Introduction

In People v. Beverly, 2025 CO 18, 568 P.3d 398, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed an issue of first impression arising under Colorado’s 2022 fentanyl legislation. The case explores whether a defendant charged with distribution of fentanyl that “proximately causes” a user’s death can introduce evidence that the user intended to die by suicide to rebut the statute’s death-related sentence enhancer. The Court held that such evidence may be relevant to proximate cause because intentional suicide can constitute an intervening cause under Colorado law, thereby breaking the causal chain required for enhanced penalties.

The case arose from an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, initiated by the People after the trial court denied their motion in limine to exclude evidence of the decedent Matthew Bowen’s suicidal intent. The State contended the legislature intended to enhance penalties whenever fentanyl distributed by a defendant caused a user’s death, regardless of whether the death was accidental or intentional. The defense argued that suicide by intentional overdose can be an unforeseeable, independent intervening cause. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Márquez joined by Justices Hood, Gabriel, Hart, and Samour, discharged the rule to show cause and affirmed the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. Justice Boatright, joined by Justice Berkenkotter, dissented.

Summary of the Opinion

• Holding on statutory interpretation: The phrase “the proximate cause” in § 18-18-405(2)(a)(III)(A), C.R.S. (2024), incorporates the established legal concept of proximate cause, which permits consideration of intervening causes. Therefore, a drug purchaser’s suicide by intentional overdose may constitute an intervening cause that breaks the causal chain from a defendant’s distribution to the death.
• Relevance ruling: Evidence of a purchaser’s suicidal intent can be relevant to proximate cause in cases brought under the fentanyl death enhancer. The Court rejected a categorical rule excluding such evidence.
• Evidentiary ruling affirmed: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the People’s motion to exclude the decedent’s text message and the coroner’s manner-of-death opinion under CRE 401/402 (relevance) and CRE 403 (risk of confusion). Any disputes about proximate cause are ultimately fact questions for the jury.
• Scope limitation: The decision does not establish that suicidal intent evidence is always admissible or that it will always warrant an intervening-cause instruction. The opinion places the proximate-cause determination where it belongs—before the jury—when supported by a sufficient evidentiary foundation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410 (Colo. 2005): The Court relied on the principle that the legislature is presumed to use terms with their established legal meaning. By using “proximate cause,” the General Assembly invoked the traditional causation framework rather than a looser “results in” standard.
• People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002); People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez, 971 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1998); People v. Lopez, 97 P.3d 277 (Colo. App. 2004): These cases define proximate cause and intervening cause in Colorado criminal law. An intervening cause is an event the defendant did not participate in, that was not reasonably foreseeable, and that is a but-for cause of the injury. The majority imports this three-part test into the fentanyl enhancer analysis.
• Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, 542 P.3d 675: Proximate cause is the cause which, in a natural and probable sequence, produces the injury; also emphasizes that proximate cause is fundamentally a fact-based determination for the jury.
• Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014): Distinguishes “but-for” cause from proximate cause. The majority highlights that Congress used “results from” in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), which courts interpret as but-for causation, whereas the Colorado legislature chose “proximate cause,” signaling a stricter, foreseeability-based analysis permitting intervening-cause defenses.
• People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, 351 P.3d 431; People v. Subjack, 2021 CO 10, 480 P.3d 114: Support the Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 due to the significant public importance of the issue and the lack of adequate alternative remedy for the People if proximate cause fails at trial.
• People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, 467 P.3d 332; People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987): Guide statutory interpretation by focusing on the plain language and presuming deliberate legislative word choice.
• Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427 (Colo. App. 2007); Boulders at Escalante LLC v. Otten Johnson, 2015 COA 85, 412 P.3d 751: Foreseeability is a policy-laden limitation on liability; suicide is often characterized as a voluntary, “abnormal” decision that can be unforeseeable in proximate-cause analysis.
• CRE 401, 402, 403: The Court reaffirms trial courts’ broad discretion in admitting evidence that is relevant and not substantially outweighed by risks of confusion or unfair prejudice.
• Comparative authorities from other jurisdictions: The Court distinguishes federal and state cases that either treat death as always foreseeable in drug-distribution contexts or apply different statutory language (e.g., United States v. Jeffries; United States v. Burkholder; State v. Thomas; State v. McCrorey; Yeary v. State; Baker v. State; State v. Price). The majority declines to adopt a categorical foreseeability rule for intentional suicides.
• Dissent’s authorities: Justice Boatright invokes People v. Fite (no intervening cause where medical care followed a shooting) and Hamrick v. People (eggshell victim principle) to argue that the defendant “takes the victim as he finds him,” viewing suicide risk as inherently foreseeable in illicit fentanyl distribution.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in two steps: statutory interpretation and evidentiary application.

1. Statutory interpretation: The text requires the distribution be “the proximate cause” of death to trigger elevation to a level 1 drug felony. Unlike Congress’s “results from” language in the federal analogue, “proximate cause” brings with it a foreseeability-laden, common-law causation framework. Within that framework, an intervening cause—an unforeseeable, non-participated-in event that is a but-for cause—breaks the chain. Suicide by intentional overdose can, depending on facts, be such an intervening cause. The legislative declaration does not override the statute’s plain wording.
2. Application to evidence law: Because suicide may, in some circumstances, serve as an intervening cause, evidence of a decedent’s suicidal intent can make a fact of consequence (proximate cause) more or less probable (CRE 401/402). Here, the decedent’s goodbye text, history of self-harm indicators, and extraordinarily high fentanyl blood concentration supported the coroner’s opinion of “lethal intent,” making an intervening-cause theory plausible for the jury. Any danger of confusing the issues (CRE 403) does not substantially outweigh the probative value, particularly because the jury can be properly instructed that the decedent’s intent bears only on intervening cause and foreseeability, not on the distributive act itself.

The Court carefully limits its holding: admissibility will be case-specific; not every suicide-related record will be admitted; and even if admitted, the evidence may not justify an intervening-cause instruction unless there is at least a “scintilla” supporting that defense. Ultimately, proximate cause remains a jury question.

The Dissent

Justice Boatright’s dissent argues for a categorical approach grounded in the extreme dangerousness of illicit fentanyl. On this view:

• Death from illicit fentanyl is always foreseeable to a distributor, whether the user overdoses accidentally or intends suicide—akin to selling a gun and bullets to play Russian roulette.
• The act of distribution “began the chain of events” causing death; the user’s mental state is irrelevant. The statute’s focus, he argues, is on the distributor’s conduct and the death that followed.
• Invoking the “take your victim as you find him” principle (Hamrick) and reluctance to find intervening causes absent extreme, independent conduct (Fite), the dissent would exclude suicidal-intent evidence and treat distribution as the proximate cause as a matter of law in scenarios like this.

Impact and Practical Implications

This decision has immediate and significant effects on Colorado drug prosecutions involving fatal overdoses:

• Sharper factual focus on causation: Prosecutions seeking the level 1 enhancer must now be prepared to litigate proximate cause in earnest, including foreseeability and potential intervening causes such as intentional suicide.
• Evidence development: Both sides will emphasize factual development surrounding the decedent’s knowledge, intent, and behavior:
  • What did the decedent believe about the substance (fentanyl or something else)?
  • Did the distributor know, or should have known, of suicidal ideation?
  • Quantity, purity, and toxicology—does the evidence suggest an intentional “lethal” dose?
  • Communications, mental health history, and contemporaneous statements that bear on intent.
• Jury instructions and trial management: Courts will grapple with when the evidence clears the “scintilla” threshold to instruct on intervening cause; careful limiting instructions will be essential to avoid conflating victim intent with elements of distribution.
• Plea practice and charging discretion: Expect more litigation and negotiation over the enhancer. In close foreseeability cases, the People may charge without the enhancer or negotiate to avoid uncertain causation trials.
• Divergence from federal law: Colorado’s proximate-cause approach is more demanding than federal “results from” jurisprudence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), intensifying the fact-bound nature of Colorado enhancer trials.
• Potential legislative response: If the General Assembly prefers a broader death enhancer, it could amend the statute to a “results from” formulation or otherwise clarify that intentional overdose does not break causation. Conversely, it may leave the fact-intensive approach in place to calibrate punishment to moral blameworthiness.
• Beyond fentanyl: Though motivated by fentanyl’s lethality, the Court’s causation analysis applies to any drug distribution charged under § 18-18-405 with the death enhancer. Expect analogous arguments in heroin, methamphetamine, and poly-substance cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• But-for cause vs. proximate cause: But-for cause asks, “Would the death have happened without the defendant’s conduct?” Proximate cause adds a fairness and foreseeability filter: “Was the death a natural and probable consequence of the conduct, without an abnormal, unforeseen event intervening?”
• Intervening cause: An event that breaks the chain of causation if (1) the defendant didn’t participate in it, (2) it was not reasonably foreseeable, and (3) it was a but-for cause of the death. Intentional suicide can qualify, depending on the facts.
• Foreseeability: A policy-infused judgment about whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated the intervening event. The majority emphasizes that accidental overdose is often foreseeable, but intentional suicide may not always be.
• “The” proximate cause vs. “a” proximate cause: Even if there can be multiple proximate causes of a result, the existence of an intervening cause means the defendant’s act is no longer a proximate cause for enhancer purposes.
• CRE 401/402/403: Evidence must make a consequential fact more or less probable to be relevant (401/402). Relevant evidence can still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by risks like confusion or unfair prejudice (403).
• C.A.R. 21 “original” proceedings: An extraordinary, discretionary review mechanism the Supreme Court uses in matters of significant public importance with no adequate alternative remedy.
• Colorado fentanyl enhancer: Under § 18-18-405, distribution involving ≤4 grams can be punished as a level 3 drug felony (presumptive 2–4 years). If distribution is the “proximate cause” of death, it can be elevated to a level 1 drug felony (presumptive 8–32 years).

Key Takeaways

• By choosing “proximate cause,” the legislature incorporated a foreseeability-based causation framework that permits intervening-cause defenses.
• Intentional suicide by overdose can, on appropriate facts, constitute an intervening cause breaking the causal chain to the distributor.
• Evidence of suicidal intent may be admissible and relevant to negating proximate cause; admissibility remains case-specific under Colorado’s evidence rules.
• Proximate cause is a fact-intensive jury question; the Court eschews categorical rules in favor of nuanced assessments.
• The dissent would treat death as inherently foreseeable in illicit fentanyl distribution, making victim intent irrelevant and supporting categorical exclusion of suicide evidence.

Conclusion

People v. Beverly marks a consequential clarification in Colorado’s fentanyl death enhancer regime: the legislature’s use of “proximate cause” requires a full, traditional causation analysis, complete with the possibility that intentional suicide may break the chain of causation. The decision aligns enhancer liability with moral blameworthiness by demanding proof that the death occurred in a natural and probable sequence from distribution, without an abnormal, unforeseen intervening decision by the user. While the dissent urges a categorical approach commensurate with fentanyl’s lethality, the majority’s fact-intensive framework places causation where it typically belongs—in the hands of juries, armed with appropriately tailored evidentiary rulings and instructions.

Going forward, the case will shape how prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial courts develop and test evidence regarding foreseeability, intent, and intervening cause in overdose prosecutions. It also invites continued legislative attention should policymakers wish to broaden or narrow the scope of death enhancements in the face of Colorado’s ongoing overdose crisis.

Note: This commentary is for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.