Temporary Telework That Precludes Essential In‑Person Duties Is Not a Reasonable ADA Accommodation: Fourth Circuit (Unpublished) Reaffirms Present‑Tense Essential‑Functions Test

Case: Donna M. Jones v. Fairfax County School Board, No. 24-1444 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (unpublished, per curiam)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Disposition: Affirmed summary judgment for the employer on an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim

Key Holding (in plain terms): An employee’s request for temporary but total telework is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA when, by the employee’s own admission, essential job functions require in-person presence. The ADA looks to whether the employee can, in the present, perform all essential functions with the requested accommodation; “temporary” status and the prospect of future recovery do not change that analysis. Employers are not required to reallocate or split essential functions among other employees, and there is no standalone liability for breakdowns in the interactive process when no reasonable accommodation exists.

Note: The opinion is unpublished and therefore not binding precedent within the Fourth Circuit, but it cogently applies and synthesizes existing circuit law.

Introduction

Donna Jones, a K–2 science and math resource teacher at Braddock Elementary School, developed a lung condition (reactive airway disease) requiring two surgeries. During recovery, she sought permission to work entirely from home for a discrete period to avoid exposure to alleged mold and construction dust at school. The school denied full telework because it concluded Jones could not perform the essential functions of her job remotely—namely, in-person testing and co-teaching support. The school did allow partial accommodations: remote attendance at weekly Thursday morning faculty meetings and provision of personal protective equipment (PPE). It also granted requested leaves, including post-surgery and whenever she felt unable to work onsite.

Jones sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), ultimately pursuing only a failure-to-accommodate claim after the district court dismissed her disability discrimination and retaliation claims. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that Jones’s requested accommodation—temporary but total telework—was unreasonable as a matter of law because it would prevent her from performing essential functions that, by her own admission, required in-person presence. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

The appeal presented a focused question: whether a request for temporary, total telework can be a reasonable accommodation when the essential functions of the job require face-to-face interaction and the employee concedes those functions cannot be performed remotely.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Fourth Circuit reviewed the cross-motions for summary judgment de novo and considered each motion separately under Rule 56.
• Under the ADA, a plaintiff must show, among other elements, that a reasonable accommodation would allow her to perform the essential functions of her position, and that the employer refused that accommodation.
• The parties largely agreed on essential functions: classroom support (including co-teaching) and providing student testing, sometimes on short notice. Jones conceded in a sworn declaration that these functions required being onsite.
• Because her proposed accommodation—temporary but total telework—would not allow her to perform all essential functions, it was unreasonable as a matter of law. The school therefore had no obligation to grant it.
• The court rejected three counterarguments:
  • “It’s only temporary”: The ADA’s analysis is present-tense—whether the employee can perform essential functions now with the accommodation—not whether she will recover later.
  • “Others can pick up the slack”: The ADA does not require employers to reallocate or split essential functions among other employees.
  • “Interactive process failure”: There is no liability for breakdowns in the interactive process if no reasonable accommodation existed that would have enabled performance of all essential job functions.
• The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the school board.

Detailed Analysis

Issues Presented

• What are the essential functions of a K–2 resource teacher’s position, and do those functions require in-person presence?
• Does a proposed accommodation of temporary but total telework allow the employee to perform all essential functions?
• Does the temporary nature of a requested accommodation, impending recovery, or willingness of coworkers to assume duties alter the ADA analysis?
• Can an employer be held liable for not fully engaging in the interactive process where the employee fails to identify any reasonable accommodation?

Precedents and Authorities Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 999 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 2021)
  • Confirms the elements of an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim and reiterates that the interactive process is a means to an end (identifying a reasonable accommodation), not an end in itself.
  • Used to underscore that without proof of an available reasonable accommodation, there is no liability for interactive-process shortcomings.
• Tartaro-McGowan v. Inova Home Health, LLC, 91 F.4th 158 (4th Cir. 2024)
  • Restates that discrimination under the ADA includes failing to make reasonable accommodations; cited for the core framework and regulatory guidance against reallocating essential functions.
• Hannah v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 72 F.4th 630 (4th Cir. 2023)
  • Confirms that the plaintiff bears the burden on each element of a failure-to-accommodate claim, including identifying a reasonable accommodation.
• Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004 (4th Cir. 2020)
  • Clarifies that employers need not change or split essential functions across employees as an accommodation.
  • Applied here to reject the argument that colleagues could “pick up the slack.”
• Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2015)
  • Defines “essential functions” and emphasizes that an accommodation must enable performance of all essential functions, not merely most.
  • Reinforces the two-step analysis: identify essential functions; then determine if the proposed accommodation allows them to be performed.
• Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995)
  • Foundational “present-tense” rule: ADA analysis asks whether the individual can, now, perform the essential functions with accommodation; future ability or prospective recovery is not dispositive.
  • Used to reject the “temporary” argument.
• EEOC v. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, 616 F. App’x 588 (4th Cir. 2015)
  • Unpublished, but cited consistently in the circuit for the principle that essential functions need not be reallocated.
• Regulatory authorities
  • 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2): Factors for determining essential functions (e.g., reason the position exists, limited number of employees available, specialized functions).
  • 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) app.: Clarifies that employers are not required to reallocate essential functions as an accommodation.
• Summary judgment standards
  • Sheet Metal Workers’ Health & Welfare Fund of N.C. v. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., 118 F.4th 621 (4th Cir. 2024), and Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2011): De novo review and separate consideration of cross-motions under Rule 56.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning tracks the ADA framework and places decisive weight on the undisputed record—especially the plaintiff’s own admissions.

1. Identifying essential functions
   • The parties largely agreed that essential functions included classroom support (co-teaching) and student testing, often on moment’s notice.
   • These functions bear more than a marginal relationship to the role and align with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2): the position exists to perform these student-facing, instructional, and assessment duties.
2. Does the proposed accommodation enable their performance?
   • Jones’s requested accommodation—temporary but total telework—would not allow performance of co-teaching and on-demand testing, which required in-person presence.
   • Crucially, Jones conceded that these functions required her to be onsite. Her sworn statement that she had to be “on-site” to assist with strategic assessments, model/co-teach lessons, and assess/progress monitor students foreclosed any genuine dispute of material fact.
   • By precedent, an accommodation is reasonable only if it enables performance of all essential functions (Jacobs). Because total telework prevented that, the accommodation was unreasonable as a matter of law.
3. Rejection of counterarguments
   • “Temporary” telework suffices: The court applied Myers’s present-tense rule—whether the employee can perform the job now with the accommodation—not whether she will recover and perform later. ADA liability cannot be premised on future capacity.
   • Colleagues could assume duties: Elledge and the EEOC’s interpretive guidance make clear that employers need not reallocate or split essential functions across employees as an accommodation. That proposal would fundamentally alter the job.
   • Interactive process: Perdue holds the interactive process is a tool, not a standalone basis for liability. Where the employee cannot demonstrate any reasonable accommodation existed that would have enabled performance of essential functions, an employer is not liable for alleged deficiencies in the process.

Procedural Posture and Standards

• Only the failure-to-accommodate claim remained at summary judgment; the discrimination and retaliation claims were dismissed at Rule 12(b)(6) and not appealed.
• The district court found a genuine dispute over the reasonableness of the accommodations actually provided (PPE and one morning of telework), but that dispute was immaterial because the plaintiff’s theory on appeal hinged on a different accommodation—total telework—which was unreasonable as a matter of law under the undisputed facts.
• The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, concluding no reasonable jury could find that total telework would permit performance of all essential functions.

What the Court Did Not Decide

• Whether the school’s offered accommodations (PPE plus limited telework for a weekly meeting) were reasonable. The district court flagged a factual dispute on that question, but the Fourth Circuit affirmed on an independent, dispositive ground: the unreasonableness of the only accommodation plaintiff sought (total telework).
• Whether substitute teaching was an essential function. The panel deemed that dispute immaterial given the plaintiff’s concessions on other essential functions.
• Causation issues about environmental conditions (mold/dust) and the lung condition; those issues were not material to the accommodation analysis resolved on summary judgment.

Impact and Implications

For ADA Accommodation Law

• Reaffirmation of the present-tense essential-functions test: Courts will ask whether the employee can perform all essential functions now with the requested accommodation. The temporary nature of an accommodation or anticipated recovery does not change the analysis.
• Telework as accommodation remains context-specific: Telework may be reasonable for roles where all essential functions can be performed remotely. But where essential duties require face-to-face interactions (e.g., K–12 instructional support, on-demand student assessments), total telework will generally be unreasonable.
• No duty to reallocate essential functions: Employees cannot compel employers to split or shift essential duties to others to make an otherwise infeasible accommodation work.
• Interactive process claims require a viable accommodation: Absent a showing that some reasonable accommodation existed, claims of process breakdown will not support liability.

For K–12 School Systems and Similar Onsite Roles

• Instructional and assessment roles are likely to be deemed inherently in-person essential functions unless the job is redesigned by policy to permit remote delivery without undermining core duties.
• Employers should still engage in the interactive process, document essential functions, and consider alternatives (e.g., leave, PPE, limited remote participation in discrete meetings) tailored to the job’s demands.
• Leave can be a reasonable accommodation when it enables eventual return to full performance, and granting leave (as here) can mitigate risk when telework would eliminate essential duties.

Litigation Strategy and HR Compliance Notes

• Employee admissions are powerful: Sworn acknowledgments that essential functions require onsite presence can be dispositive at summary judgment.
• Propose concrete, feasible accommodations: Plaintiffs should articulate accommodations that actually permit full performance of essential functions and, where possible, supply specifics showing feasibility.
• Employers should maintain up-to-date, accurate job descriptions aligning with actual practices, highlighting essential, in-person duties where appropriate, and retain records of interactive-process communications and offered accommodations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Essential functions
  • The core duties that define why the job exists (e.g., for a resource teacher, in-class co-teaching and student testing). Determined by job descriptions, actual practices, and operational needs.
• Reasonable accommodation
  • A change enabling a qualified employee with a disability to perform all essential job functions, absent undue hardship. Reasonableness is judged in light of the job’s actual essential requirements.
• Telework as accommodation
  • Potentially reasonable if all essential functions can be performed remotely. Not reasonable if key duties inherently require in-person presence.
• Present-tense test
  • The ADA asks whether the employee can perform essential functions now with the accommodation, not whether the employee will be able to perform them later after recovery.
• Interactive process
  • A collaborative dialogue to explore feasible accommodations. It is not a standalone claim; liability turns on whether a reasonable accommodation existed and was refused.
• Reallocation of essential functions
  • Not required. Employers are not obligated to divide or transfer essential tasks to other employees to accommodate someone who cannot perform them.
• Summary judgment on cross-motions
  • Each side’s motion is evaluated separately. The moving party must show no genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Jones v. Fairfax County School Board provides a clear, practical application of ADA accommodation principles in the context of K–12 education. Anchored by the plaintiff’s own admissions, the court held that total telework is not a reasonable accommodation when essential functions—co-teaching and on-demand student testing—require in-person presence. The ruling underscores three enduring principles in the Fourth Circuit:

• The present-tense essential-functions test controls; future recovery or the temporary character of a request does not satisfy the ADA if essential functions cannot be performed now with the requested accommodation.
• Employers are not required to reallocate essential functions or split them among other employees to make an accommodation work.
• Alleged shortcomings in the interactive process do not create liability absent proof that a reasonable accommodation existed and was refused.

Although non-precedential, Jones reinforces existing circuit law in a domain—telework requests for inherently in-person roles—likely to recur. For employees, the decision highlights the need to propose accommodations that preserve all essential functions. For employers, it validates careful delineation of essential duties and thoughtful consideration of alternatives like leave and limited remote participation where feasible, while clarifying that the ADA does not require remaking a job by offloading its core tasks.