Title VII Retaliation Limited to Employment Practices & No Equal-Protection Retaliation Cause of Action

1. Introduction

In Bobby Shed v. University of South Florida Board of Trustees, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit confronted the scope of anti-retaliation protections under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the availability of an Equal-Protection-Clause retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff‐appellant Bobby Shed, a Black, gay, male doctoral student with disabilities, alleged that the University of South Florida (USF) and various officials (including Professor Murat Munkin) discriminated against him and retaliated against him after he filed internal complaints about perceived racial mistreatment by campus police and alleged classroom misconduct. The district court dismissed his Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, granted judgment on the pleadings for his Equal Protection Clause retaliation claim, and taxed deposition costs against him. Shed appealed each ruling.

2. Summary of the Judgment

On May 30, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit issued a unanimous per curiam opinion affirming the district court in all respects. The court held:

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects only those complaints that oppose an unlawful employment practice. Complaints about the treatment of non-employee third parties (here, private individuals stopped by campus police) fall outside Title VII’s scope. Shed’s Count II retaliation claim thus failed.
A Title VII discrimination claim requires an allegation of an adverse employment action affecting the terms or conditions of employment. USF’s alleged failure to timely process internal complaints did not constitute such an action. Shed’s Count IV discrimination claim therefore failed.
No cause of action for general retaliation exists under the Equal Protection Clause. Eleventh Circuit precedent has refused to recognize a standalone retaliation right under § 1983’s Equal Protection component. Judgment on the pleadings for Professor Munkin in his individual capacity was proper.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing costs for Shed’s deposition transcript under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). The deposition was taken within the court-approved discovery period, was related to the issues in the case, and was properly documented.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) – Pleading must state a facially plausible claim.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) – Conclusory allegations are insufficient.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) – Title VII complaints need only a “short and plain statement” of a plausible claim.
McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024) – Title VII retaliation requires opposition to an unlawful employment practice.
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011) – Title VII protects employees against employer retaliation for protected activity.
Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338 (11th Cir. 1995) – No Equal Protection Clause right to be free from general retaliation.
Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1997) – A “pure” retaliation claim does not implicate equal protection.
W&O, Inc. v. EEOC, 213 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2000) – Costs of depositions necessarily obtained for use in the case are taxable.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court applied the familiar Twombly/Iqbal framework to review the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and Rule 12(c) judgment-on-the-pleadings de novo. Two threshold principles emerged:

Title VII Retaliation’s Scope
Title VII § 2000e–3(a) forbids an employer from retaliating against an employee because the employee “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege (1) engagement in a statutorily protected activity (good-faith opposition to an unlawful employment practice), (2) a materially adverse action by the employer, and (3) causation between them. The court emphasized that Title VII’s retaliation provision is limited to opposition to unlawful employment practices. Complaints about non-employee wrongs—here, how campus police treated private individuals—do not qualify. Although Mr. Shed was an employee as a graduate assistant, his protected activity was not tied to his employer’s unlawful employment practices, so Count II failed.
No Equal-Protection Retaliation Cause of Action
Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, retaliation as such is not an actionable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. A plaintiff may bring equal protection claims for selective enforcement or discriminatory application of laws, but “pure” retaliation—even if malicious—does not constitute a constitutional wrong under the Clause. Accordingly, Count III against Professor Munkin in his individual capacity could not stand.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

This decision clarifies and reinforces two critical limits on anti-retaliation law:

Title VII Is Not a General Anti-Bullying Statute. Complaints about non-employee mistreatment or community-policing policies are not “opposition” to unlawful employment practices. Future plaintiffs must tie their protected activity to the employer’s employment decisions, terms, or conditions.
No § 1983 Retaliation Claim Under Equal Protection. Litigants seeking relief for retaliation by state actors must ground their suit in other constitutional provisions (e.g., First Amendment, Due Process) or statutory schemes (e.g., Title VII, ADA), not the Equal Protection Clause alone.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adverse Employment Action: Any employer act that materially affects an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Here, denial of funding or program dismissal would qualify, but delay in complaint processing does not.
Protected Activity: Opposition to “practices made unlawful” by Title VII. A good-faith disagreement with an employer’s discriminatory employment conduct, not general police conduct.
Rule 12(b)(6) & Twombly/Iqbal Standard: To avoid dismissal, a complaint must plead enough facts to make the claim plausible—not merely possible—on its face.
Prior-Panel Precedent Rule: Eleventh Circuit panels are bound by earlier Eleventh Circuit precedents unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. Ratliff’s prohibition on Equal Protection retaliation claims remains binding.
Taxable Costs: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, fees for deposition transcripts “necessarily obtained for use in the case” are presumptively recoverable unless the losing party shows they were solely for convenience.

5. Conclusion

Bobby Shed v. USF reinforces the principle that Title VII’s anti-retaliation protections are confined to opposition against employment practices made unlawful by the statute. It also underscores that there is no freestanding right under the Equal Protection Clause to be free from general retaliation. Plaintiffs and practitioners must carefully frame their discrimination and retaliation claims within these statutory and constitutional boundaries. For employers and in-house counsel, the decision provides guidance on which protected complaints trigger Title VII liability and reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit’s strong adherence to precedent on constitutional retaliation.