Tartt v. Unified School District No. 475
Clarifying Decision-Maker Knowledge and Affidavit Admissibility in Title VII Litigation

Introduction

Merrier A. Jackson Tartt, an experienced Black educator and former principal of Junction City High School (Kansas), sued Unified School District No. 475 (“USD 475”) alleging (1) racial discrimination, and (2) retaliation for complaining about perceived race-based “micro-aggressions.” She pled both theories under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The district court entered summary judgment for the District after striking multiple affidavit paragraphs offered by Ms Tartt. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit:

• Dismissed all § 1981 theories, holding (again) that § 1983 supplies the exclusive damage remedy against state actors (Jett v. Dallas ISD).
• Affirmed summary judgment on retaliation because six of seven Board members—the ultimate decision-makers—were unaware of the protected activity, defeating prima facie causation despite close temporal proximity.
• Reversed in part on discrimination, finding the district court abused its discretion by striking two affidavit paragraphs that in fact satisfied Rule 56(c)(4)’s personal-knowledge standard, and remanded for renewed analysis.

Summary of the Judgment

The appellate panel (Holmes, C.J.; Moritz & Rossman, JJ.) issued a mixed ruling:

1. § 1981 claims dismissed as a matter of law – Jett remains controlling; state entities may only be sued via § 1983.
2. Affidavit Rulings – The district court properly disregarded most challenged paragraphs, but erred in excluding ¶ 11 (sentences 6-8) and all of ¶ 12 of former HR Director Dawn Toomey’s affidavit. Those paragraphs were firmly based on her personal knowledge of the District’s evaluation practices and therefore admissible under Rule 56.
3. Discrimination – Because the district court’s pretext evaluation excluded admissible evidence, the panel reversed summary judgment on Title VII discrimination and remanded.
4. Retaliation – Even assuming a prima facie temporal link, Ms Tartt failed to show decision-maker knowledge; therefore the court affirmed summary judgment for USD 475.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Jett v. Dallas Independent School District
• Bolden v. City of Topeka
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
• Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas
• Lindsay v. Denver Public Schools
• Conroy v. Vilsack
• Rule 56 trilogy – Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), 56(c)(4), 56(e)

The panel’s reasoning rests heavily on Jett and Bolden for the § 1981 bar, Argo for the “personal knowledge” requirement, and Lindsay for the principle that knowledge of protected activity by the decision-maker is essential to retaliation causation. Conroy supplied the rule that temporal proximity of 1.5 months or less can support an inference of causation, but the panel clarified that such proximity is not dispositive where decision-makers are ignorant of the protected conduct.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. § 1981 Exclusivity – Under Jett, plaintiffs cannot sue a state entity directly under § 1981; § 1983 is the required vehicle. The panel simply applied the black-letter rule.
2. Affidavit Admissibility
   • Rule 56(c)(4) requires affidavits to be based on personal knowledge and to present facts admissible in evidence.
   • The district court relied on Argo to strike several passages it thought speculative.
   • The appellate court scrutinised the two Toomey paragraphs and found a direct foundation: as HR Director she supervised evaluation reminders and therefore could state—on personal knowledge—that failure to evaluate must have been “a conscious decision.” Striking them was a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.
   • The Tenth Circuit also clarified that labelling a filing a “motion to strike” (technically a Rule 12(f) device) is not fatal; courts may simply disregard inadmissible material under Rule 56.
3. Retaliation Causation
   • Prima facie element three requires a causal connection. While five days between complaint and non-renewal recommendation is tight, timing alone is insufficient if the ultimate decision-makers lack knowledge.
   • Six of seven Board members swore they did not know about Ms Tartt’s complaint. No contrary evidence existed; mere speculation that they “might have lied” cannot defeat summary judgment.
   • Therefore the temporal proximity inference collapsed, dooming the prima facie case.

C. Impact on Future Litigation

• Reinforces “Decision-Maker Knowledge” Rule – Plaintiffs must marshal evidence that the specific actors who impose an adverse action knew of the protected activity. Temporal proximity is only a proxy and cannot bridge an evidentiary gap.
• Guidance on Affidavit Challenges – District courts should distinguish between conclusory speculation (properly disregarded) and reasonable inferences drawn from the affiant’s job-based experience. Over-zealous striking can trigger reversible error.
• § 1981 Pleading Against Public Entities – The decision is another reminder (often overlooked in pleadings) that direct § 1981 suits against school districts, municipalities, or state agencies are non-starters in the Tenth Circuit.
• Case-Management Lessons – Practitioners should authenticate affidavits carefully and describe the basis of personal knowledge to withstand Rule 56 objections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prima Facie Case – The minimal showing a plaintiff must make to shift the burden of production to the employer.
• Temporal Proximity – How close in time the protected activity and the adverse action occur; short gaps can suggest causation but are not conclusive.
• Decision-Maker Knowledge – The rule that the adverse actor must know of the protected conduct for retaliation to be plausible.
• Pretext – Evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false, masking discrimination or retaliation.
• Rule 56(c)(4) – Governs affidavits at summary judgment: must (1) be based on personal knowledge; (2) contain admissible facts; (3) show competency.
• § 1981 vs. § 1983 – § 1981 provides substantive rights; § 1983 supplies the procedural vehicle for damages against state actors.

Conclusion

Tartt v. USD 475 fine-tunes two recurring issues in employment litigation:

1. Affidavit paragraphs grounded in an affiant’s workplace expertise meet Rule 56’s “personal knowledge” threshold; striking them without careful scrutiny constitutes abuse of discretion.
2. For Title VII retaliation, timing alone cannot prove causation when decision-makers demonstrably lack awareness of protected activity.

By reinstating the discrimination claim but leaving retaliation dismissed, the Tenth Circuit underscores that each theory rises or falls on distinct evidentiary legs. The ruling will guide district courts in the admissibility of summary-judgment materials and remind litigants to connect the dots between protected conduct, decision-maker knowledge, and adverse action.