Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby County Bd. of Commrs. (2001): Establishes mandamus as the vehicle to compel appropriation proceedings when the government has effected a taking without initiating condemnation. The Court relies on Elsass to reaffirm that inverse condemnation in Ohio proceeds via mandamus.
• State ex rel. Doner v. Zody (2011): Defines what constitutes a taking (e.g., government-induced flooding) and characterizes inverse condemnation as the remedy to recover the value of property taken “without formal exercise of eminent domain.” The Court draws on Doner to reiterate that takings arise from government action even absent formal condemnation.
• State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Heights (2002): Clarifies that once a taking is found in mandamus, the writ compels initiation of appropriation proceedings to ascertain compensation. The Court follows Shemo’s sequencing: taking first (mandamus), valuation next (appropriation/jury).
• State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton (1998): Describes the trial court’s role in mandamus as trier of fact and law to determine whether a taking occurred. This informs the Court’s procedural roadmap in inverse-condemnation cases.
• State ex rel. Royal v. Columbus (1965): Holds that flights so low and frequent as to directly and immediately interfere with use and enjoyment can constitute a taking. This authority underpins the viability of aviation-related physical takings claims like Boggs’s.
• Britt v. Columbus (1974) and State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich (1953): Confirm municipal eminent-domain power as a home-rule power but limit its exercise outside municipal boundaries (except for public utilities under Article XVIII, Section 4). These cases supplied the lower courts’ premise on lack of extraterritorial condemnation authority, which the Supreme Court accepts—but distinguishes from the separate duty to compensate under Article I, Section 19.
• Clifton v. Blanchester (2012) and Moore v. Middletown (2012): Earlier cases that found no standing for mandamus-based regulatory takings against foreign municipalities. Here, the Court limits these decisions, emphasizing their narrow, fact-specific context (regulatory rezoning) and refusing to extend them to physical-intrusion takings claims.
• Foundational Ohio Takings Jurisprudence: Cases such as Cooper v. Williams (1831), Symonds v. Cincinnati (1846), Giesy (1854), Kramer (1855), and Toledo v. Preston (1893) reflect Ohio’s deep constitutional tradition that takings require compensation and that courts must provide a remedy—history that reinforces the self-executing nature of the Ohio Takings Clause.
• First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles (U.S. 1987): Quoted to underscore that once a taking occurs, the duty to compensate cannot be avoided for the period of the taking.
• Knick v. Township of Scott (U.S. 2019): Cited to support the proposition that the Takings Clause has a “self-executing character” with respect to compensation, bolstering the Court’s conclusion that Article I, Section 19 is self-executing under Ohio law.
• Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (U.S. 1992): Provides the federal standing elements (injury, traceability, redressability), framing the analytical lens for this case.

Together, these authorities allow the Court to chart a path that honors both the geographic limits on municipal condemnation power and the constitutional guarantee of compensation for takings—by recognizing standing to compel compensation even where the condemnor cannot lawfully exercise extraterritorial eminent domain.

Legal Reasoning

1) The redressability question defines standing in this case. Standing requires an injury fairly traceable to the defendant and likely redressable by the requested relief. The lower courts concluded redressability was lacking because Cleveland allegedly could not condemn outside its borders. The Supreme Court reframes redressability by asking the right question: does the Constitution guarantee compensation when a government—any government—has taken property, regardless of where the property lies? The answer is yes.

2) Article I, Section 19 is self-executing and imposes a mandatory duty to compensate. The Court expressly holds that the Ohio Takings Clause is self-executing: it fixes the right to compensation and the mechanism (jury assessment), without referring enforcement to the legislature. This matters for redressability: a court can grant relief to enforce the constitutional duty even if no specific statute authorizes the exact condemnation now that the taking has already occurred.

3) The Court separates “authority to condemn” from “duty to pay.” A municipality may lack the authority to initiate extraterritorial condemnation (as a matter of home rule and statutory limits), but if its actions nevertheless amount to a taking, the Constitution independently obligates it to pay compensation. Conflating these distinct concepts—authority to take versus duty to compensate—produced the lower courts’ “dead end.”

4) Mandamus remains the vehicle; Chapter 163 provides the valuation mechanism. The Court reiterates Ohio’s inverse-condemnation architecture:

• Step 1 (Mandamus): The court determines whether government action effected a taking. If yes, it issues a writ requiring the public entity to commence appropriation proceedings.
• Step 2 (Appropriation Proceedings under R.C. Chapter 163): In inverse-condemnation posture, Chapter 163 is used not to litigate the right-to-take (that ship sailed; the taking already occurred), but to determine “the extent of the taking” and the amount of compensation, which is assessed by a jury.

By decoupling authority to initiate condemnation from the post-taking duty to compensate, the Court explains why redress is available: a writ can compel the use of Chapter 163 procedures to value and pay for what was taken.

5) Statutory airport-condemnation authority is not the hinge. The Eighth District was correct that R.C. 719.01(O), read with R.C. 4561.01’s definitions of “airport” and “landing field,” does not authorize the appropriation of airspace beyond airport boundaries (the statute speaks to “land or water”). But that conclusion does not end the constitutional analysis. A city that has physically invaded airspace in a manner constituting a taking (see Royal) can still be compelled to compensate, even if it had no statutory power to condemn that airspace in advance.

6) Limiting Clifton and Moore to their facts. Both cases involved regulatory-takings theories (rezoning) pressed against foreign municipalities, and Clifton also failed on causation grounds. The Court emphasizes that neither decision announced a categorical bar to mandamus against foreign municipalities; both warned against overreading their holdings. Today’s opinion hews to those cautions and clarifies that mandamus-based inverse condemnation for physical intrusions remains viable.

7) Only standing is decided; merits and timeliness remain open. The Court reverses on standing and remands for the Eighth District to address the statute-of-limitations defense not reached below. If timely, the trial court must decide whether a taking occurred under Ohio takings law (e.g., whether aircraft operations produce direct, immediate interference with use and enjoyment under Royal), and, if so, proceed to compensation.

Impact

For property owners near municipal borders and regional infrastructure:

• Property owners whose land lies outside a project-operating municipality (airports, water/sewer facilities, flood-control works) can bring mandamus-based inverse-condemnation claims directly against that municipality when government activities effect a physical taking.
• The remedy is real and redressable: a court can order appropriation proceedings limited to valuing and paying compensation, even if the city lacked statutory authority to condemn the property in the first place.

For municipalities and regional authorities:

• Risk management and budgeting: Municipalities must anticipate potential compensation exposure for extraterritorial impacts of their facilities and operations (e.g., persistent overflights, flooding, recurring vibration or debris). Acquiring avigation or similar easements and maintaining mitigation programs may be prudent.
• Strategic planning: When projects foreseeably impose physical burdens beyond city limits, municipalities should consider intergovernmental agreements, easement acquisition, or compensation plans to reduce litigation risk.
• Litigation posture: Defenses will likely shift from standing to merits (Was there a taking?) and timeliness (When did the claim accrue?), as well as valuation methodology.

Doctrinal clarifications with broader reach:

• The explicit recognition that Article I, Section 19 is self-executing strengthens direct, constitutional takings claims in Ohio courts and anchors the availability of a judicial remedy independent of legislative grace.
• The opinion confirms that Chapter 163 procedures are adaptable: in inverse condemnation, they serve to value compensation post-taking rather than to test necessity or public use in advance.
• Regulatory takings against foreign municipalities remain constrained by Clifton and Moore; today’s decision does not open the door to all cross-border regulatory-takings mandamus actions, but it unmistakably preserves and protects physical takings claims.

Open and practical questions left for future development:

• Accrual and limitations: The opinion remands for statute-of-limitations analysis, which may hinge on when the taking became sufficiently permanent or inevitable. Future cases will refine accrual principles for recurring or progressive harms.
• Proof of a taking: On the merits, claimants must show direct and immediate interference—e.g., under Royal’s aviation standard. The quantum and quality of evidence (noise signatures, vibration data, residue testing, expert testimony) will be central.
• Scope of compensation: Valuation disputes may involve diminution in market value, cost-to-cure, and whether the “extent of the taking” includes avigational easements effectively imposed by operations.
• Institutional defendants: While the case concerns a municipality, the logic—duty to compensate independent of preexisting authority—may inform takings claims against other public entities that operate across jurisdictional lines.