Substantial Evidence Over Treating‐Physician Deference in LHWCA Disability Claims

Introduction

Dedic v. Fluor Federal, decided April 25, 2025 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, addresses the standard of review and the weight to be given medical opinions in Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) disability claims. Petitioner Rifat Dedic sought compensation for orthopedic and psychological injuries allegedly sustained while working as a tow‐truck operator in Afghanistan for Fluor Federal Global Projects. The Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board (“the Board”) had affirmed an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of both sets of claims. Dedic challenged that ruling, arguing principally that the ALJ improperly discredited his treating physicians in favor of non‐examining and independent medical examiners. The Second Circuit denied review, reinforcing the principle that, under the LHWCA’s substantial evidence standard, an ALJ need not defer to a treating physician’s opinion if there is substantial contrary evidence.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision in a summary order. The court held:

Under the LHWCA, “disability” is an economic concept, not purely a medical determination, and the burden‐shifting framework (Palombo) applies.
The ALJ may give greater weight to non‐treating or non‐examining physician reports when they are supported by objective findings and consistent with each other (Pietrunti).
Dedic failed to establish a prima facie case of orthopedic disability: the ALJ reasonably preferred the opinions of Dr. Obermiller (record reviewer) and Dr. Kocjancic (independent examiner) over Dr. Hrustic (treating physician).
Dedic also failed to prove a compensable psychological injury: the ALJ found him not credible, discredited Dr. Selimbasic’s opinion, and showed that Dr. Tsanadis’s initial recommendation was based on a mistaken factual premise.
No reversible legal error was found; the petition for review was DENIED.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Pietrunti v. Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 119 F.3d 1035 (2d Cir. 1997): Established that disability under the LHWCA is an economic concept and that an ALJ may discount a treating physician’s opinion if contradicted by substantial evidence.
Palombo v. Director, OWCP, 937 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1991): Adopted a burden‐shifting framework for total vs. partial disability claims under the LHWCA.
Rainey v. Director, Office of Workers’ Comp., 517 F.3d 632 (2d Cir. 2008): Clarified that appellate review of Board decisions is limited to questions of law and whether substantial evidence supports ALJ findings.
Howell v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 104 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1996) (table): Forgone issues not raised before the Board are forfeited on appeal.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied the “substantial evidence” standard, asking whether the ALJ’s findings were “irrational” or in conflict with the law. In weighing medical opinions:

Treating vs. Non‐Treating Opinions: The ALJ is not bound by a treating physician’s opinion if substantial evidence to the contrary exists. Here, the ALJ credited two physicians whose opinions aligned with objective test results and who conducted or reviewed neurological examinations.
Credibility Assessments: ALJs have broad discretion to evaluate claimant credibility based on consistency of reported symptoms and observed activities. The court granted “great deference” to credibility findings unless “patently unreasonable.”
Factual Basis for Medical Opinions: The ALJ may discount opinions formed on an incorrect understanding of fact (e.g., Dr. Tsanadis’s initial belief that Dedic had been hospitalized).
Forfeiture of Issues: Arguments not presented to the Board (e.g., claim for unauthorized surgery) are forfeited and not considered on appeal.

Impact

This decision underscores several guiding principles in LHWCA jurisprudence:

It reinforces that an economic definition of “disability” requires analysis of ability to earn wages, not solely medical impairment.
It confirms that treating physicians’ opinions, while important, are not conclusive if contradicted by substantial and objective evidence.
It solidifies deference to ALJs on credibility determinations and the evaluation of conflicting medical testimony.
Future claimants must ensure all arguments are fully presented below, or risk forfeiture on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial Evidence Standard: A court will uphold an administrative finding if a reasonable mind might accept the evidence to support it—even if other conclusions are possible.

Burden‐Shifting in LHWCA: First, the claimant shows inability to return to usual work (prima facie total disability). Then, the employer must show suitable alternative employment exists, converting any remaining impairment to partial disability.

Credibility Determinations: ALJs decide which witnesses are believable. These findings receive special deference and are overturned only if clearly irrational.

Conclusion

Dedic v. Fluor Federal clarifies that under the LHWCA, an ALJ’s decision to give greater weight to non‐treating or non‐examining physicians is legally sound when supported by objective findings and consistency among expert opinions. It affirms the economic lens through which disability is evaluated and the deference owed to administrative fact‐finders on credibility and medical‐opinion disputes. The ruling serves as a vital precedent for practitioners and claimants navigating the interplay of medical evidence and legal standards in maritime compensation cases.