Substantial-Assistance Departures and Mandatory Minimums: The Eleventh Circuit’s Clarification of § 3553(e)’s Limits in United States v. Perez & Rivera Rodriguez

I. Introduction

In this published decision, the Eleventh Circuit squarely resolves an important and recurring sentencing question: when the government moves under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) to allow a sentence below an otherwise applicable statutory mandatory minimum, may the district court go still further below that minimum based on the general sentencing factors in § 3553(a)? The panel’s answer is an unequivocal “no.”

The consolidated appeal—arising from the fentanyl-distribution prosecutions of Karen Altagracia Perez and Jovan Rivera Rodriguez—required the court to reconcile the text and structure of § 3553(e), the role of substantial-assistance motions, the general sentencing factors in § 3553(a), and the presence of a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under the federal drug statutes. The district court had taken the position that once the government filed a substantial-assistance motion under § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, it had unfettered discretion to consider all § 3553(a) factors and impose any sentence it deemed appropriate, even far below the reduced statutory floor. The government appealed.

Chief Judge William Pryor, writing for a unanimous panel (with Judge Abudu concurring separately), holds that the extent of any downward departure below a statutory minimum under § 3553(e) must be based only on assistance-related considerations. District courts may not use § 3553(a) factors—such as the defendant’s personal history, minor role, or the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities—to push the sentence further below the mandatory minimum once they have accounted for the defendant’s substantial assistance. The panel vacates both sentences and remands for resentencing consistent with this rule.

The opinion firmly aligns the Eleventh Circuit with every other numbered circuit on this issue and clarifies any residual uncertainty in the Circuit’s own precedents. The concurrence, while fully agreeing with the legal holding, highlights the asymmetrical nature of the current sentencing regime and raises broader policy and fairness concerns about mandatory minimums and cooperation-driven reductions.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Fentanyl Conspiracy and the Defendants’ Roles

Perez and Rivera Rodriguez were implicated in a conspiracy to distribute fentanyl throughout the Orlando area. The conspiracy involved counterfeit pharmaceutical pills containing small quantities of fentanyl—a drug whose potency makes even small quantities extremely dangerous and prosecutorially significant.

Within the conspiracy:

Rivera Rodriguez was responsible for picking up packages containing fentanyl and delivering them to co-conspirators.
Perez assisted her partner by helping to unpack fentanyl pills at their residence and sending them on to distributors.

The district court characterized both as minor participants in the larger scheme. However, the amounts they handled were not minor: each was responsible for possession or distribution of multiple kilograms of fentanyl. Federal drug laws hinge on drug quantity, not just role, for mandatory minimums and statutory maximums.

B. Statutory Framework: Mandatory Minimums and Substantial Assistance

Perez and Rivera Rodriguez pleaded guilty. Because each was held accountable for more than 400 grams of fentanyl, they faced the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under:

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi) – possession with intent to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl; and
21 U.S.C. § 846 – conspiracy, which carries the same penalty range as the underlying offense.

The government, however, recognized each defendant’s cooperation and filed substantial-assistance motions in both cases:

under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (Guidelines-based reduction of the advisory range), and
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (statutory authority to sentence below the mandatory minimum to reflect substantial assistance).

In each motion, the government recommended a two-level reduction in offense level and specifically objected to any additional reduction below that adjusted mandatory minimum based on the general § 3553(a) factors.

C. Sentencing Proceedings in the District Court

1. Perez’s Sentencing

Perez filed a sentencing memorandum requesting only two years of home confinement plus supervised release. Crucially, she did not treat the ten-year statutory minimum as controlling; instead, she cited §§ 3553(a) and (e) as independent bases for a below-minimum sentence.

The district court:

Granted the government’s substantial-assistance motion under § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e).
Calculated a post-departure Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months.
Queried the prosecutor about the court’s authority to go below that reduced floor, given the mandatory minimum.

The prosecution reiterated its stance: a court cannot “vary below [the reduced sentence] based on noncooperation factors.” The district court disagreed, remarking that the law was “unsettled” and announcing that it would consider “all of the 3553 factors” in fashioning a sentence, “until the Eleventh Circuit tells me otherwise.” It ultimately sentenced Perez to 66 months—well below the ten-year mandatory minimum and below the already-reduced range—expressly based on § 3553(a).

2. Rivera Rodriguez’s Sentencing

At Rivera Rodriguez’s sentencing, the pattern repeated. The government again filed a § 5K1.1 / § 3553(e) substantial-assistance motion and again objected to any further downward variance based on § 3553(a).

Rivera Rodriguez’s memorandum contained only a brief note that he “expects that [the minimum] will not apply,” implicitly relying on the same theory that a substantial-assistance motion removed the mandatory minimum’s binding force.

The district court told the parties that once “the Government files a 5K motion, in my view I then have discretion to impose any sentence that I think is warranted.” It engaged in a § 3553(a) analysis and sentenced Rivera Rodriguez to 60 months—half the ten-year statutory minimum.

The government appealed both sentences, challenging the legality of using § 3553(a) factors to go below the statutory minimum after a § 3553(e) motion.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Core Holding

The Eleventh Circuit holds:

The extent of any departure from a statutory minimum under § 3553(e) must be based only on substantial-assistance factors. District courts may not vary downward based on § 3553(a). If this Court has not yet squarely held it, we do so now.

Put differently, § 3553(e) creates a narrow and limited exception to a statutory minimum: it allows a court, upon motion of the government, to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum, but only “so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance” in investigating or prosecuting another person. General sentencing considerations under § 3553(a) cannot be used to expand that exception or justify additional reductions once the assistance has been credited.

B. Disposition

Applying this principle:

The panel holds that both sentences were unlawful because the district court went below the statutory minimum based not only on assistance, but also on non-assistance § 3553(a) factors.
It vacates both sentences and remands for resentencing consistent with the opinion.

Judge Abudu concurs fully and writes separately to spotlight broader structural and policy concerns—particularly the asymmetry whereby courts may use § 3553(a) to justify upward variances but may not use it to go below statutory minimums, absent a narrow statutory exception.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. The Statutory and Guideline Framework

1. Mandatory Minimums: 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(vi) and 846

Under § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi), possession with intent to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl carries a minimum term of 10 years’ imprisonment. Section 846 applies that same penalty scheme to conspiracies to commit such drug offenses.

Once the prosecution proves, or the defendant admits, the requisite drug quantity, the statutory minimum becomes binding. Absent specific statutory mechanisms—such as safety-valve relief under § 3553(f) or a substantial-assistance motion under § 3553(e)—a district court cannot impose a sentence below the minimum, no matter what the Guidelines or § 3553(a) would otherwise suggest.

2. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance in the Guidelines)

The first path for rewarding cooperation is the Sentencing Guidelines provision:

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 authorizes the government to move for a downward departure in the advisory Guidelines range based on a defendant’s substantial assistance.
It lists several assistance-related factors (e.g., significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance, truthfulness, risk to the defendant, timeliness) that guide the extent of the departure.

Section 5K1.1 operates at the level of the advisory Guidelines, not statutory minima. On its own, it does not permit a court to go below a statutory mandatory minimum. When a mandatory minimum exceeds the otherwise-applicable Guidelines range, the minimum becomes the effective floor unless a statute such as § 3553(e) or § 3553(f) authorizes a lower sentence.

3. Rule 35(b) (Post-Sentencing Substantial Assistance)

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) offers a second avenue: a post-sentencing reduction for substantial assistance. Among other things, Rule 35(b)(4) expressly allows the court to “reduce the sentence to a level below the minimum sentence established by statute” based on post-conviction cooperation, again on motion of the government.

Like § 3553(e), Rule 35(b) is a statutory mechanism for overcoming the mandatory nature of a statutory minimum, but only for cooperation-related reasons and only upon a government motion.

4. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (e), and (f)

Section 3553 is the core sentencing statute. Three subsections are central here:

§ 3553(a) – lists the general sentencing factors (such as the nature and circumstances of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford deterrence, protect the public, and avoid unwarranted disparities). These factors guide the sentencing court’s choice of sentence within the authorized statutory range.
§ 3553(e) – captioned “Limited Authority to Impose a Sentence Below a Statutory Minimum,” it provides that upon the government’s motion to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance, the court may “impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance.”
§ 3553(f) – the “safety valve,” which allows courts, under enumerated conditions, to impose a sentence “without regard to any statutory minimum sentence” for certain drug offenses, thereby freeing the court to apply § 3553(a) in the usual way, unconstrained by the minimum.

The interplay among these subsections—particularly (e) and (f)—is central to the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning.

B. The Court’s Textual Analysis of § 3553(e)

The panel starts with the text of § 3553(e). Two key phrases structure the court’s reading:

The statute allows a court to “impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence”—but does not say that the mandatory minimum is otherwise nullified or that the court may impose “any sentence” it deems fit.
It states that this departure is available “so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.”

The court reads the “so as to reflect” clause as a purpose-and-limitation provision. Drawing on the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 2011), the panel explains that the reduction must “reflect” the value of the defendant’s assistance. Reductions based on non-assistance factors—such as personal background or general equity considerations—would exceed the “limited authority” granted by § 3553(e). The Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 2007), is quoted for precisely this point.

In other words, § 3553(e) confers a narrow, targeted power: to move the sentence below the statutory floor to the extent necessary to credit the defendant’s substantial assistance. It does not rewrite the statutory minimum or open the door to a full § 3553(a)-based resentencing away from that floor.

C. Structural Interpretation: § 3553(e) vs. § 3553(f)

The panel then turns to the internal structure of § 3553 itself, especially the contrast between subsections (e) and (f). Citing United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000), the court notes that (e) and (f) are “the only two circumstances in which a court can depart downward” from a statutory minimum.

Applying the canon from Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)—that when Congress includes language in one subsection and omits it from another, the difference is presumed intentional—the court emphasizes:

§ 3553(f) explicitly authorizes sentencing “without regard to any statutory minimum sentence.”
§ 3553(e) does not contain such sweeping language; instead, it speaks only of going “below a level” of the minimum “so as to reflect” assistance.

The First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2002), reinforces this understanding: § 3553(e) “retains the mandatory minimum” and permits only a “specific, carefully circumscribed type of departure.” By contrast, § 3553(f) fully frees the court from the mandatory minimum, allowing it to sentence in light of all § 3553(a) factors, as if no minimum existed.

This structural comparison is decisive: if Congress had intended § 3553(e) to authorize a general § 3553(a)-guided departure from the mandatory minimum, it would have used language akin to § 3553(f)’s “without regard to any statutory minimum.” It did not.

D. The Role of § 3553(a) When a Mandatory Minimum Applies

Perez and Rivera Rodriguez argued that the “mandatory principles” of just sentencing embedded in § 3553(a)—especially its parsimony directive that a sentence be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”—should govern even when § 3553(e) is invoked, thus allowing further downward variances.

The panel rejects this argument as foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent, particularly United States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008). There, the court held that § 3553(a) “merely lists the factors the district court must consider in determining an appropriate sentence” and does not itself supply authority to ignore or undercut a statutory minimum.

The panel clarifies a nuanced but important point:

Even when a mandatory minimum applies, a sentencing judge may still consider the § 3553(a) factors in deciding where within the permissible range to sentence, and in evaluating how to respond to a § 3553(e) motion.
But these factors cannot be used to justify a sentence below the statutory minimum beyond what is necessary to reward substantial assistance, because Congress has already fixed that minimum as the bottom of the legitimate sentencing range absent a specific statutory carve-out.

Thus, § 3553(a) factors are relevant, but not dispositive, and strictly subordinate to statutory minima when those minima apply and are not displaced by a specific statutory mechanism like § 3553(f).

E. Eleventh Circuit Precedent Consolidated and Clarified

The panel synthesizes a line of Eleventh Circuit decisions that, taken together, already pointed strongly toward the rule it announces explicitly here.

United States v. Williams, 549 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2008) – The court held that § 3553(e), unlike § 3553(f), does not eliminate the statutory minimum. This case underscores the limited nature of § 3553(e) relief and underscores the distinction between (e) and (f).
United States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2008) – The court held that § 3553(a) provides no independent authority to vary below a statutory minimum. This directly refutes the argument that generalized “just-sentencing” principles can trump Congress’s chosen floor.
United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2007) – When remanding for resentencing in a § 3553(e) context, the court instructed the district court to “consider only substantial assistance factors” in determining the extent of the departure from the statutory minimum. The panel here emphasizes that such specific remand instructions are holdings, not dicta, citing Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.9 (11th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Aponte, 36 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 1994) – The court held that a § 3553(e) motion could grant the defendant “full credit only for the ‘substantial assistance’ he had rendered,” reaffirming that § 3553(e) is a cooperation-based carve-out and nothing more.

The panel concludes that these cases, taken together, effectively dictated today’s outcome even before this opinion: § 3553(e) departures must be confined to assistance factors, and the general § 3553(a) factors cannot justify going below the statutory minimum.

F. National Consensus Across Circuits

The Eleventh Circuit also situates itself within a unanimous national consensus. Every numbered circuit has adopted the same interpretation: a sentence below a mandatory minimum under § 3553(e) must rest solely on substantial-assistance considerations.

The opinion cites:

United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2002)
United States v. Richardson, 521 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008)
United States v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2011)
United States v. Spinks, 770 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2014)
United States v. Desselle, 450 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2006)
United States v. Williams, 687 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2012)
United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2009)
United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130 (8th Cir. 2007)
United States v. Lee, 725 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2013)
United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2008)

This unanimity both reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s reading and makes Supreme Court review less likely, as no circuit split exists to be resolved.

G. Rejection of the Defendants’ Arguments

Perez and Rivera Rodriguez advanced several arguments, all of which the court rejects:

§ 3553(a) “just sentencing” principles control even under § 3553(e).
The court explains that § 3553(a) is purely directive—listing factors to consider—but does not itself create a power to disregard statutory minima. Castaing-Sosa squarely forecloses this theory.
The government’s reliance on prior Eleventh Circuit cases is mere dicta.
The panel disagrees, pointing to specific holdings and remand instructions in Williams, Mangaroo, and Aponte, and emphasizing that instructions limiting what a district court may do on remand are not dicta.
§ 3553(e)’s text and structure do not clearly limit the basis for departure.
The panel responds by underscoring the limiting “so as to reflect” language and the sharp contrast with § 3553(f)’s “without regard” phrasing. The unanimous circuit authority is invoked as confirmation.

H. The Concurring Opinion: Structural and Policy Concerns

Judge Abudu concurs fully in the majority’s legal analysis, reiterating that:

Mandatory minimums remain binding absent a specific statutory exception.
§ 3553(e) permits departures only to reflect substantial assistance and does not authorize a broader, § 3553(a)-based downward variance.

However, he writes separately to highlight the asymmetrical sentencing regime that results:

District courts may always look upward and vary above the Guidelines range under § 3553(a), even when a mandatory minimum applies, since the minimum sets only the floor, not the ceiling.
But when a mandatory minimum applies, courts generally cannot look downward below it—even if the Guidelines would recommend a lower sentence and § 3553(a) factors strongly support mitigation—except:
- through § 3553(e), to the extent justified by cooperation, and
- through § 3553(f), if the defendant satisfies the safety-valve criteria.

He notes that under the Guidelines, § 1B1.1 instructs courts to apply § 3553(a) at the end of the calculation and to use those factors to vary up or down from the advisory range. Yet, mandatory minimums, combined with the narrowness of § 3553(e), effectively override that symmetry: the court may increase a sentence in the name of seriousness, deterrence, or public safety, but cannot decrease it below the statutory floor for those same reasons once the floor applies.

Judge Abudu invokes:

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), emphasizing advisory Guidelines and individualized sentencing.
United States v. Henry, 1 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2021), confirming that courts err by treating any Guidelines provision as binding.

He also references Eleventh Circuit cases like:

United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) – holding that when granting a § 5K1.1 departure, the extent of the reduction must be based solely on assistance-related factors, not other § 3553(a) considerations like restitution.
United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2008) – similarly emphasizing that cooperation, not culpability or personal history, drives the § 5K1.1 reduction.

These cases underscore a central concern: cooperation-based departures focus on the value of information, not on culpability, personal circumstances, or broader fairness. Two defendants with starkly different roles and backgrounds can end up with similar sentences if their assistance is viewed as commensurably useful—while a less-culpable but non-cooperating defendant might receive a much harsher sentence.

Judge Abudu underscores this dynamic with references to scholarship (e.g., Sonja Starr & M. Marit Rehavi on prosecutorial charging decisions and racial disparity; Shana Knizhnik on substantial assistance and the “cooperator’s dilemma”) and even raises a possible due process concern, citing Judge Rosenn’s concurrence in United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990), which warned against sentencing systems that shift effective sentencing power from judges to prosecutors.

He uses the present case as an illustration: both Perez and Rivera Rodriguez were minor participants in a large-scale fentanyl conspiracy. The district court attempted to calibrate sentences reflecting both their assistance and their limited culpability, consistent with a holistic § 3553(a) approach. The majority opinion, however, makes clear that while such holistic consideration is permissible above the statutory minimum, it is not permissible to justify going below that minimum except to the extent warranted by substantial assistance (or safety-valve eligibility, which is not at issue here).

Judge Abudu thus calls for broader reflection—by Congress and perhaps by courts—on whether a sentencing regime that permits broad discretion to go up but tightly restricts discretion to go down is consistent with the goals of fairness, uniformity, and individualized sentencing.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Mandatory Minimum Sentences

A mandatory minimum sentence is a floor set by Congress for certain offenses (often drug or firearm crimes). Once the criteria for the minimum are met—e.g., a specific drug quantity—the judge:

cannot impose a sentence below that minimum,
even if the Sentencing Guidelines suggest a shorter term,
unless a separate statute (like § 3553(e) or § 3553(f)) expressly authorizes a lower sentence.

B. Guidelines, Departures, and Variances

Sentencing Guidelines – advisory ranges recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Commission based on offense level and criminal history. Federal judges must consider them but are not bound to follow them after Booker.
Departure – a sentence outside the advisory Guidelines range if the court follows a specific guideline or statutory provision authorizing an adjustment (e.g., § 5K1.1, § 3553(e), or § 3553(f)).
Variance – a sentence outside the Guidelines range based directly on § 3553(a) factors, without reference to a specific departure provision. Variances are permitted, but only within the legally authorized statutory range (bounded by any applicable minimums and maximums).

C. Substantial Assistance: § 5K1.1, § 3553(e), and Rule 35(b)

Substantial assistance means that a defendant has helped the government investigate or prosecute others, typically by:

providing useful information,
testifying, or
participating in undercover activity.

There are three main mechanisms to reward this:

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 – permits a Guidelines-based reduction in the advisory range at the initial sentencing, based on assistance-related factors. Does not by itself overcome mandatory minimums.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) – allows a judge, on government motion, to go below a statutory mandatory minimum “so as to reflect” the defendant’s assistance. After this opinion, in the Eleventh Circuit (and elsewhere), the amount of that below-minimum reduction must be based solely on cooperation factors.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) – allows post-sentencing reductions for later assistance and can also authorize sentences below mandatory minimums, again on government motion and again tied exclusively to cooperation.

D. § 3553(a) Sentencing Factors and Their Limits

Section 3553(a) lists the factors that judges must consider in determining a sentence, including:

the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the history and characteristics of the defendant,
the need for the sentence to reflect seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation,
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants.

These factors guide the judge’s exercise of discretion within the already-authorized statutory range. They do not, by themselves, authorize a sentence below a statutory minimum. That is the central limitation reaffirmed in this case.

E. The Safety Valve: § 3553(f)

The safety valve under § 3553(f) is a separate mechanism that allows courts in certain drug cases to disregard statutory minimums entirely—if the defendant meets specific criteria (such as limited criminal history and full disclosure to the government). When it applies, the court may sentence “without regard to any statutory minimum sentence” and is free to set a sentence using § 3553(a) in the ordinary way, as though the minimum did not exist.

This is fundamentally different from § 3553(e), which permits a partial carve-out from the minimum only to reward substantial assistance.

VI. Practical Implications and Future Impact

A. For District Judges in the Eleventh Circuit

This decision provides clear guidance for sentencing when a statutory minimum and a § 3553(e) motion are both in play:

Identify the statutory minimum and whether it applies.
If the offense and drug quantity trigger a mandatory minimum (as here, with 10 years for fentanyl), that minimum sets the floor.
Determine safety-valve eligibility under § 3553(f).
If § 3553(f) applies, the court may sentence without regard to the minimum, guided by § 3553(a).
If the safety valve does not apply but the government files a § 3553(e) motion, set a below-minimum sentence based only on assistance-related factors.
The court may go below the statutory minimum, but the amount of the reduction must reflect the nature, extent, and value of the defendant’s cooperation—not their role in the offense, personal hardship, or similar considerations.
Within the resulting lawful range, use § 3553(a) to choose the precise sentence.
After determining the lawful range (which may now extend below the minimum due to cooperation), the judge may consider § 3553(a) to select an appropriate sentence within that range. But § 3553(a) cannot justify pushing the floor lower than what cooperation alone supports.

B. For Prosecutors

Prosecutors in the Eleventh Circuit now have:

clarified gatekeeping power over sub-minimum sentences, since no below-minimum sentence is possible under § 3553(e) or Rule 35(b) without a government motion;
a strong doctrinal basis to oppose defense requests that invoke § 3553(a) to go further below the statutory minimum than cooperation alone would justify.

This reinforces the importance of transparent and consistent internal policies regarding when to offer substantial-assistance motions and what level of reduction to recommend, to mitigate the risk of uneven or discriminatory application noted in the scholarship cited by Judge Abudu.

C. For Defense Counsel

Defense counsel must recalibrate sentencing strategies in cases involving mandatory minimums:

They cannot argue that § 3553(a) alone authorizes a sentence below the statutory minimum.
When a § 3553(e) motion is filed, they must focus argument on the quality and extent of the assistance to maximize the permissible departure.
Non-assistance factors (family circumstances, minor role, rehabilitation, etc.) may still be argued, but only:
- to influence where within the post-assistance permissible range the court should sentence, or
- to support safety-valve eligibility or other distinct statutory mechanisms.
They should carefully advise clients that, absent cooperation or safety-valve eligibility, mandatory minimums will remain binding regardless of § 3553(a) considerations.

D. For Appellate Practice and Potential Supreme Court Review

Because all numbered circuits now read § 3553(e) in the same way, this opinion:

solidifies the national consensus on the narrow scope of § 3553(e);
reduces the likelihood of Supreme Court review, absent some novel constitutional argument or legislative change.

However, Judge Abudu’s concurrence highlights policy and potential due process concerns that may influence future legislative debates or inform the development of internal DOJ practices regarding cooperation and charging decisions.

E. Interaction with Booker and the Advisory Guidelines

Post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory, and sentencing judges have broad discretion—guided by § 3553(a)—to vary up or down from the advisory range. Yet this discretion is bounded by statutory minima and maxima. This opinion reinforces that:

Mandatory minimums remain fully binding constraints unless displaced by a specific statutory mechanism (e.g., § 3553(f)).
Advisory-Guidelines flexibility does not translate into authority to ignore or undercut a statutory floor.

In that sense, the decision highlights a core feature of the post-Booker landscape: while the Guidelines no longer bind sentencing, Congress’s mandatory minimums still do, and the judiciary’s flexibility is limited by the precision and narrowness of statutory carve-outs like § 3553(e) and § 3553(f).

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Perez & Rivera Rodriguez crystallizes and clarifies an important principle in federal sentencing law: when the government moves under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), a court may impose a sentence below an otherwise binding statutory mandatory minimum only to the extent necessary to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance. General sentencing factors under § 3553(a) cannot be used to justify a further downward variance below that reduced floor.

This decision:

harmonizes Eleventh Circuit law with every other numbered circuit,
confirms that mandatory minimums remain firmly in place absent specific statutory exceptions, and
draws a sharp line between cooperation-based departures and broader, equity-driven mitigation arguments.

At the same time, the concurrence reminds us that this framework produces a fundamentally asymmetrical system: courts may invoke § 3553(a) to increase sentences above advisory ranges, but may not use those same factors to go below statutory minima once triggered, unless Congress has expressly allowed it. That asymmetry places enormous practical power in the hands of prosecutors, whose decisions about charging and substantial-assistance motions shape not only the sentencing range, but in many cases the possibility of any below-minimum sentence at all.

Whether Congress chooses to recalibrate mandatory minimums or expand mechanisms like the safety valve is a legislative question. For now, in the Eleventh Circuit and beyond, the rule is clear: § 3553(e) is a narrowly tailored cooperation reward, not a general license to disregard statutory floors in the name of individualized sentencing.