Tug Master’s Non-Delegable Duty to Verify Tow Clearance before Passing Fixed Obstructions
Jersey Shore Boat Towing & Salvage, Inc. v. Abdel-Illah Zidal, 24-13009 (11th Cir. July 15 2025)

1. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision stems from an allision—an impact between a moving vessel and a stationary object—when a 30-foot S2 sailboat under tow by Absolute Boat Towing & Salvage struck the underside of the Pineda Causeway Bridge on Florida’s Banana River. The owner of the towing companies, Jersey Shore Boat Towing & Salvage, Inc. (Jersey Shore) and Absolute Boat Towing & Salvage, Inc. (Absolute Boat) petitioned for exoneration from or limitation of liability under the federal Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq. The district court denied their request, and the Eleventh Circuit has now affirmed.

The ruling crystallises a key proposition: when a tug undertakes to navigate a tow beneath a fixed bridge, the tug master has a non-delegable obligation to ascertain and confirm the tow’s clearance—even when the tow’s owner is on board and may possess relevant information. A failure to discharge that duty constitutes negligence that the owner of the tug cannot shed through the Limitation Act because the negligence lies within the owner’s privity or knowledge.

Parties:

• Appellants: Jersey Shore Boat Towing & Salvage, Inc. (lessor of the tug) and Absolute Boat Towing & Salvage, Inc. (operator of the tug)
• Appellee: Abdel-Illah Zidal, owner of the sailboat Action and personal-injury claimant

Key issues on appeal included: (i) entitlement to exoneration from liability, (ii) application of the Dominant Mind Doctrine, (iii) operation of the Pennsylvania Rule, and (iv) whether the tug owner had “privity or knowledge” of the negligent acts.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit held:

• The tug master (Captain Nunn) was negligent in failing to verify mast height before transiting a bridge of known 43-foot vertical clearance.
• The negligence was within the privity and knowledge of owner-manager Charles Tharp, defeating limitation under 46 U.S.C. § 30523.
• The Dominant Mind Doctrine placed navigational responsibility on the tug, rendering the tug primarily at fault notwithstanding the tow owner’s contributory negligence.
• The tug violated Inland Navigation Rule 7 (“assumptions shall not be made on scanty information”), invoking the Pennsylvania Rule and shifting the causal burden to the tug, a burden it failed to rebut.
• Because the owner could not prove freedom from contributory fault, exoneration was likewise denied.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. State of Florida, 768 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1985) – Framed the two-step Limitation Act analysis (identify negligent acts, then determine owner’s privity/knowledge).
• American Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 81 F.3d 127 (11th Cir. 1996) – Reiterated that a vessel owner must be free of contributory fault to gain exoneration and elaborated on privity/knowledge principles.
• Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195 (1932) – Defined the tug’s duty of reasonable care and maritime skill toward its tow.
• Nat’l G. Harrison Overseas Corp. v. Tug Titan, 516 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1975) – Allocated responsibility: tug for safe navigation, tow owner for seaworthiness.
• Continental Ins. Co. v. L&L Marine Transp., 882 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2018) – Explained application of Dominant Mind Doctrine even where the tow (rather than a third-party) is damaged.
• The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873) – Established the shift in burden when a vessel violates a safety statute.

The Eleventh Circuit employed these authorities to allocate fault and to interpret “privity or knowledge” broadly so as to capture negligence that a reasonable owner should have uncovered with ordinary precautions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Negligence of the Tug. The court found that Captain Nunn:
   • Knew bridge clearance (43 ft) but failed to ascertain mast height;
   • Omitted an elementary industry practice (length × 1.5) which, correctly applied to a 30-ft vessel, yields ≈ 45 ft;
   • Proceeded based on an unverified assumption drawn from the owner’s comment that the boat “came from the north”.
   This violated Inland Rule 7(c) and constituted a breach of the duty of prudent navigation articulated in Stevens.
2. Contributory Negligence of the Tow Owner. The sailboat’s unseaworthiness (excessive mast height) and Zidal’s inexperience placed some fault on him, but not enough to supersede the tug’s dominant responsibility.
3. Dominant Mind Doctrine. Because the tug controlled the navigation and possessed the superior capacity to avert danger, it was deemed the “dominant mind” of the flotilla. Hence, its negligence bound the entire flotilla, including the non-powered tow.
4. Pennsylvania Rule Application. Statutory violation (Rule 7) triggered a presumption of causation. The tug could not prove the breach “could not have contributed” to the allision; thus, causation was presumed.
5. Privity or Knowledge. Owner Tharp managed both corporate entities, leased the tug to himself under a bareboat charter, approved the towage job, and knew the route required passage under the bridge. The means of discovering mast height were readily available. Accordingly, the negligence was within his privity or knowledge, foreclosing limitation under § 30523.

3.3 Potential Impact

The decision’s practical and doctrinal implications are significant:

• Height-Verification Protocols. Tug operators now have authoritative circuit-level guidance that mere reliance on the tow owner’s statements or assumptions is insufficient; objective verification is mandatory.
• Scope of Privity/Knowledge. Corporate owners who actively manage day-to-day operations will find it harder to invoke limitation when negligent acts stem from routine operating decisions.
• Dominant Mind Broadened. The opinion reinforces that tugs can be deemed dominant minds—and primarily at fault—even where the tow owner is on board and directing destination choice.
• Litigation Strategy in Limitation Actions. Claimants now have a clear roadmap: allege (i) negligent navigation, (ii) rule violation (Rule 7 or analogous Inland Rules), and (iii) managerial knowledge, to defeat limitation at the summary-judgment stage.
• Bridge-Strike Risk Management. Marinas, insurers, and maritime regulators may update policies to require written clearance confirmation before issuing towing instructions in constrained waterways.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Allision vs. Collision. An allision is contact with a stationary object (e.g., bridge pier); a collision is vessel-to-vessel contact.
• Limitation of Liability Act. Allows a vessel owner to cap liability at the post-casualty value of the vessel, unless the owner had “privity or knowledge” of the causative negligence/unseaworthiness.
• Privity or Knowledge. Not limited to what the owner actually knew; encompasses what the owner should have known through reasonable inspection or management oversight.
• Dominant Mind Doctrine. In a flotilla (tug + tow), the vessel that controls navigation bears primary responsibility. If that vessel is at fault, its negligence is imputed to the flotilla.
• Pennsylvania Rule. When a vessel violates a navigational statute, it is presumed causative; the violator must prove its fault could not have contributed to the casualty—an onerous burden.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion firmly places the onus on tug masters—and by extension, their corporate owners—to undertake objective, independent clearance assessments whenever a tow is navigated beneath fixed structures. The court harmonised several doctrines—Dominant Mind, Pennsylvania Rule, and privity/knowledge under the Limitation Act—to deny limitation and exoneration. The ruling will likely shape operational checklists in the towing industry and narrow the availability of statutory limitation where managerial oversight lapses involve basic navigational prudence. In essence, the decision converts what operators may have regarded as a discretionary precaution into a non-delegable legal duty.