The “Actual-Innocence” Gateway Post-Taylor:
Seventh Circuit Narrows Collateral Relief Under § 2255 in Cobbs v. United States

Introduction

On 26 June 2025 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided Cobbs v. United States, No. 23-3140, a case that squarely confronted the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in United States v. Taylor. In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Defendants with § 924(c) convictions predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery have since mounted collateral attacks, arguing that their firearms convictions are invalid. Michael Cobbs—serving 25 years after an open guilty plea to three counts—filed such a challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

The Seventh Circuit rejected his petition, establishing an important limit on when Taylor can serve as a vehicle for relief. The court held that where (1) the § 924(c) count expressly incorporates “a violation of § 1951 as set forth in Count One,” and (2) the plea colloquy contains admissions that satisfy the elements of a completed Hobbs Act robbery, the petitioner cannot invoke Taylor to demonstrate “actual innocence” and bypass procedural default. In effect, factual admissions—rather than the label in the charging heading—control.

Summary of the Judgment

• Procedural Posture: Cobbs filed a § 2255 petition four years after sentencing, claiming his § 924(c) conviction was invalid under Taylor. The district court denied relief but granted a Certificate of Appealability.
• Key Holding: The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Cobbs’s own admissions established a completed Hobbs Act robbery, which remains a valid § 924(c) predicate. Therefore, he could not show “actual innocence” to excuse his procedural default.
• Result: Petition denied; 300-month sentence stands.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022) – Attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a § 924(c) “crime of violence.” Provided the doctrinal springboard for Cobbs’s claim.
• Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) – Established that a petitioner who pled guilty but did not appeal must show “cause and prejudice” or “actual innocence,” and that “actual innocence” means factual innocence of both the pleaded charge and any more serious counts the government abandoned.
• Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) – Clarified “use” of a firearm under § 924(c); served as backdrop for Bousley.
• Lund v. United States, 913 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2019); White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547 (7th Cir. 2021) – Addressed procedural default and the contours of the “actual innocence” gateway.
• Lewis v. Peterson, 329 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2003) – Interpreted Bousley, emphasizing that a petitioner must disprove guilt on any charge the government dropped if it is equally or more serious.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court proceeded through three analytic steps:

1. Procedural Default Acknowledged. Because Cobbs never appealed, his claim was defaulted. Relief hinged on the “actual innocence” gateway.
2. Threshold Questions Bypassed. The panel expressly left open two unsettled questions:
   • (a) Whether a change in law, rather than new evidence, can power the actual-innocence gateway.
   • (b) Whether the same change in law can serve both as a gateway and the merits ground for relief.
   Assuming–without deciding–that both propositions favored Cobbs, the court still found he could not demonstrate actual innocence.
3. Focus on Count 2’s Text and Cobbs’s Admissions.
   • Indictment linkage: Count 2 alleged Cobbs brandished a firearm “in furtherance of a crime of violence … that is, a violation of § 1951 as set forth in Count One.” Count 1’s body alleged Cobbs “unlawfully obstructed, delayed, and affected, and attempted to obstruct … commerce … by robbery.” Thus, Count 1 described both completed and attempted robbery.
   • Plea colloquy facts: Cobbs admitted duct-taping employees, stealing phones and cash at gunpoint, and fleeing—elements that meet a completed Hobbs Act robbery under § 1951(b)(1).
   • Consequent predicate: Because a completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence after Taylor, the § 924(c) count remains valid. Cobbs therefore could not show it was “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted” him of Count 2.

3. Impact

The decision has several ripple effects:

• Cabining Taylor-based § 2255 Petitions. Defendants who pled guilty before Taylor cannot rely solely on the caption “attempted Hobbs Act robbery.” If the indictment’s narrative or plea admissions encompass a completed robbery (or another valid predicate), Taylor will not help.
• Drafting & Charging Practices. Prosecutors may deliberately include language describing both completed and attempted forms of an offense, fortifying § 924(c) counts against future doctrinal shifts.
• Actual-Innocence Doctrine Clarified. While leaving ultimate doctrinal questions open, the Seventh Circuit signaled that fact-based innocence—not purely legal innocence—is paramount when invoking the gateway.
• Plea-Colloquy Scrutiny. Defense counsel must ensure the factual basis is narrowly tailored; broad admissions can later block relief if the law changes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hobbs Act Robbery (§ 1951). A federal crime punishing robbery that affects interstate commerce. “Robbery” means taking property against someone’s will by force or threat; “attempt” means taking a substantial step with the intent to commit the robbery.
• 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Adds mandatory consecutive sentences for using, carrying, or brandishing a firearm “during and in relation to” a “crime of violence.”
• Crime of Violence – Elements Clause. Under § 924(c)(3)(A), an offense whose elements include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” After Taylor, attempted Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies, but completed robbery does.
• Procedural Default. Failure to raise a claim on direct appeal generally bars later collateral review unless the petitioner shows (a) cause and prejudice, or (b) actual innocence.
• Actual Innocence Gateway. An equitable doctrine allowing courts to reach defaulted claims when a petitioner shows it is “more likely than not” that no reasonable juror would convict, considering all admissible evidence.
• Open Plea. A guilty plea without a plea agreement; the defendant receives no charging or sentencing concessions from the government.

Conclusion

Cobbs v. United States marks a significant post-Taylor development. The Seventh Circuit held that where (i) the indictment’s text and (ii) the defendant’s sworn admissions substantiate a completed Hobbs Act robbery, a Taylor-based collateral attack on a § 924(c) conviction fails—even if everyone once assumed the predicate was only an attempted robbery. The ruling underscores two enduring lessons: factual guilt eclipses technical labels, and the “actual-innocence” gateway remains a high bar, demanding an evidentiary—not merely doctrinal—showing. Future litigants must therefore scrutinize the factual basis of their pleas as carefully as the statutory landscape, for the former may foreclose relief even when the latter shifts dramatically.