Strong DNA on Trigger and Grip, Coupled with Access and Furtive Movements, Is Sufficient to Prove Knowing Possession Under § 922(g) Even When the Gun Is in a Passenger’s Purse

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, non-argument decision in United States v. Charles Grim Rudolph (No. 24-12817, Sept. 30, 2025). Rudolph, a convicted felon, challenged his jury conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. The key issue on appeal was whether the government’s proof—consisting primarily of strong DNA evidence on the firearm’s trigger and grip, the defendant’s access to the gun (located in a passenger’s open purse next to the center console), his movements and behavior during a traffic stop, and state-of-mind evidence—was enough for a reasonable jury to find “knowing possession.”

The panel (Judges Abudu, Kidd, and Marcus) affirmed. While the opinion is “Not for Publication,” it offers a detailed synthesis of Eleventh Circuit sufficiency principles and clarifies how forensic DNA evidence, when combined with circumstantial indicators of access and control, can sustain a § 922(g) conviction even where the weapon is located in another person’s bag.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that a rational jury could find Rudolph knowingly possessed the firearm. The government introduced:

• Forensic testimony showing “very strong support” that Rudolph’s DNA contributed 84% of the trigger swab and 94% of the grip swab.
• Evidence that the firearm was in an open purse next to the center console, within Rudolph’s reach as the driver.
• An officer’s observation of Rudolph moving his right arm toward the center console during the stop, nervous demeanor, delayed stop after lights and siren, and admission about “party stuff” (narcotics) in the car.
• State-of-mind evidence from a prior conviction for possession of a firearm or ammunition by a felon.

Together, these facts permitted the jury to infer either actual possession (handling of the firearm before it was placed in the purse) or constructive possession (knowledge plus the ability and intent to exercise control). The court rejected Rudolph’s “mere proximity” argument, distinguishing cases like United States v. Pedro, because the DNA results and corroborating circumstances went well beyond proximity. The conviction was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. Beach, 80 F.4th 1245 (11th Cir. 2023):
  • Articulates the de novo standard for reviewing Rule 29 denials, but with evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government.
  • Reaffirms that a jury’s verdict stands if “any reasonable construction of the evidence” supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Applied here to emphasize deference to the jury’s reasonable inferences from DNA, access, and conduct.
• United States v. Guevara, 894 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2018):
  • Direct and circumstantial evidence carry the same weight for sufficiency purposes.
  • Supports reliance on circumstantial indicators (furtive movements, location of gun) alongside DNA.
• United States v. Estepa, 998 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 2021):
  • When relying on circumstantial proof, convictions must rest on reasonable inferences, not speculation.
  • Here, the DNA percentages and placement on the trigger and grip turned “transfer” arguments into speculative alternative hypotheses the jury could reject.
• Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), and United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2016):
  • Set out § 922(g) elements, including knowledge of felon status. Only knowing-possession was contested; the others were uncontested.
• United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 2011):
  • Define actual and constructive possession.
  • Constructive possession exists when a defendant knows of the firearm and has the power and intent to exercise dominion and control (Perez’s two-part articulation).
  • The panel leveraged these definitions to conclude the jury could infer either actual handling (trigger/grip DNA) or constructive possession (ready access, intent, and behavior).
  • Ochoa also supports admission of prior firearm-possession convictions as state-of-mind evidence (e.g., knowledge, absence of mistake) under Rule 404(b), a point the panel noted.
• United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846 (11th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Pedro, 999 F.2d 497 (11th Cir. 1993):
  • “Mere presence” or proximity is not enough to establish possession.
  • Pedro is a cautionary case (defendant merely walked with another person carrying the gun in a suitcase, no forensic tie). The panel distinguished Pedro because Rudolph’s DNA and conduct were affirmative indicators of possession beyond mere proximity.
• United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497 (11th Cir. 1992) and United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2014):
  • Show that ready access to a firearm in a vehicle (under a seat; in a glove compartment) supports constructive possession.
  • Howard emphasized corroborating links (e.g., ownership documents, prior firearm possession) to show knowledge and control; the panel echoed that logic with Rudolph’s access, DNA, and prior conviction.
• United States v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1994):
  • Furtive movements and suspicious behavior can support inferences of knowing possession.
  • Officer Borgen’s testimony about Rudolph’s movement toward the center console, hesitation in stopping, and visible nervousness fits Stanley’s framework.

Legal Reasoning

The panel employed a familiar sufficiency framework but applied it to a distinctive evidentiary mix:

• Standard of Review and Evidentiary Lens:
  • De novo review of the Rule 29 denial, but with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict (Beach).
  • Any reasonable construction of the record that supports guilt must be adopted; circumstantial evidence is not discounted (Guevara).
• Actual vs. Constructive Possession:
  • Actual possession: The jury could infer Rudolph physically handled the gun prior to its being placed in the purse because his DNA overwhelmingly dominated samples from the firearm’s trigger (84%) and grip (94%). Those are parts consistent with use and handling, not incidental contact.
  • Constructive possession: Even absent proof of prior handling, the gun’s placement in an open purse next to the center console, coupled with the officer’s observation of Rudolph reaching toward that area, indicated knowledge, access, and intent to exert control. This aligns with Perez, Flanders, Gunn, Gates, and Howard.
• DNA “Transfer” Rebuttal:
  • The defense elicited that DNA can transfer within a purse. On redirect, the forensic scientist explained that multi-step transfers typically yield lower-quality profiles, less likely to produce a full DNA summary; the strong, high-percentage results here were more consistent with direct handling.
  • Under Estepa and Beach, the jury could reasonably credit that testimony and reject speculative transfer scenarios.
• Behavior and Consciousness of Guilt:
  • Rudolph delayed stopping even after lights and siren, reached toward the center console, and exhibited pronounced nervousness.
  • Under Stanley, such behavior is probative of knowing possession when evaluated with other evidence.
• State-of-Mind Evidence:
  • The jury also heard evidence of a prior conviction for possession of a firearm or ammunition by a felon, which the Eleventh Circuit has permitted for knowledge/intent purposes (Ochoa; Howard), subject to appropriate evidentiary rules and limiting instructions.

Synthesizing these strands, the court concluded that this was far more than a “mere proximity” case. The fusion of strong forensic linkage to critical contact points on the firearm and contemporaneous access and conduct provided a rational basis for finding that Rudolph knowingly possessed the gun.

Impact

Although unpublished and thus nonbinding in the Eleventh Circuit, the decision is likely to be persuasive in several recurring scenarios:

• Vehicle-and-Purse Cases:
  • It signals that the government can carry its burden where a firearm is found in a passenger’s bag if there is strong forensic evidence tying the driver to functional parts of the weapon, plus indicators of access and control.
• Role of Forensic DNA:
  • High-contribution DNA on the trigger and grip can serve as decisive proof of direct handling, supporting either actual possession or constructive possession (via knowledge and control).
  • Prosecutors may increasingly emphasize the quality and nature of DNA mixtures, not just the presence of DNA, to rebut transfer theories.
• Constructive Possession Doctrine:
  • The opinion reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit’s pragmatic, factor-based approach: access, movements, demeanor, location of the gun, and forensic or documentary corroboration can collectively establish dominion and control.
• Evidence Strategy:
  • For the government: Document and articulate the defendant’s movements and behavior; pinpoint the gun’s proximity; and, where possible, secure and present high-quality DNA evidence from functionally significant surfaces.
  • For the defense: Focus on undermining the forensic testimony (transfer, contamination, handling timeframes, mixture interpretation), challenge the inference from movements and nervousness, and seek to cabin or exclude 404(b) state-of-mind evidence via Rule 403 balancing and limiting instructions.
• Jury Instruction and Appellate Framing:
  • The case underscores that appellate courts will defer to juries on reasonable inferences and will not require the government to disprove every innocent explanation when the totality supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal:
  • A request made after the government rests (and/or after the defense case) arguing that no reasonable jury could convict based on the evidence presented.
  • On appeal, the court reviews de novo but views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
• Actual vs. Constructive Possession:
  • Actual possession: Physical control of the object (holding, carrying, or otherwise having it on one’s person).
  • Constructive possession: Not physical holding, but knowing where the item is and having both the ability and intent to control it (e.g., within easy reach in a car, access to glove compartment, etc.). It can be shared with others.
• “Mere Presence” Doctrine:
  • Merely being near a gun or aware of its location is not enough to prove possession. The government must show more—like control, handling, or corroborating behavior.
• DNA Mixture and Contributor Percentages:
  • When multiple people touch an object, forensic labs may obtain a mixture profile. Probabilistic methods can estimate the proportion of DNA attributable to each contributor.
  • Very high percentages on functionally meaningful areas (trigger, grip) support an inference of direct handling, as opposed to incidental or transferred contact.
• “Not for Publication”:
  • The opinion is nonprecedential within the Eleventh Circuit, meaning it is not binding in future cases. It may still be cited for its persuasive reasoning.
• Rule 404(b) “Other Acts” Evidence:
  • Evidence of prior crimes can sometimes be admitted to show knowledge, intent, or absence of mistake—not propensity—subject to Rule 403 balancing and limiting instructions.
  • The panel referenced the jury’s consideration of a prior felony firearm/ammunition possession conviction for state-of-mind purposes.

Conclusion

United States v. Rudolph reinforces a pragmatic, evidence-integrated approach to § 922(g) prosecutions in vehicle settings. The jury’s finding of “knowing possession” was sustained not on proximity alone, but on a confluence of:

• High-contribution DNA on the firearm’s trigger and grip, consistent with actual handling.
• Ready access to the weapon in an open purse next to the center console, and the defendant’s movement toward that area.
• Behavioral cues suggesting consciousness of guilt (hesitation to stop, visible nervousness).
• Permissible state-of-mind evidence of a prior firearm-related conviction.

The decision synthesizes longstanding Eleventh Circuit principles: circumstantial and direct evidence are equally valid; juries may draw reasonable inferences from forensic and behavioral facts; and “mere presence” is insufficient, but presence plus control, access, and corroborative evidence suffices. While unpublished, the opinion offers a clear roadmap for evaluating sufficiency where a gun is found in a shared space or another person’s container: robust DNA on functional surfaces plus demonstrable access and intent can carry the government’s burden beyond a reasonable doubt.