Tenth Circuit Reaffirms AEDPA’s One-Year Limit on State-Prisoner § 2241 Petitions; Equitable Tolling Not Triggered by Postconviction Counsel’s Missteps

Introduction

In St. Clair v. Quick, No. 24-7090 (10th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) to Oklahoma prisoner Michael St. Clair, thereby dismissing his appeal from the federal district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas application as untimely. The case presents a procedural, rather than merits, resolution to a complex interstate-custody dispute arising from a 1995 executive agreement between the governors of Oklahoma and Kentucky governing St. Clair’s extradition and return.

Two questions framed the appeal: (1) whether the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) applies to a state prisoner’s § 2241 petition challenging the execution of a sentence; and (2) whether equitable tolling should excuse a nearly four-year delay in filing, where counsel struggled with how to properly exhaust state remedies. The Tenth Circuit answered both questions against the petitioner, relying on circuit precedent and established limitations and tolling doctrine.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Matheson, Carson, and Federico) denied St. Clair’s request for a COA and dismissed the appeal. The court reaffirmed that state-prisoner § 2241 applications are subject to AEDPA’s one-year limitations period drawn from § 2244(d)(1), citing Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2003). It held the petition was untimely because:

The one-year period began no later than November 15, 2018—the date Kentucky returned St. Clair to Oklahoma custody—under § 2244(d)(1)(D)’s “factual predicate” trigger.
He filed his § 2241 petition in October 2023, almost four years after the limitations period expired in November 2019.
Statutory tolling did not apply because his state collateral filings began after the federal limitations period had already lapsed.
Equitable tolling was unwarranted; difficulty identifying the correct state vehicle to exhaust claims and counsel’s ignorance of the law do not constitute extraordinary circumstances.

Because reasonable jurists could not debate the correctness of the district court’s procedural ruling or its refusal to equitably toll, the COA was denied under Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).

Factual and Procedural Background

St. Clair was convicted in Oklahoma on multiple counts of first-degree murder and solicitation for murder, escaped before sentencing, and committed additional crimes in Kentucky. Oklahoma courts ultimately imposed consecutive life sentences without parole on several counts. Kentucky separately prosecuted him for capital offenses, initially resulting in death sentences that later led to reversals, retrials, and, after extensive litigation, a term-of-years sentence with credit for time served.

A 1995 executive agreement between the Governors of Oklahoma and Kentucky authorized extradition and stipulated that Kentucky would return St. Clair to Oklahoma if he was acquitted or if the prosecution terminated otherwise than by a judgment and sentence of death. Kentucky returned St. Clair to Oklahoma on November 15, 2018.

In 2020, St. Clair pursued state habeas relief, arguing Kentucky’s return violated the executive agreement; the state courts rejected the petition on procedural grounds and later denied postconviction relief on the merits. In October 2023, he filed a federal § 2241 petition asserting: (1) Oklahoma’s confinement violates the executive agreement, and (2) Kentucky violated due process by returning him without notice or a hearing. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely under § 2244(d)(1). He sought a COA from the Tenth Circuit.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 869 (10th Cir. 2000): Establishes that a state prisoner must obtain a COA to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition. This frames the appellate posture: without a COA, the Tenth Circuit lacks authority to reach the merits.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000): Sets the COA standard when the district court denies habeas on procedural grounds. Petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate both the correctness of the procedural ruling and the validity of the underlying constitutional claim. The panel applied Slack to conclude the procedural bar was not debatable.
Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003): Holds that state-prisoner § 2241 challenges to the execution of a sentence are subject to AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. This is the linchpin for the time-bar; the panel reaffirmed Burger and rejected the petitioner’s invitation to reexamine it.
United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000): Articulates intra-circuit stare decisis: a panel cannot overrule another panel absent en banc intervention or a contrary Supreme Court decision. This foreclosed St. Clair’s attack on Burger’s reasoning.
Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006): Clarifies that only state collateral attacks filed within the federal one-year period toll the clock; filings after expiration cannot revive a lapsed limitations period. This defeated St. Clair’s statutory tolling theory.
Al-Yousif v. Trani, 779 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2015): Emphasizes that equitable tolling is a “rare remedy” and requires specific facts showing both diligence and extraordinary circumstances. This raised the bar for St. Clair’s tolling argument.
Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000): Articulates the two-pronged equitable tolling test (diligence and extraordinary circumstances) and the principle that ignorance of the law does not excuse untimely filing. This directly undercut the petitioner’s reliance on counsel’s uncertainty about exhaustion pathways.
Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 2007): At the COA stage, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether a district court abused its discretion in refusing equitable tolling. The panel held no such debate was possible on St. Clair’s facts.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three steps: applicability of AEDPA’s one-year limitations period, timeliness assessment and statutory tolling, and equitable tolling.

Applicability of the one-year limitations period to § 2241: Relying on Burger, the panel reaffirmed that state prisoners proceeding under § 2241 to challenge the execution of their sentences are subject to AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations codified at § 2244(d)(1). Although St. Clair argued Burger lacked adequate statutory construction, the panel invoked intra-circuit stare decisis (Meyers) to hold itself bound by Burger absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention.
Trigger and expiration of the one-year period: Because St. Clair did not identify a specific trigger, the district court (and the panel) used § 2244(d)(1)(D)—“the date on which the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through due diligence.” The factual predicate here was Kentucky’s return of St. Clair to Oklahoma on November 15, 2018. The deadline therefore ran to November 16, 2019. St. Clair filed his § 2241 application in October 2023, well beyond the deadline.
Statutory tolling: The court ruled that nothing statutorily tolled the period because the first state collateral action relevant to these issues was initiated in July 2020, after the one-year period had already expired. Under Clark, filings made after expiration cannot restart or revive AEDPA’s clock.
Equitable tolling: The panel held that equitable tolling did not apply. St. Clair’s tolling arguments centered on counsel’s difficulty determining the appropriate vehicle for exhausting remedies in the Oklahoma courts and asserted ignorance of the law. But equitable tolling requires both diligent pursuit and extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control. Further, because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, counsel’s negligence or strategic confusion generally cannot justify tolling. Marsh also forecloses tolling based on ignorance of the law, including for incarcerated pro se litigants.
COA standard and disposition: Applying Slack and Fleming, the panel concluded that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s procedural timeliness ruling or its refusal to grant equitable tolling. As a result, the COA was denied and the appeal dismissed without reaching the merits of the executive agreement or due process claims.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although issued as a nonprecedential order, the decision carries persuasive force within the Tenth Circuit and reaffirms key limitations and tolling principles that will influence future habeas practice:

Re-cementing Burger’s rule: Until altered by en banc review or the Supreme Court, state prisoners in the Tenth Circuit who invoke § 2241 to challenge the execution of their sentence face AEDPA’s one-year limit. Attempts to relitigate Burger’s reasoning will continue to be foreclosed by intra-circuit stare decisis.
Factual-predicate trigger under § 2244(d)(1)(D): In execution-of-sentence cases, the clock will often start when the petitioner knows, or with due diligence could know, the core custody fact underlying the claim. Here, that was the physical return to Oklahoma custody in 2018, not later state-court developments. Practitioners should identify the earliest date on which the claim’s factual predicate was knowable and compute the limitations period from that date.
Statutory tolling is use-it-or-lose-it: Only state collateral filings initiated within the one-year federal limitations window toll the clock. Late state filings cannot resuscitate an expired federal deadline. Counsel must file state collateral actions early enough to create tolling and should track tolling intervals with precision.
Equitable tolling remains exceptional: Ordinary attorney error, uncertainty about exhaustion pathways, or ignorance of the law generally do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances. Without a constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, ineffective postconviction lawyering seldom moves the equitable tolling needle.
Strategic filing considerations: Where exhaustion is unsettled or complex, practitioners should consider timely protective federal filings (with appropriate motions addressing comity and ripeness) rather than risk the limitations period expiring while navigating state remedies. While the opinion does not address stay-and-abeyance, counsel should be alert to tools that preserve federal timeliness without short-circuiting state processes.
Interstate custody and executive agreements: Claims invoking extradition instruments or executive agreements are not exempt from AEDPA’s timing rules. Even novel or complicated interstate-custody arguments will be dismissed at the threshold if not brought within the one-year period or otherwise tolled.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 2241 vs. § 2254: State prisoners often use § 2254 to attack the validity of their conviction or sentence and § 2241 to challenge the execution of an existing sentence (e.g., custody location, sentence computation). In the Tenth Circuit, § 2241 execution challenges by state prisoners are subject to AEDPA’s one-year limit via § 2244(d)(1).
Certificate of Appealability (COA): A jurisdictional gatekeeping document required for state prisoners appealing habeas denials. To obtain a COA after a procedural dismissal, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate both the procedural ruling and whether the petition states a valid constitutional claim (Slack).
§ 2244(d)(1) one-year limitations period: The clock starts from the latest of several potential dates, including when the claim’s factual predicate could have been discovered with due diligence. For execution-of-sentence claims, this can be the date of transfer, recalculation, or other custody event.
Statutory tolling: The time during which a properly filed state collateral proceeding is pending does not count against the one-year period—but only if the state filing was initiated before the federal period expired (Clark).
Equitable tolling: An extraordinary remedy requiring diligent pursuit plus circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control (e.g., severe impediments). Attorney negligence, uncertainty about exhaustion, and ignorance of legal rules usually do not qualify (Al-Yousif; Marsh).
Stare decisis within a circuit: A three-judge panel cannot overrule a prior panel’s published decision; only the full court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court can do so (Meyers). Thus, Burger controls the limitations question in the Tenth Circuit.

Key Takeaways

The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations applies to state-prisoner § 2241 petitions challenging the execution of sentence (Burger v. Scott).
The one-year period began when Kentucky returned St. Clair to Oklahoma (the factual predicate date), making his 2023 federal filing untimely.
State collateral filings initiated after the federal period expired do not toll or revive the limitations clock (Clark v. Oklahoma).
Equitable tolling is reserved for rare cases; confusion over exhaustion and counsel’s errors are generally insufficient to qualify (Al-Yousif; Marsh).
Because reasonable jurists could not debate the timeliness ruling or the denial of equitable tolling, no COA issued (Slack; Fleming), and the appeal was dismissed.

Conclusion

St. Clair v. Quick underscores that timing is often dispositive in federal habeas practice. The Tenth Circuit’s order, though nonprecedential, persuasively reaffirms that state-prisoner § 2241 petitions are constrained by AEDPA’s one-year limit, that the factual predicate trigger can be straightforwardly pegged to a custody event, and that neither late state filings nor ordinary attorney missteps will salvage an untimely federal petition. For practitioners, the decision is a pointed reminder to identify the earliest plausible trigger date, initiate timely state collateral attacks to secure statutory tolling, and avoid relying on equitable tolling absent truly extraordinary circumstances. The merits of St. Clair’s interstate-custody and due process theories remain unaddressed—not because they were adjudged weak, but because AEDPA’s clock expired before he reached the courthouse door.

Note: The order states it is not binding precedent except under law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, but it may be cited for persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.