I. Introduction

This consolidated Eleventh Circuit decision, Carlos A. Alonso Cano, et al. v. 245 C&C, LLC & CFH Group, LLC, concerns a family of tenants asserting disability-related discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., along with a state-law claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The plaintiffs, largely proceeding pro se on appeal, challenged a wide array of district court rulings: discovery sanctions, pretrial orders by a magistrate judge, partial summary judgment on several FHA and state-law counts, and an adverse bench verdict on their remaining FHA claims. They also attempted to enlist the Eleventh Circuit to vacate an adverse Florida state appellate decision.

The Court of Appeals (Judges Luck, Lagoa, and Wilson, per curiam) affirmed most of the district court’s rulings and dismissed other aspects of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction or procedural forfeiture. While the opinion is designated “Not for Publication” and therefore is not binding precedent, it provides a compact but instructive synthesis of several important doctrines:

• How strictly the Eleventh Circuit enforces procedural preservation rules (especially Rule 72 objections and issue abandonment on appeal), even for pro se litigants.
• The evidentiary burdens for FHA reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims—particularly the “necessity” requirement and the need for an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief in illegality.
• The interaction between express lease provisions and the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
• The deference given to district court credibility determinations at bench trial, especially when a statute of limitations is dispositive.
• The limited power of federal appellate courts to disturb state court judgments under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit resolved the consolidated appeals as follows:

1. Discovery Sanctions – The court affirmed a $3,000 sanction imposed on plaintiff Cano under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for discovery violations. The court held there was no abuse of discretion, and emphasized appellants’ failure to provide necessary hearing transcripts in the appellate record.
2. Magistrate Judge’s Pretrial Orders (Jury Demand & Motion to Amend) – The court dismissed these challenges for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because appellants failed to timely object under Rule 72(a) to the magistrate judge’s non-dispositive orders, they could not seek direct review in the court of appeals.
3. Partial Summary Judgment on FHA & Quiet Enjoyment Claims – The court:
   • Deemed appellants’ challenges to Counts 4 (guest bathtub accommodation) and 10 (OnCall Patrol harassment) abandoned on appeal.
   • Affirmed summary judgment for the landlord on:
     • Count 5 – noise-related accommodation (tree trimming / pressure washing equipment);
     • Count 9 – alleged retaliation over tape on windows and related notices;
     • Count 11 – alleged retaliation through eviction following a HUD complaint;
     • Count 12 – alleged retaliation via the landlord’s appeal of an adverse state eviction judgment; and
     • Count 14 – state-law breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
4. Bench Trial on Remaining FHA Claims – The court:
   • Held that any challenge to the district court’s bifurcation of trial was abandoned for inadequate briefing.
   • Affirmed the bench verdict that:
     • Count 1 (failure to provide a reserved handicap parking space) was barred by the FHA’s two-year statute of limitations; and
     • Count 3 (bathroom modification) failed because the landlord approved the requested modification rather than refusing it.
5. Attempt to Vacate a Florida Appellate Decision – The court dismissed this request for lack of jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which bars lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.
6. Taxable Costs – Appellants’ challenge to the district court’s award of taxable costs, raised for the first time in their reply brief, was deemed abandoned and the cost award was effectively affirmed.

Overall disposition: AFFIRMED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Discovery Sanctions and the Appellate Record

1. Legal Framework and Precedents

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the discovery sanctions under an abuse-of-discretion standard, consistent with Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997). It reiterated that abuse of discretion occurs when a court:

• Applies an incorrect legal standard;
• Fails to follow appropriate procedures; or
• Makes clearly erroneous factual findings.

Citing Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Brown, 69 F.4th 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2023), and Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2011), the court underscored that:

• District courts have “wide discretion” in imposing sanctions, grounded in their firsthand handling of the litigation;
• An appellate court will only reverse if left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.

The court also invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A), which requires the court to award reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, when a party’s conduct necessitates a motion to compel and that motion is granted, subject to limited exceptions (e.g., substantial justification).

Plaintiffs argued the sanction should have fallen on their attorney under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (which penalizes attorneys or other admitted persons who “unreasonably and vexatiously multiply” proceedings). The magistrate judge, however, proceeded under Rule 37, which explicitly authorizes sanctions against the party, the attorney, or both.

Procedurally, the court applied Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2) and Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002), to emphasize that:

• The appellant bears the burden to provide a complete record, including transcripts of relevant proceedings.
• Where the record is incomplete, the appellate court must generally affirm the district court’s challenged rulings.

Pro se status did not change this, though the court reiterated the standard admonition that pro se briefs are “liberally construed” (Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008)).

2. Application to Cano

The appellate court upheld the $3,000 sanction because:

• The magistrate judge properly proceeded under Rule 37, which allows sanctions directly against a party—not just against counsel.
• Cano had an opportunity to be heard regarding sanctions.
• There was no basis to conclude Cano’s delay in disclosing discovery was “substantially justified,” and he did not show that sanctions would be unjust.
• Crucially, appellants did not provide transcripts of the relevant discovery hearings to either the district court (in the objections phase) or the Eleventh Circuit, severely limiting any basis for finding abuse of discretion.

The combination of a deferential standard of review and an incomplete record effectively doomed this challenge. The opinion serves as a cautionary example: even meritorious objections to sanctions may fail if the appellate record is not properly assembled.

B. Magistrate Judge Orders, Rule 72, and Appellate Jurisdiction

1. Rule 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)

Appellants attacked two magistrate judge rulings: (1) striking their jury demand; and (2) denying leave to amend their second amended complaint. Both were treated as non-dispositive pretrial matters governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Consistent with Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 106 F.4th 1091, 1099–1100 (11th Cir. 2024), such orders:

• Must be challenged by objections filed with the district judge within 14 days of service; and
• Are reviewable by the district court under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard.

Rule 72(a) further provides that “[a] party may not assign as error a defect in the [magistrate judge’s] order not timely objected to.”

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and the former Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980) (binding via Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)), appeals from a magistrate judge’s pretrial ruling must go to the district judge; the courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review such orders “directly.” The Eleventh Circuit has applied this principle in cases such as United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1359–62 (11th Cir. 2009).

The court also stressed that pro se litigants are not exempt from these procedural rules (Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007)).

2. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction

Because appellants did not file timely objections with the district judge under Rule 72(a), the Eleventh Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to consider their complaints about:

• The striking of their jury demand; and
• The denial of their motion to further amend their complaint.

The court therefore dismissed these aspects of the appeal, without reaching the merits or their argument about the magistrate judge’s authority. This portion of the opinion underscores how failing to take simple but time-sensitive steps in the district court can irrevocably undermine appellate review.

C. Summary Judgment on FHA Discrimination/Retaliation and Quiet Enjoyment

1. Appellate Abandonment of Counts 4 and 10

The court first applied its well-established abandonment doctrine under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). Issues are abandoned on appeal if they are not “plainly and prominently” raised and supported with argument and authority in the opening brief. Largely, this means:

• No mere passing references;
• No skeletal or perfunctory claims;
• No arguments raised for the first time in reply.

Applying Sapuppo (and Timson for pro se parties), the court held that appellants abandoned any challenge to summary judgment on:

• Count 4 – FHA claim about refusal to accommodate by painting the guest bathtub; and
• Count 10 – FHA claim of harassment by OnCall Patrol.

2. FHA Failure-to-Accommodate – Count 5 (Noise from Tree Trimming / Pressure Washing)

a. Governing Law

The FHA prohibits discrimination “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” because of disability. Discrimination includes refusing “reasonable accommodations” in rules, policies, practices, or services, when necessary to afford a disabled person equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling. Key precedents:

• Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) – establishes the four elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim:
  1. The plaintiff is disabled;
  2. The plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation;
  3. The accommodation was “necessary” to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and
  4. The defendant refused to make the accommodation.
• Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1219 (11th Cir. 2008) – a housing provider must know of both the handicap and the need for the accommodation before it can be liable for refusing to grant it.
• Bhogaita again – if a landlord doubts the disability or the relationship of the accommodation to the disability, the landlord must seek clarification or open a dialogue, not ignore the request.
• Sailboat Bend Sober Living, LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 46 F.4th 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2022) – “necessary” means the accommodation must actually alleviate the effects of the disability and address the needs created by that disability.
• Schaw v. Habitat for Humanity of Citrus Cnty., Inc., 938 F.3d 1259, 1270 (11th Cir. 2019) – the focus is on whether the effects of the handicap would be ameliorated by the accommodation, not whether the underlying condition is cured.

b. Evidence and Reasoning

Count 5 alleged that noise from landscaping (tree trimming) and pressure washing equipment required a reasonable accommodation for Angie, the disabled minor child. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to either:

• Whether the requested accommodation was “necessary” to alleviate the effects of Angie’s disability; or
• Whether the landlord had sufficient notice that such accommodation was needed.

Key evidence:

• Medical records showed Angie suffered hearing loss—including a notation that he had “no startle response” to sounds as loud as 100 decibels—suggesting insensitivity rather than hypersensitivity to noise.
• Videos submitted by appellants showed little to no audible noise inside the apartment with the sliding glass door closed. Noise was only notable when the door was open or when there were brief bursts, such as from a chainsaw.
• Cano’s complaints to management identified Angie as a “disabled son” and referenced inconvenience and sleep disruption, but did not specify a noise sensitivity related to his disability or provide documentation tying the disability to the requested accommodation.

The court also rejected the argument that the district judge ignored evidence stored on appellants’ “PSUSB” (a USB drive submitted with evidence). The opinion notes that the district court cited evidence contained on the USB, confirming that it had in fact been considered.

Applying the FHA precedents, the court concluded:

• The record did not show that the accommodation (relief from certain noise) would “actually alleviate” the effects of Angie’s particular disability (hearing loss).
• The landlord was not adequately informed that a noise-related accommodation was medically necessary, as opposed to merely preferable or convenient.

As a result, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Count 5. The case illustrates that reasonable accommodation claims must be backed by specific, disability-linked evidence—not generalized assertions of inconvenience.

3. FHA Retaliation and Interference – Counts 9, 11, and 12

a. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

FHA anti-retaliation and anti-interference provisions appear at 42 U.S.C. § 3617, which makes it unlawful:

“to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by” the FHA.

HUD’s regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c), provide examples of unlawful conduct, including:

• Threatening or intimidating a person in the enjoyment of a dwelling because of handicap;
• Retaliating because a person has filed a fair housing complaint or participated in FHA proceedings; and
• Retaliating because a person has reported discriminatory housing practices to authorities.

The Eleventh Circuit uses a familiar three-element framework for retaliation (borrowing from employment law), as in Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2016):

1. Protected activity (e.g., complaining of discrimination, requesting a reasonable accommodation);
2. Adverse action by the landlord; and
3. Causal connection (but-for causation) between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Critically, under Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff must have:

• A subjective good-faith belief that the challenged conduct violated the law; and
• An objectively reasonable belief in light of existing statutes and case law.

Lack of statutory or case support for viewing a landlord’s actions as unlawful can render the belief objectively unreasonable (Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos., Inc., 627 F.3d 849, 857 (11th Cir. 2010)).

b. Count 9 – Tape on Windows, Fine Threat, and Lease Termination

Count 9 alleged that the landlord’s threats to fine appellants $150 for failing to remove tape from their windows, issuing a seven-day notice to cure, and later sending a lease termination notice constituted retaliation under § 3617.

The court affirmed summary judgment for the landlord, reasoning:

• There is no statute or case law suggesting that requiring tenants to remove tape from windows or threatening to assess a (contractual) fine is an FHA violation.
• Similarly, there is no authority that categorically prohibits landlords from issuing notices to cure or non-renewal notices for noncompliance with lease rules.

Without any legal basis to deem these actions unlawful, appellants could not demonstrate an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that they were opposing unlawful conduct. That failure defeated the “protected activity” element of a retaliation claim. The court therefore held there was no genuine dispute of material fact and affirmed summary judgment on Count 9.

c. Count 11 – Causation Between HUD Complaint and Eviction Proceedings

Count 11 focused on whether the landlord initiated eviction proceedings in retaliation for appellants filing a second HUD complaint. Under Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1211 (11th Cir. 2013), causation typically requires:

• The decisionmaker’s knowledge of the protected activity; and
• Some logical relationship (temporal or otherwise) between that activity and the adverse action.

The record showed:

• Appellants received a notice of nonrenewal before filing their second HUD complaint.
• They filed the HUD complaint the next day.
• They refused to vacate upon lease expiration, prompting the landlord to initiate eviction.
• After learning of the HUD complaint, the landlord mutually agreed to extend the move-out date by five months to accommodate the HUD investigation.

Because the eviction proceedings were initiated after the nonrenewal notice but before the landlord had knowledge of the HUD complaint, appellants could not establish that the HUD complaint was the “but-for” cause of the eviction. The undisputed evidence pointed instead to nonrenewal and refusal to vacate as the operative cause. Summary judgment on Count 11 was therefore affirmed.

d. Count 12 – Retaliation through Appealing the State Eviction Judgment

Count 12 characterized the landlord’s decision to appeal an adverse state eviction ruling as a retaliatory act under § 3617. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this framing. It accepted the district court’s factual finding that the appeal was filed because the landlord reasonably believed it was entitled to a favorable judgment, not as a tool of coercion or intimidation aimed at punishing protected FHA activity.

Without evidence of retaliatory motive—and given the ordinary legality of pursuing appellate rights—appellants could not show a genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment on Count 12 was thus affirmed.

4. Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment – Count 14

a. Legal Baseline

Under Florida law and general landlord–tenant principles, a covenant of quiet enjoyment protects a tenant from substantial interference with their use and enjoyment of the premises. However, in Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Brickell Bldg. 1 Holding Co., Inc., 923 F.2d 810, 815 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit recognized that where express lease covenants are inconsistent with an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, courts can give effect to both, often allowing the specific express terms to limit or clarify the scope of quiet enjoyment.

b. Lease Provisions and Alleged Breaches

Appellants alleged a variety of interferences:

• Maintenance and fumigation personnel entering their apartment without notice;
• Excessive noise from neighbors;
• Water shutoffs without proper notice;
• Noise from laundry equipment near their apartment.

The court noted several key lease and addendum provisions:

• The lease allowed maintenance and pest control to enter the unit “at any reasonable time, without notice for inspection.”
• A “good conduct addendum” required tenants to report noise problems to management and allow staff to handle them “in an appropriate manner.”
• Appellants acknowledged in the addendum that water might be turned off temporarily without notice in emergencies; when outages occurred outside emergencies, the landlord provided advance notice.
• Record evidence showed that noise from the laundry equipment was not audible inside appellants’ apartment.

The Eleventh Circuit agreed that these express terms either:

• Authorized the complained-of conduct (e.g., entry without notice for inspection, emergency water shutoffs); or
• Required tenants to address issues (like neighbor noise) through management, not via a direct quiet enjoyment claim; or
• Were factually unsupported by the record (e.g., laundry noise not audible in the unit).

Consequently, appellants failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact that the landlord breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and summary judgment on Count 14 was affirmed.

D. Bench Trial: Statute of Limitations and Merits on Remaining FHA Counts

1. Bifurcation of Trial (Abandoned Challenge)

The district court bifurcated the trial—separating certain issues or counts into different proceedings—pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), which allows such bifurcation for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize. The Eleventh Circuit reviews bifurcation for abuse of discretion (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vizcay, 826 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016)).

However, appellants’ briefs did not meaningfully argue the bifurcation issue or cite legal authority. Applying Timson, the court deemed any challenge to bifurcation abandoned and declined to consider it further.

2. Count 1 – Reserved Handicap Parking Space and the FHA’s Two-Year Limitation

a. Statutory Limitation and Elements

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A), a private civil action under the FHA must be filed “not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice.” For a failure-to-accommodate claim, the discriminatory act generally occurs when the landlord refuses a requested reasonable accommodation (Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1219).

The Eleventh Circuit reviews the interpretation and application of a statute of limitations de novo (Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006)), but reviews factual findings from a bench trial—including dates, number of requests, and credibility determinations—for clear error (U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. S. Tr. Metals, Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2018); Sidman v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 841 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 2016)).

b. Factual Dispute and Credibility

The core dispute was whether Cano (on behalf of Angie) requested a reserved handicap parking space only once in late 2012 or early 2013, or whether he made additional requests in later years (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017). The lawsuit was filed on May 6, 2019, so only a refusal of a request made on or after May 6, 2017 would fall within the two-year limitations period. A 2017 request, if proven, could potentially save the claim.

Both sides agreed there was at least one request in late 2012/early 2013. Cano testified that he made repeated requests in subsequent years, including 2017. The district court, however:

• Found Cano’s testimony on repeated requests not credible, based on the judge’s observations of his demeanor and inconsistencies during trial; and
• Found no corroborating documentary or testimonial evidence of additional requests beyond the initial 2012/2013 request.

Other witnesses contradicted Cano’s account of multiple later requests, and no written records documented them. The court thus found as a fact that there was only a single request, made in 2012 or 2013.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the great deference owed to district court credibility determinations, citing OHI Asset (VA) Martinsville SNF, LLC v. Wagner, 115 F.4th 1296, 1303 (11th Cir. 2024). So long as the credited testimony is coherent, facially plausible, and not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, appellate courts rarely disturb such findings.

Given the record, the Eleventh Circuit held there was substantial evidence supporting the finding that the parking request was made only once in 2012/2013 and not renewed within two years of the lawsuit. As that denial fell outside the FHA’s two-year limitations period, Count 1 was properly dismissed as time-barred.

3. Count 3 – Bathroom Modification Request

a. Accommodation vs. Modification

The FHA distinguishes between:

• Reasonable accommodations – changes in rules, policies, or services; and
• Reasonable modifications – structural changes to premises, typically at the tenant’s expense, that may be necessary for use and enjoyment.

Although Count 3 was framed as a refusal to “permit reasonable modifications” to Angie’s bathroom, the legal analysis is functionally similar to a failure-to-accommodate claim in that the plaintiff must show:

• A bona fide request for modification;
• That the modification is reasonable and necessary; and
• A denial of that request by the housing provider.

b. Factual Determination

The district court found that appellants submitted one formal request for a bathroom modification on August 26, 2018. That request was:

• Approved the next day by the landlord; and
• Reconfirmed a few days later.

The Eleventh Circuit held that this finding was supported by substantial evidence and that appellants failed to show clear error. Because the landlord granted the only documented request, there was no refusal—and thus no actionable failure-to-accommodate/permit-modification claim. Count 3 therefore failed on an essential element and the bench verdict was affirmed.

Practically, this portion of the opinion sends a straightforward message: a landlord’s approval of a requested accommodation or modification cannot be repackaged as a discrimination claim, absent evidence that the approval was illusory or not implemented.

E. Rooker–Feldman and the Attempt to Vacate a Florida Appellate Decision

1. Jurisdictional Basics

The Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is limited to “final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” It also has limited interlocutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292. It does not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts.

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine, derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), bars lower federal courts from reviewing final state-court judgments. As the Eleventh Circuit emphasized in:

• Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 2021); and
• Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1281–85 (11th Cir. 2018),

the doctrine is of “limited scope” but squarely prohibits what appellants sought here: a federal court acting, in effect, as an appellate tribunal over a state court judgment.

2. Application

Appellants explicitly asked the Eleventh Circuit to vacate a Florida state appellate decision that was adverse to them in the state eviction proceedings. The court held:

• This is not a “final decision of a district court” within the meaning of § 1291;
• Nor is it an appealable interlocutory order;
• And, under Rooker–Feldman, lower federal courts are not authorized to review and reverse state court judgments.

The court therefore dismissed this request for lack of jurisdiction. The opinion thus reinforces a fundamental structural principle: dissatisfaction with a state appellate decision must be pursued through the state’s own higher courts and, ultimately, by certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court—not by collateral attack in lower federal courts.

F. Taxable Costs and Arguments Raised Only in Reply

At the end of the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit noted that appellants challenged the district court’s award of taxable costs for the first time in their reply brief. While their notice of appeal referenced the cost order, the failure to brief the issue in their opening brief meant it was abandoned under Timson and related authority.

The court declined to consider arguments raised only in reply and effectively affirmed the cost award. This underscores a recurring theme of the opinion: issue preservation and proper briefing are indispensable, even for pro se litigants.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Reasonable Accommodation” Under the FHA

A reasonable accommodation is a change in rules, policies, or services that is:

• Requested by or on behalf of a person with a disability;
• Necessary to give that person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their home; and
• Not an undue burden or fundamental alteration of the housing provider’s operations.

Key points from this case:

• The landlord must know about both the disability and the link between the disability and the requested change.
• The request must be tied to the effects of the disability; mere inconvenience or preference is not enough.
• If the landlord approves the request, there is no “refusal” and thus no failure-to-accommodate claim on that point.

2. FHA Retaliation and “Objectively Reasonable” Belief

To claim retaliation under § 3617, it is not enough to show you complained and then something bad happened. You must:

1. Engage in protected activity—opposing conduct that you reasonably and in good faith believe to be illegal under the FHA;
2. Suffer a material adverse action (e.g., eviction, harassment, substantial threats); and
3. Show the adverse action was taken because of the protected activity (but-for causation).

“Objectively reasonable belief” means that a reasonable person, knowing the law and the facts, would think the conduct was illegal—not merely unfair or unpleasant. In this case, the court held it was not objectively reasonable to believe that enforcing window-tape rules or issuing a cure notice violated the FHA.

3. “Abandonment” of Issues on Appeal

Courts of appeals do not scour the record to make arguments for appellants. If a party does not clearly present an issue, explain why the lower court was wrong, and cite supporting law in the opening brief, that issue is treated as abandoned. References in passing, or arguments made only in a reply brief, are usually insufficient. This rule applies to pro se litigants as well.

4. Standard of Review: De Novo vs. Clear Error vs. Abuse of Discretion

• De novo – The appellate court decides the issue fresh, without deference (used for legal questions, including statute-of-limitations interpretation and summary judgment rulings).
• Clear error – The appellate court defers to the trial judge’s factual findings (particularly after a bench trial), reversing only if it has a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made.
• Abuse of discretion – A highly deferential standard used for rulings like sanctions, bifurcation, and other case-management decisions. The appellate court looks for a clear error in judgment or application of the wrong legal standard.

5. Rule 72(a) and Magistrate Judge Orders

When a magistrate judge decides a non-dispositive pretrial matter (e.g., discovery disputes, motions to amend), a party who disagrees must:

• File written objections with the district judge within 14 days; and
• Explain why the order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

If the party fails to object, they generally cannot challenge that order on appeal. The court of appeals will not act as if it were reviewing the magistrate judge directly.

6. Rooker–Feldman Doctrine (Why Federal Courts Cannot “Undo” State Judgments)

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents federal district and circuit courts from acting as appellate courts over state court judgments. If you lose in state court, you must use the state appellate process; you cannot ask a federal district court or the Eleventh Circuit to reverse that state decision. Only the U.S. Supreme Court can review state court judgments directly, via certiorari.

V. Impact and Practical Significance

1. For FHA Plaintiffs and Advocates

• Documentation is critical. Requests for accommodations or modifications should be in writing where possible, clearly linking the requested change to the disability and its effects.
• Necessity must be shown. Preferences or general complaints (e.g., about noise) should be distinguished from accommodations that are medically or functionally necessary.
• Be mindful of limitations periods. The two-year FHA limitation runs from the discriminatory act (e.g., refusal of a request), not from a tenant’s later realization that the act might be unlawful.
• Retaliation claims require legal grounding. Before characterizing landlord conduct as discriminatory or retaliatory, ensure there is at least some legal authority suggesting the conduct is unlawful under the FHA.

2. For Pro Se Litigants

• Procedural rules still apply. Missing deadlines for objections (Rule 72), failing to order necessary transcripts, or not clearly briefing issues will often be fatal on appeal.
• Opening briefs are decisive. All key issues and arguments should be fully presented there; issues introduced only in reply are generally forfeited.
• Records matter. Appeals are decided on the record from the trial court; anything not included (especially hearing transcripts) usually cannot be considered.

3. For Landlords and Housing Providers

• Well-drafted leases can limit disputes. Express provisions on access for maintenance, pest control, water outages, and rules about noise or conduct can significantly shape and limit quiet enjoyment claims.
• Respond appropriately to accommodation requests. Document receipt, ask for clarification or medical support where appropriate, and provide clear written responses.
• Exercise caution around enforcement actions following complaints. While the court upheld eviction and appeal actions here, those decisions were heavily fact-dependent. Landlords should be prepared to demonstrate non-retaliatory reasons for enforcement steps taken near in time to FHA-protected activity.

4. Doctrinal Clarifications within the Eleventh Circuit

Even though the opinion is unpublished, it:

• Reaffirms a strict view of issue preservation (Rule 72, abandonment, reply-brief limitations);
• Clarifies the high evidentiary bar for showing “necessity” and landlord knowledge in noise-related accommodation claims;
• Emphasizes the requirement of an objectively reasonable belief for FHA retaliation claims; and
• Demonstrates robust deference to district court credibility findings in applying the FHA’s statute of limitations.

VI. Conclusion

Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC is primarily an application, rather than an expansion, of existing law, but it is significant in the way it weaves together several procedural and substantive strands:

• Procedurally, it is a cautionary tale about the consequences of failing to object under Rule 72, omitting key transcripts from the record, inadequately briefing issues, and raising arguments only in reply.
• Substantively, it reaffirms that FHA claims—especially those involving reasonable accommodations, modifications, and retaliation—must be supported by concrete evidence of disability, necessity, and causation, not merely by general dissatisfaction with a landlord’s conduct.
• Contractually, it shows how carefully drafted lease provisions and conduct addenda can narrow the scope of implied covenants like quiet enjoyment.
• Jurisdictionally, it underscores the impermeable barrier Rooker–Feldman places between state-court judgments and collateral review in lower federal courts.

As a whole, the decision underscores that fair housing litigation in the Eleventh Circuit is both fact-intensive and procedure-driven. Tenants and advocates must align their evidence, their timelines, and their appellate strategies with these demands if they hope to prevail.