties, their agents, and those in active concert or participation with them. The added language is a common, clarifying feature rather than an improper expansion.

The broader specificity requirement—ensuring that the order “describe[s] in reasonable detail” the required or prohibited acts—was met. The injunction directed compliance with identified federal regulations, tracking the 2021 merits ruling that specific lease terms were unlawful. Given the case’s history and the parties’ sophistication, the order posed no realistic risk of uncertainty or contempt traps.

Impact and Practical Consequences

For Class Action Practice

• Rule 23(e) approval is indispensable: After certification, parties cannot extinguish class claims—including injunctive components—without judicial approval. A settlement-in-principle or partial agreement does not moot adjudicated or live class claims.
• Sequencing matters: Where entitlement to injunctive relief has already been adjudicated, negotiations over terms do not negate the court’s prior decision. Courts may enter final injunctions even late in the day if no approved settlement supersedes the adjudication.
• Late submissions can be forgiven: Under Pioneer, courts retain flexibility to excuse missed deadlines, particularly when the opposing party is not prejudiced and the underlying entitlement has already been resolved.

For Injunction Drafting and Enforcement

• Context-based specificity: Rule 65(d) does not demand hyper-technical detail in every case; it demands clarity sufficient to prevent confusion. Minor drafting errors that cause no real uncertainty are not fatal.
• Clarify who is bound: Including “parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors and assigns” aligns with Rule 65(d)(2) and can avoid evasion or confusion while remaining within permissible bounds.

For Transportation and Leasing Compliance

• Lease templates must align with 49 C.F.R. Part 376: Carriers should proactively audit and revise lease forms to ensure compliance with § 376.12 and related provisions (e.g., disclosures, chargebacks, escrow accounting, etc.).
• Permanent compliance obligations: Once a court adjudicates violations and orders injunctive relief, carriers face ongoing obligations enforceable through contempt; technical quibbles will not shield noncompliance.

Institutional Takeaways

• Magistrate judge authority by consent: Parties may streamline post-merits proceedings (including injunction entry and settlement approval) by consenting under § 636(c), with appellate review available under § 1292(a)(1) for injunctions.
• Non-precedential but instructive: While not binding, the decision signals how the Third Circuit approaches settlement mootness in certified class contexts, excusable neglect for late remedial submissions, and pragmatic enforcement of Rule 65(d).