The “Reasonably Articulable Basis” Test for Special and Local Legislation under Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution

1. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Russell Coleman, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 2023-SC-0498-DG, rendered December 19, 2024 and modified on rehearing December 19, 2025. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Bisig, affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals in holding that key portions of Senate Bill 1 (2022) (“SB 1”), codified at KRS 160.370(2), violate Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution.

At the heart of the case is a constitutional challenge to a statute that rearranged the balance of power between the Jefferson County Board of Education (“the Board”) and the Jefferson County Superintendent, treating Jefferson County’s public school district differently from every other public school district in the Commonwealth. The statute:

• Stripped the Jefferson County Board of Education of powers that all other Kentucky school boards retain; and
• Conferred on the Jefferson County superintendent powers that no other superintendent in the state possesses.

The Jefferson County Board of Education argued that this “one-county-only” approach to the management of public schools is an impermissible “local or special act” under Section 59—especially because subsection 25 expressly forbids local or special acts “to provide for the management of common schools,” and subsection 29 forbids special laws where a general law can be made applicable.

The Attorney General defended SB 1 as a permissible, general law directed to an articulated class—“a county school district in a county with a consolidated local government”—which in practice currently means Jefferson County (Louisville Metro), but theoretically could apply elsewhere.

The case is doctrinally important for at least three reasons:

1. It clarifies and, in practice, reconfigures the test for what counts as unconstitutional “special” or “local” legislation under Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution.
2. It invalidates a high-profile statute that singled out Jefferson County Public Schools, the state’s largest school district, for a unique governance regime.
3. It exposes a deep division within the Court over stare decisis, the proper use of rehearing under RAP 43, and the legacy of Calloway County Sheriff’s Department v. Woodall, 607 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. 2020).

Justice Bisig’s majority opinion affirms the unconstitutionality of SB 1 under Section 59 and articulates a “reasonably articulable natural and distinctive basis” test for evaluating class-based legislation under Sections 59 and 60. Justice Nickell, joined by Chief Justice Lambert and Justice Conley, dissents, arguing that rehearing was improvidently granted and that the majority has effectively (and improperly) undone the simplifications introduced in Woodall.

2. Summary of the Court’s Opinion

2.1 Core Holding

The majority holds that the challenged provisions of SB 1:

• Constitute prohibited “local or special” legislation governing “the management of common schools” in violation of Section 59(25); and
• Also violate Section 59(29) because they are special laws enacted in a situation where a general law could have been made applicable.

The Court affirms the judgments of the Jefferson Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals and declares the challenged provisions unconstitutional as applied to Jefferson County’s school district.

2.2 New / Clarified Legal Test under Sections 59 and 60

The Court rearticulates the governing standard for challenges under Sections 59 and 60:

• There is a presumption of constitutionality for all statutes.
• The challenger bears the initial burden of showing that there is no reasonably articulable natural and distinctive basis for the classification created by the statute, when viewed in light of the statute’s purposes and objectives.
• The Commonwealth may rebut by articulating any such natural and distinctive basis for the classification, whether or not that was the actual motive for the law.
• If there is any reasonably articulable natural and distinctive reason for limiting the statute to the class that it covers, the law survives Sections 59 and 60.

This is, functionally, a rational-basis style inquiry applied within the special/local-legislation clauses. The majority explicitly links this approach to equal protection analysis under Sections 1–3 of the Kentucky Constitution, and to the familiar standard from Weiand v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, 25 S.W.3d 88 (Ky. 2000): a classification must be upheld if there is any “reasonably conceivable state of facts” that could provide a rational basis.

2.3 Application to SB 1

Applying this test, the Court concludes:

• SB 1 creates a class defined as “a county school district in a county with a consolidated local government” (KRS 160.370(2)).
• In reality, only Jefferson County meets this definition; no other county has a consolidated local government with a county school district.
• The statute significantly:
  • Reduces the powers of the Jefferson County Board of Education compared to all other boards.
  • Increases the powers of the Jefferson County superintendent compared to all other superintendents.
  • Imposes unique constraints (such as limiting Board meetings to once every four weeks).
• Nothing in the statute explains why these governance changes are:
  • Appropriate only for a county school district located in a consolidated local government, or
  • Inappropriate or unnecessary for any other school district.
• The Court cannot independently perceive any natural and distinctive reason why the form of county government (consolidated vs. not) should determine the balance of power between a school board and superintendent, especially given that school boards are arms of state government, not county government.
• The Attorney General, despite multiple opportunities (trial court, Court of Appeals, initial oral argument, and rehearing argument), failed to articulate any plausible, non-arbitrary justification connecting the special Jefferson-only treatment to the statutory objectives.

Because there is no reasonably articulable natural and distinctive basis for singling out Jefferson County’s district for this governance scheme, the statute fails the Section 59 test and must be struck down.

2.4 Reassurance about Other Classification-Based Statutes

The Attorney General warned that if SB 1 is invalidated, many other Kentucky statutes tied to county class, size, or municipal form of government—covering county government structure, hotel taxes, police bargaining, health boards, etc.—might be endangered.

The Court expressly rejects that slippery slope:

• It does not hold that the General Assembly can never legislate for a particular type of county or local government.
• It only forbids unreasonable classification—i.e., classifications for which no natural and distinctive reason can be articulated in relation to the statute’s purposes.
• Existing statutes keyed to population, county class, or municipal status typically do rest on such reasons (e.g., large urban areas face different fiscal or administrative challenges than rural counties).

The decision is framed as targeting only “unreasonable special or disparate treatment of any one specific community,” not reasonable legislative experimentation tailored to actual differences across jurisdictions.

3. Factual and Legal Background

3.1 The Pre-SB 1 School Governance Framework

Prior to SB 1, the general Kentucky statutory scheme was:

• School boards had “general control and management of the public schools in [their] district,” including funds and property (KRS 160.290(1)).
• The superintendent was “the executive agent of the board” and supervised schools “subject to the control of the board” (KRS 160.370(1)).

This framework applied uniformly across the Commonwealth, including Jefferson County.

3.2 What SB 1 Changed

In 2022, the General Assembly enacted SB 1. Section 3 of that bill added a new subsection, KRS 160.370(2), creating two different governance regimes:

1. General rule – KRS 160.370(2)(a): For most districts, it largely retained the traditional model: the superintendent’s authority was still “subject to the control of the board.”
2. Special rule – KRS 160.370(2)(b): For “a county school district in a county with a consolidated local government,” it made major changes:
   • The superintendent gained exclusive authority over “the general conduct of the schools, the course of instruction, the discipline of pupils, and the management of business affairs.”
   • The superintendent could implement rules, regulations, bylaws, and policies unless a super-majority of the board overrode them—whereas in other counties a bare majority of the board controlled policy.
   • The superintendent could approve purchases up to $250,000 without board approval—an authority not extended to other superintendents.

In addition, KRS 160.370(2)(a)(2) forbade the Jefferson County Board of Education from meeting more than once every four weeks—another restriction unique in the Commonwealth and unexplained in the statute.

Only Jefferson County meets the statutory description “a county school district in a county with a consolidated local government.” Thus, in practice:

• The Jefferson County superintendent is more powerful than every other superintendent.
• The Jefferson County Board of Education is significantly weaker than every other school board in Kentucky.
• No other county or district is subject to these governance constraints.

3.3 The Lawsuit and Prior Proceedings

The Jefferson County Board of Education sued, arguing that SB 1 violates Section 59 because:

• It is a local or special act “to provide for the management of common schools” (forbidden by Section 59(25)); and
• It is a special law where a general law could be made applicable (forbidden by Section 59(29)).

The Jefferson Circuit Court agreed and held SB 1 unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On initial review, the Kentucky Supreme Court (with a different composition) issued an opinion upholding SB 1 under the test from Woodall. The Jefferson County Board then petitioned for rehearing under RAP 43.

On rehearing, the reconstituted Court reversed course, held SB 1 unconstitutional, and simultaneously elaborated a broader test for Sections 59 and 60.

4. The Legal Framework: Sections 59 and 60 and Competing Tests

4.1 Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution

Section 59 is Kentucky’s “special and local legislation” clause. Among other things, it:

• Forbids the General Assembly to pass local or special acts concerning certain enumerated subjects, including “the management of common schools” (Section 59(25)); and
• Contains a general command that “in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted” (Section 59(29)).

Section 60 reinforces and supplements Section 59 with additional limits on special and local acts.

Historically, these provisions served to:

• Prevent the legislature from granting special favors to particular localities, interests, or persons; and
• Prevent targeting of certain counties or cities for adverse treatment.

A “local or special” act, the Court has often said, is one that either:

• Applies only to a single person, place, or locale; or
• Arbitrarily discriminates between similarly situated persons, places, or things, favoring some and burdening others.

4.2 Earlier “Classification” Test: Schoo and Its Progeny

For much of the 20th century, Kentucky courts evaluated Section 59 challenges through an explicitly classification-based analysis, exemplified by Schoo v. Rose, 270 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954).

Schoo and its progeny (including Zuckerman v. Bevin, 565 S.W.3d 580 (Ky. 2018)) articulated a two-part test:

1. The statute must apply equally to all members of the articulated class.
2. There must be “distinctive and natural reasons” supporting that classification in relation to the statute’s purpose.

The concept of “classification” was central: the question was whether the persons, places, or entities covered by the statute “by themselves form a proper and legitimate class with reference to the purposes of the act.” (See Droege v. McInerney, 120 Ky. 796, 87 S.W. 1085 (1905), quoting Sutherland.)

Over time, this approach increasingly drew on, and became entangled with, equal protection reasoning—particularly in cases like Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1985), which added a more demanding scrutiny and controversial burden-shifting, and Zuckerman, which applied a Schoo-type test in a high-stakes pension context.

4.3 Woodall’s Simplification and the “Particular Individual, Object, or Locale” Test

In Calloway County Sheriff’s Department v. Woodall, 607 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. 2020), the Court attempted to disentangle Sections 59/60 from equal protection analysis and to simplify the doctrine. The statute there limited a lump-sum workers’ compensation death benefit to deaths occurring within four years of injury. Challengers invoked Section 59.

Woodall held:

• Challenges to legislation based on classification (e.g., differential treatment of groups) properly belong under Kentucky’s equal protection provisions (Sections 1–3), not under Sections 59 and 60.
• The “original” Section 59 test should be restored: a statute violates Sections 59/60 if it is a special or local act—that is, if it “applies to a particular individual, object or locale,” as opposed to a genuine class of persons, places, or things.
• Schoo and its classification-based analysis were effectively rejected as governing Section 59 law.
• Tabler was explicitly repudiated for “super-charging” Schoo and creating an elevated, unpredictable standard.

After Woodall, many understood the test to be:

• If a law applies to a class (even a very narrowly drawn or currently one-member class), it is not “special or local” under Sections 59/60; any fairness or reasonableness objections must be raised under equal protection.
• If a law truly singles out a named individual or place (e.g., “Louisville only,” by explicit name), it may violate Sections 59/60.

The original (now superseded) majority in Coleman applied this understanding and upheld SB 1 as a general law because it applied to an “open” class (any county school district in a consolidated local government).

4.4 The Majority on Rehearing: Reintegrating “Reasonableness” into Sections 59 and 60

On rehearing, the new majority accepts that Woodall remains precedent but insists it did not fully displace the older classification/“reasonableness” analysis. The majority’s key moves are:

• Contextualizing Woodall: The Court says the “particular individual, object or locale” language in Woodall was articulated in the context of a workers’ compensation scheme that inherently involves line-drawing and classes of benefit recipients. That formula is not sufficient as a universal test for Sections 59 and 60.
• Reaffirming classification analysis: The Court cites Droege, Zuckerman, and Sutherland’s treatise, emphasizing that classification has always been “the real heart of the special legislation doctrine.”
• Re-adopting the Zuckerman/Schoo-type test: It embraces the two-part formulation from Zuckerman—(1) equal application within the class and (2) “distinctive and natural reasons” supporting the class—and refines it into a more explicit, rational-basis-style inquiry.
• Articulating a unified standard: The operative question under Sections 59 and 60 is now:

  whether there is any reasonably articulable natural and distinctive basis for the class distinctions drawn by the legislature, in light of the statute’s purposes and objectives.

The Court adopts then-Chief Justice Minton’s concurrence in Zuckerman as a practical framework by posing four questions:

1. What is the “condition” the legislature is trying to remedy?
2. Why is the legislature treating one class differently from another?
3. Why is it treating some members of a class differently from others?
4. Does the legislature have good reasons for all of this?

So, Sections 59 and 60 now require courts to:

• Identify the statutory purpose.
• Examine the class the statute singles out (by geography, population, form of government, etc.).
• Ask whether there is any natural, non-arbitrary reason why that class is uniquely suited or uniquely burdened in relation to that purpose.

If the answer is yes, the law passes Sections 59/60. If not, it fails.

4.5 Burden of Proof and Presumption of Constitutionality

The majority also clarifies the burdens and evidentiary posture:

• Statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.
• The challenging party must make a prima facie showing that no reasonably articulable natural and distinctive basis exists for the classification.
• The government can rebut by articulating any such basis—even if this explanation is developed in litigation and was not expressly stated in legislative findings.

This is a deliberate rejection of any notion, associated with Tabler, that Sections 59 and 60 impose a heightened scrutiny or special burden on the State. The Court aligns the Sections 59/60 approach more closely with rational-basis equal protection review, both doctrinally and functionally.

5. Applying the Test: Why SB 1’s Jefferson-Only Scheme Fails Section 59

5.1 Identifying the Class and the Disparate Treatment

SB 1’s key classification is:

“a county school district in a county with a consolidated local government.”

At present, only Jefferson County fits this description. The effect of SB 1:

• Alters the statewide default rule (board control of superintendent) only for Jefferson County’s school district;
• Vests the Jefferson County superintendent with unilateral power over core operational matters unless overridden by a super-majority of the board; and
• Constrains the Jefferson County Board’s operations (e.g., meeting frequency) in ways no other board faces.

Meanwhile:

• Other county school districts retain the traditional board-dominant governance structure.
• Independent school districts—even those operating in complex or urbanized environments—do not receive either the extra superintendent powers or the governance constraints imposed on Jefferson County.

5.2 The Missing Link: No Reasonable Connection Between “Consolidated Local Government” and School Governance

The Court’s core conclusion is that there is simply no natural, distinctive reason for linking the unique governance regime in SB 1 to the form of county government (consolidated vs non-consolidated). Key points:

• School boards are “agencies of state government” (Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 527 (Ky. 2001)), not arms of county government. Their core responsibilities and challenges do not logically turn on whether the county operates under a consolidated local government model.
• SB 1 provides no legislative findings, no recitals, and no textual clues connecting consolidated local government status to the chosen governance changes in Jefferson County schools.
• Neither the Attorney General’s briefs nor his oral arguments developed a plausible story of why:
  • Only a county school district inside a consolidated local government would benefit from a stronger superintendent and weaker board; or
  • Other districts—county or independent—would be harmed or ill-served by that same model.

The Court is particularly struck by the statutory silence regarding:

• Why an independent district located in a consolidated local government (e.g., Anchorage Independent, within Jefferson County) would not also benefit from the same governance changes.
• Why county school districts in non-consolidated counties (which still face issues of performance, discipline, finance, and transportation) should be denied the tools purportedly given to Jefferson County’s superintendent.

Absent any plausible tie between the class and the statutory goal, the Court infers that the law is simply singling out Jefferson County’s district for differential treatment without a constitutionally adequate reason.

5.3 Distinguishing Legitimate Geographic/Population-Based Legislation

The Court contrasts SB 1 with earlier cases where differential treatment of Jefferson County or first-class cities was upheld. For example:

• Sims v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, 290 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1956):
  • Allowed a “board of education containing a city of the first class” (then, Jefferson County) to impose occupational license fees.
  • This was upheld because the Board faced significantly higher building and salary costs than other districts—a natural and distinctive reason justifying extra revenue authority.
• Board of Education of Louisville v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, 522 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1975):
  • Upheld a statute that provided a special merger mechanism for Louisville’s first-class city school district and the Jefferson County district.
  • The Court emphasized that the large urban district had:
    • Far greater student population;
    • Substantially more property and complex financing needs; and
    • “Localized enclaves” of minority populations requiring assured representation.
  • Those features made Louisville’s circumstances materially different from smaller districts; the classification sensibly matched the problem.

In those cases, the statutes addressed problems uniquely or especially associated with large, urban, first-class city districts. The differences were not only real but also clearly linked to the statute’s means.

By contrast, SB 1:

• Does not expressly target distinctly urban or population-driven problems; it simply reallocates power between board and superintendent.
• Addresses issues (student performance, discipline, dropout rates, busing, school assignment) that exist across the Commonwealth.
• Does not explain why those issues, in Jefferson County, require the specific governance remedy of a strengthened superintendent and weakened board, nor why similar remedies would be inappropriate elsewhere.

Thus, while the earlier statutes were tailored to unique urban conditions, SB 1 is not tied to any such unique characteristic; it is instead an unexplained singling-out of Jefferson County’s district, which Section 59 does not permit in the context of school management.

5.4 Section 59(25) and 59(29): Direct Violations

The Court identifies two overlapping constitutional infirmities:

1. Violation of Section 59(25): Special or local acts “to provide for the management of common schools”
   • SB 1 plainly regulates the “management of common schools” by altering who (board vs. superintendent) has final say over policy, discipline, curriculum implementation, purchasing, and meeting schedules.
   • Because it applies only to Jefferson County’s school district and there is no reasonable, natural basis for that limitation, it is a prohibited “local or special” act on a subject for which local/special acts are expressly forbidden.
2. Violation of Section 59(29): Special law where a general law can be made applicable
   • There is no apparent reason SB 1’s governance model could not be applied to all school districts, or at least to some broader, rationally drawn class (such as all districts above a certain enrollment threshold, or all districts in counties above a certain population).
   • Because a general law could have been made applicable, but the legislature instead enacted a de facto single-district regime without justification, Section 59(29) is violated.

5.5 Judicial Role and Separation of Powers

The majority takes care to emphasize:

• It is not passing on the wisdom or policy merits of SB 1—only its constitutionality.
• Courts must defer to legislative policy judgments within constitutional bounds, but cannot abdicate their duty to enforce constitutional limits.
  • The opinion quotes Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), to reaffirm that the judiciary must interpret the Constitution even when doing so checks another branch.
  • The Court also invokes Shaw v. Fox, 246 Ky. 342, 55 S.W.2d 11 (1932), for the proposition that courts do not judge expediency or wisdom, only constitutional compliance.

In effect, the Court presents its decision as faithful to separation of powers—deferring on policy but enforcing the structural constraints that the people embedded in Sections 59 and 60 to protect communities against unreasonable favoritism or targeting.

6. The Dissent: Rehearing, Stare Decisis, and the Status of Woodall

6.1 Rehearing Under RAP 43: Was It Properly Granted?

Justice Nickell’s dissent (joined by Chief Justice Lambert and Justice Conley) is as much about process as substance. He argues that:

• The Court’s grant of rehearing was improper under RAP 43(B)(1)(a).
• The only meaningful change between the original opinion (upholding SB 1 under Woodall) and the rehearing decision (striking it down) was the change in Court membership.
• Rehearing is not a vehicle to reverse course simply because a new majority prefers a different outcome.

RAP 43(B)(1)(a) allows rehearing only when:

• The Court has overlooked a material fact in the record; or
• Overlooked a controlling statute or decision; or
• Misconceived the issues or the applicable law; or
• In “extraordinary cases when justice demands it.”

The dissent’s core points:

1. No overlooked controlling statute:
   • The Board argued on rehearing that SB 1’s class was “closed” because no other county could adopt a consolidated local government under existing law, and that the Court had “overlooked” statutes governing city classification and consolidation.
   • The dissent notes those statutes (KRS 67C.101, 81.005, 83A.160) were already briefed and considered; the original majority concluded the class was “open” because other counties could, in theory, meet the criteria.
   • On rehearing, the Board retreated from “impossible” to merely “extremely unlikely,” effectively conceding the original point.
   • Thus, no genuinely “controlling” statute had been overlooked; the Board simply disagreed with the original interpretation.
2. No misapplication of law:
   • At the time of the original opinion, Woodall was the governing precedent. Both parties framed their Section 59 arguments under Woodall.
   • The original majority applied Woodall faithfully, asking whether SB 1 applied to a “particular individual, object or locale” or to a class (concluding it was the latter, and thus not special/local under Sections 59/60).
   • Disagreement over whether Woodall should be modified or overruled is not the same thing as misapplying existing law.
3. No “extraordinary” palpable error:
   • “Extraordinary” cases justifying rehearing are likened to palpable error: clear, obvious, and resulting in manifest injustice.
   • The dissent finds it implausible to characterize the original majority’s straightforward application of the Court’s own recent precedent (Woodall) as a palpable error of that magnitude.

Justice Nickell warns that using rehearing to effectively reverse a fully briefed and decided appeal simply because membership has changed “will be undoubtedly perceived as a result-oriented outlier” and risks undermining the judiciary’s legitimacy as a non-political institution.

6.2 Has Woodall Been Overruled in Substance?

The dissent takes issue with the majority’s characterization of its move as a mere “expansion” of Woodall. In the dissent’s view:

• Woodall deliberately:
  • Abandoned the Schoo-style classification/reasonableness tests for Section 59; and
  • Confined such classification scrutiny to equal protection under Sections 1–3.
• The majority, by reinstating classification and reasonableness as the core of Sections 59 and 60, has in substance revived Schoo and its progeny, and thus overruled Woodall, even if not in name.
• Labeling this as “expansion” is, in the dissent’s words, sophistry—semantic maneuvering to conceal what is effectively a doctrinal reversal tied to a change in the Court’s composition.

The dissent notes that:

• Zuckerman relied on the Schoo classification test and was later characterized by Woodall as consistent with Section 59 only in result, not analysis.
• Post-Woodall decisions like Cates v. Kroger, 627 S.W.3d 864 (Ky. 2021), refused to treat classification arguments as Section 59 issues, instead channeling them into equal protection claims.

Thus, in the dissent’s view, the majority’s reliance on Zuckerman and similar cases as “still good law” is incompatible with Woodall and disregards basic principles of precedent—where the most recent case governs when older ones conflict.

6.3 The Dissent’s Merits View: SB 1 Is Constitutional Even Under Classification Analysis

Even accepting the revived classification test, the dissent would uphold SB 1 because:

• The relevant class is not “Jefferson County” in name, but “county school districts in counties with consolidated local governments,” which:
  • Necessarily involves a first-class city; and
  • Requires a county population of at least 250,000 (per KRS 81.005 and KRS 83A.160(6)); and
  • Reflects a merger of city and county governance structures through voter choice under KRS 67C.101.
• Large urban districts like Jefferson County face qualitatively and quantitatively different challenges:
  • Massive student populations (over 95,000 in Jefferson County Public Schools);
  • Complex property, facilities, and financing needs;
  • High poverty rates, diverse student bodies (over 139 languages), and higher incidences of discipline, absenteeism, and dropout issues;
  • Extraordinarily complex busing operations (more students ride the bus in Jefferson County than the entire population of most Kentucky counties).
• These differences align with earlier cases like:
  • City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W. 411 (Ky. 1909), upholding a minimum school tax applied only to Louisville; and
  • Board of Education of Louisville (1975), upholding a differently structured merger board for Louisville based on size and minority-representation concerns.

From the dissent’s perspective:

• The legislature reasonably concluded that governance tools that may be unnecessary or even ill-suited for small, rural counties are appropriate for a large urban district embedded in a consolidated local government.
also benefit from similar tools does not invalidate the legislature’s decision to address the most acute case first.

Thus, even under the majority’s own “reasonably articulable basis” test, the dissent believes there is an obvious and natural reason for SB 1’s classification: the distinctive scale and complexity of Jefferson County’s school system within a consolidated local government.

6.4 Broader Institutional Concerns

The dissent closes with strong warnings about:

• The danger of allowing changes in Court membership to drive rapid swings in constitutional doctrine.
• The risk that the Court will come to be seen as merely another political branch, with outcomes shifting based on electoral cycles rather than stable law.
• The importance of judges viewing themselves as representatives of the law rather than political constituencies.

It emphasizes that:

• Judges are accountable to the law, not to voters’ policy preferences.
• Rewriting Section 59 doctrine via rehearing, under circumstances where the only material change is the Court’s composition, undermines public confidence in a neutral, principled judiciary.

7. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

7.1 “Special” and “Local” Legislation

A statute is:

• Local if it applies to a particular geographic area (e.g., one named county or city).
• Special if it applies to a particular person, entity, or very narrow class that has been singled out, as opposed to a generally applicable rule.

Kentucky’s Constitution goes further than many states by:

• Listing subjects—including the “management of common schools”—on which local or special acts are absolutely forbidden.
• Then broadly saying no special law may be passed where a general law could be made applicable.

7.2 “Classifications” and the “Open vs. Closed Class” Idea

A classification is how a statute defines the group it applies to—often by criteria like population, form of government, or some other characteristic. For example:

• “Counties with a population greater than 250,000” is a classification by population.
• “Cities of the first class” is a classification by municipal type.

An open class is one into which new members can enter over time (e.g., other counties might grow to exceed 250,000 population). A closed class is fixed from the outset (e.g., “Jefferson County as of 2025”).

Earlier Kentucky cases often used the open/closed distinction to distinguish general laws (open classes) from special/local laws (closed classes). The Woodall majority paid more attention to this. The current majority, while acknowledging the concept, makes “reasonableness” rather than open/closed status the central question.

7.3 Rational-Basis Style Review

The majority adopts a standard under Sections 59 and 60 that closely resembles “rational basis” review in equal protection law:

• The law is presumed constitutional.
• The classification must be upheld if there is any reasonably conceivable set of facts under which the distinction makes sense in light of the statutory purpose.
• The State does not need to show that the classification is the best or most precise; only that it is not purely arbitrary.

The twist is that this rational-basis style test is applied within the special/local-legislation clauses, not only under equal protection. That is the doctrinal innovation (or restoration, depending on viewpoint) of this decision.

7.4 “Consolidated Local Government”

A “consolidated local government” in Kentucky (KRS 67C.101) is a unified city–county government, formed when a “city of the first class” merges with its county following voter approval. Jefferson County (Louisville Metro) is the prime—and currently only—example. This structure:

• Combines county and city governance into one entity.
• Is tied by statute to thresholds of population (at least 250,000) and municipal status.

SB 1 used this concept to define its class: “a county school district in a county with a consolidated local government.” The majority concludes that using consolidated local government status as the trigger for a unique school governance model lacks a meaningful connection to the purposes of SB 1.

8. Likely Impact of the Decision

8.1 For the General Assembly and Legislative Drafting

The decision sends a clear message to the General Assembly:

• The legislature may still tailor legislation to particular counties, cities, or classes (by size, type, or form of government), including laws that in practice affect only one jurisdiction.
• However, to survive Sections 59 and 60, such classifications must rest on reasonably articulable natural and distinctive reasons that tie the chosen class to the statutory goals.

Practical legislative implications:

• Legislative findings or preambles explaining why a particular class is uniquely situated to the problem can be beneficial, although the Court does not require formal findings if plausible reasons can be articulated later.
• Geographically targeted educational reforms—especially those that single out individual districts—will be closely scrutinized for arbitrary singling-out.
• Laws that affect governance, taxation, or regulatory powers of a specific county or city should be drafted in terms of neutral, rational criteria (e.g., population thresholds, urbanization level, fiscal capacity) that match the problem being addressed.

8.2 For Future Section 59/60 Litigation

The case gives lawyers a clearer template for both attacking and defending classification-based statutes under Sections 59 and 60.

• Challengers will:
  • Identify the statutory purpose.
  • Show that the class singled out does not differ in any relevant way from other similarly situated entities.
  • Argue that no plausible, non-arbitrary reason exists for the limitation.
• The State will:
  • Offer plausible rationales connecting the class to the objective (even if post hoc).
  • Stress the presumption of constitutionality and analogize to rational-basis equal protection cases.
  • Point to precedents like Sims, City of Louisville, and Board of Ed. of Louisville where population- and status-based distinctions were upheld.

Compared to Woodall’s more binary “particular individual vs. class” approach, this decision:

• Makes it somewhat easier to mount Section 59/60 challenges, because even laws framed as “classes” can now be struck down if the class definition is unreasonable.
• But still sets a deferential standard: if any articulable basis exists, the law stands.

8.3 For School Governance in Kentucky

As a direct effect of this decision:

• The unique governance regime created by SB 1 for Jefferson County Public Schools is invalid.
• Jefferson County’s school governance reverts to the statewide default:
  • The Board retains “general control and management” of schools, funds, and property.
  • The superintendent operates as the Board’s executive agent, subject to Board control, like all other superintendents in Kentucky.
• Other superintendents do not gain the extra powers that SB 1 confers on the Jefferson County superintendent; those provisions are struck down rather than expanded statewide by judicial fiat.

More broadly, the decision signals that:

• Major structural changes in governance—especially for the state’s largest school district—cannot be imposed as one-off experiments without a constitutionally adequate justification for treating that district differently.
• If the General Assembly wishes to reconfigure the relationship between boards and superintendents, it will likely need to do so through:
  • Generally applicable reforms; or
  • Reforms limited to a rationally drawn class (e.g., all districts over a certain size) with a clear, articulable basis.

8.4 For Separation of Powers and Stare Decisis

Institutionally, the case:

• Revives, in substance, a classification-based Section 59/60 doctrine closer to the Schoo/Zuckerman line than to Woodall.
• Leaves some uncertainty about the precise status of Woodall—formally cited and “expanded,” but in practice significantly revised.
• Highlights internal disagreement about:
  • How strictly the Court should adhere to recently adopted precedent;
  • When rehearing is an appropriate vehicle for doctrinal adjustment; and
  • How to maintain public confidence in the judiciary’s independence from political change.

Future courts may need to clarify:

• Whether Woodall’s more limited “particular individual, object or locale” test retains any independent role; or
• Whether Section 59/60 analysis is now fully governed by the “reasonably articulable natural and distinctive basis” standard articulated here.

9. Conclusion: The Significance of Coleman v. Jefferson County Board of Education

Coleman v. Jefferson County Board of Education is a pivotal decision in Kentucky constitutional law. Its key contributions can be summarized as follows:

1. Reframing Section 59/60 doctrine:
   • It reinstates and refines a classification-based, reasonableness-centered test for special and local legislation.
   • It aligns that test closely with rational-basis equal protection analysis, while grounding it specifically in Sections 59 and 60.
2. Clarifying burdens and standards:
   • Statutes are presumed constitutional.
   • Challengers must demonstrate the absence of any reasonably articulable natural and distinctive rationale for the classification.
   • The State can defend using any plausible connection between the class and the legislative objective.
3. Policing arbitrary singling-out of communities:
   • The Court enforces the constitutional promise that no community—however large or controversial—can be subjected to a specially crafted governance regime absent a rational, articulated justification.
   • Sections 59 and 60 protect both against unfair favoritism and against unfair targeting.
4. Preserving space for tailored legislative solutions:
   • The decision does not declare all geography- or size-based legislation suspect.
   • Instead, it explicitly endorses statutes that draw reasonable lines grounded in real differences, citing earlier cases involving Jefferson County and first-class cities as examples.
5. Raising important institutional questions:
   • The dissent warns that the use of rehearing and the effective reworking of recent precedent may damage the Court’s perceived neutrality.
   • These concerns will likely echo in future debates over stare decisis and the Court’s role in constitutional development.

In the specific context of public education, the decision restores Jefferson County’s alignment with the general governance framework for Kentucky school districts and underscores that reforms in school management must respect the constitutional ban on special and local acts in this sensitive domain.

In the broader constitutional landscape, Coleman stands for the principle that:

Class-based legislation is permissible only when the class bears a natural and distinctive relationship to the problem the statute seeks to solve. Where that relationship cannot be reasonably articulated, Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution require the courts to step in.

That is the enduring precedent established by this opinion.