Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983): These cases establish the COA threshold. When a district court dismisses on procedural grounds, a COA issues only if reasonable jurists could debate both the procedural ruling and the underlying constitutional claim. The Mitchell panel emphasized the procedural prong and resolved the case there, a common approach when a waiver controls.

United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), and United States v. Viera, 674 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2012): Hahn sets the three-part framework for enforcing appellate or collateral-attack waivers: (1) scope; (2) knowing and voluntary; (3) miscarriage of justice. Viera reiterates those standards and lists the four narrow miscarriage-of-justice exceptions. In Mitchell, the panel applied Hahn and Viera to enforce the waiver.

United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2005): Green holds that a plea (and its attendant waivers) remains knowing and voluntary despite later favorable changes in law. Mitchell invoked Taylor (2022) to argue he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of that development; Green forecloses that theory.

United States v. Dominguez, 998 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2021): Dominguez confirms that the statutory maximum for all § 924(c) offenses is life imprisonment. Mitchell’s 216-month sentence on the § 924(c) count therefore did not exceed the statutory maximum.

United States v. Dominguez, No. 23-8016, 2024 WL 277678 (10th Cir. Jan. 25, 2024) (unpublished): Cited as persuasive authority reinforcing Green: an intervening favorable change in law does not unsettle the expectations created by a waiver of appeal or collateral attack.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013): Apprendi requires jury findings for facts that increase a statutory maximum; Alleyne extends that to facts increasing mandatory minimums. The panel held these doctrines inapplicable because § 924(c)’s maximum is life regardless of additional facts, so no fact increased a cap beyond life.

United States v. Shockey, 538 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2007): These decisions clarify that the “otherwise unlawful” miscarriage-of-justice exception focuses on the lawfulness of the waiver itself, not on alleged errors in calculating or imposing the sentence. The panel applied this to reject Mitchell’s attempt to use alleged sentencing errors to invalidate the waiver.

United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022): Taylor held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). Mitchell argued, by analogy, that his prior attempted bank robbery should not qualify as a “crime of violence” for career-offender purposes. The Tenth Circuit did not decide this question, instead holding that even if the change were favorable, his waiver still controls.

United States v. Mitchell, 696 F. App’x 927 (10th Cir. 2017): In Mitchell’s direct appeal, the Tenth Circuit enforced his appeal waiver. The present decision notes that prior holding as consistent with the conclusion that his waivers were knowing and voluntary.

Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2008): Cited for the principle that while courts liberally construe pro se filings, they will not act as a litigant’s advocate or construct arguments for them. This frames the court’s treatment of Mitchell’s pro se COA application.

Legal Reasoning

COA Framework: Procedural Disposition Ends the Inquiry

The court applied Slack’s two-pronged COA standard for procedural dismissals and elected to “begin and end” with the procedural question of whether the district court correctly enforced the collateral-attack waiver. If reasonable jurists could not debate that procedural ruling, no COA issues regardless of the potential merits.

Hahn Step One — Scope

The plea agreement’s text unambiguously waived collateral attacks under § 2255 except for ineffective-assistance claims. Mitchell’s motion did not allege ineffective assistance. Accordingly, his claims, including the career-offender challenge premised on Taylor, fell squarely within the waiver’s scope. The court noted that Mitchell did not seriously contest this conclusion.

Hahn Step Two — Knowing and Voluntary

The court looked to the plea language and the Rule 11 colloquy. Mitchell acknowledged he reviewed the agreement with counsel, understood his appellate and post-conviction rights, and knowingly and voluntarily waived them. The district court specifically explained the habeas implications of the waiver. This is reinforced by the Tenth Circuit’s prior decision enforcing his direct-appeal waiver.

Mitchell’s principal rejoinder—that he would not have pleaded had he known about subsequent favorable legal developments—was foreclosed by Green and later persuasive authorities. A plea and its waivers do not become retroactively unknowing or involuntary when the law later changes.

Hahn Step Three — Miscarriage of Justice

The Tenth Circuit recognizes four narrow circumstances where enforcing a waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice:

• the district court relied on an impermissible factor (e.g., race);
• ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating the waiver;
• the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; or
• the waiver is otherwise unlawful.

Mitchell invoked two of these:

• Statutory maximum: He argued his 216-month § 924(c) sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. The panel rejected this, citing Dominguez (2021) and § 924(c) itself: the statutory maximum is life. Because life is the maximum, no fact-finding could increase the maximum beyond that cap, making Apprendi inapplicable. Alleyne was likewise inapposite because it addresses increases in mandatory minimums, not maximums. As a result, reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s conclusion that this miscarriage-of-justice exception does not apply.
• Otherwise unlawful waiver: Mitchell’s arguments—e.g., that the district court imposed consecutive sentences for a single crime of violence—challenged the lawfulness of his sentence, not the lawfulness of the waiver itself. Under Shockey and Smith, the “unlawfulness” exception focuses on defects in the waiver (such as coercion, ambiguity, or lack of informed consent), not alleged sentencing errors. Allowing otherwise would allow the very claims waived to nullify the waiver. Thus, no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s rejection of this exception.

Because none of the Hahn exceptions applied, the court enforced the waiver, upheld the procedural dismissal, and denied COA.

Impact and Implications

• Durability of collateral-attack waivers: Mitchell reinforces that plea-based collateral-attack waivers remain enforceable even after favorable changes in substantive law. Defendants who executed broad waivers can rarely leverage intervening decisions (e.g., Taylor) to reopen sentences through § 2255 unless their waivers carve out those issues or fit within a narrow Hahn exception (most commonly ineffective assistance during waiver negotiation).
• COA gatekeeping in waiver cases: The decision shows how Slack’s procedural prong can be dispositive. Appellants must identify a debatable defect in the enforcement of the waiver itself; otherwise, courts will not reach potentially substantial underlying constitutional questions.
• Clarification on § 924(c) maximum: By reiterating that § 924(c) carries a statutory maximum of life imprisonment, the panel undercuts Apprendi-based arguments aimed at maximums. While facts such as brandishing or firearm type can raise mandatory minimums under § 924(c), they do not increase the statutory maximum beyond life.
• Narrow scope of “otherwise unlawful” exception: The opinion underscores Shockey/Smith’s focus on the waiver’s validity, not sentencing disputes. Practitioners should frame miscarriage-of-justice arguments to target defects in the waiver (coercion, ambiguity, lack of counsel’s effective advice), rather than substantive guideline or statutory issues.
• Career-offender litigation after Taylor: The panel avoided deciding whether Taylor’s reasoning affects attempted bank robbery’s status as a crime of violence for career-offender purposes under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The lesson is procedural: even potentially meritorious Taylor-based claims will not be heard if a valid waiver bars them.
• 11(c)(1)(C) pleas remain insulated: Stipulated sentences under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), when coupled with broad appellate and collateral waivers, are highly resistant to collateral review in the Tenth Circuit absent a Hahn exception.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Certificate of Appealability (COA): A threshold permission required to appeal a habeas or § 2255 decision. If the district court dismissed your case on a procedural ground (like enforcing a waiver), you must show that reasonable judges could debate both the procedural ruling and the underlying constitutional claim.
• Collateral-attack waiver: A clause in a plea agreement where a defendant gives up the right to later challenge the conviction or sentence through habeas or § 2255, often with a limited exception for ineffective assistance of counsel.
• Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea: A plea in which both sides agree to a specific sentence or sentencing range; if the court accepts the plea, it generally must impose the agreed sentence.
• Hahn framework: The Tenth Circuit test for enforcing waivers: scope, knowing/voluntary, and miscarriage of justice. If all three favor enforcement, the waiver stands.
• Miscarriage-of-justice exceptions: Narrow circumstances where a court will not enforce a waiver, including where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum or the waiver itself is unlawful (for example, because it was coerced or not understood).
• Apprendi/Alleyne: Jury must find facts that increase the statutory maximum (Apprendi) or mandatory minimum (Alleyne). They do not apply where the statutory maximum is already life, as with § 924(c).
• Career offender: A Sentencing Guidelines designation (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1) that increases the sentencing range if a defendant has at least two prior qualifying felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses.
• United States v. Taylor (2022): Held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s elements clause. Mitchell invoked its reasoning to challenge a prior attempted bank-robbery predicate for his career-offender status, but the court did not reach that merits question due to the waiver.
• § 924(c) statutory maximum and minimums: The maximum is life imprisonment for all § 924(c) offenses. Mandatory minimums vary by conduct and firearm type (e.g., brandishing or using a short-barreled shotgun increases the minimum), but the maximum remains life.