Tenth Circuit: Federal Kidnapping Is Not a “Crime of Violence” for § 3559(f)(2) Mandatory Minimums

Introduction

In United States v. Ford (10th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025), the Tenth Circuit resolved a recurring sentencing question that has taken on outsized importance since the Supreme Court invalidated several federal “residual clause” definitions of “crime of violence.” The court held that the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), is not categorically a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). As a result, the mandatory minimum sentence in 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(2)—which requires at least 25 years’ imprisonment for a “crime of violence” involving a child when the offense is kidnapping or maiming—does not apply to federal kidnapping convictions, even where child victims are involved.

The case arises from the resentencing of Killiu “Caveman” Ford, convicted in 2011–2012 of multiple kidnappings—including of two children—conspiracy, and a firearm enhancement. After his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count was vacated in light of evolving Supreme Court law on residual clauses, the district court resentenced Ford in 2023. Believing it was constrained by § 3559(f)(2), the court imposed concurrent 300-month sentences (25 years) on each remaining count. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that § 3559(f)(2) did not mandate those minimums and remanding for a new sentencing without that constraint.

The decision has significant implications for how federal courts within the Tenth Circuit (and potentially beyond) treat mandatory minimums for violent crimes against children when the underlying offense is kidnapping under § 1201, and it further harmonizes federal “crime of violence” analysis post-Dimaya and Davis.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Chief Judge Holmes and Judge Ebel, acting as a quorum) held:

Section 3559(f) applies only when the defendant is “convicted of a Federal offense that is a crime of violence” against a minor. Because § 3559(f) does not define “crime of violence,” the court looked to the federal code’s general definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16.
After Sessions v. Dimaya (2018) invalidated § 16(b)’s residual clause, only § 16(a)’s “elements clause” can support the “crime of violence” designation. That clause requires that the offense has, as an element, “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”
Applying the categorical approach, kidnapping under § 1201(a) can be committed by non-forceful means such as “inveigling” or “decoying,” so it does not categorically require physical force. Therefore, it is not a “crime of violence” under § 16(a).
The government’s textual argument—that § 3559(f)(2)’s phrase “if the crime of violence is kidnapping (as defined in section 1201)” effectively deems kidnapping a crime of violence—was rejected as an unnatural reading that would render surplusage the provision’s threshold “crime of violence” requirement.

The court vacated Ford’s sentences and remanded for resentencing unconstrained by § 3559(f)(2)’s 25-year mandatory minimum. The court acknowledged that this result effectively disables § 3559(f)(2) from applying to § 1201 kidnappings after Dimaya but emphasized that Congress can amend § 3559(f) if it wishes to restore such mandatory minimums for child kidnappings.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148 (2018): The Supreme Court invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. This forced courts to rely solely on § 16(a)’s elements clause when an undefined statutory reference uses the term “crime of violence.” Dimaya is the backbone for excluding residual-clause reasoning in § 3559(f) cases.
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019): The Court invalidated § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause. Davis is cited for legislative context—Congress knew § 16’s definition when it enacted § 3559(f) in 2006—and relates to Ford’s earlier vacatur of his § 924(c) count.
United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022): Reaffirmed strict adherence to the categorical approach for “elements clause” analyses, asking whether the offense always requires proof of force as an element. The Tenth Circuit uses Taylor’s framing to assess § 1201.
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 388 F.3d 779 (10th Cir. 2004): Establishes the Tenth Circuit’s use of the categorical approach under § 16(a).
United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019): Held that federal kidnapping under § 1201(a) does not necessarily involve violent physical force, emphasizing non-forceful means like “inveigle” and “decoy.” The Tenth Circuit aligns with Gillis’s reasoning.
United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2000): Recognized § 1201(a) covers both forcible and non-forcible kidnappings, supporting the conclusion that force is not an element.
United States v. Coleman, 149 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025): The First Circuit similarly observed that the federal kidnapping statute does not include a physical-force requirement.
United States v. Hopper, 723 F. App’x 645 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished): The Tenth Circuit previously reasoned that § 1201(a) is not a categorical crime of violence given the “inveigle” means; Ford adopts that reasoning.
United States v. Sanders, 708 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2013): Read § 3559(f)’s “crime of violence” phrase as incorporating § 16, but—pre-Dimaya—treated kidnapping as a crime of violence, likely via the now-invalid residual clause. Ford aligns with Sanders on the incorporation point, but not on kidnapping’s status post-Dimaya.
United States v. Mobley, 971 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2020): Clarified that § 1201(a)’s numbered subparagraphs are jurisdictional and noted Congress’s inclusion of common-law kidnapping concepts, including “taking and carrying away by force,” while the statute also encompasses non-forceful means.

Legal Reasoning

Text and structure of § 3559(f): The subsection begins with a threshold requirement—applying only to a person “convicted of a Federal offense that is a crime of violence” against a person under 18. It then prescribes different mandatory minimums depending on what the “crime of violence” is (murder, kidnapping/maiming, or resulting in serious bodily injury/weapon use). Because § 3559(f) does not define “crime of violence,” the court applied the “whole-code” canon and Congress’s presumed awareness of § 16 to import § 16’s definition.
Incorporation of § 16: Congress enacted § 16 in 1984 and used the “crime of violence” term in § 3559(f) in 2006 without redefining it. The court therefore looked to § 16. This reading is bolstered by contrast to § 3559(c), where Congress expressly defined “serious violent felony” and enumerated offenses (including kidnapping) directly. When Congress intends to enumerate, it knows how to do so explicitly.
No reliance on residual clauses: Dimaya disables § 16(b). Thus, only the elements clause in § 16(a) can sustain the “crime of violence” label. This sharply narrows the path to mandatory minimums under § 3559(f).
Categorical approach controls: Under Taylor and circuit precedent, courts ask whether the offense by its elements always requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The analysis is offense-focused, not fact-focused. The parties did not argue for the modified categorical approach, and the court agreed it does not apply because § 1201(a) is indivisible—it sets out alternative means, not alternative elements, of committing a single kidnapping offense.
Federal kidnapping under § 1201(a) does not require force: Section 1201(a) lists multiple ways to commit kidnapping—“seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away”—and courts have repeatedly recognized that “inveigle” and “decoy” are non-physical, deceit-based means. Because the statute can be violated without physical force, § 1201(a) is not categorically a “crime of violence” under § 16(a).
Rejection of the government’s textual argument: The government argued that the clause “if the crime of violence is kidnapping (as defined in section 1201)” implicitly declares that kidnapping is a “crime of violence.” The court found this reading unnatural and structurally unsound because it would make superfluous the threshold requirement that the defendant be convicted of a crime of violence. If Congress had intended to deem kidnapping a crime of violence for § 3559(f), it would have done so expressly, as it did in § 3559(c) for “serious violent felony.”
Acknowledgment of practical consequences and congressional prerogative: The court recognized that, after Dimaya, § 3559(f)(2) will not reach § 1201 kidnappings because the elements clause cannot be satisfied. If that outcome conflicts with contemporary policy preferences, the remedy lies with Congress to revise § 3559(f).

Impact and Practical Implications

The decision has concrete consequences for federal sentencing in the Tenth Circuit (Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming), and it contributes to a growing national consensus on the status of federal kidnapping under modern “crime of violence” jurisprudence.

Immediate effect in Ford: The district court must resentence Ford without treating § 3559(f)(2)’s 25-year minimum as mandatory for the two child-kidnapping counts. Although Ford’s advisory guideline range on each count was 300–327 months, the Guidelines are advisory; without the statutory floor, the court may vary downward under § 3553(a), as the defense had requested.
Broader sentencing practice: Prosecutors cannot rely on § 3559(f)(2) to impose a 25-year minimum solely because the kidnapping victim is a minor. The government may still argue for lengthy sentences under the Guidelines and § 3553(a), but the statutory minimum is no longer automatic.
Limits on § 3559(f)(3): Subsection (f)(3) prescribes a 10-year minimum if “the crime of violence” results in serious bodily injury or involves a dangerous weapon. Because Ford holds that § 1201 kidnapping is not itself a “crime of violence,” § 3559(f)(3) cannot be used to impose a 10-year minimum for kidnapping offenses either—unless Congress amends the statute or the predicate offense independently qualifies under § 16(a).
Alignment with post-Dimaya/Davis landscape: The ruling dovetails with decisions invalidating residual clauses and narrowing elements-clause analyses. It also complements cases finding that certain offenses (e.g., attempted Hobbs Act robbery in Taylor) do not categorically require violent force.
Charging and plea strategy: Expect a shift in prosecutorial strategy where child victims are involved. To obtain mandatory minimums, the government may emphasize alternative or additional charges that clearly satisfy the elements clause (for example, offenses that require violent force as an element), or advocate enhancements under the Guidelines. Reliance on § 924(c) with a kidnapping predicate is likewise constrained after Davis and elements-clause decisions.
National uniformity and potential circuit considerations: Ford harmonizes with the Eleventh, First, and Fourth Circuits’ understanding that § 1201 covers non-forceful means. While the Seventh Circuit once upheld § 3559(f) minimums for kidnapping, that analysis preceded Dimaya and appears to have rested on the now-defunct residual clause. Ford thus contributes to a converging national approach post-Dimaya.
Invitation to Congress: The opinion explicitly signals that if Congress intends mandatory minimums to apply to child kidnappings irrespective of the elements-clause analysis, it can amend § 3559(f) to enumerate kidnapping directly or otherwise define the relevant triggers with precision.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Crime of Violence (COV): A legal term that, in many federal statutes, carries sentencing and charging consequences. Where a statute doesn’t define the term, courts look to 18 U.S.C. § 16. After Dimaya, only § 16(a)’s “elements clause” remains: the offense must have, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. It’s not enough that many real-world violations involve force; the law looks to what the statute requires every time.
Elements Clause vs. Residual Clause: The elements clause focuses strictly on the legal elements of the offense—what the government must prove in every case. The residual clause captured offenses that by their nature involved substantial risk of force. The Supreme Court has invalidated multiple residual clauses (including § 16(b) and § 924(c)(3)(B)) as unconstitutionally vague, so courts now primarily apply elements-clause analyses.
Categorical Approach: A method of analysis that asks whether an offense’s statutory elements always require a particular feature (here, violent force). Courts do not look to the defendant’s actual conduct. If a statute can be violated by non-forceful means in any realistic way, it will not qualify under the elements clause.
Indivisible Statute and Modified Categorical Approach: A statute is indivisible when it lists alternative means (ways) of committing a single crime, rather than alternative elements creating distinct crimes. For indivisible statutes like § 1201(a), courts may not use the “modified categorical approach” to consult charging documents; they must assess the statute as a whole.
“Inveigle” and “Decoy” in § 1201(a): “Inveigle” means to lure or entice through deception; “decoy” means to lure or lead astray. Both are non-physical, deceit-based methods. Because § 1201(a) reaches such conduct, it does not categorically require physical force.
Mandatory Minimum Sentence: A statutory floor below which the judge cannot go, regardless of the advisory Guidelines and the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Ford holds that § 3559(f)(2)’s 25-year floor does not apply to § 1201 kidnappings because those offenses are not crimes of violence under § 16(a).
Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentences: Concurrent sentences run at the same time; consecutive sentences run back-to-back. At Ford’s resentencing, the district court imposed concurrent 300-month terms on each count, believing a 25-year minimum applied. After Ford, the court can resentence without that statutory floor and may vary below 300 months.
De Novo Review: An appellate standard of review under which the court gives no deference to the district court’s legal interpretations. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the meaning of § 3559(f)(2) de novo.
Vacatur and Remand: Vacating a sentence nullifies it. Remanding returns the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. Here, the district court must resentence Ford without treating § 3559(f)(2) as mandatory.

Conclusion

United States v. Ford establishes an important rule in the Tenth Circuit: federal kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) is not categorically a “crime of violence” under § 16(a), and therefore § 3559(f)(2)’s 25-year mandatory minimum for violent crimes against children does not apply to such convictions. The opinion is anchored in the Supreme Court’s modern “crime of violence” jurisprudence, particularly the invalidation of residual clauses and the strict application of the categorical approach to elements clauses.

Doctrinally, the decision reinforces two interpretive principles. First, when Congress uses the term “crime of violence” without defining it, courts will look to § 16’s general definition. Second, absent express enumeration by Congress, courts will not expand the term’s scope beyond what the elements clause permits. Practically, Ford rebalances sentencing discretion in child-kidnapping cases within the Tenth Circuit by removing an automatic 25-year floor, while leaving intact the government’s ability to seek substantial sentences through the Guidelines and § 3553(a).

If Congress intends mandatory minimums to apply to child kidnappings irrespective of the elements-based definition of “crime of violence,” Ford makes clear that a legislative amendment is the appropriate path. Until then, Ford will guide district courts in the Tenth Circuit to forego § 3559(f)(2)’s mandatory minimum for § 1201 kidnappings and to sentence based on the advisory Guidelines and the full range of statutory sentencing factors.