Structural Challenges to NLRB Proceedings as “Cases Growing Out of a Labor Dispute”:
Commentary on Spring Creek Rehabilitation & Nursing Center LLC v. NLRB (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 2025)

I. Introduction

In Spring Creek Rehabilitation & Nursing Center LLC v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed a question that sits at the intersection of labor law, federal jurisdiction, and constitutional structure: can an employer invoke a federal district court’s equitable powers to enjoin National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) unfair labor practice proceedings on the ground that the Board’s administrative law judges (ALJs) and Members are unconstitutionally insulated from presidential removal?

The Third Circuit answered no, but not on the familiar “channeling” grounds associated with Thunder Basin and Axon. Instead, the court held that the Norris–LaGuardia Act (NLGA), 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., strips the district court of jurisdiction to issue the requested injunction because the employer’s suit is a “case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.” That conclusion:

Applies the NLGA’s anti-injunction provisions expansively to modern structural constitutional challenges to NLRB proceedings;
Creates a clear circuit split with the Fifth Circuit’s 2025 decision in Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. NLRB (SpaceX), which held the NLGA does not apply to such suits; and
Is accompanied by a concurrence that would instead dismiss the case for lack of Article III standing, underscoring an additional barrier to pre-enforcement challenges to removal protections.

This commentary examines the opinion’s background, main holdings, statutory and precedential foundations, its rejection of the Fifth Circuit’s approach, and its likely impact on future labor and separation-of-powers litigation.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. The Underlying Labor Dispute

Spring Creek Rehabilitation and Nursing Center LLC (“Spring Creek”) purchased a skilled nursing facility from Amboy Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (“Amboy”) in November 2021. Amboy had a long-standing collective bargaining relationship with 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (“1199SEIU” or “Union”). The most recent collective bargaining agreement (CBA) ran from June 2017 to June 2020, after which it expired.

In August 2021, when the Union learned of Amboy’s plan to sell the facility, it filed an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge with the NLRB. Central to that charge was the allegation that Amboy violated the expired CBA’s successor clause by selling the facility to Spring Creek without requiring Spring Creek to assume responsibility for unpaid wages and benefit-related obligations (vacations, sick leave, welfare fund payments, etc.).

Shortly before assuming ownership, Spring Creek sent a letter to the Union declaring that it would not assume the expired CBA and asserting it was free to set terms and conditions of employment unilaterally, without bargaining with the Union. The Union later amended its charge in May 2023 to add Spring Creek as a respondent.

In May 2024, the NLRB’s General Counsel issued a ULP complaint against Spring Creek, later amended in July. The complaint alleged that Spring Creek refused to bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union, in violation of NLRA § 8(a)(1) and (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(5). The complaint noticed a hearing before an NLRB ALJ on September 10, 2024.

B. The Collateral District Court Action

Rather than litigating its defenses solely in the NLRB proceeding, Spring Creek filed a separate action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. In that suit, Spring Creek sought a preliminary injunction to halt the NLRB’s administrative hearing, arguing:

NLRB Members and ALJs are protected by unconstitutional limitations on presidential removal, in violation of Article II and separation-of-powers principles; and
Therefore, being subjected to a proceeding before an ALJ enjoying such protections constitutes an ongoing, irreparable constitutional injury.

The district court (Judge Jamel K. Semper) denied the preliminary injunction, holding that Spring Creek had not demonstrated irreparable harm. The NLRB hearing went forward; as of the Third Circuit’s opinion, no ALJ decision had yet issued. Spring Creek appealed, and on appeal it argued that the court of appeals could still enjoin the ALJ from issuing a decision.

C. The New Jurisdictional Argument on Appeal

Before the Third Circuit, the NLRB raised a new threshold defense: that the Norris–LaGuardia Act stripped the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction to grant any injunction in this case because the employer’s suit “involv[es] or grow[s] out of a labor dispute.” See 29 U.S.C. § 101.

Although the NLRB had not made this argument below, the Third Circuit considered it because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

A. The Majority (Judge Ambro)

The Third Circuit majority, per Judge Ambro (joined by Judge Bibas), held:

Norris–LaGuardia applies: Spring Creek’s federal suit to enjoin NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings is a “case involving or growing out of a labor dispute” under the NLGA.
Jurisdiction is stripped: Section 1 of the NLGA, 29 U.S.C. § 101, deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in such cases, unless the requirements of § 107 (Section 7) are satisfied or a judicially recognized exception applies. None apply here.
No applicable exception: The two recognized judicial exceptions—(1) cases needed to effectuate the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, and (2) cases necessary to reconcile the NLGA with other federal statutes—do not cover constitutional structural challenges to NLRB proceedings.
Rejection of Fifth Circuit’s Space Exploration: The court explicitly rejects the Fifth Circuit’s construction of the NLGA in Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. NLRB, 151 F.4th 761 (5th Cir. 2025), which held that similar structural challenges to NLRB proceedings do not “grow out of” a labor dispute and thus fall outside the NLGA.
Disposition: The court vacates the district court’s order denying the injunction (issued without considering Norris–LaGuardia) and remands for proceedings consistent with this opinion—effectively requiring dismissal for lack of jurisdiction to issue the requested relief.

B. The Concurrence (Judge Montgomery-Reeves)

Judge Montgomery-Reeves concurred in the judgment but took a different route. She would dismiss the case solely on Article III grounds:

To challenge removal protections for NLRB Members and ALJs, a plaintiff must show a concrete injury traceable to those protections.
Under Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021), and Third Circuit decisions such as NLRB v. Starbucks Corp. and CFPB v. National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust, that requires more than simply being subject to agency action by officers alleged to be improperly insulated.
Spring Creek alleged only that being subject to “unconstitutional agency authority” is itself a “here-and-now” injury, which the concurrence treats as insufficient.

On that basis, she concludes Spring Creek lacks standing (no injury in fact), so the courts lack constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case, regardless of the NLGA.

IV. The Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

A. The Norris–LaGuardia Act’s Anti-Injunction Regime

The NLGA was enacted in 1932 against a backdrop of frequent employer use of broad labor injunctions, often obtained ex parte, to suppress strikes and picketing. Its core provision, § 1, states:

“[N]o court of the United States … shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.”
29 U.S.C. § 101.

Key points:

It is a jurisdiction-stripping provision: courts literally lack power to issue covered injunctions unless statutory prerequisites are met.
It does not bar all injunctions in labor disputes. Instead, it conditions them on compliance with NLGA § 7 (29 U.S.C. § 107), which imposes demanding procedural and substantive findings (e.g., hearing, specific findings of unlawful acts, inadequate legal remedies, etc.).
The statute incorporates a broad definition of “labor dispute” in § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c).

The Third Circuit has previously articulated a four-step analysis under Lukens Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 989 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1993), to determine whether the NLGA deprives a court of jurisdiction:

Does the action involve or grow out of a “labor dispute”?
Is the relief sought an “injunction” within the meaning of the NLGA?
Has the district court complied with § 7?
Is there a judicially recognized exception?

Here, steps (2) and (3) were straightforward:

The relief Spring Creek sought—a preliminary injunction halting ongoing NLRB proceedings—plainly qualifies as an “injunction.”
The district court denied relief without reaching NLGA compliance, so § 7 was not satisfied.

Thus the decisive issues were:

Does Spring Creek’s constitutional suit “involve” or “grow out of” a labor dispute?
Is there an applicable exception to the Act’s anti-injunction rule?

B. The Broad Statutory Definition of “Labor Dispute”

The NLGA defines “labor dispute” broadly:

“The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.”
29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (emphasis added).

Section 13(a), in turn, specifies when a “case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute,” including when it:

Involves persons engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or
Involves persons interested in the dispute or allied with disputants; or
Otherwise arises out of labor relations as defined in § 113(c).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that this definition is “intentionally broad” and that courts must give the NLGA a “broad interpretation.” See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 708, 712 (1982). The “critical element,” in the Court’s formulation, is whether “the employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy.” Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942), quoted in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals.

V. How the Third Circuit Applied Norris–LaGuardia

A. Step One: Does This Case Involve or Grow Out of a Labor Dispute?

No one disputed that the underlying NLRB unfair labor practice case between Spring Creek and the Union was a labor dispute. It turns on whether Spring Creek, as an employer, refused to bargain in good faith with the Union—an “association or representation” controversy concerning “terms or conditions of employment.”

The core question was more nuanced: does a separate, collateral suit brought by the employer to enjoin NLRB proceedings—raising only structural constitutional claims and not contesting ULP merits—still “involve or grow out of” that labor dispute?

The majority said yes, for several reasons:

“But for” causation and tight connection to the dispute.
There would be no NLRB proceeding, and thus no need for an injunction, without the labor dispute over bargaining obligations. The constitutional suit therefore “grows out of” the underlying labor dispute because it exists only by virtue of that controversy.
Functional impact on the labor dispute.
If a federal court enjoined the NLRB from adjudicating the ULP charge, it would “put a thumb on the scale for Spring Creek in the underlying dispute” by disabling the statutory forum Congress chose to resolve such claims. That is exactly the type of “judicial interference in management-labor relations” the NLGA seeks to prevent. See United Tel. Workers v. W. Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 704 (3d Cir. 1985).
Precedent treating collateral forum disputes as “growing out of” labor disputes.
The Third Circuit in Lukens Steel had already held that an employer’s suit to enjoin a labor arbitration “grows out of” the underlying labor dispute over a CBA. The fact that the employer was challenging the forum rather than the merits did not place the case outside the NLGA.

B. Use of Supreme Court and Circuit Precedent

1. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. BMWED, 481 U.S. 429 (1987)

In Burlington Northern, a railroad employer faced a strike and picketing after a CBA expired. The union extended picketing to “secondary” railroads not party to the primary dispute. The district court enjoined picketing of secondary railroads. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:

The CBA dispute over employment terms was “unquestionably a labor dispute”; and
The secondary picketing activity “grows out of” that dispute.

The Court rejected arguments that secondary activity was too far removed or that some forms of conduct might be treated differently. The Third Circuit here draws heavily on this breadth: if secondary picketing by different parties at third-party facilities still “grows out of” a labor dispute for NLGA purposes, then a collateral suit attacking the forum where the primary dispute is being adjudicated does as well.

2. Lukens Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 989 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1993)

Lukens Steel concerned a union’s attempt to compel arbitration of employer violations of a CBA; the employer sought to enjoin arbitration. The Third Circuit held that:

The employer’s suit “grew out of” the underlying labor dispute over the CBA, triggering the NLGA’s jurisdictional limits.
The NLGA applies even when the immediate dispute centers on which forum (arbitrator vs. court) should resolve the merits.

Spring Creek is closely analogous: the Union has chosen the NLRB forum (through a ULP charge), and the employer seeks a judicial order stopping that forum from operating. The majority sees no reason to treat arbitration-focused actions differently from NLRB-forum challenges.

3. Other Supporting Authorities

Armco, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 280 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2002)
The Sixth Circuit held that constitutional claims collateral to alleged labor law violations still “grow out of” the underlying dispute where they “would not exist but for” that dispute.
AT&T Broadband, LLC v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 317 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2003)
The Seventh Circuit similarly concluded that suits over the propriety of arbitration “grow out of” the labor dispute, even though the arbitration itself is not the labor dispute.
District court cases on NLRB structural challenges
The majority notes that multiple district courts have already applied the NLGA to pre-enforcement challenges to NLRB proceedings on constitutional grounds (e.g., Hannam Chain, Red Rock Resorts, Amazon.com Services, VHS Acquisition No. 7), aligning with the Third Circuit’s approach.

C. Confronting the Fifth Circuit: Rejection of Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. NLRB

The opinion squarely rejects the Fifth Circuit’s contrary interpretation in Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. NLRB, 151 F.4th 761 (5th Cir. 2025). There, the Fifth Circuit concluded that an employer’s suit to enjoin NLRB proceedings did not “grow out of” a labor dispute, primarily because:

The suit was between the employer and the NLRB, not the employer and its employees; and
The NLRB is not “engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation” as the employer; and
The claims concerned constitutional structure, not strikes, boycotts, or union organizing.

The Third Circuit disagrees on multiple fronts.

1. Misreading of § 13: Who Must Be “Engaged in the Same Industry”?

Section 13(a) states that a “case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry” (among other criteria). The Fifth Circuit read this to mean that the parties to the lawsuit must be so engaged.

The Third Circuit rejects this limitation:

The NLGA does not require that every litigant in the case be in the same industry.
It is enough that the case “involves” persons engaged in the same industry—here, Spring Creek and its employees in the healthcare/nursing-facility industry.
Even though the NLRB itself is not in that industry, the underlying controversy before it clearly involves employer and employees in that industry, and this collateral suit will determine whether the NLRB can lawfully adjudicate that dispute.
The Union is also an intervenor in the case, further underscoring the labor-dispute nexus.

The majority also invokes Jacksonville Bulk Terminals to emphasize that the statute requires only that the case involve any labor dispute; it does not demand that every dispute or every party fit the statutory definition.

2. Conflict with New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U.S. 552 (1938)

In New Negro Alliance, a grocery store sued a civil rights organization to enjoin picketing. The organization was neither the store’s employees nor engaged in the same business. Yet the Supreme Court held the NLGA applied:

The underlying dispute was a labor dispute over employment opportunities and conditions for Black workers.
The picketers were “persons interested in the dispute,” even though not employees or competitors.
The legal theory (conspiracy in restraint of trade) did not determine NLGA applicability; what mattered was that the controversy “grew out of” a labor dispute.

The Third Circuit uses this to show that neither identical parties nor employer–employee relationships are required. The Fifth Circuit’s narrower reading (requiring the case to be strictly between employers and employees or concerning classic labor tactics like strikes) is inconsistent with New Negro Alliance.

3. Surplusage Problems: § 160(h) and § 178(b)

The majority deploys a strong textualist argument: the Fifth Circuit’s approach risks rendering important NLRA provisions surplusage.

a. NLRA § 10(h), 29 U.S.C. § 160(h)

Section 10(h) provides that when courts grant temporary relief or enter decrees enforcing or reviewing NLRB orders, “the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by” the NLGA (chapter 6 of Title 29). In other words, it creates a partial carve-out: when a court is dealing with Board orders under § 10, the NLGA’s anti-injunction provisions do not apply.

If, as the Fifth Circuit suggests, the NLGA never applies to suits “against the NLRB” because the Board is not in the same industry and the cases are not classic labor actions, then § 160(h) is unnecessary. Congress would not have needed to expressly exempt a class of NLRB-related suits from an Act that never would have applied to them to begin with. That violates the canon against surplusage.

b. NLRA § 208 (29 U.S.C. § 178(b))

Under § 178(a), the Government may seek injunctions against strikes or lockouts that imperil “the national health or safety.” Section 178(b) expressly exempts such suits from the NLGA.

If all suits with the Government as a party were already outside the NLGA (because the Government is not an employer or employee and not in the same industry), then § 178(b)’s exemption would be redundant. Again, the Third Circuit’s broader reading of the NLGA preserves the function of § 178(b); the Fifth Circuit’s approach risks nullifying it.

4. Rejecting a “Structural Challenge” Exception

The Fifth Circuit also reasoned that Congress, in enacting the NLGA, did not intend to preclude “constitutional challenges to agency structure.” The Third Circuit responds:

The NLGA’s text contains no exception for structural or constitutional claims.
Congress’s “broader goal” in the NLGA is to prevent judicial interference in management–labor relations, which extends beyond strike injunctions to any injunctive relief that skews the balance in ongoing labor disputes.
Courts have consistently read the NLGA broadly; reading in a non-textual carve-out for structural challenges would undermine the statute’s core function.

In short, Spring Creek holds that constitutional claims are not self-executing exceptions to the NLGA’s anti-injunction regime.

5. Thunder Basin / Axon Are Irrelevant to NLGA’s Separate Jurisdictional Bar

The Fifth Circuit also invoked the Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994), framework—which examines whether a “special statutory review scheme” implicitly strips district courts of jurisdiction—to argue that district courts retain jurisdiction over these constitutional claims.

The Third Circuit rejects this reasoning on a categorical basis:

The Thunder Basin / Axon line addresses whether Congress implicitly channeled review to a specific appellate forum via a special review scheme.
The NLGA, by contrast, is not a “special review scheme” at all; it is an anti-injunction statute that expressly withdraws equitable jurisdiction in a defined class of cases.
Therefore, Thunder Basin factors about meaningful review, collateral claims, and agency expertise are “off point” in determining the NLGA’s independent jurisdictional effect.

D. Step Two: No Applicable Exceptions to the NLGA

The Third Circuit recognizes two judicially developed exceptions to the NLGA (again referencing Lukens Steel):

Arbitration Exception: Necessary to accommodate the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, particularly in cases implementing Boys Markets-type injunctions enforcing no-strike obligations pending arbitration.
Statutory-Reconciliation Exception: Necessary to reconcile the NLGA with other federal statutes that would otherwise be rendered ineffective (e.g., certain injunction provisions in other labor-related statutes).

The court finds neither exception applicable:

The case does not involve enforcement of an arbitration agreement or any arbitral process.
Spring Creek’s claim is not premised on any federal statute that would be thwarted by NLGA application; its claims rest on constitutional principles, not on a statutory right that must be reconciled with the NLGA.

As a result, the NLGA applies in full force, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the requested injunction at all.

VI. The Concurring Opinion: Article III Standing and Removal-Protection Harm

A. The Injury-in-Fact Requirement

Judge Montgomery-Reeves would affirm the ultimate outcome (no injunction and dismissal) on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. She emphasizes the basic Article III requirement:

A plaintiff must show:

An injury in fact—concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;

That is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct; and

That is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision.

See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).

The concurrence focuses on the first prong—injury in fact.

B. Removal-Protection Challenges After Collins, Axon, and Related Cases

The Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021), addressed when an unconstitutional removal restriction actually causes a compensable injury. The Court suggested examples where harm might be shown:

A President is enjoined by a court from removing an agency head, and the agency then takes action adverse to a litigant.
The President affirmatively states he would remove the official but for the statutory protections.

These scenarios illustrate a concrete causal link between the removal restriction and the harm suffered.

The Third Circuit, in cases such as NLRB v. Starbucks Corp. and CFPB v. National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust, has elaborated that:

Merely being subject to an agency headed by an official with arguably unconstitutional removal protections is not enough.
A plaintiff must allege either a “compensable and identifiable harm” caused by the restriction or that the disputed agency action would not have occurred “but for” the constrained presidential removal authority.

Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175 (2023), held that certain structural challenges to agency adjudication schemes are sufficiently “here-and-now” injuries to avoid the Thunder Basin channeling bar. But, as the concurrence stresses, Axon assumed standing and did not relax the Article III injury requirement itself; it addressed where those claims must be brought (district court vs. direct appellate review), not whether a plaintiff had proven a sufficient injury-in-fact under Collins.

C. Application to Spring Creek

Spring Creek argued its injury was being “subject to unconstitutional agency authority”—i.e., forced to litigate before allegedly unconstitutionally insulated ALJs and Board Members. The concurrence concludes:

This is not enough under Collins and the Third Circuit’s precedents.
Spring Creek did not allege:
- Any presidential attempt to remove NLRB officials that was thwarted by the statute;
- Any statement by the President that he would have removed those officials but for removal protections; or
- Any specific, identifiable harm caused by the protections themselves (as opposed to the mere existence of NLRB proceedings).
It also did not allege that “this suit would not have been undertaken but for a president’s authority to remove” NLRB members, or any other comparable causal narrative.

Absent such allegations, Spring Creek has not pled a cognizable “here-and-now injury.” For the concurrence, this failure of injury-in-fact is “fatal to its Article III standing,” and thus to federal jurisdiction.

Thus, while the majority relies on the NLGA’s statutory jurisdictional bar, the concurrence relies on the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement. Both routes lead to dismissal, but on different grounds.

VII. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

A. “Case Involving or Growing Out of a Labor Dispute”

The phrase “involving or growing out of a labor dispute” is broader than it might appear:

A case “involves” a labor dispute whenever a controversy concerning employment terms or union representation is part of the case’s subject matter.
A case “grows out of” a labor dispute when the dispute is a factual and causal foundation for the litigation, even if the immediate question is different (e.g., what forum to use, or how an agency is structured).

The central test, per the Supreme Court, is whether the employer–employee relationship is the “matrix of the controversy.” If the dispute would not exist absent that relationship and its conflicts, the NLGA likely applies.

B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Merits

“Subject-matter jurisdiction” refers to a court’s basic power to hear a type of case. If a statute like the NLGA withdraws jurisdiction, the court cannot issue an injunction regardless of how strong the plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory arguments may be.

Here, the Third Circuit holds: even if Spring Creek were right on the merits that NLRB ALJ removal protections are unconstitutional, the NLGA prevents the district court from enjoining NLRB proceedings in this posture.

C. Article III Standing and “Injury in Fact”

Standing doctrine ensures that federal courts decide only concrete disputes, not abstract disagreements. An “injury in fact” must be:

Concrete: Real, not hypothetical or abstract.
Particularized: Affects the plaintiff in a personal and individualized way.
Actual or Imminent: Occurring now or sure to occur, not speculative.

In removal-protection challenges, courts increasingly demand a specific causal connection between the challenged protection and the harm. Being subject to an allegedly unlawful agency structure is not, standing alone, always sufficient.

D. Removal Protections and Separation of Powers

“Removal protections” are statutory restrictions limiting the President’s ability to fire executive officials (e.g., “for cause” provisions, multi-layer tenure protection). Supreme Court precedents like Free Enterprise Fund, Seila Law, and Collins examine when such protections violate the separation-of-powers principle that the President must retain sufficient control over the execution of the laws.

Spring Creek’s underlying constitutional theory—though not reached on the merits in this case—is that NLRB Members and ALJs have impermissible layers of removal protection. Spring Creek does not resolve whether that theory is correct; it holds only that an injunction cannot be issued in this posture.

E. The Thunder Basin / Axon Framework

Thunder Basin and Axon address whether Congress has created a “special statutory review scheme” that implicitly channels challenges to agency action away from district courts (usually to courts of appeals after final agency action).

Key considerations (the “Thunder Basin factors”) include:

Whether district court jurisdiction would “foreclose all meaningful judicial review”;
Whether the claims are “wholly collateral” to the statutory review scheme; and
Whether the claims fall outside the agency’s expertise.

The Third Circuit clarifies that this framework is inapplicable to the NLGA issue, because the NLGA is not a review-scheme statute but an anti-injunction statute that explicitly limits equity jurisdiction.

VIII. Practical and Doctrinal Implications

A. For Employers and Unions in the Third Circuit

Within the Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands), the decision carries significant practical consequences:

No pre-enforcement injunctions against NLRB proceedings based on structural constitutional claims—at least where those proceedings arise out of classic labor disputes over bargaining, representation, or terms and conditions of employment.
Employers cannot easily use district court suits to halt or delay NLRB ULP hearings by invoking removal-protection or other structural arguments. Those claims must typically be raised:
- Within the administrative proceeding; and then
- On petition for review in the court of appeals after a final NLRB order issues (where NLRA § 10(h) removes the NLGA barrier).
Unions and the NLRB gain greater certainty that ongoing proceedings will not be disrupted by collateral injunction suits in district court, preserving the Board’s role as Congress’s chosen forum for labor disputes.

B. For Structural Constitutional Litigation Strategy

Axon encouraged parties to bring structural constitutional challenges in district court, at least outside the NLGA context, rather than waiting for final agency orders. Spring Creek demonstrates that in the labor context, the NLGA places a powerful limitation on that strategy:

Even if Thunder Basin and Axon would otherwise permit district court jurisdiction over structural challenges, the NLGA may independently bar injunctive relief when the case “grows out of” a labor dispute.
This means that, in the Third Circuit, many structural attacks on the NLRB’s adjudicative machinery must be litigated through the Board process and then reviewed in the court of appeals, not in pre-enforcement suits in district court.

C. Inter-Circuit Conflict and Supreme Court Review

By openly rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s Space Exploration approach, the Third Circuit has created a direct conflict on a recurring and important question:

In the Fifth Circuit, employers may be able to pursue pre-enforcement structural challenges to NLRB proceedings without NLGA constraints (subject still to standing and other doctrines).
In the Third Circuit, similar suits are jurisdictionally barred by the NLGA.

Such a split—involving federal jurisdiction, separation of powers, and nationwide labor policy—has a strong potential to attract Supreme Court review. The Court would then be asked to resolve:

How broadly the NLGA’s definition of “labor dispute” and “growing out of” applies in modern settings; and
Whether structural constitutional challenges to the NLRB are categorically outside the NLGA’s anti-injunction scope.

D. The Dual Barriers of NLGA and Standing

Even if the Supreme Court eventually narrows the NLGA’s reach, litigants face a separate, independent barrier highlighted by the concurrence: Article III standing in removal-protection cases. Together:

The NLGA restricts the remedy and forum (no injunction in district court in cases growing out of labor disputes); and
Article III standing doctrine restricts the availability of structural claims by demanding concrete, removal-linked harm.

This dual framework significantly narrows the universe of viable pre-enforcement structural challenges to the NLRB in the labor context.

IX. Conclusion

Spring Creek Rehabilitation & Nursing Center LLC v. NLRB is a significant decision on multiple fronts. Doctrinally, it:

Affirms a broad construction of the Norris–LaGuardia Act, treating collateral structural challenges to NLRB proceedings as “cases growing out of a labor dispute.”
Clarifies that the NLGA’s jurisdiction-stripping effect operates independently of the Thunder Basin / Axon channeling framework.
Rejects the Fifth Circuit’s narrower Space Exploration reading of § 13, siding instead with a textually and historically expansive view of the NLGA.
Highlights statutory-interpretation concerns, particularly surplusage, in reconciling the NLGA with NLRA provisions like § 10(h) and § 208.

From a practical vantage, the case:

Constrains employers in the Third Circuit from using district courts to preempt NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings via structural constitutional claims;
Channels such claims into post-order appellate review, after the Board has completed its work; and
Reinforces the NLGA’s core purpose of limiting judicial interference in the delicate field of management–labor relations.

Finally, the concurring opinion underscores that even if the NLGA hurdle could be surmounted, litigants must still satisfy a rigorous Article III standing test for removal-protection challenges, requiring concrete, causally connected injury rather than abstract structural objections alone.

Taking the opinion and concurrence together, Spring Creek significantly shapes the terrain on which future constitutional challenges to the NLRB will play out, and it sets up a sharp inter-circuit conflict likely to demand eventual Supreme Court resolution.

Structural Challenges to NLRB Proceedings as “Cases Growing Out of a Labor Dispute”: Commentary on Spring Creek Rehabilitation & Nursing Center LLC v. NLRB (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 2025)