The “Jackson Investigation Doctrine”
Eleventh Circuit clarifies that discipline flowing from an employee-requested, good-faith investigation constitutes a legitimate, non-retaliatory basis for termination unless the employee can prove that the investigation itself was a sham.

Introduction

Schyla M. Jackson, a 58-year-old administrative assistant employed by Atlanta Public Schools (“APS”), alleged that she was discriminated against and fired in retaliation for complaining about age and sex discrimination. After losing on summary judgment in the Northern District of Georgia, she appealed. The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished but detailed opinion, affirmed—laying down an important clarifying principle: when an employer conducts an investigation at the request of the complaining employee and disciplines her on the basis of independently corroborated misconduct discovered during that investigation, the employee must present concrete evidence that the investigation was a mere pretext designed to retaliate; unsupported speculation will not suffice.

Although designated “Do Not Publish,” this decision solidifies a trend in Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence, harmonising the dual analytical avenues of McDonnell Douglas and the “convincing mosaic” framework, and crystallising how courts should treat employer investigations in the retaliation context. Practitioners will recognise this as the “Jackson Investigation Doctrine.”

Summary of the Judgment

• Claims on Appeal: Retaliation under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).
• Holding: Summary judgment for APS affirmed. Jackson failed to create a genuine dispute of fact that her termination was a pretext for retaliation.
• Key Points:
  • The Eleventh Circuit assumed, arguendo, that multiple complaints and meetings were “statutorily protected activity,” yet found no evidence of causal connection or pretext.
  • APS articulated a legitimate reason—rude and unprofessional conduct confirmed by nine witnesses and two internal hearings—easily meeting its “exceedingly light” burden.
  • Jackson’s allegations that APS performed a “hatchet-job investigation” were unsupported speculation and could not create a triable issue.
  • The court reiterated that McDonnell Douglas and “convincing mosaic” are “two paths to the same destination”—ordinary summary-judgment review.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – provides the familiar three-step burden-shifting framework for discrimination and retaliation claims. The panel used it to structure the analysis.
• Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023) and McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024) – modern authority emphasising that the McDonnell Douglas and “convincing mosaic” routes are analytically interchangeable. The court cites them to dispel any notion that a plaintiff can survive summary judgment simply by sidestepping McDonnell Douglas.
• Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP, 997 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2021) – quoted for the requirement that a plaintiff must “address head-on” an employer’s legitimate reason.
• Gogel v. Kia Motors Manufacturing of Georgia, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) – emphasises that the burden of persuasion stays with the employee throughout.
• Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329 (11th Cir. 2023) – sets forth the “exceedingly light” burden on the employer to articulate a legitimate reason.
• Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014) – used to deem Jackson’s disparate-treatment claims abandoned on appeal for insufficient briefing.
• Cordoba v. Dillard’s Inc., 419 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005) – teaches that speculation cannot defeat summary judgment; cited to reject Jackson’s unsubstantiated “scheme” theory.

Collectively, these authorities underscore two controlling ideas: (1) the primacy of evidence over conjecture in the pretext stage; and (2) the equivalence of analytical frameworks, preventing plaintiffs from exploiting procedural distinctions.

2. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Prima Facie Case (assumed met): The panel, bypassing dispute, accepted that Jackson’s EEOC charges and internal complaints were protected activities and that termination was adverse.
2. Legitimate, Non-Retaliatory Reason: APS’s internal investigator, Kevin Hills, interviewed nine witnesses and found “overwhelming” evidence of Jackson’s rude, disruptive behaviour—violating two Board policies. This satisfied APS’s minimal burden.
3. Pretext Analysis:
   • Jackson “must address head-on and rebut” APS’s reason. She offered only speculation that Carter (her supervisor) orchestrated a sham investigation—without proof he controlled the investigation or the decision makers.
   • Hills had no knowledge of Jackson’s EEOC activity when he completed the investigation—a fatal gap in causal proof.
   • The timing cut against Jackson: she requested the investigation, then tried to halt it, then renewed her request—making retaliation implausible.
4. Convincing Mosaic Rejected: The same evidentiary gaps barred any reasonable inference of retaliatory intent. The panel stressed that inference cannot rest on “unsupported speculation.”

3. Impact on Future Litigation

Although unpublished, the opinion is persuasive within the Eleventh Circuit and instructive nationwide, particularly on three fronts:

• Internal Investigations: Courts will examine who initiated an investigation, who controlled it, and whether investigators knew of protected activity. If an employee demanded the investigation, it becomes harder to brand the subsequent discipline as retaliatory.
• Burden of Proof at Pretext Stage: The decision elevates the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs who attack the legitimacy of an investigation—they must produce concrete proof (emails, testimony, departures from protocol) that the inquiry was a sham.
• Strategic Use of “Convincing Mosaic”: Plaintiffs can no longer rely on an amorphous mosaic if the individual tiles are speculative; courts will import the same evidence-scrutiny standard from McDonnell Douglas.

Practically, employers should:

• Maintain clear documentation of who triggers and oversees investigations.
• Segment investigators from decision makers to insulate against knowledge of protected activity.
• Ensure disciplinary processes tie back to objective policy violations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Statutorily Protected Activity: Conduct such as filing an EEOC charge or complaining about discrimination. The law shields employees from retaliation because of these actions, not from normal discipline for unrelated misconduct.
• Prima Facie Case: The initial minimal showing (like “opening the courthouse door”). For retaliation, plaintiff must show protected activity, adverse action, and causal link.
• Legitimate, Non-Retaliatory Reason: An employer’s explanation for the adverse action that is lawful and non-discriminatory. The burden here is “exceedingly light”—they just have to articulate it, not prove it.
• Pretext: Evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false and the real motive was retaliation or discrimination. Mere doubt or disagreement with the reason is not enough; plaintiff must show inconsistencies or contradictions.
• Convincing Mosaic: A term coined by the Eleventh Circuit to describe a collection of circumstantial evidence that, viewed together, suggests discriminatory intent—akin to piecing together a mosaic picture.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson v. Atlanta Public Schools reaffirms that retaliation claims live or die in the evidentiary weeds. Where an employee initiates an internal investigation and that inquiry, conducted in good faith and without knowledge of protected activity, uncovers legitimate misconduct, the employer may discipline or discharge the employee without fear of liability—unless the employee can marshal tangible evidence that the investigation was merely a façade. This “Jackson Investigation Doctrine” bolsters employers’ ability to act on credible, non-retaliatory findings while reminding employees (and counsel) that speculation cannot substitute for proof at the summary-judgment stage.

Practitioners should heed the court’s dual advice: document objectively, investigate independently, and litigate with evidence, not conjecture.