Substantial Compliance with Public-Works Bid Advertising under Alabama Title 39

Commentary on Pinpoint Locating, Inc. v. The Water Works and Gas Board of the City of Red Bay, Supreme Court of Alabama (Dec. 5, 2025)

I. Introduction

This decision marks a significant development in Alabama’s public-works law under Title 39. The Supreme Court of Alabama holds, for the first time in express terms, that:

“there can be substantial compliance with the mandatory advertising requirements of § 39-2-2.”

The case concerns a multi-million-dollar gas-line replacement and expansion project in and around Red Bay, Alabama, financed by an approximately $4.4 million loan. The Water Works and Gas Board of the City of Red Bay (“the Board”) awarded four public-works contracts to Pinpoint Locating, Inc. (“Pinpoint”) after soliciting bids. Pinpoint performed extensive work, installing over 26 miles of gas lines. The Board later ceased payment—leaving over $800,000 unpaid—after concluding that its original bid advertisements had not complied with the then-effective version of § 39-2-2(a), Ala. Code 1975 (“former § 39‑2‑2”).

Pinpoint sued for breach of contract and related claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Board, effectively treating the contracts as void under Title 39 because of defective advertising. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding both that the doctrine of substantial compliance applies to the bid-advertising requirements of former § 39‑2‑2 and that Pinpoint had produced sufficient evidence to create a fact issue as to whether the Board substantially complied.

The majority opinion thus softens a previously rigid reading of Title 39, limiting the reach of prior authority that had been understood by many to demand strict technical compliance with public-works bidding rules. A forceful dissent by Justice Shaw, joined by Justice McCool, warns that the majority’s approach conflicts with the text of § 39‑5‑6, which commands “strict competitive bidding” and bans equitable doctrines.

II. Overview of Facts and Procedural History

A. The Project and the Contracts

The project: A gas-line replacement and expansion project in and around the City of Red Bay, totaling approximately $4.4 million, broken into four phases:
- Red Bay Cast Iron Replacement Project (“Cast Iron Replacement Phase”);
- Red Bay Expansion Project Phase One (“Phase I”);
- Red Bay Expansion Project Phase Two (“Phase II”);
- Red Bay Expansion Project Phase Three (“Phase III”).
Engineer: Magnolia River Services, Inc. (“Magnolia”) was retained to design and manage the project and prepare specifications for each phase, but not to handle advertisement for sealed bids.
Contractor: Pinpoint was the only contractor to bid on each phase; the Board accepted those bids and executed four separate public-works contracts with Pinpoint.

Pinpoint began work in September 2021. By October 2022, it had completed:

100% of the installed mains for the Cast Iron Replacement Phase;
100% of Phase III;
72% of Phase II; and
62% of Phase I.

Magnolia certified this progress shortly before payments ceased. By Pinpoint’s calculation, it had installed 138,625 feet (over 26 miles) of new gas lines.

B. The Payment Dispute

The Board paid Pinpoint a total of $2,822,245 but stopped paying with $811,300.52 still owed for work already completed. A letter from the Board’s counsel dated May 6, 2023, took the position that:

because the advertisement for sealed bids had not been made in accordance with former § 39‑2‑2, “it did not appear that the Board could legally make any further payments under the contracts.”

Pinpoint contended that the real reason for nonpayment was financial strain: an Alabama Department of Transportation (ALDOT)–mandated change order allegedly added nearly $1 million to the project budget, leaving the Board without sufficient funds. According to Pinpoint, the Board seized upon the advertising defects as a convenient legal pretext.

C. Litigation and Trial Court Ruling

June 2023: Pinpoint filed suit against the Board in Franklin Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract and other claims.
The Board moved for summary judgment under Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing the contracts were void because the bid advertisements failed to strictly comply with former § 39‑2‑2(a).
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Board, effectively ruling that strict compliance was required and had not occurred.
Pinpoint’s postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate was denied.
Pinpoint appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

D. Standard of Review

Citing Sykes v. Majestic Mississippi, LLC, 402 So. 3d 203 (Ala. 2024), the Court reiterated the standard:

Summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
The moving party must show no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Once that showing is made, the burden shifts; the nonmovant must present substantial evidence of a genuine issue of material fact.
The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, with all reasonable inferences in its favor.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holding

The Court’s core holdings are:

Substantial compliance is available under Title 39: There can be substantial compliance with the mandatory advertising requirements of former § 39‑2‑2(a), notwithstanding the “mandatory” and “strict competitive bidding” language in § 39‑5‑6.
Fact question on advertising: Pinpoint produced substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Board substantially complied with those advertising requirements.
Procedural disposition: The summary judgment in favor of the Board is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

B. Distinguishing Prior Strict-Compliance Decisions

The Court acknowledged Bessemer Water Service v. Lake Cyrus Dev. Co., 959 So. 2d 643 (Ala. 2006) (“BWS”), which described strict compliance with Title 39 and invalidated a contract where there was no bidding at all. But the Court distinguished BWS on its facts:

In BWS, the public body and the private developer bypassed bidding altogether, with allegations of misuse of public funds and inflated water rates for ratepayers.
Here, there was undisputedly a bidding process, and there were no allegations of corruption, favoritism, or bad faith, nor any ratepayer challenge.

Thus, BWS is confined to egregious cases of no bidding or clear abuse, while Pinpoint addresses imperfect but genuine efforts to comply with advertising rules.

C. Application to the Facts

The majority did not resolve whether the Board’s advertising actually met the substantial-compliance standard—that is reserved for the trial court on remand. Instead, it evaluated the evidence under the summary-judgment standard:

For the Cast Iron Replacement Phase:
- Evidence showed a bid notice posted on the Board’s bulletin board.
- Magnolia emailed three utility contractors and held a prebid meeting attended by at least two contractors.
- Pinpoint explained practical reasons why only one bidder might appear in a rural project (busy market, lodging/restaurant limitations).
For Phases I, II, and III:
- The Board claimed advertisement only in the Red Bay News, which it asserted was not a newspaper “of general circulation throughout the state.”
- Pinpoint countered with evidence that:
  - The Red Bay News had subscribers statewide (Hoover, Montgomery, Huntsville, Mobile, etc.), not just in Red Bay/Vina/Franklin County.
  - The paper covered some statewide issues.
  - Bid notices were also posted on the newspaper’s website and on the Alabama Public Notices website, a statewide, searchable portal hosted by the Alabama Press Association.
  - Bid aggregators (e.g., Alabama Bid Network, Construct Connect) picked up and republished at least the Phase III bid.
  - Magnolia directly emailed specified contractors about the bids and prebid meetings.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Pinpoint, the Court held that a jury (or factfinder) could reasonably find that the statute’s objectives—especially wide notice and fair opportunity to compete—were substantially achieved. Therefore, summary judgment for the Board was improper.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Statutory Framework under Title 39

1. Former § 39‑2‑2(a): Advertising for Sealed Bids

At the relevant time, former § 39‑2‑2(a) required that, before entering a public-works contract over $50,000, the awarding authority must:

Advertise at least once in a newspaper of general circulation published in the municipality (or, if none, post notice and send mailings to those on a bid-request list); and
For projects with an estimated value over $500,000, also advertise at least once in three newspapers of general circulation throughout the state.

That latter “three statewide newspapers” requirement was repealed in 2023, reflecting the shift toward digital notice and bid-aggregator systems.

2. § 39‑2‑2(c): Nullity of Noncompliant Contracts

Former § 39‑2‑2(c) provides that:

“All contracts for public works entered into in violation of this title shall be null, void, and violative of public policy.”

It also makes willful violations a Class C felony, underscoring the seriousness of compliance.

3. § 39‑5‑1(a)–(b): Bar to Contractor Suits and Certification

§ 39‑5‑1(a): Bars any civil action by a contractor to require payment for work, materials, or related accounts if the public-works contract was let or executed in violation of Title 39.
§ 39‑5‑1(b): Requires the awarding authority, prior to executing final contracts and bonds, to certify that the contract is let in compliance with Title 39 and other law. This certification creates a presumption of lawful bidding, rebuttable only if:
- the certification is false or fraudulent, and
- the contractor knew of this before executing the contract.

The dissent emphasizes that this certification provision is designed to avoid exactly the kind of problem that arose here—and notes that Pinpoint proceeded without such certification.

4. § 39‑5‑5: Conclusive Notice of Title 39

Section 39‑5‑5 provides:

“All persons or parties entering into contracts or agreements with an awarding authority for the construction of a public work shall be conclusively presumed to have notice of the provisions of this title.”

Thus contractors cannot claim ignorance of Title 39’s requirements, including advertising and certification.

5. § 39‑5‑6: Strict Competitive Bidding and Ban on Equitable Recovery

Section 39‑5‑6 states:

“The provisions of this title are mandatory, and shall be construed to require strict competitive bidding on contracts for public works. The courts shall not invoke or apply any principle of quantum meruit, estoppel, or any other legal or equitable principle which would allow recovery for work and labor done or materials furnished under any contract let in violation of competitive bidding requirements as prescribed by law.”

This is the central provision invoked by the dissent to argue that substantial compliance—a recognized equitable doctrine—cannot properly soften the consequences of noncompliance with Title 39.

B. Case Law Cited by the Majority

1. Pittman v. Pittman, 419 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. 1982)

Pittman provides the definition of “substantial compliance”:

“‘Substantial compliance’ may be defined as ‘actual compliance in respect to substance essential to every reasonable objective’ of a [statute] … [It] means compliance which substantially, essentially, in the main, for the most part, satisfies the means of accomplishing the objectives sought to be effected by the [statute] and at the same time does complete equity.”

The majority relies on this definition to focus the inquiry: whether the statute’s essential objectives (here, fair and open competition to protect public funds) are substantially met, even if there are technical deviations.

2. Competitive-Bid Law Cases under Title 41

Although public-works contracts are governed by Title 39, the Court notes that Alabama courts have accepted substantial-compliance analysis under the more general competitive-bid laws in Title 41:

Brown’s Ferry Waste Disposal Ctr., Inc. v. Trent, 611 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 1992):
- Held a contract void because it did not substantially comply with the competitive-bid laws.
- By negative implication, if substantial compliance had been achieved, the contract would have been valid despite some defects.
Kennedy v. City of Prichard, 484 So. 2d 432 (Ala. 1986):
- Invalidated an exclusive wrecker-service contract that failed to substantially comply with competitive-bid laws and thereby violated Ala. Const. 1901, art. I, § 22.
Owens v. Bentley, 675 So. 2d 476 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996):
- The Court of Civil Appeals held that, under the facts presented, the county commission and a solid-waste authority had substantially complied with competitive-bid laws.

The majority points to these cases to show that the concept of substantial compliance is well-embedded in Alabama’s approach to competitive-bid regimes in general. It then extends that logic into the Title 39 context.

3. Bessemer Water Service v. Lake Cyrus Dev. Co. (“BWS”), 959 So. 2d 643 (Ala. 2006)

BWS is the leading prior case on strict compliance under Title 39. There, the Court:

Emphasized that the legislature intended “impregnable barriers” to prevent misuse of public funds.
Held invalid a contract awarded without any bidding whatsoever, with the mayor (doubling as utility manager) unilaterally awarding a public-works contract to a private developer amid allegations of misuse and inflated water rates.

The majority here distinguishes BWS on three main grounds:

In BWS, there was no competitive bidding at all; here, there were actual bid solicitations, prebid meetings, and executed bid contracts.
BWS involved alleged misuse of public funds and harm to ratepayers; in Pinpoint, no such allegations of corruption, favoritism, or bad faith appear.
BWS addressed whether a contract that entirely bypasses bidding is void; Pinpoint concerns how far technical noncompliance with advertising formalities can be tolerated when genuine effort to bid competitively is present.

Thus, the majority reads BWS as compatible with substantial compliance in cases where there is meaningful bidding and no signs of corruption.

4. Other Authorities

White v. McDonald Ford Tractor Co., 287 Ala. 77, 248 So. 2d 121 (1971): The Court quotes the principle that the “single most important requirement” of the competitive-bid laws is the good faith of officials in carrying out the law. This buttresses the majority’s emphasis on the absence of bad faith in the Board’s conduct here.
Sawyer v. Sonoma County, 719 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1983): Cited simply to reinforce that substantial compliance is an equitable doctrine designed to avoid hardship where a party has done what can reasonably be expected.

C. Attorney General Opinions

The Court gives persuasive weight to several Alabama Attorney General opinions interpreting former § 39‑2‑2(a) as permitting substantial compliance with its advertising requirements. These opinions, while not binding, have long guided public entities:

Ala. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2011‑100 (Sept. 20, 2011): Concluded that the City of Pelham substantially complied with former § 39‑2‑2(a) despite advertising in only one statewide newspaper, because it heavily used online postings and trade publications routinely accessed by contractors.
Ala. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2005‑136 (May 19, 2005): Found substantial compliance where ALDOT advertised in only one statewide newspaper but relied on direct mailings, internet postings, and Dodge Reports; the project was already well underway when the defect was discovered.
Ala. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2004‑018 (Oct. 31, 2003): Held that a town substantially complied with former § 39‑2‑2(a) despite advertising in one publication that turned out not to be a statewide general-circulation paper, because the town had advertised in three newspapers, drew significant contractor interest, received six sealed bids, and awarded the contract to the lowest bidder.

The majority notes these opinions as evidence of a longstanding administrative understanding that strict literal adherence to the three-newspapers requirement was not always essential if the bidding objective—publicity and competition—was substantially achieved.

By contrast, the dissent correctly emphasizes that Attorney General opinions are advisory only and not binding on the courts, citing Farmer v. Hypo Holdings, Inc., 675 So. 2d 387, 390 (Ala. 1996).

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Whether Substantial Compliance Can Apply under Title 39

The central legal question is whether a doctrine explicitly characterized as “equitable” in Pittman—substantial compliance—can coexist with § 39‑5‑6’s command for “strict competitive bidding” and its express prohibition on “any legal or equitable principle” that would allow recovery where bidding requirements are violated.

The majority approaches this in two steps:

Nature of substantial compliance: It is framed not as a device to excuse a violation of a statute, but as a method of determining whether a violation has actually occurred in the first place. If the statute’s core objectives are substantially met, then—by definition—there has been compliance, not a “violation.”
Consistency with Title 39: The majority emphasizes:
- The legislature’s intent to protect public funds and preserve open competition.
- The absence of corruption or harm to ratepayers here.
- Prior use of substantial-compliance analysis under competitive-bid laws, as well as the Attorney General’s repeated endorsement of that approach for § 39‑2‑2(a).

Thus, the Court effectively draws a line:

Where the bidding process is largely honored, widely publicized, and carried out in good faith—albeit with technical advertisement flaws—substantial compliance can be found, and the contract is valid.
If there is a true “violation” of Title 39—such as total failure to advertise, collusive bidding, or bad-faith manipulation—the statute’s nullity rule and bar on equitable recovery fully apply.

This interpretive move allows the majority to maintain the force of § 39‑5‑6 against outright violations while avoiding draconian forfeitures in the face of good-faith, functional compliance.

B. Purpose-Driven Interpretation of Former § 39‑2‑2(a)

Applying the Pittman definition, the Court focuses on the “reasonable objective” of former § 39‑2‑2(a): robust and fair competition for public-works contracts by providing broad, public notice to potential bidders, so as to protect public funds from favoritism and misuse.

The majority asks:

Did the Board’s actions “substantially, essentially, in the main” accomplish the advertising purpose?
Were the steps “equitable” in the sense that they did not unfairly skew competition or favor a particular contractor?

The Court finds the doctrine especially appropriate “where there have been no allegations … concerning the misuse of public funds” and “no charges of corruption, improper motive, bad faith, or favoritism.” In that context, the technical question—e.g., whether a particular newspaper qualifies as “of general circulation throughout the state”—becomes secondary to whether contractors in practice had ample opportunity to learn of and bid on the project.

C. Substantial Evidence of Substantial Compliance

The Court carefully reviews the evidentiary record to determine whether Pinpoint raised a triable issue of substantial compliance.

1. Cast Iron Replacement Phase

The Board asserted that no newspaper advertisement occurred for this phase. Pinpoint responded with:

Evidence of a bulletin-board posting at the Board’s office, near the payment window.
Affidavit testimony that Magnolia:
- Emailed three utility contractors about the bid;
- Held a prebid meeting attended by two contractors; and
- Received only one bid (Pinpoint’s) despite these efforts.
Contextual testimony:
- The utility industry was “extremely” busy at the time due to low interest rates.
- Rural projects often attract few bidders due to limited lodging and amenities.

The majority suggests that, in this specific factual context, these combined steps might amount to substantial compliance—particularly if they effectively approximated the competitive exposure that a newspaper advertisement would have achieved.

2. Phases I, II, and III

For these phases, the Board acknowledged publishing notices in the Red Bay News but contended that the paper was not of statewide general circulation. Pinpoint’s counterproof was multifaceted:

Circulation data: The publisher’s affidavit and subscriber list (with redacted names and addresses but with city/zip) showed subscribers in numerous Alabama cities beyond Franklin County.
Content scope: Even the Board’s own witness agreed that the paper covered some statewide issues.
Digital amplification:
- Emails show the Board’s office manager requested publication and was told the notices would also be:
  - Posted on the paper’s website; and
  - Posted on the Alabama Public Notices website.
- The Alabama Press Association aggregates public notices from qualifying newspapers onto its site, where contractors can filter by geography and project type.
- Third-party bid aggregators captured and republished at least the Phase III notice.
Targeted contractor outreach: Magnolia’s design engineer:
- Emailed three contractors about Phases I and II;
- Directly notified Pinpoint about Phase III, given its involvement in other phases;
- Noted that Pinpoint was the only contractor that attended prebid meetings and submitted bids.

This evidentiary picture supports the inference that, functionally, the Board’s notices had broad, statewide reach—especially given the modern bid-aggregation ecosystem described in the affidavit from the executive director of the Alabama Utility Contractors Association.

Recognizing the 2023 statutory amendment removing the three-newspaper requirement, the Court implicitly links that legislative change to these technological realities: contractors now rely heavily on digital bid-aggregation tools, making physical newspaper placement less central than it once was.

D. The Dissent’s Counter-Reasoning

Justice Shaw’s dissent takes a sharply textualist view of Title 39:

Equity is barred: Because § 39‑5‑6 expressly prohibits courts from applying “any legal or equitable principle” to enable recovery under contracts let in violation of competitive bidding, the dissent argues that the equitable doctrine of substantial compliance cannot be used to negate noncompliance.
Strict compliance is mandated: The statutory command that Title 39’s provisions are “mandatory” and “shall be construed to require strict competitive bidding” leaves no room (in the dissent’s view) for flexibility in advertisement requirements. Prior references in BWS to “strict” compliance are cited for this proposition.
Certification as the proper safeguard: Instead of invoking equity, the dissent stresses the internal safety valve in § 39‑5‑1(b):
- If the awarding authority issues the required certification of compliance, the contract is presumed valid.
- The presumption can be overcome only where the certification is false/fraudulent and the contractor knew it before execution.
- Pinpoint proceeded without such certification and therefore did not use the statutory protections available to it.
Equity follows the law: Quoting traditional maxims, the dissent emphasizes that equity must yield to a clear statutory scheme; Title 39 dictates the outcome when its requirements are not met.

From this vantage point, the majority’s approach is seen as an impermissible infusion of equitable flexibility into an area that the legislature deliberately made rigid to protect public funds.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For Public Entities (Awarding Authorities)

Reduced risk of total forfeiture for technical missteps: The decision offers some comfort: honest mistakes or technical irregularities in advertising, where genuine efforts are made and notice is broadly disseminated, will not automatically void contracts.
But certification remains vital: The dissent highlights—and practitioners should heed—that § 39‑5‑1(b) certification remains the best way to secure presumptive validity of a public-works contract. Entities should:
- Document compliance with Title 39;
- Issue the required certification before executing contracts and bonds; and
- Maintain records of advertising, including digital postings and bid-aggregator circulation.
Good faith is crucial: Where any indication of favoritism, collusion, or bad faith appears, the substantial-compliance safety net will likely disappear, and courts may revert to a strict nullity rule akin to BWS.

B. For Contractors

Substantial-compliance doctrine as a shield: Contractors who have performed work under public-works contracts will be less vulnerable to total nonpayment based on minor or technical advertising defects that were beyond their control, especially when the awarding authority obviously intended to follow the bidding laws.
Need for diligence: At the same time, contractors remain:
- Conclusive presumed to know Title 39’s provisions (§ 39‑5‑5);
- Subject to § 39‑5‑1(a)’s bar on actions where contracts were truly let in violation of Title 39.
Counsel should:
- Request documentation of bid advertisements;
- Insist on § 39‑5‑1(b) certification before contract execution;
- Consider contractual clauses addressing the risk of invalidity if defects in bidding later surface.

C. For Future Litigation

The decision opens a factual field for future disputes:

“Substantial compliance” is fact-intensive: Courts will have to evaluate:
- The reach and nature of the advertisement (print, online, statewide vs local);
- Whether typical channels used in the industry were employed (bid aggregators, trade publications);
- The degree of contractor awareness (number of bidders, prebid participation);
- Any evidence of intentional noncompliance or manipulation.
Summary judgments will be more difficult to obtain: Because substantial compliance is nuanced and context-dependent, public entities may find it harder to secure early dismissals based purely on deviations from statutory text.
Tension with § 39‑5‑6: The interpretive tension flagged by the dissent—between substantial compliance and the prohibition on equitable doctrines—may generate further appellate litigation or legislative response.

D. Interaction with the 2023 Amendment to § 39‑2‑2

Although the case applies the prior version of § 39‑2‑2(a), the Court notes that the legislature has now:

Removed the requirement of advertising in three newspapers of general circulation throughout the state.

This statutory change:

Signals legislative recognition that digital means (such as online public notices and bid aggregators) now effectively accomplish the publicity objective.
Reinforces the majority’s functional, purpose-driven analysis: courts should look to whether potential bidders are realistically informed, not merely whether paper formalities are mechanically followed.

Going forward, disputes will focus less on the “three-newspaper” issue and more on whether the now-simpler statutory requirements were honored in letter and spirit.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Public Works and Awarding Authority

Public works: Construction projects funded or undertaken by public entities (like cities, counties, boards)—such as water systems, sewer systems, roads, and gas lines.
Awarding authority: The public body that lets (awards) the contract—in this case, the Water Works and Gas Board of the City of Red Bay.

B. Competitive Bidding

“Competitive bidding” is a process where the public entity:

Publicizes a project;
Invites sealed bids;
Evaluates bids according to objective criteria; and
Awards the contract, typically, to the lowest responsible bidder.

Its core purposes are:

Prevent favoritism and corruption;
Ensure taxpayers receive value;
Promote fairness and open access to public contracts.

C. “Newspaper of General Circulation Throughout the State”

Under former § 39‑2‑2(a), large projects required advertisement in newspapers “of general circulation throughout the state.” Attorney General opinions have described such a newspaper as one that:

Publishes items of interest to the general public;
Has more than a minimal number of subscribers; and
Is available to members of the public across the state (not confined to a small area).

The factual question in Pinpoint was whether the Red Bay News—with subscribers scattered across Alabama and statewide content—fit this description.

D. Substantial Compliance

“Substantial compliance” means:

You have not followed every detail perfectly;
But you have obeyed the law in a way that:
- Achieves its main goals; and
- Does not create unfairness.

In this case, the question is whether the Board’s mix of local newspaper advertising, online postings, bid-aggregator publications, and direct contractor outreach sufficiently fulfilled the purpose of giving broad, fair notice—even though it may have missed some technical newspaper requirements.

E. Quantum Meruit and Equitable Doctrines

Quantum meruit: “As much as he has deserved.” A legal principle allowing recovery for the reasonable value of work performed, even without a valid contract, to prevent unjust enrichment.
Other equitable doctrines: Such as:
- Estoppel (preventing a party from denying something if the other side reasonably relied on it);
- Unjust enrichment (preventing a party from retaining a benefit unfairly).

Section 39‑5‑6 expressly forbids using these doctrines to allow recovery for work done under contracts that were truly let in violation of competitive-bidding requirements. The majority avoids direct conflict by treating substantial compliance as part of defining whether a “violation” exists, not as an after-the-fact equitable workaround.

F. Summary Judgment

A summary judgment is a ruling made before trial when:

No genuine dispute exists over key facts; and
The law, applied to those undisputed facts, clearly favors one side.

Here, the Court held that there was a genuine dispute about whether the Board substantially complied with advertising requirements. Thus, it reversed the summary judgment so that factual issues could be explored further on remand.

VIII. Conclusion

Pinpoint Locating, Inc. v. Water Works & Gas Board of Red Bay establishes a significant doctrinal point in Alabama public-works law: the mandatory advertising requirements of § 39‑2‑2 are subject to a substantial-compliance standard. The decision:

Rejects an ultra-literal, zero-tolerance approach to technical advertising defects when the core objectives of competitive bidding have been substantially achieved.
Distinguishes and narrows prior strict-compliance precedent like Bessemer Water Service, confining it to cases with no real bidding and indications of misuse of public funds.
Aligns judicial interpretation with longstanding Attorney General opinions and with modern realities of digital bidding and notice.
Preserves, at least formally, the force of § 39‑5‑6 against genuine violations of Title 39, while avoiding harsh forfeitures where public entities and contractors have acted in good faith.

At the same time, the vigorous dissent flags a continuing tension between this flexible approach and the statutory command for “strict competitive bidding” and the explicit bar on equitable doctrines. That tension may prompt further judicial refinement or legislative clarification.

In practice, the decision encourages:

Public entities to continue strict observance of Title 39—bolstered by the statutory certification mechanism—but reassures them that innocent mistakes will not automatically void contracts.
Contractors to perform reasonable diligence about the bidding process and to document the breadth of notice, while relying on substantial compliance as a shield against opportunistic nonpayment.

Ultimately, Pinpoint reorients Alabama’s public-works bidding jurisprudence toward a more functional, purpose-driven model: one that protects both the public fisc and the legitimate expectations of contractors who respond in good faith to public bid solicitations.