Tacit Renunciation of Prescription by Post‑Prescription Workers’ Compensation Payments: Commentary on Lealon Johnson v. AECOM Amentum Government Services

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Louisiana’s decision in Lealon Johnson v. AECOM Amentum Government Services, No. 2025‑CC‑00171 (La. Dec. 18, 2025), squarely addresses two important and previously unsettled questions in Louisiana workers’ compensation law:

1. When does the prescriptive period for filing a disputed claim begin where the injured employee suffers no immediate loss of wages because the employer continues him in full‑time accommodated work at his full salary?
2. What is the legal effect of an employer’s voluntary initiation and continuation of workers’ compensation indemnity payments after the applicable prescriptive period has already expired?

The Court’s answer to the first question is stark: under the current language of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law (“LWCL”), particularly La. R.S. 23:1209, there is no statutory exception to the one‑year prescriptive period simply because the employee did not initially lose wages. Absent interruption, suspension, or renunciation, the claim is prescribed one year after the accident (or under the “developing injury” rule, subject to the three‑year outer limit).

The second question leads to the Court’s central, precedent‑setting holding: when an employer, after prescription has accrued, begins and then regularly and consistently continues to pay workers’ compensation benefits over a substantial period, that conduct constitutes a tacit renunciation of prescription. The employer thereby abandons the right to plead prescription as a defense to the employee’s claim.

This commentary examines the factual context, the statutory and jurisprudential framework, the Court’s reasoning, and the broader implications of this ruling for Louisiana workers’ compensation practice and for the civil law of prescription.

II. Background and Procedural Posture

A. Facts

Lealon Johnson worked as a mechanic for AECOM Amentum Government Services (“Amentum”) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. On June 12, 2020, he tripped over the hose of a pressure washer he was using in the course and scope of his employment and injured his back.

Key factual elements:

• Medical treatment: Johnson received medical treatment for his back injuries; Amentum paid his medical expenses.
• No immediate wage loss: Johnson did not initially miss work. Amentum accommodated his restrictions by placing him in a light‑duty job in the tool room. He continued to work full‑time and received his regular salary.
• Elimination of light‑duty job: On June 22, 2022, Amentum eliminated the light‑duty position and ceased paying Johnson his salary.
• Commencement of indemnity benefits: After terminating his wages, Amentum began paying Johnson temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits weekly. These payments continued until March 28, 2024.
• Notice of controversion: On March 28, 2024, Amentum filed a notice of controversion with the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”), asserting that Johnson had abandoned medical treatment and contesting his continued entitlement to indemnity benefits.
• Filing of claim: On July 29, 2024, Johnson filed his first Disputed Claim for Compensation with the OWC—more than four years after the accident.

B. Procedural History

• OWC proceedings: Amentum filed several exceptions, including a peremptory exception of prescription, arguing that Johnson’s claim was prescribed under La. R.S. 23:1209 because it was filed more than one year after the date of accident (and beyond any possible statutory extension).
• OWC ruling: The OWC judge denied the exception of prescription, reasoning that:
  • The indemnity benefits paid for 21 months after prescription had run, without evidence of error or revocation, together with the elimination of Johnson’s light‑duty job after more than two years of accommodation, amounted to an “absolute renunciation” of the accrued prescription.
  • The extended, regular payments constituted a “new promise” by Amentum that indemnity benefits were owed.
• Court of Appeal: The court of appeal denied Amentum’s request for supervisory review.
• Supreme Court: The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and, on de novo review (because the issues were purely legal with undisputed facts), affirmed the OWC and remanded for further proceedings.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Timeliness of the Claim Under the LWCL

The Court first addressed whether Johnson’s claim was timely under the prescriptive scheme in La. R.S. 23:1209:

• La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(1): requires a formal claim to be filed within one year of the accident when the injury manifests immediately, unless payments have been agreed upon.
• La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(2): where “payments have been made,” the limitation period is one year from the last payment.
• La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(3): the “developing injury” rule: one year from when the injury develops, but in all cases no more than three years from the date of the accident.

Because Johnson’s injury manifested immediately, and no indemnity payments were made until after the one‑year period had already expired, his claim was facially prescribed under La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(1). Even if the developing injury rule applied, the Court noted that the three‑year outer limit would have barred his claim, which was filed more than four years after the accident.

The Court expressly recognized the harsh result: an employee accommodated at full salary for more than a year after injury cannot, under current law, obtain TTD benefits later if he did not file within the prescriptive period—even though he could not have lawfully obtained TTD while still earning wages. Nevertheless, the Court reiterated that it could not “rewrite” the LWCL to create an exception; only the legislature can cure this gap.

B. Renunciation of Prescription by Post‑Prescription Payments

Having concluded that the claim was prescribed on its face, the Court turned to whether the prescriptive bar had been overcome by:

• interruption,
• suspension, or
• renunciation.

There was no argument, and no basis, for interruption or suspension:

• Payment of medical expenses under La. R.S. 23:1204 does not interrupt prescription and is not an admission of liability.
• “Wages in lieu of compensation” doctrine did not apply because Johnson fully earned his wages in the accommodated job; they were not gratuitous payments.

The case instead turned on whether Amentum’s conduct—beginning and continuing weekly TTD payments for approximately two years, starting more than sixteen months after prescription had accrued—constituted a tacit renunciation of prescription under Civil Code arts. 3449 and 3450.

The Court held that:

• La. R.S. 23:1209 establishes prescriptive, not peremptive, time limits, and prescriptive periods can be renounced under Civil Code art. 3449.
• La. R.S. 23:1204 (payments not being an admission of liability) does not preclude renunciation; denial of liability and renunciation of prescription are distinct concepts.
• Amentum’s actions—initiating and then regularly paying weekly TTD benefits for roughly two years after the one‑year prescription period had run—“clearly and directly” evidenced a new promise to pay and gave rise to the presumption that the “advantages of prescription” had been abandoned, satisfying the test for tacit renunciation.

Accordingly, the Court held that Amentum had tacitly renounced prescription and could not rely on prescription as a defense. The OWC’s denial of the exception of prescription was affirmed, and the case was remanded for adjudication of the merits and any remaining defenses.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Prescriptive Scheme under La. R.S. 23:1209 and the “Accommodation Gap”

1. The three prescriptive timelines

The Court carefully restated the three timelines in La. R.S. 23:1209(A):

1. La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(1): One‑year from accident
   When the injury manifests immediately and no payments have been made or agreed, the worker has one year from the date of the accident to file a “formal claim.”
2. La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(2): One year from the last payment
   Where “payments have been made,” prescription does not begin to run (or the limitation “shall not take effect”) until one year after the last compensation payment.
3. La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(3): “Developing injury” rule, with three‑year cap
   When the injury does not manifest immediately, the worker has one year from the time the injury “develops,” but the claim is “forever barred” if not brought within three years of the accident.

In Johnson’s case:

• The injury manifested immediately on June 12, 2020.
• No indemnity payments were made before June 12, 2021.
• Johnson filed his disputed claim on July 29, 2024 (over four years later).

Thus, under the text of La. R.S. 23:1209 alone, the claim was clearly prescribed.

2. The statutory bar on TTD while working and the prematurity trap

The Court highlighted a structural tension in the LWCL that is central to this case:

• TTD eligibility depends on total wage loss: La. R.S. 23:1221(1)(a) and (c) require that the employee be unable to “engage in any employment or self‑employment” to qualify for TTD.
• Express statutory exclusion while working: La. R.S. 23:1221(1)(b) provides that “compensation for temporary disability shall not be awarded if the employee is engaged in any employment or self‑employment,” regardless of its nature.

Because Johnson continued working and earning wages (albeit in light‑duty work) at his regular salary, he was statutorily ineligible for TTD benefits under La. R.S. 23:1221(1)(b) during the first two years after the accident.

But even if he had attempted to file a disputed claim while still employed and being paid:

• La. R.S. 23:1314 renders a workers’ compensation petition premature unless it alleges a recognized basis for a claim, such as:
  • the employer’s failure to pay owed benefits, or
  • failure to furnish medical attention, or
  • failure to furnish medical reports, or
  • failure to pay penalties or attorney’s fees.

Since Johnson was being paid full wages and his medical bills were being paid, no statutory ground under La. R.S. 23:1314(A) was available. Any filing then would likely have been dismissed as premature.

The Court candidly acknowledged the “quandary”:

“An injured employee who returns to work and suffers no loss of wages during the one-year prescriptive period is without recourse when he later becomes eligible for workers’ compensation benefits.”

In other words, the statutory scheme:

• precludes TTD while the worker is earning wages (La. R.S. 23:1221(1)(b)), and
• bars a claim for TTD filed more than a year after the accident (La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(1)),

leaving a worker in Johnson’s position legally trapped: he cannot collect TTD while working, yet if he waits until his wages stop (beyond one year), his claim is prescribed.

3. The “developing injury” jurisprudence and its limits

The Court revisited its prior decision in Sevin v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 94‑1859 (La. 4/10/95), 652 So. 2d 1323, where it articulated the “developing injury” rule:

“[A]n injured employee who continues to work, despite a work-related medical condition which is painful but not then disabling, should not be penalized for attempting to remain in the work force … Requiring any injured employee, who is not yet disabled, to assert his or her claim within one year of the accident … would encourage needless litigation.”

In Sevin, the worker’s condition worsened and led to surgery, at which point she was told not to work. The Court held that:

• Her “injury” for prescriptive purposes “developed” only when it became manifestly disabling, and
• Her claim filed within a year of that development was timely under La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(3).

The Johnson Court acknowledged this doctrine but explained why it did not save Johnson’s claim:

• Even if Johnson’s “developed” injury is dated to June 22, 2022 (when his light‑duty job was eliminated), La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(3) contains a hard cap: “the claim for payment shall be forever barred unless … begun within three years from the date of the accident.”
• Johnson’s claim was filed more than four years after the June 12, 2020 accident—beyond the three‑year limit.

Accordingly, both the immediate‑injury and developing‑injury prescriptive regimes led to the conclusion that the claim was prescribed unless the prescriptive bar was overcome by interruption, suspension, or renunciation.

The Court emphasized that despite its own recognition of this type of problem in Sevin (decided in 1995), the legislature had not amended the LWCL to address employees who continue to work without wage loss beyond the prescriptive period. The Court explicitly disclaimed authority to “fill gaps” left by the legislature, citing cases such as:

• Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Jackel Int’l Ltd., 19‑0749 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So. 3d 572 (courts cannot rewrite laws to effect a purpose not expressed), and
• In re Dennis, 55,851 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/17/24), 400 So. 3d 954 (role of judiciary is to interpret, not to make, law).

B. Interruption, Suspension, and the Inapplicable Doctrines

1. Payment of medical expenses does not interrupt prescription

Johnson’s medical expenses were paid, but La. R.S. 23:1204 provides that:

“Neither the furnishing of medical services nor payments by the employer … constitute an admission of liability.”

The Supreme Court reiterated the settled jurisprudence that payment of medical expenses under this statute does not interrupt prescription for workers’ compensation claims. It cited:

• Winford v. Conerly Corp., 04‑1278 (La. 3/11/05), 897 So. 2d 560, and
• Gilbert v. Willis‑Knighton Work Kare Clinic, 43,320 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08), 986 So. 2d 211.

Thus, payment of Johnson’s medical bills did not interrupt or suspend prescription.

2. “Wages in lieu of compensation” doctrine did not apply

Louisiana recognizes that certain “wages in lieu of compensation” can interrupt prescription on a workers’ compensation claim. The Court referred to:

• Ortis v. Ortco Contractors, Inc., 00‑1460 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So. 2d 300, and
• O’Quinn v. Trinidad Drilling, LP, 49,372 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/1/14), 150 So. 3d 486.

Those cases define “wages in lieu of compensation” as:

“Unearned wages paid to an employee after an injury; if the employee actually earns the wages paid to him, they are not ‘wages in lieu of compensation’ and do not interrupt prescription.”

The Court stressed that Johnson earned his wages in the light‑duty tool room position and thus the doctrine did not apply; these were not gratuitous payments made in place of compensation. Consequently, the continued wage payments did not interrupt prescription.

C. Renunciation of Prescription: Civil Code Framework and Jurisprudence

1. Civil Code Articles 3449 and 3450: Renunciation in general

The Court grounded its analysis in two key Civil Code provisions:

• La. C.C. art. 3449 (Renunciation of Prescription):
  • Renunciation is the “abandonment of rights derived from an accrual of prescription” (Comment (c)).
  • It can only occur after prescription has accrued; it is distinct from an acknowledgment that interrupts prescription before it accrues.
  • Renunciation requires no formality (Comment (d)).
• La. C.C. art. 3450 (Tacit Renunciation):
  • Renunciation “may be tacit or express.”
  • Tacit renunciation “results from circumstances that give rise to a presumption that the advantages of prescription have been abandoned.”

The Court emphasized the distinction between:

• Acknowledgment (La. C.C. art. 3464): an admission of the creditor’s right before prescription accrues, which interrupts prescription and erases time already run, causing a new prescriptive period to begin.
• Renunciation (La. C.C. art. 3449): an abandonment of the benefit of prescription after it has accrued, usually through a new promise to pay the now‑prescribed obligation.

Citing Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So. 2d 624 (La. 1992), the Court noted that:

“Renunciation obliterates the effect of prescription that has run,” and a “new obligation binding on the debtor is created when a promise to pay is made after prescription has accrued.”

2. The requirement of a “clear, direct, and absolute” renunciation

The Court restated the well‑settled jurisprudential standard that renunciation must be:

• Clear, direct, and absolute;
• Manifested by words or actions of the party in whose favor prescription has run;
• “Necessarily and strongly connected” with the debt sought to be revived.

Key cases cited include:

• Ruffins v. HAZA Foods of Louisiana, LLC, 21‑619 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/25/22), 341 So. 3d 1259;
• Geiger v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 01‑2206 (La. 4/12/02), 815 So. 2d 80;
• Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So. 2d 624 (La. 1992).

In Geiger, the Court quoted an 1845 case, Courtebray v. Rils, to emphasize that:

Renunciation “must result from a fact which gives a presumption of the relinquishment of the right acquired by prescription … and such fact must be necessarily and strongly connected with the debt which the party intended to revive.”

The Court further highlighted decisions such as:

• Slaughter v. Arco Chem. Co., 05‑0657 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/26/06), 931 So. 2d 387, holding that mere acknowledgment of a debt after prescription accrues is not enough—there must be a new promise to pay the prescribed obligation.
• In re Benjamin, 14‑192 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/14), 165 So. 3d 161, finding that settlement negotiations did not amount to renunciation.
• Bordelon’s, Inc. v. Littell, 490 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1986), where a notarized acknowledgment interrupted prescription only as to unprescribed portions; there was no renunciation of the already prescribed part because there was no new promise to pay it.

3. Cases finding tacit renunciation

The Court contrasted these with cases where tacit renunciation was found, most notably:

• Weeks v. Louisiana Patient’s Comp. Fund, 03‑469 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/5/03), 858 So. 2d 851
  
  • A medical malpractice insurer paid its policy limits to settle a claim.
  • Under then‑La. R.S. 40:1299.44(C)(5)(e), payment of the policy limits legally constituted an admission of the health care provider’s liability and triggered the Patient’s Compensation Fund’s potential obligation for excess damages.
  • The Third Circuit held that this statutory framework, combined with the payment, amounted to a “declaration or promise” by the Fund to pay any proven excess damages, and thus a tacit renunciation of prescription.

Relying on Lima, the Court reiterated that a “promise” is:

“A declaration which gives to the person to whom it is made the right to expect or claim the performance of a specified act,” or “a pledge to another to do or not to do something specified.”

This concept of “promise” is central to the Johnson Court’s characterization of Amentum’s actions as tacit renunciation.

4. Workers’ compensation cases rejecting renunciation arguments

The Court discussed several workers’ compensation cases where courts rejected arguments that post‑prescription conduct amounted to renunciation:

• Neese v. Papa John’s Pizza, 10‑15 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/29/10), 44 So. 3d 321
  
  • An insurer issued a single check for TTD benefits more than a year after its last payment; it claimed the check was sent in error.
  • The claimant argued this was a renunciation.
  • The court rejected the argument, noting:
    • There was no evidence the check was intended as a new promise to pay TTD, and
    • There was “no language in the check that could be construed as a new promise to pay.”
• Coleman v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 19‑305 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/27/19), 284 So. 3d 1262
  
  • Three years after the claimant’s last medical benefit payment following a workers’ compensation settlement, the insurer erroneously issued a new prescription card, which was promptly canceled before use.
  • The Fifth Circuit held this was not a “clear, direct, absolute renunciation,” especially given the error and immediate cancellation.
• Queen v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1214 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989)
  
  • The court found no renunciation when the employer was led to believe prescription had not yet accrued; it reasoned that a party cannot intend to renounce prescription if it does not know it has accrued.

These cases illustrate the high threshold: isolated, ambiguous, or erroneous payments often will not suffice to show a tacit renunciation.

D. Are Workers’ Compensation Time Limits Prescriptive or Peremptive?

Amentum argued that the “forever barred” language in La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(1) indicated a legislative intent to create peremptive periods, which cannot be renounced. Under Louisiana law:

• Peremption destroys the legal right itself when the period lapses; it cannot be interrupted, suspended, or renounced. See La. C.C. art. 3461; Borel v. Young, 07‑0419 (La. 11/27/07), 989 So. 2d 42; Ebinger v. Venus Const. Corp., 10‑2516 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So. 3d 1279.
• Prescription merely bars the remedy; it can be suspended, interrupted, or renounced.

The Court rejected Amentum’s peremption argument, relying on long‑standing jurisprudence:

• Smith v. Fruehauf Trailer Operations, 27,864 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/24/96), 666 So. 2d 1246;
• Krieg v. Krieg Bros. Terrazzo Co., Inc., 93‑1065 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/28/94), 645 So. 2d 661, citing Lester v. Rebel Crane & Servs. Co., 393 So. 2d 674 (La. 1981);
• Scott v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 03‑0104 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/2/03), 851 So. 2d 1210.

These cases uniformly characterize La. R.S. 23:1209 time limits as prescriptive. That characterization has important consequences:

• Because the time periods are prescriptive, they are subject to interruption, suspension, and renunciation under the Civil Code.
• Therefore, even the “forever barred” language cannot be read as foreclosing renunciation; it simply states the effect of prescription, not its nature.

E. Application to Johnson: Why the Court Found Tacit Renunciation

With this framework, the Court applied the renunciation doctrine to the facts of Johnson’s case:

• Accident date: June 12, 2020.
• Original prescriptive bar under La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(1): June 12, 2021.
• Commencement of TTD payments: June 22, 2022—more than a year after the claim prescribed, and more than sixteen months after the prescriptive period had tolled.
• Duration of TTD payments: Weekly payments for approximately two years, until March 28, 2024.

The Court’s key conclusions:

1. Prescription clearly accrued under La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(1)
   Johnson’s claim was prescribed on its face, and there was no interruption or suspension.
2. Post‑prescription payments were substantial, regular, and ongoing
   This was not a single check mailed in error, as in Neese, nor an administratively mistaken prescription card, as in Coleman. Instead, Amentum:
   • Consciously terminated Johnson’s employment and wages, and then
   • Begun paying TTD benefits, week after week, for nearly two years.
   This pattern of conduct, the Court held, was “clearly and directly” a new promise to pay benefits for a compensable work injury.
3. Knowledge of prescription was imputed to the employer
   Amentum argued that it could not have intended to renounce prescription because it did not know the claim was prescribed. The Court was unpersuaded:
   • Amentum was Johnson’s employer and controlled payroll; it “unquestionably knew, or should have known” of the accident date and that no claim had been filed within the one‑year period.
   • Given this, its behavior must be evaluated as if it was aware prescription had accrued.
4. Conduct gave rise to the presumption of tacit renunciation under art. 3450
   Under La. C.C. art. 3450, tacit renunciation “results from circumstances that give rise to a presumption that the advantages of prescription have been abandoned.” The Court held:
   • Initiating TTD payments long after prescription accrued, and
   • Consistently maintaining those payments for an extended period,
   created such a presumption. It was a “fact … necessarily and strongly connected” with the workers’ compensation obligation (quoting Geiger) and operated as a new promise to pay that debt.
5. Distinguishing Gary v. Camden Fire Insurance Co.
   Amentum relied on Gary, 96‑0055 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So. 2d 553, for the proposition that voluntary payment of workers’ compensation benefits does not interrupt prescription. The Court found Gary inapposite:
   • Gary addressed interruption of prescription against a third‑party tortfeasor, not renunciation of prescription on the compensation claim itself.
   • There, benefits began within the normal prescriptive period; here, benefits started after prescription had run.
   • The question in Johnson was renunciation, not interruption.
6. La. R.S. 23:1204’s “no admission of liability” clause does not block renunciation
   The Court underscored that:
   • Renunciation of prescription and admission of liability are different things.
   • La. R.S. 23:1204 encourages voluntary payments by ensuring they are not admissions of liability, not by insulating employers from the civil law consequences of making long‑term post‑prescription payments that amount to a new promise to pay.
   • “One may renounce prescription yet still deny liability.”

On this basis, the Court adopted the following general rule:

“An employer or insurer’s initiation of regular and consistent workers’ compensation payments to an injured employee after the prescriptive period has tolled indicates an abandonment of the defense of prescription and constitutes a tacit renunciation of prescription.”

This is the core new legal principle established by the decision.

F. Use of Civil Code Concepts in Workers’ Compensation Law

The Court’s willingness to apply Civil Code concepts to workers’ compensation is not unprecedented. It noted:

• Trahan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc., 04‑0100 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So. 2d 1096, where the Court applied Civil Code art. 3071 (defining compromise) to determine the validity of a workers’ compensation settlement.
• Bracken v. Payne & Keller Co., Inc., 15‑1760 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/10/16), 199 So. 3d 1164, and Duncan v. Pesnell, 219 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1969), where courts applied Code of Civil Procedure articles on nullity of judgments in workers’ compensation cases because the LWCL lacked specific nullity provisions.

The Johnson Court stressed that:

• The LWCL does not expressly exclude the operation of renunciation in workers’ compensation cases.
• Workers’ compensation statutes establish specialized substantive and procedural rules but remain part of the broader civil law system, where the Civil Code fills in gaps unless displaced by specific legislation.

Accordingly, the Court’s resort to Civil Code arts. 3449 and 3450 to recognize tacit renunciation in this context is consistent with prior practice.

V. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

A. Prescription vs. Peremption

• Prescription:
  • A time limit after which a lawsuit cannot be brought.
  • The underlying right still exists abstractly, but the remedy is barred unless prescription is interrupted, suspended, or renounced.
  • Can be:
    • Interrupted (e.g., by acknowledgment, filing suit),
    • Suspended (e.g., during minority), or
    • Renounced (abandoned after it accrues).
• Peremption:
  • A time limit that extinguishes the legal right itself.
  • Once peremption runs, there is no right and no remedy; nothing can interrupt, suspend, or renounce it (La. C.C. art. 3461).

The Court reaffirmed that La. R.S. 23:1209 sets prescriptive, not peremptive, periods for workers’ compensation claims, making them subject to renunciation.

B. Temporary Total Disability (TTD) and the Wage‑Loss Requirement

• TTD benefits (La. R.S. 23:1221(1)):
  • Pay two‑thirds of the worker’s wages during a period of total disability.
  • Are intended to replace wages lost because the worker cannot engage in any employment or self‑employment.
• No TTD while working (La. R.S. 23:1221(1)(b)):
  • Explicitly bars TTD “if the employee is engaged in any employment or self‑employment,” regardless of its nature.
  • This includes accommodated work, light‑duty work, “odd‑lot” employment, sheltered employment, or work performed in pain.

Thus, an employee like Johnson, who keeps working and earning full wages in an accommodated job, cannot receive TTD during that period—even if he is medically impaired.

C. The “Developing Injury” Rule

• Applies when the worker is injured in an accident but does not become disabled until later (for example, a small back strain that later develops into a herniated disc requiring surgery).
• Under La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(3) and cases like Sevin and Bolden v. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., 363 So. 2d 419 (La. 1978):
  • The worker has one year from when the injury “develops”—when it becomes manifestly disabling and compensable.
  • But in all cases, the claim must still be filed within three years of the accident.

In Johnson’s case, even if his disabling condition is deemed to have developed when his job was eliminated in June 2022, the three‑year cap (June 2023) had long passed by the time he filed in July 2024.

D. Renunciation vs. Acknowledgment

• Acknowledgment (La. C.C. art. 3464):
  • Occurs before prescription accrues.
  • Can be express or tacit.
  • Interrupts prescription; time already run is erased; a new prescriptive period starts.
• Renunciation (La. C.C. art. 3449):
  • Occurs only after prescription has already accrued.
  • Is the abandonment of the benefit of prescription.
  • Typically takes the form of a new promise to pay a now‑prescribed debt.
  • May be:
    • Express: clear verbal or written commitment; or
    • Tacit: inferred from conduct giving rise to a strong presumption of renunciation (art. 3450).

In workers’ compensation:

• Benefits paid before the end of the prescriptive period are handled by La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(2): one year from the last payment.
• Benefits paid after prescription has accrued are not governed by La. R.S. 23:1209(A)(2) and may operate as a renunciation if they meet the standard of being a clear new promise to pay a prescribed claim.

E. Exception of Prescription and Exception of Prematurity

• Exception of prescription:
  • A procedural device by which a defendant asserts that the plaintiff’s claim is time‑barred.
  • The defendant initially bears the burden of proving that the prescriptive period has elapsed; if that is clear on the face of the pleadings, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show interruption, suspension, or renunciation.
• Exception of prematurity (La. R.S. 23:1314):
  • Used in workers’ compensation when the employee files claim before there is a justiciable dispute (e.g., benefits are being paid, or no statutory basis exists yet).
  • The petition must be dismissed as premature if the employee cannot show that the employer is refusing to pay owed benefits, furnish medical care, provide medical reports, or pay penalties/fees.

Johnson’s case illustrates the tension between these two doctrines: he could not file early without facing prematurity, but waiting led to prescription—unless saved by renunciation.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For Injured Workers

The decision has several important consequences for employees:

• Protection for accommodated workers: Workers who continue to labor in modified or light‑duty positions, at full wages, beyond the one‑year prescriptive period now have a potential path to relief if:
  • their employer later begins paying TTD beyond that period, and
  • those payments are regular and sustained, indicating a new promise to pay.
• Still subject to legislative gaps: The Court emphasized that, in the absence of post‑prescription payments, workers in Johnson’s situation remain without remedy under the current statute. Unless and until the legislature amends La. R.S. 23:1209 or related provisions, accommodation without wage loss will not stop prescription from running.
• Encouragement to act early: Despite the renunciation doctrine, workers should be advised to:
  • file claims within one year when any doubt exists, and
  • request that indemnity benefits be formally instituted and documented in a timely manner.

B. For Employers and Insurers

For employers and their insurers, the ruling has mixed implications:

• Post‑prescription payments carry legal consequences: If an employer or insurer:
  • is aware or should be aware that a claim is prescribed, yet
  • chooses to commence and continue regular indemnity payments,
  a court may deem this conduct a tacit renunciation of prescription, precluding a prescription defense to a subsequent claim.
• Isolated or mistaken payments are less likely to support renunciation: Following cases like Neese and Coleman, a single payment sent in error, or quickly corrected, typically will not amount to a renunciation absent clear evidence of a new promise to pay.
• Need for risk assessment and documentation:
  • Employers should carefully evaluate whether to commence benefits after the prescriptive period and should document their reasons.
  • If payments are made purely for humanitarian reasons or under a reservation of rights, they should consider explicit language to that effect—though whether such language will defeat a finding of renunciation will depend on the totality of the circumstances.

C. For Practitioners and Courts

The decision provides clear guidance but also raises questions likely to be litigated:

• What counts as “regular and consistent” payments?
  • Johnson involved weekly TTD for ~2 years.
  • Future cases may test shorter durations, intermittent payments, or lump‑sum back‑payments made after prescription.
• Employer’s knowledge threshold:
  • Johnson indicates that knowledge can be imputed (“knew or should have known”).
  • It remains to be seen how far this will be extended where employers lack clear notice of the injury or of the absence of a claim.
• Interaction with compromise and reservation agreements:
  • If an employer pays post‑prescription benefits under a written agreement expressly disclaiming renunciation, courts will have to decide whether the conduct nonetheless implies renunciation, or whether the express reservation controls.

D. Policy and Legislative Considerations

The Court explicitly pointed to the legislature as the appropriate actor to address the broader structural problem:

• Potential amendments to La. R.S. 23:1209:
  • The legislature could create a specific rule for workers who:
    • sustain an acknowledged work injury,
    • are kept on full wages in accommodated work, and
    • only later become unable to work or are terminated because of that injury.
  • For example, a prescriptive period could be keyed to:
    • the date of wage loss or employment termination, or
    • the date benefits are first refused,
    subject to an overall outer limit.
• Balancing protection of workers and certainty for employers:
  • The Johnson rule protects workers where employers effectively “revive” claims through post‑prescription payments.
  • But it may prompt employers to be more cautious about paying benefits after the one‑year mark without clarifying their intentions.

VII. Conclusion

Johnson v. AECOM Amentum Government Services is a significant development in Louisiana workers’ compensation and prescription law. The Court:

• Affirmed that under the current LWCL, an employee’s claim is prescribed one year from an immediately manifesting accident (or under the developing‑injury rule, within three years) regardless of whether the worker continues to earn wages in accommodated employment; there is no statutory wage‑accommodation exception.
• Recognized the resulting “quandary” for injured workers who responsibly stay in the workforce but cannot lawfully claim TTD while earning wages, yet are barred by prescription if they wait.
• Held that workers’ compensation prescription under La. R.S. 23:1209 is prescriptive, not peremptive, and thus subject to renunciation under Civil Code arts. 3449 and 3450.
• Articulated and applied a new, clear principle: an employer or insurer who initiates and then regularly and consistently pays indemnity benefits after prescription has accrued tacitly renounces the benefit of prescription and cannot thereafter plead prescription as a defense.

By grounding its holding in general civil law principles of renunciation and prescription while strictly adhering to the statutory text of the LWCL, the Court both:

• Supplied needed doctrinal clarity on the effect of post‑prescription payments, and
• Signaled to the legislature that any broader remedial adjustment for accommodated workers must come from statutory reform, not judicial innovation.

In practical terms, Johnson warns employers that substantial, sustained post‑prescription payments of workers’ compensation benefits will likely be treated as a binding new promise to pay—a tacit renunciation of prescription—while offering injured workers a crucial, though narrow, avenue of relief in otherwise harsh prescriptive circumstances.