Substantive Parental Change, Domestic Violence, and Child Preference in Alaska CINA Terminations: Commentary on Millie T. & Frank L. v. State

Substantive Parental Change, Domestic Violence, and Child Preference in Alaska CINA Terminations: Commentary on Millie T. & Frank L. v. State

I. Introduction

This memorandum opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court, Millie T. v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children's Services and Frank L. v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children's Services (Supreme Court Nos. S‑19248/19258), concerns the termination of parental rights to three teenagers – Ryker, Emmett, and Evan – on grounds of long‑standing neglect, exposure to serious domestic violence, and physical and mental abuse.

The mother, Millie, appealed the termination of her rights to Ryker and Evan, arguing that she had remedied within a reasonable time the conduct or conditions that rendered the children children in need of aid (CINA). The father, Frank, appealed the termination of his rights to Evan, contending that the superior court erred in determining that termination was in Evan’s best interests.

The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that:

  • The superior court did not clearly err in finding that Millie failed to remedy the conduct and conditions that placed her children in need of aid, despite substantial “paper” compliance with her case plan; and
  • The superior court did not clearly err in finding that termination of Frank’s parental rights was in Evan’s best interests, particularly in light of Evan’s age, express preference for adoption, and Frank’s history of severe abuse and near-complete non‑engagement with his case plan.

Although the opinion is expressly designated as a memorandum decision under Alaska Appellate Rule 214 and therefore does not create binding precedent, it synthesizes and applies existing Alaska law in a way that is highly instructive. It underscores two themes that recur in Alaska CINA jurisprudence:

  1. Compliance with a case plan is not enough; a parent must demonstrate genuine insight, behavioral change, and the ability to safely parent.
  2. For older children, the best‑interests analysis can appropriately give substantial weight to the child’s own preferences, especially where those preferences align with stability, safety, and strong foster bonds.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Family and Prior OCS Involvement

Millie is the mother of three children: Ryker (15 at the time of removal), Emmett (13), and Evan (12). Frank is Evan’s father and, at the relevant time, also lived with Millie and all three children in Wasilla.

The family had a long and troubled history with the Office of Children’s Services (OCS):

  • Between 2007 and 2021, OCS investigated more than 20 reports involving neglect, abuse, or mental injury to the children.
  • At least three reports were substantiated.
  • The children had already been removed twice before:
    • From 2009 into late 2010; and
    • From 2013 to 2015.

These prior removals were based on similar concerns: unsafe and unsanitary living conditions, lack of supervision, exposure to domestic violence, and neglect.

B. The 2021 Incidents Triggering Removal

The present case was triggered in November 2021 by serious incidents involving Emmett:

  • Emmett ran away after being “whipped” by Frank, spent the night in an unlocked truck, and was brought to the hospital by Millie; he was placed on a short mental health hold.
  • Upon return home, Emmett had a violent meltdown: he threatened to kill others in the home, tried to harm the family dog, and attempted self‑harm with a knife.
  • Millie restrained Emmett with zip ties, and state troopers brought him back to the hospital.

At the hospital, Emmett disclosed extensive abuse and unsafe conditions to an OCS worker:

  • He described severe physical abuse by Frank and dangerous activities Frank had involved him in.
  • He reported Millie’s minimizing attitude: when he told her about abuse, she would say that if he had listened better, it would not have happened.
  • He described domestic violence between Millie and Frank – including Frank injuring Millie’s arm badly enough to require medical treatment and Millie hitting Frank with a pipe to protect Ryker.

OCS, suspicious due to Millie’s historic lack of cooperation, obtained a writ of assistance to access the home. Once inside, OCS workers observed:

  • Exposed electrical wiring;
  • Excessive clutter blocking all but one exit;
  • Inadequate heating; and
  • Insufficient food.

Ryker and Evan initially denied physical abuse, but at trial Ryker testified that Frank shoved and hit the children and Millie, corroborating a pattern of violence.

OCS took emergency custody of all three children on grounds of neglect, domestic violence, and physical abuse. Ryker and Evan were placed together in a foster home; Emmett entered residential mental health treatment.

C. The Gun Incident During the Case

While the children were in care, a particularly alarming incident occurred that underscored ongoing danger:

  • Ryker’s foster mother could not locate him at an agreed pickup point after he had been with friends.
  • She enlisted Millie and Frank to help search.
  • Millie and Frank, in a car together, located Ryker; Frank pointed a gun at Ryker’s head and told him to get in the car or be shot.

This episode vividly illustrated both the continuing volatility and the parents’ failure to adopt safe, non‑violent approaches to their children, even after OCS intervention.

D. Case Plans and Parental Engagement

1. Millie’s case plan and services

In February 2022, OCS prepared case plans for both parents. For Millie, the plan required:

  • Domestic violence (family violence) assessment;
  • Psychological evaluation;
  • Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and additional treatment as recommended, including classes on adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) and domestic violence.

Millie generally engaged with her plan:

  • She attended weekly supervised visits with Ryker and Evan (though some visits were shortened or declined by the children).
  • By September 2023, she had completed most case plan requirements, including:
    • A family violence assessment (April 2022);
    • A psychological evaluation; and
    • Several months of CBT beginning March 2023.
  • She also engaged in visitation with Emmett, including out‑of‑state travel to visit him in residential treatment.

However, providers reported serious concerns:

  • In the family violence assessment, Millie:
    • Minimized the level of violence in the family;
    • Denied Frank’s abuse of the children;
    • Blamed OCS for the family’s problems; and
    • Failed to identify abuse‑related ACEs for her children.
  • The evaluator concluded that Millie used anger to control others, lacked accountability, and could not appreciate her children’s perspectives or the unhealthy family dynamic.
  • In her psychological evaluation, Millie again denied domestic violence, showed poor insight into how her abusive childhood affected her emotional reactivity, and was recommended for CBT and further education.
  • During CBT, her therapist initially noted that Millie did not believe she needed further treatment. Over eight months, the therapist reported some progress, including:
    • Millie’s claim that she had ended her romantic relationship with Frank around April–May 2023;
    • Some increased recognition of her failure to protect the children from Frank’s abuse.

Despite this, OCS and the guardian ad litem remained concerned that:

  • Millie continued to show the same problematic thought patterns;
  • She continued to blame OCS to the children during visits;
  • She maintained some form of relationship or ongoing contact with Frank, despite telling providers the opposite; and
  • Her improvements appeared superficial – “jumping through hoops” to complete tasks without genuine, deep behavioral change.

2. Frank’s case plan and minimal participation

In stark contrast, Frank made very little progress on his case plan:

  • He completed one parenting class in March 2022.
  • He attended supervised visitation only for “a couple of months,” then stopped.
  • OCS reported only four or five contacts with him over the entire three‑year case.
  • In September 2023, he told OCS he would be out of the area for work and did not further engage in services.
  • In early 2024, he had two brief phone contacts with OCS; he acknowledged being “in contact with Millie the whole time” and showed no substantive case‑plan progress; when visitation was again offered, he did not reengage.

E. Children’s Experiences in Foster Care and Their Preferences

After their placements:

  • Ryker and Evan, eventually in separate foster homes, were generally reported to be doing well.
  • Both expressed a clear desire not to return to their parents’ custody.
  • Evan, in particular, was thriving:
    • He was 14 at the time of termination;
    • He felt safe in his foster home;
    • He was in individual and group therapy, enjoyed reading, played sports, worked for neighbors, and was learning Spanish;
    • He was earning Bs and Cs in school; and
    • His foster family wished to adopt him and offer a permanent, stable, loving home.

The children’s ages (mid‑teens) and clearly stated preferences played a significant role in the superior court’s determinations and the Supreme Court’s affirmance.

F. Termination Trial and Mixed Outcome

The superior court held a four‑day termination trial in April 2024. It found, by clear and convincing evidence, that all three children were in need of aid under:

  • AS 47.10.011(6): substantial physical harm or substantial risk of such harm;
  • AS 47.10.011(8): mental injury or substantial risk of such injury; and
  • AS 47.10.011(9): neglect.

It further found that:

  • Both parents had failed to remedy the conditions placing the children in need of aid;
  • OCS had made reasonable reunification efforts; and
  • Termination was in Ryker’s and Evan’s best interests, but not in Emmett’s best interests.

The court therefore:

  • Terminated Millie’s parental rights to Ryker and Evan;
  • Terminated Frank’s parental rights to Evan; but
  • Declined to terminate Millie’s rights to Emmett, finding that continued therapeutic intervention with his mother was critical to his progress and that cutting that off would be detrimental.

This sibling‑by‑sibling differentiation illustrates the individualized nature of the CINA best‑interests analysis.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court:

  • Rejected Millie’s challenge to the finding that she had failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed Ryker and Evan in need of aid.
    • The Court emphasized that although Millie had “demonstrated some progress” and substantially completed her case plan, the superior court reasonably concluded that her progress was insufficient to ensure her children’s safety, given her limited insight, minimization of domestic violence, continued contact with Frank, and persistent unsafe patterns over more than a decade.
    • Because the Court agreed that she had not remedied the conduct, it did not need to reach her alternative argument that she had remedied her conduct “within a reasonable time.”
  • Rejected Frank’s challenge to the best‑interests finding regarding Evan.
    • Frank argued that the superior court erred by not explicitly applying the AS 47.10.088(b) factors to the best‑interests question and by relying too heavily on Evan’s stated preference.
    • The Court held that the statutory factors in AS 47.10.088(b) guide only the “remedied conduct” inquiry, not the best‑interests determination under AS 47.10.088(c) – though they may be considered.
    • The Court further held that the superior court properly conducted a “comprehensive analysis” of Evan’s best interests, in which Evan’s preference was just one, albeit important, factor among many, including his safety, stability, and thriving foster placement.

Applying a deferential “clear error” standard to the trial court’s factual findings, and emphasizing the trial court’s vantage point in weighing conflicting evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination order in full.

IV. Legal Framework and Standards of Review

A. Termination of Parental Rights under Alaska Law

Under AS 47.10.088(a), a court may terminate parental rights only if the State proves, by clear and convincing evidence:

  1. The child is in need of aid under AS 47.10.011;
  2. The parent has not remedied, within a reasonable time, the conduct or conditions that place the child at substantial risk of harm if returned home; and
  3. OCS has made reasonable efforts to provide services to the parent and child aimed at reunifying the family.

In addition, under AS 47.10.088(c) and CINA Rule 18(c)(3), the court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not), that termination is in the child’s best interests.

B. Standards of Proof: Clear and Convincing vs. Preponderance

Two different evidentiary standards are at work:

  • Clear and convincing evidence: A higher civil standard, requiring that the evidence be highly and substantially more likely to be true than not. It is more demanding than a “preponderance of the evidence” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Preponderance of the evidence: The usual civil standard, requiring that a fact be more probable than not.

Alaska law employs the higher “clear and convincing” standard to protect parental rights when determining whether statutory grounds for termination have been met, while using the lower “preponderance” standard for the ultimate best‑interests judgment.

C. Appellate Standard of Review: Clear Error

The Supreme Court reiterates that it reviews:

  • Questions of law (e.g., interpretation of statutes) de novo, independent of the lower court’s conclusions; and
  • Factual findings (including:
    • whether a parent has remedied conduct, and
    • whether termination is in a child’s best interests)
    for clear error.

Under the clear‑error standard, the appellate court will affirm unless, after reviewing the entire record, it is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the trial court made a mistake. The Supreme Court also reaffirms that determinations of whether a parent has remedied harmful conduct and whether termination is in a child’s best interests are quintessentially factual questions “best made by a trial court,” which has the benefit of live testimony and credibility assessments.

V. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Millie’s Appeal: Failure to Remedy Conduct or Conditions

1. Statutory factors for “failure to remedy”: AS 47.10.088(b)

In deciding whether a parent has failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that caused a child to be in need of aid, a court may consider any fact relating to the child’s best interests, explicitly including the following non‑exclusive factors in AS 47.10.088(b):

  1. The likelihood of returning the child to the parent within a reasonable time, based on the child’s age or needs;
  2. The amount of effort by the parent to remedy the conduct or the conditions in the home;
  3. The harm caused to the child;
  4. The likelihood that the harmful conduct will continue; and
  5. The parent’s history of such conduct or conditions.

The superior court did not mechanically tick through each factor, but the Supreme Court notes that the trial court’s findings in substance did address many of them: the children’s ages and needs, harm caused by domestic violence and neglect, Millie’s long history with OCS, and the likelihood of continued harm given her pattern of minimizing abuse and maintaining contact with Frank.

2. Millie’s core argument on appeal

Millie’s main contention was that she had, in fact, remedied the conduct/conditions, because:

  • She substantially completed her case plan;
  • She engaged in CBT and had “breakthroughs” recognizing her failures;
  • She asserted she ended her relationship with Frank;
  • Her therapist testified that she was gaining insight and improving emotional regulation.

She also attacked two particular factual findings as unsupported:

  1. The finding that she had not taken meaningful accountability for her role in causing the children to be in need of aid; and
  2. The finding that she remained, in substance, in a relationship or frequent contact with Frank.

3. The Court’s treatment of “case plan compliance”

The Supreme Court emphasizes a well‑established theme in Alaska case law: completing the steps in a case plan is not dispositive. The question is whether the parent has achieved substantive, durable change that ensures the child’s safety.

The Court relies on several precedents:

  • Charles S. v. State (442 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2019)): A parent’s mere completion of services is insufficient; the parent must "exhibit an ability to implement the necessary skills to safely care for [the] children."
  • Rick P. v. State (109 P.3d 950 (Alaska 2005)): Attending anger management counseling did not by itself demonstrate ability to control anger; the focus is on behavioral change.
  • V.S.B. v. State (45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002)): Compliance with a treatment plan does not guarantee that adequate parenting skills have been acquired.
  • Barbara P. v. State (234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010)): A parent who does not internalize the teachings of the case plan and fails to translate them into behavior has not remedied the conduct.

Applying these principles, the Court views Millie’s near‑complete checklist of services as evidence of effort but not conclusive proof of remedy. The key inquiry is whether she gained real insight, changed her responses to violence and conflict, and would actually protect the children going forward.

4. Evidence supporting the “failure to remedy” finding

The Supreme Court underscores several categories of evidence that support the superior court’s conclusion:

  • Severity and duration of harm:
    • Repeated exposure to serious domestic violence and physical abuse over many years;
    • The gun incident, in which Frank, with Millie present and participating in the "search," pointed a firearm at Ryker’s head to force compliance;
    • Unsafe home conditions (exposed wiring, blocked exits, inadequate food and heat).
  • Children’s ages and needs:
    • All three were teenagers, with limited time remaining in childhood to achieve safety and stability;
    • Both Ryker and Evan expressly did not want to return home.
  • Lengthy OCS history and repeated patterns:
    • Over a decade of OCS involvement and three separate removals;
    • Continuing themes: unsanitary and unsafe housing, lack of supervision, exposure to violence, and neglect.
  • Millie’s minimization and deflection:
    • In formal assessments, she denied Frank’s violence toward the children and blamed OCS;
    • She failed to identify abuse‑related adverse childhood experiences for her own children;
    • Supervisors reported that in visits she still blamed OCS for the removal and resisted guidance, saying she would “decide how to parent.”
  • Questionable end to relationship with Frank:
    • Millie gave different explanations for the breakup (e.g., his lack of love vs. realization of his abusiveness);
    • Frank indicated Millie had “anger issues” and suggested she claimed to be separated to impress OCS;
    • They were seen together at a gas station after the supposed breakup; Frank admitted they were still “talking and associating”; and
    • An incident in January 2024, where Millie was pounding on Frank’s door at night and called police for a welfare check about a “random” woman, indicated significant emotional entanglement.
  • Limited corroboration from neutral professionals:
    • Millie’s therapist relied heavily on Millie’s self‑reports and acknowledged this;
    • Other sources (OCS, guardian ad litem, the children’s behavior and statements, and observable incidents) contradicted Millie’s self‑portrayal of insight and distance from Frank.

Given this evidence, the Supreme Court concludes it cannot form a “definite and firm conviction” that the superior court made a mistake. That is, it does not find clear error in the trial court’s conclusion that Millie had not remedied the conduct or conditions that made her children CINA.

5. Specific findings Millie challenged

On the two factual points Millie attacked, the Court’s response is instructive:

  • Accountability and insight:
    • Millie pointed to her therapist’s testimony about “breakthroughs.”
    • The Court notes that the therapist’s opinion was based solely on Millie’s self‑reports, and that the trial court was entitled to weigh that testimony against contrary evidence.
    • The Court defers to the superior court’s evaluation of credibility and weight of evidence, citing Tessa M. v. State (182 P.3d 1110 (Alaska 2008)).
  • Continuing relationship/contact with Frank:
    • Millie argued that occasional communications do not equate to a romantic relationship and that this finding was speculative.
    • The Court clarifies that the concern was not limited to “romantic” involvement, but the fact that they were “often in contact” and she was not candid about it with OCS and providers.
    • Given the concrete evidence of contact and the January 2024 incident, the Court concludes the trial court acted within its fact‑finding authority in doubting Millie’s claimed separation.

Overall, the Court holds that the superior court’s assessment—that Millie’s progress, while not negligible, did not sufficiently reduce the risk to her children—was amply supported and not clearly erroneous.

B. Frank’s Appeal: Best Interests of Evan and the Role of Child Preference

1. Distinguishing “remedied conduct” factors from best‑interests analysis

Frank argued that the superior court erred by not explicitly analyzing the AS 47.10.088(b) factors when determining whether termination was in Evan’s best interests. The Supreme Court rejects this argument by reaffirming prior precedent:

  • Judith R. v. State (289 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2012)):
    • The AS 47.10.088(b) factors are “intended specifically to guide a court in determining whether a parent has timely remedied conduct or conditions that endanger a child,” not in assessing best interests under AS 47.10.088(c).
    • The best‑interests finding is a “more comprehensive judgment.”
  • Joy B. v. State (382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016)):
    • AS 47.10.088(b) only provides that “the court may consider” the enumerated factors; it does not mandate that each be addressed, even when deciding failure to remedy.

The Court notes that, in any event, the superior court did address several such factors in its broader analysis: Frank’s history of violence, his lack of effort on his case plan, and the long‑standing nature of the conditions that harmed the children.

2. The “capacious” nature of the best‑interests inquiry

The Supreme Court reiterates that the best‑interests inquiry under AS 47.10.088(c) is broad and flexible:

  • Karrie B. ex rel. Reep v. Catherine J. (181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008)) describes the best‑interest standard as “capacious,” allowing consideration of “any fact relating to the best interests” of the child.
  • Hannah B. v. State (289 P.3d 924 (Alaska 2012)) and Bob S. v. State (400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017)) emphasize:
    • The child’s need for permanency and stability;
    • The risk posed by returning the child to a parent;
    • The bonding between the child and foster parents.

Importantly, there is no statutory checklist for best interests in the CINA termination context, unlike some custody contexts. The court may consider – but is not limited to – factors such as:

  • Safety;
  • Stability;
  • Emotional and mental health;
  • Attachment to caregivers;
  • History of abuse or neglect;
  • Child’s preferences (especially for older children); and
  • Prospects for adoption or long‑term permanency.

3. Frank’s objection to reliance on Evan’s preference

Frank also argued that the superior court erred by relying too heavily on Evan’s preference not to maintain a relationship with him, effectively allowing a 14‑year‑old’s wishes to dictate termination.

The Court acknowledges prior language (e.g., in Thea G. v. State, 291 P.3d 957 (Alaska 2013)) that a best‑interests finding “requires a more comprehensive judgment” than simply adopting a child’s preference. It then examines what the trial court actually did and concludes that:

  • The superior court did not treat Evan’s preference as the sole factor.
  • Instead, it gave “significant weight” to Evan’s stated wishes “given the children’s ages and the circumstances presented in this case.”
  • Evan’s preference was part of a broader assessment that included:
    • His age (14) and maturity;
    • His thriving status in his foster home (safety, therapy engagement, schooling, activities, and social life);
    • The foster family’s eagerness to adopt and offer permanency;
    • Frank’s severe history of physical abuse and domestic violence;
    • Frank’s virtually nonexistent progress on his case plan and lack of visitation;
    • The ongoing risk Frank posed to the children.

The Court points out that giving greater weight to the preferences of older adolescents is common and sensible, especially when those preferences are aligned with their observable well‑being and prospects for a stable, permanent home.

Accordingly, the Court finds no clear error in the superior court’s conclusion that termination of Frank’s parental rights was in Evan’s best interests.

VI. Precedents and Their Influence

Although this is a non‑precedential memorandum opinion, it is deeply rooted in and consistent with a line of published Alaska decisions. Those precedents shape, and are reaffirmed by, the Court’s reasoning.

A. Standards of Review and Termination Framework

  • Joy B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016):
    • Clarifies standards of review (de novo for law, clear error for factual findings).
    • Confirms that the AS 47.10.088(b) factors are permissive, not mandatory.
  • Chloe W. v. State, 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014):
    • Reiterates the clear‑error standard for factual findings regarding remedy and best interests.
  • Shirley M. v. State, 342 P.3d 1233 (Alaska 2015):
    • Confirms that whether the parent has remedied conduct is a factual question reviewed for clear error.
  • Walker E. v. State, 480 P.3d 598 (Alaska 2021) and Eva H. v. State, 436 P.3d 1050 (Alaska 2019):
    • Confirm that whether termination is in a child’s best interests is a factual question reviewed for clear error.
  • Bob S. v. State, 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017):
    • Explicitly states that best interests must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

B. Case Plan Compliance vs. Actual Remedy

  • Charles S. v. State, 442 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2019):
    • Key authority for the proposition that completion of services is not enough; the parent must demonstrate real capacity to safely parent.
  • Rick P. v. State, 109 P.3d 950 (Alaska 2005); V.S.B. v. State, 45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002); Barbara P. v. State, 234 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2010):
    • All reinforce that treatment participation is not an end in itself; the ultimate question is whether the parent’s behavior has changed sufficiently to protect the child.

C. Weight to be Given to Expert Testimony

  • Tessa M. v. State, 182 P.3d 1110 (Alaska 2008):
    • Emphasizes deference to the trial court’s weighing of conflicting expert testimony and other evidence.
    • In Millie T., this principle allows the superior court to place less weight on Millie’s therapist’s account of self‑reported progress and more weight on objective indicators and long‑term patterns.

D. Scope of Best‑Interests Analysis and Role of Statutory Factors

  • Judith R. v. State, 289 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2012):
    • Separates the AS 47.10.088(b) “remedy” factors from the broader AS 47.10.088(c) best‑interests inquiry.
    • Holds that best‑interests analysis is “more comprehensive” than checking those factors.
  • Thea G. v. State, 291 P.3d 957 (Alaska 2013):
    • Highlights that a child’s preference is relevant but cannot, by itself, substitute for the comprehensive best‑interests judgment required by AS 47.10.088(c).
    • In Millie T., the Court explains that the trial court did not rely solely on Evan’s preference, but considered it within a multi‑factor assessment.
  • Karrie B. ex rel. Reep v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177 (Alaska 2008):
    • Characterizes the best‑interests standard as “capacious.”
  • Hannah B. v. State, 289 P.3d 924 (Alaska 2012); Bob S. v. State, 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017); Chloe W. v. State, 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014):
    • Underscore that best interests include stability, permanency, risk of harm if returned, and bonding with current caregivers.

The Millie T./Frank L. opinion does not create new rules; instead, it applies these precedents to a particularly stark factual record, emphasizing continuity in the law while illustrating how the principles operate in practice.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Child in Need of Aid” (CINA)

A Child in Need of Aid (CINA) is a legal designation that a child is at risk of harm or is being harmed in ways set out in AS 47.10.011. In this case, the court found the children CINA under:

  • AS 47.10.011(6) – substantial physical harm or substantial risk of such harm (e.g., severe beatings, threats with a firearm, unsafe home conditions);
  • AS 47.10.011(8) – mental injury or substantial risk thereof (e.g., serious emotional trauma from domestic violence, threats, physical abuse);
  • AS 47.10.011(9) – neglect (e.g., lack of food, heat, safe shelter, supervision).

A finding that a child is CINA is the foundation for court involvement, including possible removal and, ultimately, termination of parental rights.

B. “Remedying” Conduct vs. “Completing” Services

Parents often receive a “case plan” listing services (e.g., therapy, classes) they must complete. But:

  • Completing services = finishing the assignments (attending therapy, taking classes);
  • Remedying conduct = actually changing the behaviors and conditions that made the child unsafe (e.g., ending violent relationships, learning to non‑violently resolve conflict, providing a safe home, supervising children appropriately).

Alaska courts consistently focus on substantive change, not just “checking boxes.”

C. “Reasonable Time” to Remedy

Even if a parent is making progress, the law asks whether the needed change will occur within a “reasonable time,” considering the child’s age and needs. For teenagers who have already experienced years of instability, courts are less likely to wait many additional years for parental change, because the child’s remaining childhood is short and permanency is urgent.

D. “Clear Error” on Appeal

When a case is appealed, the Supreme Court does not re‑try it. Instead, for factual questions, it asks:

“Did the trial court clearly make a mistake?”

If reasonable judges could look at the same evidence and reach the same conclusion, the finding stands, even if another judge might have decided differently. This is a very deferential standard and explains why many termination judgments are affirmed on appeal.

E. Child’s Preference in Best‑Interests Analysis

A child’s wishes are not automatically controlling, especially for very young children. But for older teens:

  • Their preferences may be given substantial weight;
  • The court still considers safety, mental health, bonds with caregivers, and permanency;
  • If a 14‑ or 15‑year‑old is thriving in a stable foster placement, wants adoption, and fears returning to an abusive parent, courts are likely to treat that preference as an important best‑interests factor.

VIII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Non‑Precedential but Practically Instructive

By its own terms, this is a memorandum decision under Appellate Rule 214 and does not create binding precedent. However, it:

  • Faithfully applies and reinforces existing published case law;
  • Offers a concrete illustration of how appellate courts evaluate “case plan compliance” versus genuine remedy;
  • Shows how heavily courts may weigh older children’s preferences when these align with safety and stability; and
  • Demonstrates that termination decisions can differ between siblings, depending on individual therapeutic and relational needs (e.g., Millie’s rights preserved for Emmett but not the others).

B. For Parents and Their Counsel

This opinion has several practical lessons for parents involved in CINA cases:

  • Insight and honesty matter:
    • Merely attending therapy and classes is insufficient if the parent continues to deny or minimize the abuse, blame OCS, or fail to appreciate the harm to the child.
    • Therapists relying solely on the parent’s self‑report may carry limited persuasive weight if their conclusions do not match other evidence.
  • Ending violent relationships must be real and verifiable:
    • Continuing contact with an abusive partner, especially when denied or concealed, strongly undermines any claim to have remedied the problem.
    • Inconsistencies about the nature and timing of separation will be closely scrutinized.
  • Behavior in visitation is a key indicator:
    • Blaming OCS in front of children, disregarding supervisors’ guidance, and engaging in conflict are red flags.
    • Positive interactions, appropriate boundary‑setting, and responsiveness to children’s emotional needs are more persuasive evidence of change.
  • Older children’s wishes can be decisive:
    • When teenagers do not want to return home and are doing well in foster care, a parent must show very compelling evidence of change to overcome that reality.

C. For OCS, Guardians ad Litem, and Practitioners

For the State and child advocates:

  • Documenting history and patterns is crucial:
    • This case leaned heavily on the long history of OCS involvement and repeated, similar concerns across multiple removals.
  • Monitoring real‑world behavior beyond service completion:
    • Reports from visitation supervisors, foster parents, and independent observers can show whether classes and therapy are translating into practice.
  • Children’s voices need to be carefully elicited and presented:
    • The Court strongly considered the teenagers’ own views, particularly where consistent with their observed well‑being and long‑term interests.

D. Individualized Best‑Interests Decisions Across Siblings

The superior court’s decision not to terminate Millie’s rights to Emmett underscores another important feature of Alaska law: best interests are assessed child by child.

Even where parental conduct is broadly similar across siblings, their individual circumstances may differ:

  • Different therapeutic needs;
  • Different relationships with the parent;
  • Different placements and permanency options.

Here, the court found that Emmett’s therapeutic progress depended significantly on ongoing structured engagement with Millie, making termination detrimental to his mental health. That child‑specific approach is consistent with the “capacious” best‑interests framework and may be an important consideration in future cases.

IX. Conclusion

The Alaska Supreme Court’s memorandum opinion in Millie T. & Frank L. v. State affirms the termination of parental rights for two teenagers while preserving one mother‑child relationship for therapeutic reasons. It does not announce new law, but it powerfully illustrates several entrenched principles in Alaska CINA jurisprudence:

  • Participation in services and near‑complete case plan compliance do not, on their own, prove that a parent has remedied the harmful conduct or conditions; courts look for real insight, behavioral change, and a demonstrated ability to protect children from harm.
  • Long‑term patterns of neglect, domestic violence, and instability, especially when repeated across multiple removals, weigh heavily against a finding of remedy.
  • Older children’s preferences are highly relevant to best‑interests determinations, particularly where they are consistent with the child’s safety, stability, and thriving in foster care.
  • Best‑interests determinations are individualized; courts may reach different conclusions for different siblings, depending on each child’s needs and circumstances.
  • On appeal, the clear‑error standard affords substantial deference to the superior court’s factual findings and weighing of evidence, making reversals relatively rare absent clear misapprehension of the record.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores that the heart of termination litigation in Alaska lies less in whether a parent has checked all the boxes of a case plan and more in whether that parent has demonstrably transformed the family environment and their own behavior in ways that genuinely secure the child’s safety, mental health, and long‑term well‑being.

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