Supreme Court Affirms American Express's Antisteering Provisions as Consistent with Antitrust Law in Two-Sided Market Context

Supreme Court Affirms American Express's Antisteering Provisions as Consistent with Antitrust Law in Two-Sided Market Context

Introduction

The case of Ohio, et al., Petitioners v. American Express Company, et al. presented a pivotal question in antitrust law: Do American Express Company's (Amex) antisteering provisions violate federal antitrust statutes, specifically the Sherman Act? The plaintiffs, comprising Ohio and other states, challenged Amex's contractual clauses that prohibit merchants from discouraging customers from using Amex cards. The core issue revolved around whether these provisions constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade, thereby infringing upon antitrust laws. After deliberations in lower courts, the United States Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, ruling that Amex's antisteering provisions do not violate antitrust laws within the framework of a two-sided market.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, reaffirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that Amex's antisteering provisions are not anticompetitive under the Sherman Act. The judgment centered on recognizing credit-card networks as two-sided platforms, where both merchants and cardholders are integral to the network's functionality. The Court emphasized that Amex's higher merchant fees are justified by the value they provide, such as offering superior rewards to wealthier cardholders who spend more. The Court concluded that without direct evidence of Amex charging above competitive levels or stifling competition, the antisteering provisions do not constitute an unlawful restraint of trade.

Conversely, the dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer argued that the antisteering provisions inherently possess anticompetitive effects by allowing Amex to maintain higher merchant fees without corresponding benefits to consumers or merchants. The dissent criticized the majority for not adequately considering the anticompetitive nature of these provisions within the two-sided market framework.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The majority opinion extensively referenced foundational antitrust laws and key precedents to substantiate its reasoning. Central to the analysis was Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. The Court invoked the "rule of reason," a standard that requires a case-by-case analysis to determine the pro- and anti-competitive effects of a business practice. Notable cases cited include Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., which discusses horizontal restraints, and Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., which affirmed that vertical price-fixing agreements are subject to the rule of reason.

The Court also leaned on economic theories related to two-sided markets, citing works by economists Evans & Schmalensee and Filistrucchi et al. These references helped in framing credit-card networks as platforms that simultaneously serve two distinct but interdependent customer bases—merchants and cardholders—thereby necessitating a comprehensive market definition encompassing both sides.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's legal reasoning was rooted in economic principles governing two-sided platforms. It underscored that credit-card networks, such as Amex, operate by facilitating transactions between merchants and cardholders, with both parties deriving value from the network's breadth. The concept of indirect network effects was pivotal—whereby the value to one side (e.g., merchants) increases as the size of the other side (e.g., cardholders) grows, and vice versa.

By treating the credit-card market as a single entity comprising both merchants and cardholders, the Court assessed whether Amex's antisteering provisions led to anticompetitive outcomes. The majority found that the higher merchant fees were justified by the enhanced value provided through robust rewards programs, which in turn attracted affluent cardholders. Since there was no conclusive evidence that Amex was pricing above competitive levels or reducing the overall number of credit-card transactions, the Court ruled that the antisteering provisions did not unreasonably restrain trade.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for antitrust law, especially concerning two-sided markets. By affirming that market definitions in such contexts must encompass both participant groups, the Court sets a precedent for how similar cases should analyze potential antitrust violations. It clarifies that vertical restraints, like antisteering provisions, must be evaluated within the comprehensive framework of the entire platform, considering the interdependent nature of the customer bases.

Future cases involving multi-sided platforms—ranging from digital marketplaces to payment networks—will likely reference this decision to determine the legality of contractual provisions that affect one or both sides of their markets. Additionally, businesses operating within two-sided markets may feel more confident in implementing similar provisions, knowing that such clauses may withstand antitrust scrutiny if they can demonstrate procompetitive justifications.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Two-Sided Platforms

A two-sided platform is a business model that serves two distinct customer groups who interact through the platform. For credit-card networks like Amex, the two sides are merchants and cardholders. The platform must attract and maintain both sides to facilitate transactions effectively. The value to each side increases as the other side grows; more merchants accepting Amex cards make the cards more valuable to consumers, and more consumers using Amex cards make the network more attractive to merchants.

Indirect Network Effects

Indirect network effects occur when the value of a product or service to one user group depends on the size of another user group. In the context of credit cards, the more merchants accept a particular card, the more useful the card becomes to consumers. Conversely, the more consumers use the card, the more attractive it is for merchants to accept it. This interdependency is central to the operation of two-sided platforms.

Rule of Reason

The rule of reason is a legal doctrine used in antitrust cases to determine whether a business practice is anticompetitive. Under this rule, courts conduct a comprehensive analysis considering the practice's purpose, its effect on competition, and any potential procompetitive justifications. It contrasts with per se violations, which are automatically deemed unlawful without detailed examination.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's affirmation in Ohio v. American Express Company marks a critical stance in antitrust jurisprudence concerning two-sided markets. By recognizing the intricate balance required to maintain both merchant and cardholder participation, the Court reinforced the necessity of a holistic market definition in evaluating antitrust claims. This decision not only upholds Amex's contractual strategies but also provides a framework for assessing similar practices across various industries that operate multiple, interdependent customer bases. Ultimately, the ruling underscores the importance of economic context in antitrust analysis, ensuring that legal standards evolve in tandem with complex, modern business models.

Case Details

Year: 2018
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Judge(s)

Clarence Thomas

Attorney(S)

Eric E. Murphy, Solicitor, Columbus, OH, supporting the Petitioners and state Respondents. Malcolm L. Stewart, Washington, DC, for Respondent United States in support of Petitioners. Evan R. Chesler, New York, NY, for Respondents. Michael Dewine, Attorney General of Ohio, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, Counsel of Record, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Hannah C. Wilson, Deputy Solicitor, Columbus, OH, for Petitioner State of Ohio. George Jepsen, Attorney General, State of Connecticut. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, State of Idaho. Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois. Tom Miller, Attorney General, State of Iowa. Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, State of Maryland. Bill Schuette, Attorney General, State of Michigan. Tim Fox, Attorney General, State of Montana. Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, State of Nebraska. Peter Kilmartin, Attorney General, State of Rhode Island. Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General, State of Tennessee. Ken Paxton, Attorney General, State of Texas. Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General, State of Utah. Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Attorney General, State of Vermont. Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Brian H. Fletcher, Assistant to the Solicitor General, William J. Rinner, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, Kristen C. Limarzi, Robert B. Nicholson, James J. Fredricks, Craig W. Conrath, John R. Read, Nickolai G. Levin, Andrew J. Ewalt, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent United States. Michael K. Kellogg, Aaron M. Panner, Derek T. Ho, Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, Benjamin J. Horwich, Justin P. Raphael, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, San Francisco, CA, Evan R. Chesler, Peter T. Barbur, Kevin J. Orsini, Rory A. Leraris, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, New York, NY, Laureen E. Seeger, Mark Califano, Suzanne E. Wachsstock, American Express Company, New York, NY, for Respondents American Express Company and American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc.

Comments