The “Implicit Denial” Doctrine & A Re-affirmed Low Bar for Prison-Excessive-Force Claims – Commentary on Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer (4th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer is a published Fourth Circuit decision that vacates summary judgment for two Maryland correctional officers and, in doing so, delivers two important doctrinal clarifications:

Rule 56(d) Motions – “Implicit Denial” Doctrine. The court joins the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in holding that a district court need not expressly rule on a pending Rule 56(d) discovery request; when it enters summary judgment, any outstanding Rule 56(d) motion is implicitly denied. The appellate review, therefore, asks only whether the silent denial was an abuse of discretion, not whether silence itself is error.
Eighth-Amendment Excessive Force – Low Objective Threshold Re-affirmed. The panel re-emphasises that “anything more than de minimis” force is sufficient to satisfy the objective prong and that relatively “minor” injuries cannot, by themselves, foreclose a finding of malicious or sadistic intent.

The ruling will likely influence both discovery practice in civil rights litigation and how district courts evaluate prisoner excessive-force claims at the summary-judgment stage.

Summary of the Judgment

• The district court had dismissed state-law claims, the claims against the Maryland DPSCS Secretary, and entered summary judgment for Officers Holland and Arndt on Escobar-Salmeron’s §1983 excessive-force claim.
• On appeal, the Fourth Circuit:

Upheld the district court’s implicit denial of Escobar-Salmeron’s Rule 56(d) declaration (finding it procedurally deficient).
Vacated the grant of summary judgment, holding that genuine disputes of material fact existed about the amount and timing of force used and the resulting injuries.
Remanded for further proceedings, explicitly allowing Escobar-Salmeron to renew his request for appointed counsel.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002) – Established that formal affidavits are not mandatory under Rule 56(d) when the non-movant has had no discovery. The panel distinguished Harrods because the inmate’s declaration here was “vague.”
Putney v. Likin, 656 F. App’x 632 (4th Cir. 2016) – Unpublished case where failure to address a detailed Rule 56(d) request was abuse of discretion. The court explained why Putney was inapposite and therefore limited its persuasive value.
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) & Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) – Supreme Court authority for the “non-trivial force suffices” standard. The panel invoked these cases to stress that injury severity is not dispositive.
Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2021) & Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008) – Current circuit law on the objective/subjective prongs and Whitley factors; used to structure the analysis.
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) – Reminded courts to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant at summary judgment.
Inter-circuit split cases on Rule 56(d):
In re Avandia (3d Cir.) & Patty Precision (10th Cir.) (requiring explicit rulings) versus Snider (5th Cir.) & Qualls (9th Cir.) (implicit denial acceptable). The Fourth Circuit expressly sided with the latter line.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Rule 56(d) Issue

The panel treated the district court’s silence as an implicit denial, adopting Fifth/Ninth-Circuit reasoning.
Denial was not an abuse of discretion because the plaintiff’s declaration failed the minimal specificity threshold—he did not identify particular documents, depositions, or information uniquely controlled by defendants that would create a triable fact.
By contrasting Putney, the court effectively created a two-tier framework: (i) detailed, targeted Rule 56(d) requests that merit liberal grants; and (ii) vague, conclusory invocations that may be denied sub silencio.

b) Excessive-Force Analysis

Objective prong: Bruised head, bleeding ear, and persistent shoulder/back pain constitute more than “de minimis” force; therefore a jury could find the objective element satisfied.
Subjective prong: Unresolved factual questions on the timeline (whether kicks/punches occurred before or after inmate’s bite and after handcuffing) go directly to the Whitley factors—need, proportionality, perceived threat, tempering efforts. Such credibility disputes cannot be decided on summary judgment.
District court’s error: It effectively treated “minor injury” as dispositive of malice, contradicting Hudson/Wilkins.

3. Likely Impact

On Civil Procedure (Rule 56(d>):

Practitioners within the Fourth Circuit must now assume that failure to obtain an explicit ruling on a Rule 56(d) motion does not preserve error; they must demonstrate on appeal that silence was an abuse of discretion.
Pro se litigants are alerted that even the liberal Rule 56(d) standard requires specific discovery needs. Boiler-plate references to “unanswered discovery” will be inadequate.

On Substantive Prison Litigation:

The opinion bolsters the line of cases holding that relatively modest injuries can still support Eighth-Amendment claims—important for detainees whose injuries are often undocumented or untreated.
District courts in the Fourth Circuit must more carefully scrutinise defendants’ narratives before granting summary judgment in excessive-force suits, particularly where video evidence is absent or contested.
The decision may increase the frequency with which prisoner excessive-force claims proceed to trial, encouraging pre-trial settlements or deeper discovery.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 56(d): A Federal Rule that lets the non-moving party say, “I need more discovery before I can fairly oppose summary judgment.” The requester must (1) explain what facts are missing, (2) show the facts are essential, (3) explain why they are presently unavailable, and (4) show reasonable efforts to obtain them.
Summary Judgment: A procedure that ends a case without a trial if there is no genuine dispute over important facts and the movant is entitled to win under the law.
Objective vs. Subjective Prongs (Excessive Force):
• Objective – Was any non-trivial force used?
• Subjective – Did officers act “maliciously and sadistically” (bad motive) or in “good-faith” to restore order?
De Minimis Force: Force so slight (e.g., a shove causing no bruising) that it cannot support an Eighth-Amendment claim.
Implicit Denial Doctrine: When a court grants summary judgment without commenting on a pending Rule 56(d) motion, that motion is deemed denied. Appellate review focuses on whether the denial was reasonable, not on the court’s silence.

Conclusion

Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer clarifies Fourth-Circuit law on two fronts. Procedurally, it adopts the “implicit denial” approach to unresolved Rule 56(d) requests, signalling to litigants that specificity is indispensable when seeking pre-judgment discovery. Substantively, it reinforces Hudson/Wilkins by holding that prison excessive-force claims rarely turn on the gravity of injury alone; even “minor” injuries can raise a triable question of malicious intent, especially where factual narratives conflict. Future litigants—and district judges—must therefore tread carefully: vague discovery requests will not suffice, but neither will cursory reliance on modest injuries to extinguish claims that hinge on disputed motives and contested timelines.