Tucker v. Commissioner of Social Security — The Second Circuit’s Refined Approach to Harmless Error under the Treating-Physician Rule

Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Tucker v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 24-1979-cv (2d Cir. May 13, 2025), affirms the denial of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits to Melissa Maria Tucker. Although issued as a non-precedential summary order, the opinion offers an instructive—indeed, refined—restatement of how the harmless error doctrine interacts with the Social Security Administration’s venerable “treating-physician rule.”

Tucker’s principal contention was that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) failed to give controlling—or at least appropriate—weight to the opinions of two treating sources: psychiatrist Dr. Bassam Awwa and primary-care physician Dr. Suresh D’Mello. The court rejected that argument, holding that any technical failure by the ALJ to march through each regulatory factor was harmless because the ALJ had otherwise supplied “good reasons,” supported by substantial evidence, for discounting those opinions.

The decision therefore crystallises two practical points: (1) when a claimant’s case was filed before March 27, 2017, the treating-physician rule of 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 still governs; and (2) even if the ALJ does not explicitly apply each of the § 416.927(c) factors, the error will not warrant remand if the substance of the rule is satisfied.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Judges Raggi, Carney, and Nathan) affirmed the District of Connecticut’s judgment, which itself had upheld the ALJ’s adverse disability finding. Applying the familiar five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ had concluded:

Steps 1–2: Tucker had not engaged in substantial gainful activity and suffered from several severe impairments, including fibromyalgia, migraines, obesity, depressive disorder, generalised anxiety disorder, and PTSD.
Step 3: None of the impairments, singly or combined, met or equalled a listed impairment.
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): She could perform “simple light work.”
Steps 4–5: Given the RFC and vocational-expert testimony, jobs existed in the national economy that she could perform; hence she was not disabled.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the administrative record de novo to determine (a) whether the correct legal standards were applied and (b) whether substantial evidence supported the decision. Finding both requisites satisfied, the panel affirmed.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2019)
Reiterates the two-step treating-physician framework and explains that failure to explicitly discuss each § 416.927(c) factor is a procedural error—but one that can be harmless if the substance of the rule is observed.
Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. 2022)
Elaborates on harmless error, holding that remand is unnecessary when the ALJ “otherwise provided good reasons” and a “searching review of the record” shows the treating-physician rule’s substance was respected. The panel in Tucker quotes Schillo repeatedly, treating it as the controlling articulation of the standard.
Colgan v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 353 (2d Cir. 2022)
Warns that check-box forms alone are not a legitimate basis to discount a treating doctor’s opinion; the ALJ must still ascertain whether the opinion is supported by and consistent with the record.
Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 2010)
Sets forth the substantial-evidence standard and the route of appellate review.
Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1987)
Cited for the proposition that remand is unnecessary where, after correcting a legal error, only one conclusion is possible.
Rivers v. Astrue, 280 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order)
Used illustratively to support the notion that a physician’s recommendation for physical exercise can undermine an opinion of extreme physical limitation.

By weaving these cases together, the panel signalled continuity with the existing body of Second-Circuit disability jurisprudence while sharpening the contours of harmless-error review.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Governing Standard.
Because Tucker’s SSI application pre-dated March 27, 2017, the old treating-physician rule (20 C.F.R. § 416.927) applied. The crucial question therefore was whether the ALJ (i) either gave the treating opinions controlling weight, or (ii) adequately explained why not, using the regulatory factors.
Identification of Procedural Shortfall.
The panel acknowledged that the ALJ did not rigidly march through each § 416.927(c) factor at length. Under Estrella, that omission is a procedural error.
Application of Harmless Error Doctrine.
Relying on Schillo, the panel examined whether the ALJ supplied “good reasons”—supported by substantial evidence—for discounting the treating opinions.
- As to Dr. Awwa (psychiatrist), the ALJ found the opinions conclusory, internally inconsistent, and unsupported by treatment notes that often recorded intact memory, judgment, and attention.
- As to Dr. D’Mello (primary-care), the opinions were “check-list style,” contradicted by largely normal physical examinations, and inconsistent with the physician’s recommendation that Tucker engage in aerobic exercise and resistance training.
These reasons, said the panel, satisfied the treating-physician rule in substance, making the procedural lapse harmless.
Substantial-Evidence Review.
The court confirmed that a “reasonable mind” could accept the record evidence— including other providers’ notes, Tucker’s daily activities, and vocational testimony—as adequate to support the ALJ’s RFC finding.

C. Likely Impact on Future Litigation

Although labeled “non-precedential,” Second-Circuit summary orders often wield considerable persuasive force at the district-court and agency level. Tucker is likely to:

Bolster agency and government arguments that an ALJ’s failure to tabulate each § 416.927(c) factor is procedurally erroneous but harmless if the rationale elsewhere in the decision touches on supportability, consistency, treatment relationship, and specialization.
Encourage litigants to focus appellate briefs on whether the ALJ’s articulated reasons are rooted in the record—rather than on whether the ALJ performed a mechanical factor-by-factor recitation.
Serve as a blueprint for ALJs: while a factor-by-factor discussion remains the safest course, a well-reasoned narrative explanation can survive judicial scrutiny.
Reinforce the use of claimants’ everyday activities (e.g., enrollment in community college, capacity for exercise) as evidence that can undercut allegations of disabling limitations.

Because most pre-2017 disability claims have now worked their way through the system, the treating-physician rule’s relevance is waning. Nonetheless, thousands of legacy cases persist, and Tucker will likely be cited—especially in Connecticut and throughout the Second Circuit— whenever litigants debate whether an ALJ’s treating-source analysis is reversible error.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Treating-Physician Rule: A regulation requiring ALJs to give “controlling weight” to a long-time treating doctor’s medical opinion if it is (1) well supported by clinical evidence and (2) consistent with the rest of the record. If not, the ALJ must decide how much weight to give, considering factors like length of treatment, supportability, consistency, and specialization.
Harmless Error Doctrine: Even when an ALJ commits a legal or procedural misstep, a reviewing court will affirm if it can confidently say the same outcome would have resulted absent the error.
Substantial Evidence: More than a mere scintilla; enough that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is a deferential standard— courts do not re-weigh evidence.
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): What a claimant can still do despite impairments, expressed in work-related terms (e.g., “simple, light work”).
Five-Step Sequential Evaluation: SSA’s framework for deciding disability: (1) current work; (2) severity; (3) listings; (4) past work; (5) other work.
Simple Light Work: A level of work requiring the ability to lift/carry up to 20 pounds, frequently 10 pounds, stand/walk 6 hours in an 8-hour day, and perform uncomplicated tasks.

Conclusion

Tucker v. Commissioner of Social Security does not blaze new doctrinal trails, yet it meaningfully refines the Second Circuit’s application of the harmless-error standard to treating-physician controversies. The panel’s message is clear: courts will look past mechanical flaws in an ALJ’s opinion so long as the substance of the treating-physician rule is honoured through good-faith, evidence-based reasoning. For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of (a) ensuring treating-source opinions are well-documented and internally consistent, and (b) addressing head-on any daily activities or treatment notes that might undermine claimed limitations.

In the broader Social-Security landscape, Tucker stands as a persuasive reminder that procedural exactitude, though important, must ultimately yield to the overarching requirement that disability determinations be both rational and supported by substantial evidence.