Strict Limits on Interlocutory Appeals from Caremark Demand‑Futility Rulings:
A Commentary on John M. Turner, Jr. v. Katherine Richards Brewer

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I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Delaware Supreme Court’s order in John M. Turner, Jr. et al. v. Katherine Richards Brewer, No. 444, 2025 (Del. Dec. 15, 2025), refusing an interlocutory appeal from a Court of Chancery decision in a high‑stakes Caremark-style oversight case involving Regions Financial Corporation and Regions Bank.

The dispute arises from allegations that Regions’ directors knowingly allowed the bank to employ illegal and manipulative overdraft fee practices for several years, despite a whistleblower complaint from the company’s former general counsel and a subsequent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) investigation and consent order. A stockholder filed a derivative action seeking to recover the $191 million Regions paid under that consent order from the company’s fiduciaries.

The central procedural issue before the Delaware Supreme Court was not the substantive viability of the plaintiff’s oversight claims, but whether the defendants (a subset of directors, the “Remaining Defendants”) could obtain immediate, interlocutory review of the Court of Chancery’s partial denial of their motion to dismiss for failure to plead demand futility under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Supreme Court’s order reinforces a strict approach to interlocutory appeals under Supreme Court Rule 42. It underscores:

• the high bar for interlocutory review, even in significant corporate governance and Caremark cases;
• the deference granted to the Court of Chancery’s application of Rule 42; and
• the Court’s insistence on “exceptional circumstances” and a clear benefits‑versus‑costs advantage before allowing mid‑stream appellate intervention.

While the order does not decide the underlying Caremark and Massey issues on the merits, it has important practical consequences: the Chancery Court’s decision excusing demand and allowing the Caremark claim to proceed against a majority of the Regions board remains in place, and defendants must litigate the case forward before the Supreme Court will consider any substantive appeal.

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II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Order

The Supreme Court framed the matter narrowly: Should it grant an interlocutory appeal from the Court of Chancery’s order denying in part a motion to dismiss a stockholder derivative complaint alleging Caremark and Massey claims?

Key points from the order are:

1. Background. Regions’ former general counsel, acting as a whistleblower, sent a draft complaint to the board in November 2019 alleging that he was fired partly for objecting to illegal overdraft fee practices. The board hired outside counsel to investigate but did not change its overdraft practices until July 2021.
2. Regulatory action. In 2020, the CFPB began investigating Regions’ overdraft practices and, in 2022, entered into a consent order finding that Regions used manipulative methodologies to increase overdraft fee revenue from August 2018 through a three‑year period. The CFPB found Regions “was aware” the practice was illegal and “could have stopped charging [those] fees sooner” but did not. Regions denied wrongdoing but agreed to pay $191 million in fines and penalties.
3. The derivative case. A Regions stockholder, Katherine Richards Brewer, filed a derivative action asserting:
   • a Caremark oversight claim; and
   • a Massey claim premised on intentional, law‑violating business conduct.
   Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing (i) failure to plead demand futility, and (ii) failure to state a claim.
4. Chancery’s September 29, 2025 Opinion. The Court of Chancery held that plaintiff had pled particularized facts showing that a majority of the directors on the “Demand Board” faced a substantial likelihood of liability under a red‑flags Caremark theory, excusing pre‑suit demand as futile. The motion to dismiss was:
   • Denied as to the directors who served on the board during the three years of alleged wrongful overdraft practices (the “Remaining Defendants”).
   • Granted as to directors who joined the board later and as to the officer defendants.
5. Application for certification of interlocutory appeal. The Remaining Defendants sought certification under Supreme Court Rule 42, claiming the Chancery decision:
   • decided a “substantial issue of material importance” by resolving demand futility on a Caremark red‑flags theory; and
   • misapplied the standards governing what facts must be pled to show that directors face a substantial likelihood of liability.
   They argued that several Rule 42(b)(iii) factors favored interlocutory review, including alleged conflict with other trial‑court decisions, potential to terminate the litigation, and general “considerations of justice.” The plaintiff opposed.
6. Chancery’s October 30, 2025 denial of certification. The Court of Chancery:
   • Agreed that the decision involved “substantial issues of material importance” — the mandatory threshold under Rule 42(b)(i); but
   • Concluded that the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors did not justify certification:
     • No actual conflict with other trial‑level decisions concerning the “plead with particularity” standard and the presumption of director good faith.
     • Interlocutory review would not terminate litigation because the court had not yet reached the merits of the Massey claim, which would require “significant” analysis on remand.
     • Although placing before the Supreme Court the issue of whether “substantial likelihood of liability” equates to a Rule 12(b)(6) standard based on particularized facts might “serve the considerations of justice,” that single factor provided only “soft support” and was insufficient by itself.
7. The Supreme Court’s holding. The Supreme Court:
   • Gave “due weight” to the Court of Chancery’s application of Rule 42;
   • Found that the request did not satisfy the “strict standards” for interlocutory review under Rule 42(b);
   • Held that there were no “exceptional circumstances” warranting interlocutory appeal; and
   • Determined that the potential benefits of interlocutory review did not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and costs it would cause.
   The Court therefore refused the interlocutory appeal.

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III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)

The plaintiff’s primary theory is explicitly described as a “Caremark claim.” Caremark established the doctrinal foundation for director oversight liability under Delaware law. It holds that directors breach their duty of loyalty when they:

• utterly fail to implement any reasonable information and reporting system; or
• having implemented such a system, consciously fail to monitor it or ignore “red flags” indicating significant misconduct.

The Regions plaintiff invokes the second prong — a “red‑flags” claim — alleging that the board was actually put on notice (via the whistleblower’s draft complaint and ensuing regulatory scrutiny) that Regions’ overdraft practices were illegal and harmful, yet allowed the conduct to continue for years.

While the Supreme Court’s order does not analyze Caremark directly, the underlying Chancery ruling, which the Supreme Court leaves undisturbed for now, treats the case as a paradigmatic red‑flags oversight suit in the financial services context.

2. In re Massey Energy Co., 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011)

The plaintiff’s complaint also relies on Massey. That decision is often associated with the principle that Delaware fiduciaries may not pursue corporate strategies that are premised on ongoing violations of law. A Massey claim typically alleges that a board or management knowingly embraced law‑breaking as a profit strategy, separate from classic “failure to monitor” Caremark claims.

In this case, the Chancery Court, having found the Caremark claim viable at the pleading stage, expressly declined to reach the merits of the Massey claim, noting that it would require “significant” analysis. That unaddressed Massey theory is crucial to the Supreme Court’s Rule 42 analysis: because the Massey claim remains unresolved, an interlocutory appeal would not terminate the litigation.

3. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993)

The Court of Chancery’s denial of certification refers to its own interpretation of language from Rales, which governs demand futility in certain derivative contexts. Rales instructs that a court asks whether, as of the time the complaint was filed, there is a reasonable doubt that the board could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand.

In applying Rales, the Chancery Court noted language that a derivative claim must “have some merit.” It interpreted that phrase to require application of the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard — i.e., whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted — but based on particularized facts, as required by Rule 23.1. The Chancery Court also emphasized that “many cases of this court have taken the same approach,” and therefore saw no conflict.

The Supreme Court neither adopts nor rejects that interpretive move; instead, it observes that the Supreme Court has “not expressly stated” that “to show a substantial likelihood of liability, a plaintiff must meet the Rule 12(b)(6) standard based on particularized facts.” It treats that absence of an express Supreme Court ruling as, at most, a factor that could “be viewed as serving the considerations of justice,” but not enough to justify interlocutory review.

4. The Chancery Opinions in Brewer v. Turner

The Supreme Court’s order heavily references two trial‑level decisions:

• Substantive Opinion (Sept. 29, 2025): Brewer v. Turner, 2025 WL 2769895 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2025).
  • Held that the plaintiff adequately pled demand futility under a Caremark red‑flags theory as to directors on the board during three years of alleged wrongdoing.
  • Dismissed claims against later‑joining directors and officer defendants.
  • Relied in part on the CFPB’s consent order and its findings that Regions “was aware” of the illegality of its overdraft practices but continued them to preserve revenue while seeking replacement fee streams.
• Denial of Certification (Oct. 30, 2025): Brewer v. Turner, 2025 WL 3048942 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2025).
  • Found the interlocutory order satisfied the threshold “substantial issue of material importance” requirement under Rule 42(b)(i).
  • Rejected the assertion that the decision conflicted with other trial‑court rulings; instead, it considered its approach consistent with prior applications of Rule 23.1 and the presumption of director good faith.
  • Concluded that the litigation would not be terminated by an interlocutory appeal because the Massey claim remained unresolved.
  • Described the “considerations of justice” factor as having only “soft support” and insufficient, alone, to warrant certification.

The Supreme Court does not revisit the Chancery Court’s doctrinal analysis in detail. Rather, it accepts the Chancery Court’s characterization of its own ruling — including the lack of conflict with other trial‑court decisions and the limited utility of interlocutory review — and builds its Rule 42 analysis upon that foundation.

5. Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42

Supreme Court Rule 42 governs interlocutory appeals. The order invokes several key components:

• Rule 42(b)(i): The court must first find that the order involves a “substantial issue of material importance” that merits appellate consideration.
• Rule 42(b)(ii): Interlocutory appeal requires “exceptional circumstances” that justify a departure from the normal rule of review after final judgment.
• Rule 42(b)(iii): Sets out eight non‑exclusive factors (e.g., conflicts among trial courts, questions of law of first impression, potential to terminate litigation, etc.) that may support interlocutory review, but no single factor is dispositive.
• Rule 42(d)(v): Clarifies that applications are addressed to the “sound discretion” of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s order reaffirms that these standards are “strict,” that the court will give “due weight” to the trial court’s certification decision, and that even important corporate law issues do not automatically satisfy the “exceptional circumstances” requirement.

6. Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 and Rule 12(b)(6)

Although not quoted in full, these procedural rules are central:

• Rule 23.1 requires that a derivative plaintiff plead particularized facts showing either:
  • (1) a pre‑suit demand was made and wrongfully refused, or
  • (2) demand is excused as futile because the board could not impartially consider it.
• Rule 12(b)(6) provides the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The intersection of these rules with the Rales standard and the concept of a “substantial likelihood of liability” is the doctrinal zone the Chancery Court sought to clarify and the defendants attempted to bring before the Supreme Court. The order leaves the emerging Chancery practice intact but does not definitively resolve the standard at the Supreme Court level.

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B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Narrow Scope: Only Interlocutory Review, Not Merits

The Supreme Court carefully confines its analysis to whether Rule 42’s prerequisites for interlocutory review are met. It explicitly does not address:

• whether the plaintiff has, in fact, pled a viable Caremark claim;
• whether the directors indeed face a “substantial likelihood of liability”; or
• how precisely the “have some merit” language in Rales should be harmonized with Rule 12(b)(6).

By limiting its holding, the Court preserves the final‑judgment rule as the ordinary route for substantive appellate review, especially in complex fiduciary‑duty cases.

2. Deference to the Court of Chancery’s Rule 42 Analysis

The Court emphasizes that applications for interlocutory review are committed to its “sound discretion,” but that it gives “due weight” to the trial court’s assessment. Here, the Chancery Court:

• acknowledged the importance of the issues (demand futility and oversight liability in a major bank);
• carefully walked through the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors; and
• ultimately found insufficient support for certification.

The Supreme Court agrees with the Chancery Court’s bottom‑line judgment that the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors, in aggregate, do not justify interlocutory review. The Court particularly endorses:

• the Chancery Court’s view that there is no real conflict between its Opinion and other trial‑court cases concerning the demand‑futility pleading standard; and
• the conclusion that the presence of an unresolved Massey claim means an early appeal would not terminate the litigation anyway.

This deference underscores the institutional role of the Court of Chancery in managing complex corporate litigation and in screening which orders are appropriate candidates for mid‑stream appellate intervention.

3. The “Exceptional Circumstances” Requirement

Under Rule 42(b)(ii), interlocutory appeals are reserved for “exceptional circumstances.” The Supreme Court concludes those are absent here. The order implies that the following considerations are not, in themselves, exceptional:

• That the underlying ruling involves an important question of Delaware corporate law (demand futility in oversight cases);
• That the ruling could have substantial financial consequences for directors and their insurers; or
• That there is academic or practical interest in clarifying the interface between Rales, Rule 23.1, and Rule 12(b)(6).

Exceptional circumstances would typically involve something more: a direct conflict in Delaware law, an urgent systemic issue, or a situation where delay until final judgment would severely undermine the integrity of the judicial process. The Court finds none of that here.

4. Balancing Benefits Versus Costs of Interlocutory Review

Rule 42(b)(iii) requires the Court to weigh whether the benefits of an interlocutory appeal outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and cost. The Supreme Court finds that:

• The potential benefit — early clarification of some aspects of the demand‑futility standard in Caremark red‑flags cases — is real but modest, especially since the Chancery Court’s approach aligns with a body of trial‑level authority.
• The costs are significant:
  • delaying the progress of an already complex derivative case;
  • fragmenting appellate review (Caremark and demand futility now; a later appeal on Massey and any other issues after further proceedings); and
  • increasing litigation expense and court system burden without definitively resolving the entire controversy.

Given that the Caremark claim will proceed regardless and that the unresolved Massey claim would likely return the case to the Supreme Court later, an interlocutory appeal would front‑load appellate resources without proportional systemic value.

5. The “Soft Support” of the “Considerations of Justice” Factor

The Chancery Court had candidly acknowledged that one Rule 42(b)(iii) factor — that interlocutory review could “serve the considerations of justice” by giving the Supreme Court an opportunity to speak to the “substantial likelihood of liability” standard — offered some support for certification. The Supreme Court does not dispute this assessment; however, it categorically rejects the notion that such “soft support” can, standing alone, justify an interlocutory appeal.

This reinforces a key procedural principle: even when a case might offer a good vehicle for clarifying an interesting doctrinal issue, the Supreme Court will typically wait for a final judgment unless multiple Rule 42 factors strongly favor early intervention.

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C. Impact on Future Cases and Delaware Corporate Law

1. Interlocutory Appeals in Caremark and Oversight Litigation

The most immediate impact is procedural: defendants in Caremark and related oversight cases should not expect ready access to interlocutory review simply because the Court of Chancery has:

• denied a motion to dismiss; and
• held that demand futility is adequately pled based on alleged “red flags.”

The order makes clear that:

• Importance is not enough. Oversight claims in heavily regulated industries (like banking) are undoubtedly important, but their importance does not alone create “exceptional circumstances.”
• Partial dismissals complicate interlocutory review. Where the Court of Chancery has dismissed some defendants or claims but allowed others to proceed (as with the officer defendants and later‑joining directors here), an interlocutory appeal risks piecemeal, inefficient review.
• Unresolved parallel theories matter. The presence of an unresolved and potentially significant alternative theory (here, the Massey claim) weighs heavily against interlocutory review, because it guarantees further litigation regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

This approach may reduce the volume of interlocutory applications in oversight cases, because director defendants and their counsel will understand that Delaware’s high court expects them to litigate through to a more complete procedural endpoint before seeking appellate correction.

2. Practical Consequences for Directors and Boards

The refusal of interlocutory review means the Chancery Court’s decision finding demand futility remains operative. From a boardroom perspective, this carries several implications:

• Exposure to discovery. Having survived the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff will likely obtain discovery, including board materials, internal communications, and documents relating to the regulatory investigation and the whistleblower’s complaints. This can be burdensome and strategically significant for directors.
• Leverage for settlement. Directors may feel increased settlement pressure once motion‑to‑dismiss defenses have failed and discovery looms, particularly where regulatory findings (like the CFPB consent order) describe sustained awareness of illegality.
• Deterrence of “wait‑and‑see” responses to red flags. The underlying facts — a whistleblower general counsel, a major federal investigation, and a long delay in ending the challenged practice — present a stark scenario. Leaving the Chancery decision in place signals to other boards that prolonged inaction in the face of clear red flags is fertile ground for Caremark liability at the pleading stage.

3. The Evolving Standard for “Substantial Likelihood of Liability”

The order also has a subtler doctrinal impact: it preserves, at least for now, the Court of Chancery’s practice of reading Rales’ “have some merit” language as effectively tracking the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, but applied to particularized allegations under Rule 23.1.

Because the Supreme Court expressly notes that it has never definitively adopted this articulation, yet declines to take the opportunity to review it on an interlocutory basis, the resulting message is:

• Chancery’s current framework is tolerated and operational even if not yet canonized by the Supreme Court.
• Future, more fully‑developed cases (post‑trial or post‑summary judgment) may provide better vehicles for the Supreme Court to address, in a precedential opinion, the exact relationship among:
  • Rule 23.1 particularized pleading;
  • Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility; and
  • the notion of a “substantial likelihood of liability” in demand‑futility analysis.

In practice, until the Supreme Court squarely addresses it, litigants should expect the Chancery Court to continue applying a hybrid standard: a Rule 12(b)(6)–style merits inquiry on whether the pled claim is viable, but requiring the enhanced factual detail and inferences appropriate for a derivative, demand‑futility context.

4. Reinforcing the Final‑Judgment Rule in Corporate Cases

From a systemic standpoint, this order reinforces the Delaware Supreme Court’s longstanding preference for reviewing corporate disputes after final judgment, even when they involve headline‑grabbing issues like director liability for regulatory noncompliance. The Court demonstrates unwillingness to:

• become a routine second‑stage reviewer of mid‑case Chancery rulings in fiduciary suits; or
• allow interlocutory appeals to become a tactical device for delaying or fragmenting complex corporate litigation.

This helps maintain the efficiency and coherence of Delaware corporate adjudication: the Court of Chancery develops the factual and doctrinal record; the Supreme Court intervenes once the case has reached a dispositive procedural posture or judgment, allowing it to address the issues in a more comprehensive and authoritative way.

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IV. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

To make the Opinion more accessible, this Part breaks down several of the core legal concepts referenced in the order.

1. Stockholder Derivative Actions and Nominal Defendants

A derivative action is a lawsuit brought by a stockholder on behalf of the corporation, not on behalf of the stockholder personally. The logic is:

• The alleged harm (here, the $191 million payment under the CFPB consent order) was suffered by the company.
• The primary wrongdoers are corporate fiduciaries (directors and officers) who allegedly breached their duties.
• Because those fiduciaries normally control the corporation, the corporation might not sue them; hence, equity allows a stockholder to step into the corporation’s shoes.

The corporation itself is named as a nominal defendant — formally on the opposing side of the caption but, in substance, the real party in interest that stands to recover any judgment.

2. The Demand Requirement and Demand Futility

Before a stockholder may sue derivatively, she must ordinarily make a demand on the board, asking it to bring the lawsuit. Delaware law presumes the board will act in good faith in considering such a demand.

But where the board members themselves are implicated in the alleged wrongdoing, requiring demand would be pointless. In such cases, the stockholder can plead that demand is futile. To do so, she must allege particularized facts showing that a majority of the directors:

• lack independence;
• lack disinterestedness; or
• face a substantial likelihood of personal liability for the conduct alleged.

If the plaintiff meets this standard, the court excuses demand, and the stockholder can proceed without first asking the board to act.

3. “Substantial Likelihood of Liability”

A director faces a substantial likelihood of liability when, if the claims are proven, there is a serious prospect that the director will be personally liable in damages or otherwise. In the context of Caremark claims:

• If the complaint adequately alleges that directors consciously ignored clear warnings of illegality (red flags), they may face such a likelihood.
• Because fiduciary‑duty claims for oversight failures typically implicate the duty of loyalty, they are not ordinarily exculpated by Section 102(b)(7) charter provisions that shield directors from monetary liability for simple negligence.

Thus, pleading a substantial likelihood of liability often turns on alleging facts suggesting intentional or bad‑faith behavior, not mere carelessness.

4. Caremark Red‑Flags Claims

A Caremark red‑flags claim asserts that:

1. The corporation had some form of compliance or reporting system; but
2. Despite that system, the board became aware of clear warning signs (“red flags”) indicating legal violations or serious misconduct; and
3. The board consciously failed to act in response, allowing the wrongdoing to continue.

In this case, the alleged red flags include:

• the whistleblower complaint by Regions’ own former general counsel, explicitly accusing the bank of illegal overdraft practices; and
• the CFPB’s investigation and ultimate findings that Regions knew its practices were illegal but persisted while trying to find substitute revenue sources.

If true, these facts may support an inference that the board knowingly tolerated illegality for financial gain — the core of a classic Caremark red‑flags theory.

5. Massey Claims

A Massey claim (after In re Massey Energy Co.) typically alleges that:

• the corporation deliberately embraces unlawful conduct as a profit‑making strategy; and
• the board affirmatively chooses or approves that strategy, rather than merely failing to monitor.

While conceptually related to Caremark oversight liability, Massey claims stress the affirmative pursuit of illegal business plans, not just failure to detect or halt misconduct. In the Regions case, the Court of Chancery has not yet reached the merits of this Massy theory, contributing to the Supreme Court’s decision to defer appellate review until a more complete record and set of rulings exist.

6. Interlocutory Appeals and Final Judgments

An interlocutory appeal is an appeal taken from a trial court order issued before final judgment — for example, from the denial of a motion to dismiss or a grant of partial summary judgment. By contrast, a final judgment is a decision that resolves all claims against all parties in the case.

Delaware follows a strong final‑judgment rule: appeals are generally allowed only after the case is fully resolved in the trial court. Rule 42 provides a narrow exception, permitting interlocutory appeals in “exceptional circumstances” when:

• the order decides a substantial issue of material importance; and
• the potential benefits of immediate review clearly outweigh the disruption and cost.

This case illustrates the rule in action: although the Chancery decision is important and implicates major corporate law doctrines, the Supreme Court insists that those considerations alone do not justify interrupting the normal litigation process.

7. Regulatory Consent Orders

A consent order is a settlement between a regulator (here, the CFPB) and a company in which:

• the company typically does not admit wrongdoing; but
• agrees to certain findings, remedies, payments, and future compliance obligations.

In fiduciary litigation, consent orders can be powerful factual inputs because they often contain detailed descriptions of the conduct at issue and the regulator’s assessment of the company’s knowledge and intent. In the Regions case, the CFPB’s findings that the bank:

• “was aware” its overdraft practices were illegal, and
• “continued to charge [those] fees for years” while planning substitute revenue,

are highly supportive of a Caremark red‑flags theory — at least at the pleading stage.

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V. Conclusion: Significance of the Opinion

The Delaware Supreme Court’s order in John M. Turner, Jr. v. Katherine Richards Brewer does not break new substantive ground in Caremark or Massey doctrine. Its significance lies primarily in its procedural and institutional messages:

• Strict enforcement of Rule 42. The Court reiterates that interlocutory review is an exception, not the rule. Even important and high‑profile corporate cases — including oversight suits against bank directors predicated on federal regulatory actions — must ordinarily await final judgment before receiving appellate scrutiny.
• Deference to Chancery’s gatekeeping role. By accepting the Court of Chancery’s application of Rule 42 and refusing to second‑guess its assessment of conflicts, termination potential, and justice considerations, the Supreme Court underscores the Chancery Court’s central role in managing complex, multi-claim corporate litigation.
• Preservation of ongoing developments in Caremark demand‑futility doctrine. The Supreme Court leaves undisturbed the Chancery Court’s approach to reconciling Rales, Rule 23.1, and Rule 12(b)(6), while pointedly noting that it has yet to adopt that framework expressly. This allows the doctrine to mature further in the trial courts before the Supreme Court selects a fully developed case for merits review.
• Practical consequences for directors and corporations. The order leaves in place a significant Chancery ruling that finds demand futility and allows a Caremark red‑flags claim to proceed against a majority of Regions’ directors. Boards facing similar red flags — especially in heavily regulated sectors — can expect close Chancery scrutiny and should not rely on early Supreme Court intervention to overturn adverse demand‑futility decisions.

In the broader legal context, Turner v. Brewer can be read as a reaffirmation of two core Delaware commitments: (1) robust enforcement of fiduciary duties, especially when directors allegedly ignore clear signs of illegality, and (2) disciplined adherence to procedural rules governing when and how appellate review should occur. Together, these commitments preserve both the integrity of Delaware’s corporate law doctrine and the efficiency of its judicial process.