Swanson v. State — Transporting a Terry Detainee to the Station for DNA Collection Is a De Facto Arrest Requiring Probable Cause

1. Introduction

In Swanson v. State (Del. Dec. 15, 2025), the Delaware Supreme Court reversed Marvin Swanson’s Superior Court convictions for Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP) and Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (PABPP). The case arose from a Wilmington Police investigation triggered by (i) an Instagram story video and (ii) a tip from a past-proven reliable confidential informant (the “CI”). Police detained Swanson at 23rd and Jessup, conducted a pat-down (no gun found), searched the immediate area, located a loaded handgun in a recycling bin roughly 25–30 feet away, handcuffed Swanson, transported him to the police station, and obtained a buccal DNA swab. The gun later matched Swanson’s DNA, and he was arrested months later.

Two issues were raised on appeal: (1) whether the stop/detention/transport and resulting evidence violated constitutional search-and-seizure protections; and (2) whether voir dire was inadequate on “victim bias.” The Supreme Court reversed on suppression grounds and therefore did not reach the voir dire claim.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held:

The initial detention and pat-down were supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.
The continued brief on-scene detention while officers searched nearby for a discarded firearm did not exceed the permissible scope of a Terry stop.
Transporting Swanson in handcuffs to the police station for DNA collection was “indistinguishable from an arrest” and thus constituted a de facto arrest.
The de facto arrest was not supported by probable cause; corroboration largely established identity and presence, not the alleged concealed possessory illegality, and the nearby gun discovery did not sufficiently link the firearm to Swanson.
Because the arrest was unlawful, the exclusionary rule required suppression of the evidence flowing from it; the convictions were reversed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Delaware frameworks for suppression review and seizure doctrine

McDougal v. State and Register v. State supply the mixed standard of review: factual findings for clear error, legal determinations de novo, and de novo evaluation of whether totality supports reasonable suspicion. The opinion also cites Garnett v. State, State v. Rollins, Lopez-Vazquez v. State, and Juliano v. State for these review and probable-cause principles.
Womack v. State anchors that both the Fourth Amendment and Delaware’s Article I, § 6 protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Flowers v. State (quoting Quarles v. State) frames the two key seizure categories at issue: Terry stops versus arrests, and reiterates that arrests require probable cause. Flonnory v. State (quoting Scott v. State) restates the warrant/probable-cause default rule.
Hicks v. State supplies Delaware’s core “scope” test: a Terry stop must be minimally intrusive and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the interference. Related Delaware citations include Caldwell v. State (via Howard v. State (ORDER)) on duration/scope, and United States v. Goode (via Flowers v. State) on officer safety/status quo measures.
United States v. Sharpe is used for the principle that investigative stops can “ripen” into de facto arrests when duration or intrusiveness becomes unreasonable.

B. Stationhouse transport as de facto arrest

Dunaway v. New York is the Court’s central analogue: taking a suspect to the station and detaining him in an interrogation setting can be “in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest,” even if officers avoid formal booking or telling the suspect he is “under arrest.” The Court quoted Dunaway’s emphasis that avoiding arrest labels does not make the seizure “roughly analogous” to Terry.
Hayes v. Florida provides the line-crossing rule: absent probable cause, a warrant, or consent, police may not forcibly remove a person and transport him to the station for investigative purposes (there, fingerprinting).
Cupp v. Murphy appears in Dunaway’s discussion, underscoring that certain limited evidentiary intrusions may be treated differently—but Swanson’s stationhouse detention was not such a narrowly defined intrusion.

C. Delaware “limited transport” cases and why they did not save this transport

State v. Kang is cited for the Delaware proposition that, in limited circumstances, police may transport a suspect without probable cause during an investigatory detention when “reasonable and necessary” (in Kang, moving a DUI suspect to a hospital for field sobriety tests because the accident scene was unsuitable).
State v. Matthews (ORDER) and State v. Biddle (and its affirmance order) illustrate transports found narrowly tailored/minimally intrusive, such as moving a DUI investigation a short distance due to conditions, or a brief show-up shortly after a crime. Critically, the Court emphasized that in State v. Biddle the separate transport to headquarters for fingerprinting was justified on consent.
Hicks v. State and State v. Maxwell appear as cautionary examples where moving a suspect or removing them from the scene was not justified as the least intrusive means.
The Court also addressed (and limited) the State’s reliance on Delvalle v. State (ORDER), noting that the defendant there did not litigate whether transport exceeded Terry scope; therefore Delvalle did not establish a transport-without-probable-cause rule.

D. Informant tips, corroboration, and the reasonable suspicion/probable cause gap

For reasonable suspicion from tips, the Court relied on Nickerson v. State (ORDER) (quoting Miller v. State), Bloomingdale v. State (quoting Florida v. J.L.), and Brown v. State for the “totality” factors: informant reliability, detail, and independent corroboration.
It drew on Florida v. J.L. for the key distinction: reliability must relate to the assertion of illegality, not merely the ability to identify a determinate person.
The opinion contrasted the reliability of known/past-proven sources—supported by Henry v. State (ORDER) and evaluated carefully in Valentine v. State—with anonymous tips. It also cited Cooper v. State (Cooper I) (ORDER) for the idea that even first-time sources can support action if sufficiently corroborated.
The Court used Adams v. Williams, Miller v. State, and Purnell v. State to show how known informants and corroboration of predicted behaviors/location/clothing can justify a Terry stop. It further cited Diggs v. State and Murray to emphasize deference to trained officer inference within constitutional bounds.
For probable cause from tips, the Court invoked Cooper v. State (Cooper II) (citing State v. Holden (en banc)), while emphasizing the higher reliability demanded for probable cause as explained in Alabama v. White and Robertson v. State.
Most importantly, the Court relied on LeGrande v. State and McKinney v. State to reinforce that corroborating identity/location/probation status—without corroborating concealed criminality—does not establish probable cause. Additional examples of sufficient corroboration in other contexts were collected (e.g., Holden, Bailey v. State, Darling v. State (ORDER), King v. State (ORDER)).

E. Probable cause definition and exclusionary rule

Stafford v. State (quoting Maryland v. Pringle) provided the objective probable-cause assessment framework.
Jarvis v. State and Thompson v. State were cited for the principle that reasonable suspicion cannot justify an arrest-level intrusion.
Register v. State (quoting Diggs v. State) supplied the exclusionary-rule statement: evidence obtained from unconstitutional searches/seizures is inadmissible.

F. Fingerprints vs DNA timing arguments

The Court used Davis v. Mississippi to show that stationhouse detentions to obtain fingerprints—especially with interrogation—raise Fourth Amendment concerns and generally do not present the same “disappearing evidence” rationale.
It cited Pierce v. State to note latent prints’ fragility, while distinguishing that a person’s fingerprints (or DNA available later by warrant) typically do not present the same urgency.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The Court’s three-step holding

Reasonable suspicion existed for the initial Terry stop.
Even setting aside the disputed ability to see a firearm in the Instagram video (the trial court could not see one; the detective testified he could), the Court held the CI’s tip—combined with the police corroboration of Swanson’s clothing and location and the CI’s past reliability—supported a brief investigatory detention. The Court treated this as consistent with the tip jurisprudence reflected in Adams v. Williams, Miller v. State, and Purnell v. State.
The brief continued on-scene detention while officers searched nearby remained within Terry.
The Court applied Hicks v. State and Flowers v. State to balance the government’s need (officer safety, weapon recovery, status quo) against intrusion. The officers did not escalate force during the brief search; this remained tied to the original justification (locating the suspected gun), especially given the “call out” dynamic suggesting possible discarding.
Transporting Swanson in handcuffs to the station converted the encounter into a de facto arrest.
The transport—followed by stationhouse questioning in the turnkey area before any DNA consent—was treated as materially indistinguishable from the stationhouse seizures condemned in Dunaway v. New York and Hayes v. Florida. The Court rejected the State’s “no absolute bar against transport” framing, reiterating Delaware’s rule (from Hicks v. State) that the investigative detention must remain minimally intrusive and scope-related. Unlike DUI/BAC or show-up cases where evidence can dissipate or identification can fade, the Court found no demonstrated need to obtain DNA immediately rather than later through warrant procedures.

B. Why probable cause was missing at the moment of de facto arrest

The State argued alternatively that even if the stationhouse transport was an arrest, it was supported by probable cause—primarily because the police found a handgun in a nearby recycling bin. The Court rejected that, reasoning that probable cause requires a substantially higher showing than reasonable suspicion, and that the corroboration here did not sufficiently tie Swanson to the recovered firearm.

Corroboration was largely identity-based. The police corroborated clothing and location, but those facts chiefly establish who the CI meant—not that Swanson was committing the concealed possessory offense. This tracks LeGrande v. State and McKinney v. State: identity/location corroboration does not show the tipster’s knowledge of concealed illegality.
The recovered gun did not sufficiently link to Swanson. The tip contained no firearm descriptors (model, make, color) and no details about how Swanson possessed or handled it, nor the CI’s vantage point. The police observed no conduct connecting Swanson to the recycling bin, and the pat-down found no gun.
The Instagram video did not bridge the gap. Even if the detective’s interpretation is credited, the video yielded no specific identifying features of a gun that could connect it to the gun found in the bin. Thus, discovery of a gun nearby did not elevate suspicion to a “likelihood” that Swanson possessed it.

Because the arrest-level seizure lacked probable cause, the resulting evidence was subject to exclusion under Register v. State and Diggs v. State, requiring reversal.

3.3. Impact

A. Practical rule for Delaware policing: stationhouse DNA collection during Terry is high-risk

Swanson establishes a clear constraint: handcuffing and transporting a suspect to the police station to obtain DNA—when done as part of an “investigatory detention” and not supported by probable cause, warrant, or valid consent to the transport—will be treated as a de facto arrest. Merely labeling the action as “detention,” delaying formal arrest, or intending not to charge at that moment does not prevent Fourth Amendment consequences.

B. “Necessity” must be evidence-based and tied to evanescent proof

The opinion narrows reliance on Delaware’s “limited transport” cases (e.g., State v. Kang) by emphasizing that “reasonable and necessary” transportation generally requires a concrete rationale: unsafe/unsuitable scene conditions, prompt show-up identification needs, or evidence that can dissipate. By contrast, DNA collection typically can be pursued later through a warrant once probable cause is established.

C. Probable cause from tips: nearby contraband is not enough without linkage

The Court’s probable-cause analysis signals that, in concealed possessory offenses, a reliable CI plus identity corroboration plus nearby contraband may still be insufficient when there is no particularized nexus tying the suspect to the item (observed discard, exclusive access, matching descriptors, admissions, etc.). This is especially significant in gun investigations where police often recover firearms in public areas near a suspect after a “call out.”

D. Litigation and suppression consequences

Defense challenges may increasingly focus on (i) whether police “transport” was truly consented to and (ii) whether asserted necessity is genuine or simply investigative convenience. On the State’s side, prosecutors will likely need to develop trial-court records on consent, exigency, and nexus facts—because Swanson treats stationhouse transport as arrest-like in the absence of such showings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Terry stop: A brief, on-the-spot detention to investigate possible crime, allowed on reasonable articulable suspicion (a lower standard than probable cause). Delaware codifies investigative detention authority in 11 Del. C. § 1902, but the statute cannot authorize what the Constitution forbids.
Reasonable articulable suspicion: Specific facts that make it reasonable to suspect crime may be occurring—less than “more likely than not.”
Probable cause: Facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe the person committed a crime—needed for an arrest.
De facto arrest: When police actions become so intrusive (e.g., handcuffs plus stationhouse transport and detention) that, functionally, it is an arrest even if not called one.
Corroboration of illegality vs identity: Confirming who a tip refers to (identity, clothing, location) is not the same as confirming the criminal conduct alleged (possession of a concealed gun).
Exclusionary rule: If police obtain evidence through an unconstitutional search or seizure, courts generally exclude that evidence from trial.

5. Conclusion

Swanson v. State draws a firm constitutional line in Delaware: while officers may briefly detain and investigate on reasonable suspicion—and may maintain the status quo while searching a nearby area— they cannot handcuff and transport a suspect to the station for investigative DNA collection on reasonable suspicion alone. Absent probable cause, a warrant, or valid consent to the transport, such stationhouse movement is treated as an arrest. The decision also reinforces that, even with a past-proven reliable informant, probable cause requires corroboration that meaningfully connects the suspect to the alleged concealed criminal activity—not merely identification plus nearby contraband.