Town of Vinton v. Indian Harbor: Separate-Contract Endorsements, the New York Convention, and Louisiana’s Ban on Insurance Arbitration

I. Introduction

In Town of Vinton v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co. and a series of consolidated appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confronted the intersection of:

The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“the Convention”),
Louisiana’s statutory prohibition on arbitration clauses in insurance contracts covering property in the state, and
Complex, multi-insurer “surplus lines” policies that include both foreign and domestic insurers.

The key question was whether a group of American insurers could compel Louisiana public entities to arbitrate coverage disputes under an arbitration clause originally embedded in a multi-insurer policy that had also included foreign insurers. The case turns on whether that arbitration agreement “falls under” the Convention and whether state law—including Louisiana’s strong anti-arbitration rule for insurance—can block arbitration notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Convention.

Judge James C. Ho, writing for a panel that also included Judges Haynes and Oldham, affirmed the district court’s refusal to compel arbitration. The opinion crystallizes three key holdings:

A “separate contract” endorsement in a multi-insurer policy creates separate arbitration agreements between the insured and each insurer; once the foreign insurers are dismissed, there is no foreign party to any remaining arbitration agreement, and the Convention does not apply.
Louisiana law—specifically La. R.S. 22:868—prohibits arbitration clauses in Louisiana-issued insurance policies, and that prohibition cannot be circumvented by equitable estoppel.
A delegation clause cannot send the threshold validity of the arbitration agreement to arbitrators where state law prevents the valid formation of any arbitration agreement in the first place.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The dispute arose from surplus lines insurance policies covering Louisiana property and purchased by multiple public entities, including:

Town of Vinton (Calcasieu Parish),
Police Jury of Cameron Parish,
Cameron Parish Recreation #6, and
School Board of Cameron Parish.

The policies were underwritten by a combination of foreign and domestic insurers. The overarching policy contained an arbitration clause, including a delegation provision assigning gateway questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators. Crucially, a Contract Allocation Endorsement provided that the “contract shall be construed as a separate contract between the Insured and each of the Underwriters.”

Each public entity initially sued both foreign and domestic insurers in Louisiana state court for breach of contract. The plaintiffs then dismissed the foreign insurers with prejudice. The remaining American insurers removed the cases to federal court and moved to compel arbitration under the Convention and the FAA.

The district court denied the motions, reasoning that:

Because the policy created separate contracts with each insurer, the dismissal of foreign insurers left only domestic parties to the arbitration agreements, so the Convention no longer applied; and
Louisiana law prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance policies, and equitable estoppel could not be used to impose arbitration despite that prohibition.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit:

Rejected the insurers’ argument that the Convention still applied, holding that the separate-contract endorsement meant that no remaining arbitration agreement involved a foreign party.
Rejected the insurers’ attempt to compel arbitration via equitable estoppel, in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., which held that La. R.S. 22:868 categorically bars arbitration clauses in Louisiana insurance policies and cannot be evaded through estoppel.
Rejected reliance on a delegation clause, because when state law prevents the valid formation of an arbitration agreement, courts cannot compel arbitration even on threshold questions of arbitrability.

The court therefore affirmed the orders denying the motions to compel arbitration in all consolidated cases.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The disputes here arise from “surplus lines” property insurance policies, used for risks not readily insurable on the standard admitted market, and often involving multiple underwriters (both foreign and domestic) that each assume a portion of the risk.

The policies shared the following key features:

A Declaration Page describing multiple “coverage parts,” each with its own policy number and premium, but forming one overarching policy.
An arbitration clause requiring that “[a]ll matters in difference between the Insured and the Companies … in relation to this insurance, including its formation and validity … shall be referred to an Arbitration Tribunal.”
A delegation clause embedded in that arbitration provision, assigning questions such as “formation and validity” to arbitrators.
A Contract Allocation Endorsement stating that “[t]his contract shall be construed as a separate contract between the Insured and each of the Underwriters.”

The insured public entities sued for breach of contract in Louisiana state court, naming both foreign (Lloyd’s and other non‑U.S. carriers) and domestic insurers. They later dismissed the foreign insurers with prejudice. With only American insurers remaining, those insurers removed to the Western District of Louisiana and moved to compel arbitration and stay proceedings under:

The New York Convention, as implemented by Chapter 2 of the FAA (9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208), and
The domestic provisions of the FAA (Chapter 1).

The district court denied the motions. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit confronted three arguments from the American insurers:

The Convention required arbitration because the overarching policy once included foreign insurers.
Even if the Convention did not apply facially, it should apply via equitable estoppel, allowing domestic insurers to rely on the insured’s arbitration agreement with the foreign insurers.
The delegation clause required the court to send the arbitrability dispute to the arbitrators.

Importantly, the Fifth Circuit held these cases in abeyance while the Louisiana Supreme Court answered certified questions in a related case, culminating in Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., which clarified Louisiana law on insurance arbitration and equitable estoppel. That state high court decision then heavily shaped the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Vinton.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. The New York Convention and Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT

The Convention, implemented via 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208, requires courts of contracting states to recognize and enforce agreements to arbitrate disputes involving at least one foreign party, subject to limited exceptions. The Fifth Circuit uses a four-part test, stated in Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2002), to determine whether an arbitration agreement “falls under” the Convention:

There is an agreement in writing to arbitrate the dispute;
The agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a Convention signatory;
The agreement arises out of a commercial legal relationship; and
At least one party to the agreement is not an American citizen.

In Vinton, only the fourth element—presence of a foreign party to the arbitration agreement—was disputed.

2. Bennett v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest – Endorsements vs. Main Policy

The court relied on Bennett v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 890 F.3d 597, 605 (5th Cir. 2018), for a basic contract principle in insurance law: if a conflict exists between an endorsement and the main policy form, the endorsement controls. This reflects the idea that endorsements are negotiated or added specifically to alter or clarify the standard-form policy language.

Here, even if the generic arbitration clause (referring to “the Companies” collectively) could be read as suggesting one integrated arbitration agreement, the Contract Allocation Endorsement expressly provided that the contract “shall be construed as a separate contract between the Insured and each of the Underwriters.” Under Bennett, that endorsement controls.

3. Weir v. Federal Asset Disposition Association – Contra Proferentem

The opinion also invoked the interpretive canon of contra proferentem—ambiguities are construed against the drafter—citing Weir v. Federal Asset Disposition Ass’n, 123 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 1997). In the insurance context, this typically favors the insured, since insurers draft the policy language.

The court held that even if there were tension between the collective-reference arbitration clause and the separate-contract endorsement, that ambiguity would be resolved against the insurers who drafted the language, reinforcing the conclusion that each insurer had its own separate contract—and thus its own separate arbitration agreement—with the insured.

4. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle – State Law and Non-Signatory Enforcement

The Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009), holds that whether a non-signatory can enforce an arbitration agreement via doctrines like equitable estoppel is governed by applicable state contract law. The FAA does not itself create substantive non-signatory rights; courts must look to state-law doctrines of assignment, estoppel, third-party beneficiaries, etc.

In Vinton, this principle was crucial. The American insurers sought to use equitable estoppel to enforce the insured’s arbitration agreement with the (now-dismissed) foreign insurers. Whether such estoppel is available turns on Louisiana contract law, as clarified by the Louisiana Supreme Court.

5. Pontchartrain Natural Gas System v. Texas Brine Co. – Louisiana’s Estoppel Framework

Pontchartrain Nat. Gas Sys. v. Texas Brine Co., 2018-1249 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 317 So. 3d 715, provided a key articulation, under Louisiana law, of when equitable estoppel can allow a non-signatory to enforce an arbitration clause. It recognized an estoppel theory when:

a signatory “alleges substantially interdependent and concerted conduct by both [a] non-signatory and one or more of the signatories” to the contract containing the arbitration clause.

In Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., the Fifth Circuit had previously relied on Pontchartrain to allow domestic insurers to compel arbitration under the Convention, even where the policy language treated each underwriter as having a separate contract with the insured. Vinton revisits that reliance in light of an intervening Louisiana Supreme Court decision.

6. Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co.

In Bufkin Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 96 F.4th 726 (5th Cir. 2024), the Fifth Circuit had held:

That even if a surplus lines policy is “several” (i.e., separate contracts with each insurer),
Domestic insurers could nevertheless compel arbitration under the Convention via equitable estoppel, by piggybacking on the insured’s arbitration agreement with a foreign insurer.

Bufkin thus provided an earlier roadmap for insurers to enforce arbitration clauses in Louisiana insurance policies, despite the state anti-arbitration statute, so long as the Convention applied and equitable estoppel was available under Louisiana law.

In Vinton, however, the Fifth Circuit explicitly notes that the Louisiana Supreme Court later described Bufkin’s conclusion as “flawed and not supported by Louisiana law” in Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish. That state-court pronouncement effectively undercuts Bufkin’s estoppel reasoning as a matter of Louisiana law.

7. Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. and La. R.S. 22:868

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Police Jury of Calcasieu Par. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 2024-00449 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So. 3d 717, is central to Vinton. In that case, the court addressed certified questions from the same federal district court, holding:

La. R.S. 22:868 applies to all Louisiana insurance policies covering property in the state, including policies issued to municipalities and other public entities.
That statute “prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in Louisiana-issued insurance policies.”
Equitable estoppel “cannot contravene Louisiana positive law”; thus La. R.S. 22:868’s prohibition cannot be circumvented by estoppel or similar doctrines.
As a result, attempts (like those in Bufkin) to use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration in Louisiana insurance cases conflict with Louisiana law and are impermissible.

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Vinton explicitly relies on Police Jury to reject the insurers’ estoppel arguments and to recognize the full force of La. R.S. 22:868 in federal court.

8. Kubala v. Supreme Production Services, Inc. and S.K.A.V. v. Independent Specialty Ins. Co. – Delegation Clauses

Kubala v. Supreme Prod. Servs., Inc., 830 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2016), establishes the two-step inquiry for delegation clauses:

First, the court must determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists under applicable state law.
Second, if such an agreement exists and includes a clear and unmistakable delegation clause, the arbitrator decides gateway issues of arbitrability.

S.K.A.V. v. Independent Specialty Ins. Co., 103 F.4th 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 2024), applies that framework in the insurance context, holding:

“When a statute prevents the valid formation of an arbitration agreement … we cannot compel arbitration, even on threshold questions of arbitrability.”

In Vinton, the court uses Kubala and S.K.A.V. to reason that because Louisiana law (La. R.S. 22:868), as interpreted in Police Jury, prevents the valid formation of any arbitration agreement in insurance policies covering Louisiana property, there is no valid delegation clause for an arbitrator to act on.

C. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Does the New York Convention Apply?

Applying the Francisco test, the court focused on the fourth element: whether a party to the arbitration agreement is not an American citizen.

The insurers argued that:

The overarching policy, signed by both foreign and domestic insurers, contained a single arbitration clause referring to “the Companies” collectively.
Even though the foreign insurers were dismissed from the litigation, the arbitration agreement remained one unified contract in which foreign underwriters had been parties; thus the Convention should still apply.

The court rejected this by:

Relying on the separate-contract endorsement: The Contract Allocation Endorsement states that the contract “shall be construed as a separate contract between the Insured and each of the Underwriters.”
Following a broader judicial consensus: The panel noted that “numerous courts” have held that such “separate contract” language means a single arbitration clause gives rise to separate agreements to arbitrate between the insured and each individual insurer, citing Stonelake Condo. Ass’n v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 726 F. Supp. 3d 639, 647 (M.D. La. 2024), among others.
Applying Bennett and contra proferentem: Even if the arbitration clause’s reference to “the Companies” suggested a single, joint agreement, any conflict with the endorsement would be resolved:
- In favor of the endorsement (Bennett), and
- Against the insurers as drafters (Weir’s contra proferentem).

Because each insurer had a separate arbitration agreement with the insured, and the foreign insurers had been dismissed with prejudice, no remaining arbitration agreement involved a foreign party. Element (4) of the Francisco test was therefore not satisfied.

The court’s bottom line:

“Because there are no foreign parties to the arbitration agreement in this case, the Convention does not apply.”

Once the Convention is off the table, state law (here, Louisiana’s anti-arbitration statute) is not preempted in this context and governs the validity of the arbitration clause.

2. Can Equitable Estoppel Save Arbitration Under the Convention?

The American insurers advanced an alternative theory: even if the Convention did not apply directly—because no foreign party remained to the arbitration agreement—arbitration should still be compelled via equitable estoppel.

The argument ran as follows:

The foreign insurers had separate contracts (and arbitration agreements) with the insured.
The insured’s complaint alleged “substantially interdependent and concerted conduct” by foreign and domestic insurers.
Under Louisiana’s equitable estoppel doctrine (as described in Pontchartrain and previously applied in Bufkin), a non-signatory (the domestic insurer) can compel a signatory (the insured) to arbitrate where such interdependent and concerted conduct is alleged.

However, the court, guided by Arthur Andersen, correctly noted that whether estoppel is available is a question of Louisiana law. And the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish, had recently clarified that:

La. R.S. 22:868 “prohibits the use of arbitration clauses in Louisiana-issued insurance policies,”

and that equitable estoppel cannot be used to contravene this positive law.

The Fifth Circuit expressly acknowledges that “the Louisiana Supreme Court has now held that Bufkin’s ‘conclusion [is] flawed and not supported by Louisiana law.’” Consequently, the court holds that La. R.S. 22:868 precludes the use of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration in this context.

The insurers attempted to minimize Police Jury by arguing that Bufkin was really grounded in federal, not state, law. The panel rejected that contention, emphasizing that Bufkin:

“expressly relies on Louisiana courts and federal courts applying Louisiana law.”

In other words, federal courts are bound by the Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Louisiana contract law. Once Police Jury held that Louisiana law forbids using estoppel to enforce arbitration clauses in insurance policies, that ruling controls.

3. Does the Delegation Clause Change the Result?

Finally, the insurers argued that even if there were questions about the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, the presence of a delegation clause (sending issues of “formation and validity” to arbitrators) meant the court must compel arbitration merely to allow the arbitrator to decide whether arbitration could proceed.

The Fifth Circuit rejected this as “put[ting] the cart before the horse,” invoking Kubala and S.K.A.V.:

Under Kubala, courts must first determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists at all under state law before enforcing a delegation clause.
As S.K.A.V. put it, “[w]hen a statute prevents the valid formation of an arbitration agreement … we cannot compel arbitration, even on threshold questions of arbitrability.”

Here, Police Jury held that La. R.S. 22:868 prevents the valid formation of arbitration agreements in Louisiana-issued insurance policies. Accordingly:

“State law prevents the valid formation of an arbitration agreement here. See Police Jury, 395 So.3d at 728.”

If there is no valid arbitration agreement, there is no valid delegation clause. The arbitrator has nothing to decide, and the court cannot compel the parties to arbitrate even the question of arbitrability.

D. Simplifying the Complex Concepts

1. Surplus Lines Insurance and Multi-Insurer Policies

Surplus lines insurance is coverage placed with non‑admitted insurers (often foreign or specialty carriers) for risks that standard insurers will not or cannot cover. These policies commonly involve:

Multiple insurers (“underwriters”), each assuming a percentage of the total risk;
Shared policy forms, but sometimes with endorsements that clarify each underwriter’s separate responsibility; and
Complex funding and claims-handling structures.

The “separate-contract” language in endorsements is used to confirm that each subscribing insurer is separately accountable for its stated share, rather than all being jointly liable on a single, indivisible contract.

2. Separate-Contract Endorsements

A separate-contract endorsement states that the policy is to be treated as if there were distinct contracts between the insured and each insurer. Practically, this can mean:

Each insurer is liable only for its own share of coverage and not for the shares of others.
Legal relationships—such as arbitration obligations—exist on a one‑to‑one basis between the insured and each individual insurer.

In Vinton, this endorsement is the linchpin for the court’s conclusion that there is no longer any arbitration agreement involving a foreign party once the foreign insurers are dismissed. Each insurer had its own contract and its own arbitration agreement. Those with foreign citizenship had exited; the remaining agreements were solely between domestic insurers and the insured.

3. The New York Convention in Plain Terms

The New York Convention is an international treaty that:

Requires courts in member countries (including the U.S.) to enforce written arbitration agreements and arbitral awards arising out of international commercial relationships.
Applies only when there is a foreign element—typically, at least one party that is not a citizen of the enforcing state, or an award made in a foreign state.

U.S. courts ask whether an arbitration agreement “falls under” the Convention using the four-part test from Francisco. Without a foreign party, the treaty’s obligations are not triggered.

In Vinton, because each remaining arbitration agreement was between a Louisiana public entity and American insurers, and no foreign underwriters remained as parties to those agreements, the Convention did not apply, and U.S. courts were not treaty‑bound to compel arbitration.

4. Equitable Estoppel in the Arbitration Context

Equitable estoppel is a fairness doctrine that can allow a party who did not sign a contract to either:

Enforce the contract (offensive estoppel), or
Be bound by it (defensive estoppel),

where the other party’s own conduct or allegations make it inequitable to deny the non-signatory the benefit or burden of that contract.

In arbitration, this often arises when:

A signatory sues a non-signatory while relying on the contract, and
Alleges “interdependent and concerted” wrongdoing by signatories and non-signatories.

Some courts then let the non-signatory compel arbitration under the contract’s arbitration clause. But whether that’s permitted depends on state contract law.

In Louisiana, after Police Jury, equitable estoppel cannot be used to enforce arbitration clauses in insurance policies governed by La. R.S. 22:868. The statute’s ban on arbitration clauses in such policies is seen as a matter of “positive law” that private doctrines like estoppel cannot override.

5. Delegation Clauses

A delegation clause is a contractual provision assigning “gateway” issues of arbitrability to the arbitrators rather than to the court. These issues include:

Whether the arbitration clause itself is valid or enforceable;
Whether a dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement; and
Whether certain defenses bar arbitration.

The Supreme Court has held that clear delegation clauses must generally be enforced. But there is an important threshold:

Courts must still first decide whether a valid arbitration agreement exists at all under applicable state law.
If no valid contract to arbitrate was ever formed—because state law makes such clauses void or invalid—there is no delegation clause to enforce.

Vinton applies this threshold rule. Because Louisiana’s statute prevents the formation of a valid arbitration clause in these insurance policies, the delegation clause cannot operate; arbitrators cannot be appointed to decide whether non-existent agreements are valid.

6. Louisiana’s Anti-Arbitration Statute for Insurance

La. R.S. 22:868 is a Louisiana insurance statute that, as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Police Jury, prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance policies covering property in Louisiana. The statute is not limited to consumer or individual policies; it also applies to:

Municipalities,
School boards, and
Other public entities,

as well as private insureds.

While the FAA generally favors arbitration, it also contains a “savings clause” preserving state-law contract defenses that apply to “any contract” (e.g., illegality, fraud, unconscionability). When the Convention does not apply, and no federal preemption is triggered, state statutes like La. R.S. 22:868 can render arbitration clauses invalid ab initio in covered policies.

E. Impact and Implications

1. For Louisiana Municipalities and Public Entities

Vinton, combined with Police Jury, powerfully confirms that Louisiana public entities:

Cannot be compelled to arbitrate insurance coverage disputes involving property located in Louisiana, if their policies are governed by La. R.S. 22:868.
Are protected from being forced into arbitration through indirect routes, such as equitable estoppel or delegation clauses, when dealing with insurance contracts.

This significantly strengthens the litigation position of municipalities, school boards, and other public bodies in Louisiana coverage disputes. They can litigate in Louisiana courts, despite standard-form surplus lines policies that attempt to require international or out-of-state arbitration.

2. For Insurers and Policy Drafting

For insurers writing property coverage in Louisiana—especially surplus lines insurers using multi-underwriter subscription policies—Vinton has several implications:

Arbitration provisions in Louisiana property insurance policies are effectively unenforceable against Louisiana insureds when state law governs, unless some independent federal preemption (like a properly applicable Convention) clearly overrides La. R.S. 22:868.
The use of “separate-contract” endorsements, while common for risk allocation, will also be interpreted to create separate arbitration agreements, which may limit insurers’ ability to rely on foreign underwriters to bring the policy under the Convention.
Equitable estoppel arguments to drag domestic disputes into Convention-based arbitration are foreclosed under Louisiana law.

Insurers will likely need to re-evaluate:

Whether to continue including arbitration clauses in Louisiana property policies at all,
How they structure multi-insurer arrangements and endorsements, and
Whether alternative dispute resolution methods (e.g., appraisal, non-binding mediation) can be used without violating La. R.S. 22:868.

3. For Federal Arbitration Jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit

Vinton contributes several notable points to Fifth Circuit arbitration law:

Clarified scope of the Convention: The presence of foreign insurers in a multi-underwriter policy does not automatically bring every dispute under the Convention. The key is whether a foreign party is a party to the particular arbitration agreement at issue—especially in the face of separate-contract endorsements.
State-law control of non-signatory doctrines: Following Arthur Andersen, the Fifth Circuit affirms that doctrines like equitable estoppel are entirely a matter of state law; if the state’s highest court says they do not apply to circumvent a statutory prohibition, federal courts must follow.
Limit on delegation clauses: The panel reiterates that delegation clauses cannot bootstrap themselves into existence; courts must first ascertain the validity of the arbitration agreement under state law. If a statute like La. R.S. 22:868 invalidates such clauses, arbitrators cannot be invoked to decide their own jurisdiction.
Practical narrowing of Bufkin: While not formally overruling Bufkin, the opinion recognizes that its Louisiana-law premise has been repudiated by the Louisiana Supreme Court, effectively limiting its ongoing relevance in Louisiana insurance cases.

4. Potential Litigation Strategies After Vinton

After Vinton and Police Jury, parties in Louisiana insurance litigation can be expected to adjust their litigation strategies:

Insureds will:
- Invoke La. R.S. 22:868 and Police Jury/Vinton to resist any motions to compel arbitration concerning Louisiana property policies.
- Argue that even Convention-based theories fail where no foreign party is part of the specific arbitration agreement at issue, particularly under separate-contract endorsements.
Insurers may:
- Try to distinguish their policy language from the “separate contract” endorsements discussed in Vinton, though the court noted a broad consensus among courts on similar language.
- Explore whether any residual federal preemption arguments remain viable where genuinely international elements persist (e.g., foreign insureds, foreign performance sites), though Vinton sets a high bar when state law is clear.
- Focus more on choice-of-law and jurisdiction clauses, seeking to take disputes outside Louisiana’s regulatory reach where legally permissible.

IV. Conclusion

Town of Vinton v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co. is a significant Fifth Circuit decision at the intersection of federal arbitration law, international treaty obligations, and state insurance regulation.

The court holds that:

A separate-contract endorsement in a multi-insurer policy creates separate arbitration agreements. Once foreign insurers are dismissed, the remaining agreements may be purely domestic, taking them outside the Convention’s scope.
Louisiana’s La. R.S. 22:868 flatly prohibits arbitration clauses in Louisiana-issued insurance policies covering Louisiana property, and that prohibition cannot be sidestepped by equitable estoppel or other non-signatory doctrines.
Delegation clauses cannot be enforced where state law prevents the valid formation of an arbitration agreement in the first place.

In the broader legal context, Vinton reinforces a key principle: federal courts applying the FAA and the New York Convention remain bound by state contract law on issues of contract formation and non-signatory enforcement, absent clear federal preemption. Where a state’s highest court, as in Louisiana, has clearly declared arbitration clauses in certain insurance contracts unlawful, federal policy favoring arbitration must yield in cases that do not legitimately fall under the Convention.

For Louisiana insureds—public and private—and for insurers writing property policies in the state, Vinton provides a clear and authoritative statement: arbitration clauses in such insurance contracts are, in practical effect, unenforceable in Louisiana courts and in federal courts applying Louisiana law, unless a truly international arbitration agreement falling under the Convention can be shown.