Tenth Circuit Adopts Two‑Step “Genuinely Responsive to Safety” Test and Holds Delay Can Defeat Irreparable Harm in FAAAA/ADA Preemption Disputes

Introduction

In Colorado Motor Carriers Association v. Town of Vail, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed the boundary between federal preemption of trucking regulations under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) and the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), and the states’ retained “safety regulatory authority with respect to motor vehicles.” The case arose from Vail’s effort to limit motor-vehicle access in pedestrian mall areas by eliminating an exemption for “high‑volume commercial carriers” (HVCCs) and channeling deliveries through a Town‑approved contractor using small motorized carts.

The litigation presented two key issues:

Whether Vail’s amended ordinance fits within the FAAAA/ADA safety exceptions by being “with respect to motor vehicles” and “genuinely responsive to safety concerns,” notwithstanding the general federal preemption of local regulation of motor carriers’ routes and services.
Whether a district court may discount irreparable harm and deny a preliminary injunction when a plaintiff delays over a year before suing—particularly where granting the injunction would alter the status quo.

Plaintiff Colorado Motor Carriers Association (CMCA), representing numerous trucking companies, obtained a preliminary injunction against Vail’s amended ordinance in the district court; the court, however, refused to enjoin Vail’s earlier (original) ordinance. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the injunction against the amended ordinance and affirmed the denial of relief against the original ordinance. Judge Bacharach authored the majority opinion; Judge Phillips dissented in part regarding the safety exception analysis.

Summary of the Judgment

Safety exception and preemption. The Tenth Circuit held that Vail’s amended ordinance likely falls within the FAAAA/ADA safety exceptions. The Court formally adopted a two‑step framework used in other circuits to assess whether a regulation is “genuinely responsive to safety concerns”: (1) Was the regulation motivated by legitimate safety concerns? and (2) Is there a logical nexus between the regulation and safety? Applying this test, the Court found the ordinance regulates “with respect to motor vehicles” and is genuinely responsive to safety concerns. It reversed the district court’s preliminary injunction against the amended ordinance.
Preliminary injunction and delay. The Court affirmed the district court’s refusal to enjoin the original ordinance, holding that CMCA’s year‑plus delay in filing suit undermined its showing of irreparable injury. The Court emphasized that preliminary injunctions are meant to preserve the status quo and are disfavored when they would change it; delay can undercut irreparable‑harm claims. The panel also rejected the notion that success on an express preemption claim creates a presumption satisfying the other preliminary‑injunction factors.
Dissent. Judge Phillips agreed safety can motivate the ordinance but would have affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Vail’s amended ordinance lacks a logical safety nexus because it regulates based on the identity of the vehicle operator (e.g., a Town‑approved contractor) rather than vehicle size or frequency, thereby allowing “the exact same” large vehicles to enter the pedestrian malls.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002). The Supreme Court recognized a broad safety exception preserving states’ traditional police power over motor vehicle safety and described the exception as limited to regulations “genuinely responsive to safety concerns.” The Tenth Circuit anchored its analysis in Ours Garage, rejecting arguments that later Supreme Court cases silently displaced the “genuinely responsive” language.
Loyal Tire (2d Cir.), United Motorcoach (5th Cir.), Cal. Tow Truck (9th Cir.), Galactic Towing (11th Cir.). These circuits operationalized Ours Garage by asking whether a regulation (1) was motivated by safety and (2) bears a logical safety nexus. The Tenth Circuit expressly adopted this two‑step framework, harmonizing its approach with sister circuits.
Miller v. C.H. Robinson (9th Cir.). Construed “with respect to” in the safety exception as synonymous with “relating to,” indicating a broad scope. The Tenth Circuit adopted this breadth, concluding Vail’s ordinance—by its terms restricting “vehicular traffic”—regulates with respect to motor vehicles.
UPS v. Flores‑Galarza (1st Cir.). Held that Puerto Rico’s tax‑evasion control regime (licensing/bonding/record‑keeping) was not about vehicle safety and thus preempted. The Tenth Circuit contrasted Vail’s ordinance as truly vehicle‑safety‑oriented.
Morales v. TWA (1992). Defined “relating to” broadly as bearing a connection or association. This reinforced the capacious reading of “with respect to” in the safety exception.
Ye v. GlobalTranz (7th Cir.); Aspen American Ins. v. Landstar (11th Cir.). Both recognize the breadth of “with respect to motor vehicles,” which the Court relied on to find the ordinance within the safety rubric.
VRC LLC v. City of Dallas (5th Cir.). Upheld a safety regulation without demanding “documentary evidence, reports, or studies,” crediting regulators’ experience and testimony. The Tenth Circuit echoed this deference in rejecting the district court’s more searching evidentiary demands.
FCC v. Beach Communications (1993). Legislatures may proceed incrementally in addressing perceived harms. Invoked to justify Vail’s choice to remove HVCC box trucks first while working on other large‑vehicle categories (e.g., garbage trucks).
Chhetri v. United States (11th Cir.) and Pornomo v. United States (4th Cir.). Cited for deference to government regulators’ safety determinations in the motor carrier context.
Winter v. NRDC (2008). Governs preliminary injunction factors (likelihood of success, irreparable injury, balance of equities, public interest). Applied to both ordinances.
Free the Nipple–Fort Collins (10th Cir.). Restates the abuse‑of‑discretion standard of review and the de novo review of embedded legal questions.
Osborn v. Durant Bank & Trust (10th Cir.). When factual findings rest on an incorrect legal standard, de novo review applies—used to re‑examine the district court’s nexus analysis.
Schrier v. University of Colorado (10th Cir.). Preliminary injunctions should preserve the status quo; requests to disturb it are disfavored.
Fish v. Kobach (10th Cir.). A “heightened” showing is required when injunctions would alter the status quo; delay is a factor that can undercut irreparable harm.
Ng v. Board of Regents (8th Cir.) and RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal (10th Cir.). Support that unreasonable delay undermines irreparable harm.
Trans World Airlines v. Mattox (5th Cir.). The Court declined to read Mattox as establishing a presumption that success on preemption automatically satisfies the other injunction factors; even if such a presumption existed, the Town’s rebuttal (delay) would defeat it.
North Haven Board of Education v. Bell (1982). Post‑enactment statements can illuminate purpose; used to consider the Police Chief’s post‑ordinance email referencing safety.

Legal Reasoning

1) Safety exception: “With respect to motor vehicles” and the two‑step nexus test

The Court began with the FAAAA and ADA’s broad preemption of state and local laws “related to a price, route, or service” of motor carriers, 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501(c)(1), 41713(b)(4)(A), and turned to the safety exceptions, which preserve “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,” §§ 14501(c)(2)(A), 41713(b)(4)(B)(i).

First, the ordinance regulates “with respect to motor vehicles.” The Court treated “with respect to” as equivalent to “relating to,” a connection‑based standard. By text and structure (e.g., “Vehicular Traffic”; “vehicular traffic … is generally prohibited”; enumerated vehicle‑traffic exceptions), Vail’s scheme plainly targets the use of vehicles in pedestrian malls.

Second, the regulation must be “genuinely responsive to safety concerns.” Aligning with the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit adopted the two‑step inquiry:

Motivation. Consider text, legislative history, and contextual statements to assess whether safety concerns genuinely motivated the regulation.
Logical nexus. Determine whether there is an obvious and logical connection between the regulation and safety. Defer to local policy‑makers unless the record suggests pretext (e.g., cloaked economic regulation or discriminatory targeting), in which case closer scrutiny is warranted.

Applying step one, the Court found Vail was motivated by safety: the ordinance and legislative record consistently referenced pedestrian safety, the hazards of large delivery trucks in dense, traffic‑control‑free pedestrian environments, and a pilot program indicating safety improvements from restricting large trucks. References to the “guest experience” were not disqualifying; safety need not be the sole motivation.

At step two, the Court concluded there was a logical nexus. Prior to the amendment, two to six large box trucks from HVCCs routinely traversed the pedestrian malls daily—spaces not designed for vehicles, lacking typical traffic controls, and filled with pedestrians who do not expect or watch for vehicles. The Town’s move to centralize deliveries through a contractor using smaller motorized carts placed drivers “eye to eye” with pedestrians and alleviated obstructions to emergency vehicles. The Court held that regulators need not produce empirical studies or prior injury counts; experiential testimony can suffice. Nor must the Town adopt the most comprehensive solution at once; incremental regulation is permissible. The Court also rejected the claim that awarding a single‑contractor delivery channel was a mere economic pretext, finding record evidence that the contractor model was a means to achieve safety objectives.

2) Preliminary injunction: Status quo, delay, and irreparable harm

On the original ordinance (which had been in force for more than a year before suit), the Court affirmed the denial of preliminary relief. Preliminary injunctions are designed to preserve the status quo; injunctions that alter it are disfavored and require a heightened showing. CMCA’s year‑long delay undermined its claim of irreparable harm. Although delay is not dispositive, an unreasonable delay suggests a litigant “sat on its rights,” undercutting the urgency and irreparability of alleged harm. CMCA’s only explanation—an enforcement change affecting one member (FedEx Freight)—did not justify relief for all members and thus failed to overcome the delay problem.

The Court also rejected the notion that success on an express preemption theory creates a presumption satisfying irreparable harm, equities, and public interest. Even if such a presumption were conceivable, Vail rebutted it through the demonstrated delay.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Significance

Alignment with sister circuits. The Tenth Circuit has now squarely adopted the two‑step “genuinely responsive” framework used by the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, reducing uncertainty in multi‑jurisdictional litigation and encouraging consistent analysis of local motor‑vehicle safety regulations under the FAAAA/ADA.
Deference to local safety policy. Municipalities within the Tenth Circuit (and beyond, by persuasive force) have clearer leeway to design delivery‑management systems in pedestrian corridors—such as centralized contractors or micro‑mobility carts—so long as the record shows genuine safety motivations and a logical nexus to safety. Legislatures may proceed incrementally and are not required to produce studies or injury tallies if they act on experience and observable risk.
Guardrails against pretext. Courts will scrutinize more closely where evidence suggests economic protectionism or discriminatory targeting cloaked as “safety.” Policymakers should build contemporaneous records tying chosen mechanisms to specific safety risks and documenting why alternatives were not adopted (or were deferred) to mitigate pretext arguments.
Contractor models and preemption. The ruling indicates that awarding exclusive or centralized delivery contracts is not inherently pretextual if demonstrably tethered to safety objectives (e.g., standardized small vehicles, routing discipline). Constitutional or antitrust issues, however, were not decided and could be litigated separately.
Preliminary‑injunction strategy. Plaintiffs challenging local safety regulations on preemption grounds should act promptly. Extended delay can seriously weaken irreparable‑harm claims, particularly when an injunction would upend the existing regulatory status quo. Litigants should also avoid over‑reliance on any supposed preemption‑based presumption of irreparable harm.
Practical municipal guidance. Cities designing pedestrian‑area delivery rules should: (a) articulate safety in ordinance text; (b) compile legislative records (pilot data, testimony, incident reports, operational obstacles, emergency access issues); (c) consider incremental steps with documented reasons; and (d) align contracts and permits with the safety aims (vehicle size, speed, routing, training) to reinforce the nexus.

Complex Concepts Simplified

FAAAA/ADA preemption. Federal law generally prevents states and cities from regulating motor carriers’ prices, routes, or services. But there is an important carve‑out: states and cities can regulate for motor‑vehicle safety.
“With respect to motor vehicles.” This means “relating to” motor vehicles. A law qualifies if it governs or meaningfully connects to how vehicles are used (e.g., where and when they can drive).
“Genuinely responsive to safety concerns.” A two‑part test: (1) Did the government actually care about safety when it passed the law? (2) Does the law reasonably connect to increasing safety? Courts respect local judgments unless the safety rationale looks like a cover for economic favoritism or discrimination.
Status quo in preliminary injunctions. Courts aim to keep things as they were when the dispute arose. If you want the court to change the status quo with an injunction, you must make an especially strong showing.
Delay and irreparable harm. If you wait a long time to sue, it’s harder to argue you need urgent court protection. Delay can signal that the harm is not truly irreparable.

The Dissent’s Perspective

Judge Phillips agreed that safety concerns motivated Vail but found no logical nexus because the ordinance regulates by who is driving (the Town‑approved contractor) rather than what is being driven (size, type, or frequency of vehicles). In his view, if the ordinance allows the same large delivery vehicles to enter the pedestrian malls—just operated by a different company—then it lacks a safety nexus and falls outside the safety exception. He also cautioned against relying on a contract (requiring small carts) to save an ordinance that, on its face, would permit the Town to authorize large vehicles tomorrow.

Conclusion

Colorado Motor v. Town of Vail establishes two consequential guideposts in the Tenth Circuit. First, it adopts a deferential, two‑step framework—shared with other circuits—for determining when local regulations fall within the FAAAA/ADA safety exceptions: jurisdictions must show genuine safety motivations and a logical safety nexus, but they need not furnish extensive empirical proof and may proceed incrementally. Second, on preliminary relief, it underscores that delay can fatally undercut claims of irreparable harm, especially where an injunction would alter the status quo; there is no automatic presumption that success on preemption satisfies other injunction factors.

The decision empowers municipalities to manage pedestrian‑area safety—potentially through centralized delivery systems—while emphasizing contemporaneous, safety‑centric legislative records. For carriers and trade associations, it signals that preemption challenges to well‑documented local safety schemes face an uphill climb, and that prompt litigation is critical where preliminary relief is sought.