Tranter v. Z&D Tour: Pennsylvania High Court Rejects “Key Witness” Requirement and Articulates a 100‑Mile Benchmark in Forum Non Conveniens Analysis

Introduction

In a set of consolidated appeals arising from a catastrophic accident in Westmoreland County, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clarified the contours of forum non conveniens under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006(d)(1). Multiple plaintiffs—ranging from estates to individual injury claimants residing in several states and abroad—filed suit in Philadelphia against a slate of transportation-related defendants, including Z&D Tour, Ohio Coach, Federal Express Corporation, United Parcel Service, Penske-related entities, Ryder-related entities, Sioux Trucking, and an individual driver, Brandon Stowers.

Defendants petitioned to transfer venue from Philadelphia to Westmoreland County. The trial court granted transfer. The Superior Court vacated, imposing what it framed as a “key witness” requirement on the defense. On further review, the Supreme Court held that the Superior Court’s approach misapprehended Pennsylvania precedent and reinstated the transfer, while also offering new guidance on how distance factors into oppressiveness. Justice Mundy concurred in the result and in rejecting the “key witness” rule, but wrote separately to caution against overreliance on raw mileage and headcounts of witnesses.

The decision matters for litigants who routinely confront venue battles in multi-party tort cases: it rejects an unduly stringent “key witness” threshold, emphasizes the multi-factor, record-based showing of oppressiveness, and, importantly, articulates a 100‑mile “benchmark” that will influence how Pennsylvania courts assess the travel burden component of forum non conveniens.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court (per the majority) reached two principal holdings:

It rejected the Superior Court’s “key witness” requirement as unsupported by Supreme Court precedent and as imposing an excessively high burden on defendants seeking transfer for convenience of parties and witnesses.
It affirmed the trial court’s transfer from Philadelphia to Westmoreland County, concluding there was no abuse of discretion given the totality of the record—particularly the many Westmoreland-based witnesses, sworn affidavits describing concrete burdens, and the facilitation of a potential view of the accident scene.

In doing so, the majority described a “100‑mile” distance as a valuable benchmark and a “reasonable line” to help distinguish between mere inconvenience and oppressiveness. Justice Mundy concurred in full with rejecting the “key witness” requirement and with the disposition upholding transfer, but cautioned that:

Distance alone cannot carry the day; it must be assessed alongside other factors and supported by clear and convincing record evidence of actual oppressiveness to defendants, not merely inconvenience.
Counting witnesses is not dispositive; courts should consider the role and content of proposed testimony and avoid treating cumulative testimony as a basis for oppressiveness.
Deference to a plaintiff’s chosen forum remains a central tenet; courts should also consider the burden on plaintiffs if a transfer is granted.

Applying these principles, the concurrence agreed that the trial court’s transfer had a proper basis—which, under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, required affirmance—even though, in Justice Mundy’s view, the case was “much closer” than the majority portrayed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s reasoning sits squarely within the framework developed in three leading cases and the governing procedural rule:

Cheeseman v. Lethal Exterminator, Inc., 701 A.2d 156 (Pa. 1997). Cheeseman anchors Pennsylvania’s forum non conveniens doctrine. It requires trial courts to give deference to a plaintiff’s chosen forum and places on the defendant a burden to demonstrate, with detailed record evidence, that the forum is oppressive or vexatious—not simply inconvenient. Cheeseman identifies proper considerations, including:
- Ease of access to witnesses and sources of proof, and
- The ability to conduct a view of the premises when relevant.
In Tranter, these Cheeseman factors guided the analysis: the accident occurred in Westmoreland County, many percipient witnesses were based there, and trial in that county would better facilitate any site visit.
Bratic v. Rubendall, 99 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014). Bratic reiterates that distance “alone” is insufficient to show oppressiveness, but recognizes that when a transfer is sought to a more distant county, factors such as the burden of travel, time away from work, disruption to business operations, and difficulties obtaining witnesses and proof grow in significance. Bratic contains language—quoted by the majority in Tranter—suggesting that, as between Philadelphia and counties 100 miles away, inconvenience may approach oppressiveness “with every milepost.” The Tranter majority relied on Bratic to articulate a 100‑mile benchmark; the concurrence stressed that Bratic’s core teaching is the multi-factor, record-intensive approach and that distance cannot be dispositive.
Zappala v. Brandolini Property Management, Inc., 909 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 2006). Zappala emphasizes that trial courts have “considerable discretion” in venue transfers and that appellate courts must affirm if “any proper basis” supports the decision. Tranter reaffirms this deferential standard: the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s transfer because a proper basis existed on the record.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006(d)(1). The rule authorizes transfer “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses” to any county where the action could have been brought. Tranter sharpens how that standard is applied: defendants must present detailed, record-supported reasons why the chosen forum is oppressive (not just inconvenient), and courts should weigh multiple factors, with distance as a relevant but non-dispositive consideration.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds in three steps.

Burden and proof. Consistent with Cheeseman, the Court reaffirmed that defendants bear the burden to demonstrate oppressiveness by detailed, on-the-record showings. In Tranter, defendants identified numerous Westmoreland-based witnesses—who, according to the concurrence, would have to travel more than 200 miles to Philadelphia—and submitted affidavits explaining negative effects on their personal and professional lives. This evidence went beyond “distance alone,” addressing disruption, time out of work, and practicality of presenting testimony and other proof.
No “key witness” requirement. The Supreme Court rejected the Superior Court’s imposition of a “key witness” threshold as incompatible with precedent. The doctrine does not require defendants to prove that particular “key” witnesses must testify live in the transferee forum to obtain relief. Rather, the totality of burdens on parties and witnesses—and access to proof—controls. The concurrence agrees with this holding, while emphasizing that trial courts may still consider the centrality and content of proposed testimony to assess whether the claimed burdens truly render the forum oppressive to the defendants (as opposed to merely inconvenient or duplicative).
Distance as a benchmark, not a rule. Drawing on Bratic’s discussion, the majority stated that a distance of about 100 miles is a “valuable benchmark” and a “reasonable line” in distinguishing inconvenience from oppressiveness. Justice Mundy cautions that reliance on such a benchmark risks morphing distance into a near-dispositive factor, which Bratic forbids. The concurrence insists that:
- Oppressiveness can never be presumed by mileage alone,
- Defendants must show—by clear and convincing record evidence—how the distance produces oppression in the specific case, and
- Trial courts must weigh all relevant factors, including the role of each witness, cumulative nature of testimony, access to proof, and the ability to view the accident site.
With these caveats, the concurrence agrees the record supported the trial court’s transfer.

Finally, both the majority and the concurrence situate the decision within the abuse-of-discretion framework. Even if reasonable minds could differ, an appellate court must affirm a transfer if any proper basis appears in the record. The concurrence underscores this point by observing that, while the case was “much closer” than the majority suggested, the site-view factor and the robust affidavits provided a sufficient basis to defer to the trial court.

Impact

Tranter is poised to shape Pennsylvania venue practice in several concrete ways:

Eliminates the “key witness” hurdle. Defendants no longer need to meet a judge-made “key witness” standard to secure transfer. This should streamline motion practice by focusing courts on the overall burdens documented in the record rather than on categorical labels for witnesses.
Elevates the role of detailed affidavits. Parties seeking transfer should anticipate that trial courts will look for affidavits or comparable record materials specifying:
- Where witnesses reside and work,
- Travel time and logistics,
- Work disruptions, costs, and scheduling constraints, and
- Why live testimony and access to local proof are materially affected by the current venue.
Institutionalizes a 100‑mile reference point. Trial courts will likely treat 100 miles as a persuasive, though not controlling, indicator that travel burdens are moving toward oppressiveness. The concurrence’s caution should temper mechanistic applications: mileage contributes to, but cannot substitute for, a holistic showing.
Reemphasizes site-visit feasibility. In accident cases, the ability to conduct a view of the premises remains a legitimate factor. Where the incident site is far from the chosen forum, this factor will weigh toward transfer.
Preserves deference to the plaintiff and considers plaintiff burdens. Cheeseman’s deference to the plaintiff’s forum remains intact. Trial courts should continue to weigh how transfer would burden plaintiffs (including out-of-state and international plaintiffs), alongside defendant-centered considerations.
Reinforces appellate deference. Under Zappala and Bratic, appellate courts will rarely disturb a trial court’s venue decision if any proper basis appears. Tranter vindicates that approach and signals that well-developed transfer records will be upheld.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Forum non conveniens. A doctrine allowing courts to move a case to a different county “for the convenience of parties and witnesses” when the plaintiff’s chosen forum, though permissible, is oppressive to the defendant in the particular circumstances.
Oppressive versus vexatious. “Vexatious” filing is designed to harass. “Oppressiveness” focuses on real-world burdens—travel, time away from work, logistical difficulties in presenting proof—that exceed mere inconvenience.
Deference to the plaintiff’s choice. Pennsylvania presumes a plaintiff’s chosen forum is proper; defendants carry a heavy burden to justify transfer.
Clear and convincing record evidence. As emphasized by the concurrence, defendants must substantiate claimed burdens with concrete, detailed evidence—typically affidavits—explaining how the forum choice is oppressive in this case, not just generally inconvenient.
100‑mile benchmark. The majority identifies roughly 100 miles as a useful reference point indicating that travel burdens may be approaching oppressiveness. It is a benchmark—not a bright-line rule—and must be considered with other factors.
Abuse-of-discretion review. Appellate courts do not re-weigh the transfer factors; they ask only whether the trial court’s decision rests on a proper basis in the record. If so, it stands even if another judge might have decided differently.
View of premises. In accidents and site-specific disputes, the practical ability to have the jury (or court) view the location may legitimately factor into the oppressiveness analysis.

Conclusion

Tranter v. Z&D Tour recalibrates Pennsylvania’s forum non conveniens jurisprudence in two important respects. First, it decisively rejects the Superior Court’s “key witness” requirement, returning the focus to a holistic, record-based assessment of burdens that affect the convenience of parties and witnesses. Second, it articulates a 100‑mile benchmark as a useful, but non-dispositive, indicator that distance may be tipping inconvenience toward oppressiveness.

Justice Mundy’s concurrence is a measured reminder of the doctrine’s core commitments: mileage and headcounts do not substitute for evidence, oppressiveness must be shown with case-specific detail and tied to the defendants’ burdens, and deference to a plaintiff’s forum choice remains significant. The opinion also reaffirms the trial court’s “considerable discretion” and the limited scope of appellate review.

Taken together, Tranter will likely yield better-developed transfer records and more predictable trial-level decisions, while avoiding rigid formulas. For practitioners, the path forward is clear: build detailed affidavits, address the qualitative importance (not just the number) of witnesses and proofs, engage with site-visit feasibility, and candidly weigh the burdens on both sides. For courts, the case supplies guidance without handcuffs—a benchmark to consult, not a rule to apply mechanically.

Decided September 25, 2025. Justice Mundy concurred, joined by Justice McCaffery.