Title VII Personal-Staff Exemption: Prejudice Test & Six-Factor Framework

Introduction

In Dr. Jasmine Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit clarified two key legal principles under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: (1) a defendant may assert an unpleaded affirmative defense—the “personal-staff” exemption—at summary judgment so long as the plaintiff suffers no prejudice; and (2) application of a six-factor test, derived from Laurie v. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, to determine whether an employee is “personal staff” of an elected official.

Dr. Jasmine Younge, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy and Programs in the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office, sued her employer for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII after she was terminated post-announcement of her pregnancy. The DA’s Office, an entity headed by an elected District Attorney, did not plead the “personal-staff” exemption in its answer but raised it for the first time at summary judgment. The district court admitted the defense upon finding no prejudice to Younge, then granted summary judgment in the DA’s Office’s favor. Younge appealed, challenging the standard for late assertion, the existence of prejudice, and her status as personal staff.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held:

Affirmative Defense Standard: Title VII’s personal-staff exemption, treated as an affirmative defense, may be considered at summary judgment if the plaintiff is not prejudiced by its late assertion.
Prejudice vs. Good Cause: A prejudice standard governs unpleaded affirmative defenses (Rule 8(c)), not a “good cause” Rule 16 amendment standard.
No Prejudice Shown: Discovery had already addressed the six “personal-staff” factors—Younge deposed and produced documents on her supervisory relationship, public‐facing duties, chain of command, etc.—so she suffered no surprise or harm from the late defense.
Six-Factor Test Applied: Under Laurie’s factors, five weighed in favor of personal-staff status and one was neutral, leaving no genuine issue of fact. Younge was thus exempt from Title VII as a matter of law.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Curl v. Reavis (4th Cir. 1984): Treated employee status (and thus Title VII exemptions) as elements of the prima facie case.
Oden v. Oktibbeha County (5th Cir. 2001): Held the personal-staff exemption is an affirmative defense.
Hassan v. U.S. Postal Service (11th Cir. 1988): Established that a late, unpleaded affirmative defense may proceed if the plaintiff is not prejudiced.
Pensacola Motor Sales v. East Shore Toyota (11th Cir. 2012), Proctor v. Fluor (11th Cir. 2007), Miranda de Villalba v. Coutts (11th Cir. 2001): Reinforced the non-prejudice rule for affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c).
Laurie v. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (M.D. Ala. 2000), aff’d 256 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2001): Articulated a six-factor framework for “personal-staff” status.

2. Legal Reasoning

Rule 8(c) vs. Rule 16: The court explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) demands that affirmative defenses be pleaded, but failure to do so does not bar a defense if the plaintiff suffers no prejudice. Rule 16’s “good cause” amendment standard applies to late motions to amend pleadings, not to unpleaded defenses raised at summary judgment.

Prejudice Inquiry: Under Hassan and its progeny, prejudice means unfair surprise or inability to gather necessary evidence. Here, discovery had probed every “personal-staff” factor, and Younge never sought to reopen discovery, so no prejudice existed.

Six-Factor Framework: Drawing on Laurie, the court assessed:

Appointment/Removal Powers—Neutral (DA could fire but hiring conditioned on county approval).
Personal Accountability—In favor (Younge answered only to the District Attorney).
Public Representation—In favor (Younge regularly spoke for and represented the DA’s Office to community leaders and dignitaries).
Degree of Control—In favor (DA personally supervised and micro-managed Younge’s work).
Chain of Command—In favor (third-highest official in the Office).
Working Relationship Intimacy—In favor (daily contact, open office access, weekend messages).

With five factors pointing toward “personal staff” and one neutral, no material issue of fact remained.

3. Impact

This decision will guide both plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII actions:

Litigation Strategy: Defendants may wait until summary judgment to invoke the personal-staff exemption so long as the plaintiff is not prejudiced, reducing early motion practice.
Pleading Practice: Plaintiffs can anticipate that defendants may raise unpleaded affirmative defenses later in the case and should avoid limiting discovery.
“Personal Staff” Analysis: The six-factor Laurie test is reaffirmed—courts will apply it to determine Title VII coverage for public-sector employees of elected officials.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Title VII Personal-Staff Exemption: Title VII protects employees from discrimination, but excludes people “elected to public office” and those “chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff.”
Affirmative Defense: A legal argument by a defendant that, even if the plaintiff’s facts are true, the defendant is not liable (here: no “employee” status).
Rule 8(c) (Pleading Defenses): Requires affirmative defenses to be stated in the answer—but a late assertion can stand if it does not harm the other side.
Prejudice Standard: Courts ask whether the plaintiff was unfairly surprised or could not complete discovery on the defense. No harm means the defense may be heard.
Six-Factor “Personal Staff” Test: Evaluates appointment/removal power, direct accountability, public representation, degree of control, chain-of-command level, and working intimacy.

Conclusion

Younge v. Fulton DA’s Office affirms that Title VII’s personal-staff exemption may be raised late if it causes no prejudice, and it confirms a structured, six-factor analysis for determining “personal staff” status. Public-sector employees of elected officials should assess their roles under these factors, and litigants should tailor discovery to cover any potential late defenses. This ruling refines procedural and substantive boundaries of Title VII in the public arena.