Strict Enforcement of Removal Deadlines and Sua Sponte Fee Awards Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c): Commentary on U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Galvin

Strict Enforcement of Removal Deadlines and Sua Sponte Fee Awards Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c):
Commentary on U.S. Bank National Association v. Galvin

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, non-argument calendar decision in U.S. Bank National Association v. David Warren Galvin, Jr. and Susan E. Galvin, No. 24‑13491 (11th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025). Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore non-precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, the opinion sharply illustrates two important points of federal civil procedure:

  • The strict application of the 30‑day removal deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), even where the removing party invokes federal civil rights law; and
  • The breadth of a district court’s authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to award attorney’s fees sua sponte (on its own initiative) for frivolous removals, without a motion by the non-removing party and without a separate hearing.

The case arises from a long-running Florida residential foreclosure action. U.S. Bank, acting as trustee under a pooling and servicing agreement, initiated foreclosure proceedings against David and Susan Galvin after mortgage default. A state court entered a final foreclosure judgment in 2015, but over the next decade the Galvins engaged in repeated efforts to delay or thwart the sale, including multiple bankruptcy filings and at least two removal attempts to federal court.

In 2024, after an amended final foreclosure judgment and on the eve of yet another scheduled foreclosure sale, the Galvins—acting pro se—filed a notice of removal citing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and “Public Law 88‑234” as jurisdictional anchors. The Northern District of Florida remanded the case to state court for untimely removal and awarded attorney’s fees to U.S. Bank under § 1447(c), warning the Galvins about further sanctions. The Galvins appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on two discrete issues:

  1. The removal was untimely under § 1446; and
  2. The attorney’s fee award under § 1447(c) was within the district court’s discretion and did not violate due process.

This commentary analyzes the opinion’s reasoning, its treatment of precedents, and the implications for removal practice, sanctions, and foreclosure-related litigation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

  • 2012: U.S. Bank files a foreclosure complaint in Florida state court against the Galvins following mortgage default.
  • February 23, 2015: State court enters final judgment authorizing foreclosure sale; sale is set for March 27, 2015.
  • March 26, 2015: One day before the sale, the Galvins file the first of several bankruptcy cases, which delays the foreclosure.
  • 2015–2024: The Galvins file six additional bankruptcies and otherwise litigate extensively to thwart or delay foreclosure, including an earlier attempt (in 2016) to remove the foreclosure case to federal court, which was rejected and deemed untimely.
  • 2023: The Galvins file a notice in state court claiming that multiple tenders of full payment discharged the mortgage debt.
  • June 28, 2024: State court enters an amended final judgment, increasing the amount due and setting a foreclosure sale for August 6, 2024. The judgment is entered nunc pro tunc to the 2015 final judgment.
  • August 5, 2024: One day before the scheduled sale, the Galvins file a second notice of removal in the Northern District of Florida, invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and “Public Law 88‑234” as their bases for federal jurisdiction.
  • District court ruling: The court (1) holds the removal untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 and remands; and (2) awards attorney’s fees to U.S. Bank under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), concluding that the removal was frivolous and designed to delay the sale, especially in light of prior unsuccessful attempts to federalize the dispute.

On appeal, the Galvins argue primarily: (1) that § 1446’s 30‑day deadline does not apply to removals grounded in the Civil Rights Act; and (2) that the sua sponte fee award violated their due process rights and/or exceeded the district court’s authority under § 1447(c).

B. Holdings

  1. Timeliness of removal. The Eleventh Circuit holds that the removal was untimely. The 30‑day clock under § 1446(b)(1) ran in 2012 when the complaint was served, and no later “amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” within the meaning of § 1446(b)(3) restarted that clock. Even assuming the June 28, 2024 amended judgment could make the case first appear removable, the August 5, 2024 removal was filed 38 days later, still outside the 30‑day period.
  2. Applicability of § 1446 to civil-rights-based removals. The court rejects the argument that Congress intended to exempt civil rights removals from § 1446’s timing requirements. The Galvins’ reliance on The Mayor v. Cooper and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee is found inapposite.
  3. Attorney’s fees under § 1447(c). Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, the court affirms the fee award. It emphasizes:
    • The removal was clearly untimely, especially in light of the prior 2016 federal case, so the Galvins “knew or should have known” there was no legal basis to remove.
    • The timing (again the day before a scheduled sale) and the litigation history indicate the purpose was to delay, not to vindicate a legitimate jurisdictional claim.
    • Section 1447(c)’s text does not require:
      • a motion for fees by the non-removing party; or
      • that the removing party be given a separate “opportunity to challenge” a fee award, in contrast with specific notice requirements in Rule 11.

Because the untimeliness of removal sufficed to affirm the remand, the Eleventh Circuit declines to address additional arguments on jurisdiction or the underlying merits of the foreclosure dispute.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Removal Jurisdiction and Standards of Review

  • Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002)
    Cited for the standard of review: whether the district court had removal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. This means the appellate court reexamines the question of removal jurisdiction from scratch, without deference to the district court’s legal conclusions.
  • MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Hanover Insurance Co., 995 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Referenced for the standard applicable to attorney’s fees under § 1447(c): abuse of discretion. MSP Recovery also provides the articulation that abuse of discretion allows a “range of choice” so long as there is no clear error of judgment. The panel relies on this to frame its deference to the district court’s fee award.
  • Hill v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 364 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2004)
    Hill stands for the basic proposition that removal is proper only if the suit could originally have been filed in federal court (i.e., the district court must have had original jurisdiction, such as federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 or diversity under § 1332). The panel recites this to ground the general removal framework, even though it ultimately decides the case on the procedural defect of untimeliness rather than lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1331
    Quoted for the federal-question jurisdiction rule: district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions “arising under” the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The opinion uses this to show the threshold basis for federal jurisdiction that might support removal under § 1441(a), assuming the claims were properly federal.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
    The general removal statute allowing removal of any civil action brought in state court that could have been brought originally in federal court. The opinion does not dwell on § 1441’s substantive aspects because the case turns on timeliness under § 1446.

2. The Removal Time Limits: 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)

The core statutory provisions applied are:

  • § 1446(b)(1): 30‑day deadline from receipt of the initial pleading or summons.
    The court notes that the Galvins’ notice of removal was filed “over a decade” after the 2012 complaint, plainly outside this period.
  • § 1446(b)(3): 30‑day period from receipt of “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” from which removability “may first be ascertained.”
    The Galvins failed to identify any such later document. The only candidate was the June 28, 2024 amended final judgment, issued 38 days before removal. Even generously assuming that this amended judgment qualified as an “order or other paper” making the case newly removable, the removal was still 8 days late.

By relying on the plain language and the undisputed dates in the record, the court treats the timeliness issue as both straightforward and dispositive.

3. Rejected Reliance on Historical Cases

  • The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247 (1867)
    The appellants apparently cited this Reconstruction-era case to argue that § 1446’s time limits should not constrain certain federal rights, including those under the Civil Rights Act. Mayor v. Cooper dealt primarily with the constitutionality of the then-existing removal statute and reversed dismissal based on an incorrect determination that that statute was unconstitutional. The Eleventh Circuit finds this irrelevant: it neither creates an exception to modern procedural deadlines nor suggests that civil rights cases are exempt from removal timing rules.
  • Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816)
    A foundational early case establishing that the U.S. Supreme Court may review certain state-court decisions. The panel correctly notes that it has no bearing on modern removal deadlines; it speaks to appellate jurisdiction over state judgments, not to the timing of initial removal from state to federal court.

These citations exemplify a recurring phenomenon in pro se litigation: invocation of weighty, historic constitutional precedents that do not meaningfully intersect with the procedural issues actually in dispute.

4. Attorney’s Fees for Frivolous Removal

  • BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021)
    The Supreme Court in BP expressly recognized that district courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) when a party “frivolously removes a case from state court.” The Eleventh Circuit quotes this to support its characterization of the Galvins’ removal as frivolous and sanctionable under § 1447(c).
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)
    This statute governs procedure and fees upon remand. It provides that an order remanding a case “may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” The opinion interprets this language as:
    • permitting sua sponte fee awards (no explicit requirement of a motion), and
    • not requiring separate notice or hearing as a statutory condition for imposing fees.
  • Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (2005)
    Martin provides the governing standard: fees under § 1447(c) should turn on whether “the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” The Supreme Court also emphasized that fee awards should deter removals “sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation” without undermining the general right to remove.

    The Eleventh Circuit uses this framework (via MSP Recovery) to conclude that the Galvins:
    • lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal—given the clear untimeliness and prior federal warnings—and
    • appeared to use removal as a tactic to prolong a decade-long foreclosure dispute, especially by filing the notice the day before a scheduled sale.
  • United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2008)
    Morse involved sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 when a pro se litigant persisted in raising frivolous arguments after prior warnings. The panel uses it by analogy: just as prior warnings can justify sanctions for repetitive frivolous appeals, the prior failed removal (and associated judicial findings) put the Galvins on notice that another removal attempt would be improper. This notice supports finding their conduct objectively unreasonable.
  • Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)
    The opinion contrasts Rule 11(c), which explicitly requires “notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond” before sanctions, with § 1447(c), which contains no such procedural requirement. The comparison underscores the panel’s textual reading: when Congress wants to impose a notice requirement, it knows how to do so; its silence in § 1447(c) is meaningful.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Removal Timeliness as a Threshold, Dispositive Issue

The court first addresses—and decides the case solely on—the procedural defect of untimeliness under § 1446. The analysis proceeds in three steps:

  1. Initial 30‑day period expired long ago.
    Under § 1446(b)(1), the defendant must remove within 30 days of receiving the initial pleading or being served. The foreclosure complaint was filed in 2012; the notice of removal was filed in 2024. There is no dispute that this initial period had long expired.
  2. No qualifying “other paper” reset the clock under § 1446(b)(3).
    Section 1446(b)(3) provides a second 30‑day window when an “amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” first reveals removability. In many cases, this applies when (for example) a plaintiff amends a complaint to add a federal claim or when new information reveals diversity of citizenship.

    The Eleventh Circuit notes that the Galvins failed to identify any such document. The only potentially relevant filing was the June 28, 2024 amended final foreclosure judgment—entered 38 days before the August 5, 2024 removal.
  3. Even under the most generous assumption, removal remained untimely.
    The court assumes arguendo that the amended final judgment might qualify as an “order” or “other paper” within § 1446(b)(3) that could make the case newly removable. Even so, the removal was filed 38 days after that judgment, 8 days beyond the statutory 30‑day deadline.

    Additionally, the amended judgment was entered nunc pro tunc to the 2015 judgment, meaning it related back to the earlier judgment date and did not substantively “re-open” or transform the nature of the case in a way that would obviously trigger new federal-question jurisdiction.

Because untimeliness alone independently justifies remand, the panel explicitly declines to consider the district court’s alternative grounds or other appellate arguments. This is a classic appellate economy move: it avoids unnecessary rulings on potentially more complex jurisdictional theories or the merits of the underlying foreclosure.

2. Rejection of the “Civil Rights Exception” Theory

The Galvins argued that:

  • § 1446 is “inapplicable” to their case, and
  • Congress did not intend the 30‑day removal timeframe to apply to claims brought under the Civil Rights Act (they cited the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Public Law 88‑234).

The Eleventh Circuit summarily rejects this argument as unsupported. The reasoning is implicit but clear:

  • Nothing in the text of § 1446 differentiates among types of cases; its deadlines apply to “any civil action” removed pursuant to § 1441 or other removal statutes, absent a specific statutory carve-out.
  • Traditional civil rights removal (now codified primarily in 28 U.S.C. § 1443) remains subject to the procedural requirements of § 1446 unless Congress has expressly provided otherwise.
  • The Mayor v. Cooper and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee do not address removal deadlines and therefore cannot support an exemption from § 1446(b).

The significance here is confirmatory rather than novel: civil rights claims do not enjoy a special exemption from removal timing rules. Even where state-court proceedings allegedly violate federal civil-rights protections, defendants must comply with statutory deadlines.

3. Attorney’s Fees Under § 1447(c): Objectively Reasonable Basis and Deterrence

The second major issue concerns the fee award. The panel applies the framework established in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., as adopted in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Standard: A district court may award fees under § 1447(c) when the removing party lacked an “objectively reasonable basis” for removal.
  • Purpose: Fee awards should:
    • deter removals intended to prolong litigation or impose costs, while
    • not discourage defendants from making reasonable, even if ultimately unsuccessful, use of their statutory right to remove.

Using that test, the Eleventh Circuit upholds the fee award for several reasons:

  1. Clear untimeliness.
    The untimeliness of the removal was obvious from the face of the record. This alone cuts heavily against any claim of objective reasonableness.
  2. Prior federal litigation as notice.
    The opinion references a prior case, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Galvin, No. 3:16‑cv‑00395 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2017), in which a federal court had already found their attempt to remove the same foreclosure case untimely. This prior ruling put the Galvins on notice that a renewed removal effort would be improper. Continuing to pursue removal in the face of this history strongly supports a finding of frivolousness.
  3. Litigation history and timing as evidence of improper motive.
    The court draws an inference from:
    • the Galvins’ “extensive litigation” over a decade, featuring multiple bankruptcy filings and other delaying actions, and
    • the fact that each removal (and several other actions) were filed immediately before scheduled foreclosure sales.
    Together, these suggest that the primary aim was to postpone foreclosure rather than legitimately seek federal adjudication.

On this record, holding that the Galvins “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal” fits comfortably within the Martin standard, and fee-shifting serves the deterrent goal articulated by the Supreme Court.

4. Due Process and the Lack of a Motion or Hearing

The Galvins further argued that:

  • their due process rights were violated because they did not have an opportunity to be heard on the fee issue; and
  • § 1447(c) should be read (like Rule 11) to require a motion and a chance to respond before sanctions are imposed.

The Eleventh Circuit addresses this by:

  1. Textual reading of § 1447(c).
    The statute says that “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of … attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” It does not mention:
    • any requirement that fees be requested in a motion, or
    • a notice-and-opportunity-to-respond mechanism like Rule 11(c) or similar sanctions provisions.
    The court emphasizes that Congress knows how to require such procedures when it chooses (as in Rule 11(c)), and it did not do so here.
  2. Authority to act sua sponte.
    While the bank’s motion to remand did not expressly request fees, it did ask for “any further relief [the] [c]ourt deem[ed] just and proper.” The district court interpreted this, together with its inherent authority and the statutory language, as permitting fees without a specific fee motion. The Eleventh Circuit agrees that § 1447(c) allows such sua sponte awards.
  3. Due process considerations.
    The opinion does not conduct a lengthy constitutional analysis, but its holding implies that:
    • the combination of the remand proceedings themselves and the clear statutory authority under § 1447(c) sufficed to satisfy any procedural fairness requirements, especially where the basis for fees (frivolous, untimely removal) was identical to the central issue the parties were already litigating; and
    • no binding precedent requires additional process beyond what was provided, nor a separate notice solely about potential fee-shifting.

Ultimately, under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the Eleventh Circuit concludes that the district court’s decision to award fees falls within the permissible “range of choice” and is not a clear error of judgment.

IV. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

A. Removal, Remand, and Federal Jurisdiction

  • Removal: A defendant’s right to transfer a civil case from state court to federal court when the case could have been filed in federal court originally (e.g., because it involves a federal question or diversity of citizenship). Governed primarily by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1455.
  • Remand: When a federal court sends a removed case back to state court. Under § 1447(c), remand is required if the federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction or if there is a timely raised procedural defect in removal (such as untimeliness, removal by an ineligible party, etc.).
  • Original jurisdiction: The authority of a court to hear a case initially, rather than on appeal. For federal district courts, key bases include:
    • Federal question jurisdiction (§ 1331): The case arises under federal law.
    • Diversity jurisdiction (§ 1332): The parties are from different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum.

B. The 30‑Day Removal Deadline and “Other Paper”

  • Initial 30‑day period (§ 1446(b)(1)): Starts when the defendant receives the complaint or summons. If the case appears removable on its face at that time, the defendant must remove within 30 days.
  • Second 30‑day period (§ 1446(b)(3)): Applies when the case was not removable based on the initial pleading but later becomes removable due to an amended complaint, an order, or “other paper” (such as discovery responses) that newly reveals federal jurisdiction. The defendant must remove within 30 days of receiving that new document.
  • “Other paper”: A broad but not limitless category that can include deposition transcripts, settlement letters, or other filings that for the first time show that the amount in controversy or federal questions are present. In Galvin, even taking the amended judgment as “other paper,” the removal was 8 days too late.

C. “Nunc Pro Tunc”

Nunc pro tunc is a Latin term meaning “now for then.” A court enters an order nunc pro tunc to retroactively correct or clarify an earlier order as of a prior effective date. In this case:

  • The June 28, 2024 amended final judgment was entered nunc pro tunc to the 2015 final judgment.
  • This signals that the amended judgment is treated as if it had been entered in 2015 for certain legal purposes; it does not typically re-start substantive deadlines like those governing removal unless there is a fundamental transformation of the claims or parties.

D. Standards of Review: De Novo vs. Abuse of Discretion

  • De novo review: The appellate court considers the legal issue anew, giving no deference to the district court’s interpretation. Used for legal questions such as whether removal jurisdiction exists.
  • Abuse of discretion: The appellate court gives substantial deference to the trial court’s decision and will overturn only if the decision is arbitrary, irrational, or a clear error of judgment. Applied to fee awards under § 1447(c) in this case.

E. Frivolous Removal and “Objectively Reasonable Basis”

  • Frivolous: Legally baseless to such an extent that no reasonable litigant could expect success. In the removal context, filing despite clear statutory bars (like an expired 30‑day window) with no new jurisdictional facts is often deemed frivolous.
  • Objectively reasonable basis: A standard focused not on the party’s subjective good faith, but on whether a reasonable lawyer, viewing the law and the facts at the time of removal, could plausibly think removal was proper. Under Martin, the absence of such a basis justifies fee awards under § 1447(c).

F. Pro Se Litigants and Sanctions

A pro se litigant is a party who represents themselves without a lawyer. Courts often afford some leeway in construing pro se pleadings. However:

  • Pro se litigants remain bound by procedural rules, including removal deadlines.
  • They can be sanctioned—through fee awards or other measures—when they engage in frivolous litigation, especially after being warned in prior cases.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Confirmation of Strict Removal Deadlines

The opinion underscores that the 30‑day removal deadlines in § 1446(b) are applied strictly and mechanically in the Eleventh Circuit. Key implications:

  • No equity-based exceptions for sympathetic contexts. Even where the underlying dispute involves a home foreclosure and self-represented homeowners, the court does not relax statutory deadlines.
  • Amended judgments do not automatically restart clocks. A later amended state-court judgment—particularly one entered nunc pro tunc—will not itself create a new window for removal unless it introduces a genuinely new federal jurisdictional basis, and even then the 30 days run from receipt of that amended order.
  • Removal strategy must be prompt and informed. Defendants have one clear opportunity to remove based on the initial pleading and, in some circumstances, another if the case later becomes removable. Sitting on the right to remove for years, then attempting removal on the eve of foreclosure, risks both remand and fee sanctions.

B. Civil Rights Claims Do Not Override Procedural Requirements

Although the opinion is brief on this point, it sends an important signal:

  • Federal civil rights provisions (such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866) do not exempt litigants from abiding by statutory procedural rules like § 1446’s deadlines.
  • Attempts to recast long-running state-law disputes as civil rights cases at a late stage, particularly in order to avoid state-court judgments or foreclosure sales, are unlikely to succeed if they disregard removal timing requirements.

C. Attorney’s Fees and Deterrence of Abusive Removal Tactics

The decision reinforces a robust conception of fee-shifting under § 1447(c):

  • Fee awards as deterrence. In line with Martin v. Franklin, the opinion emphasizes that fees help deter removal attempts aimed at delay, especially repeated attempts following earlier federal guidance.
  • Application to pro se litigants. The court does not hesitate to affirm fee awards against self-represented homeowners where the record supports an inference of bad faith or objective unreasonableness.
  • Warning of escalating sanctions. The district court’s explicit warning of “future additional sanctions” if the Galvins again try to draw the federal court into the foreclosure underscores that repeated misuse of federal processes can lead to progressively harsher sanctions (potentially including filing injunctions or contempt in other contexts).

D. Sua Sponte Fee Awards and Procedural Fairness

Perhaps the most notable doctrinal contribution of this opinion—though in an unpublished form—is its clear acceptance of sua sponte fee awards under § 1447(c) without:

  • a separate motion for fees by the non-removing party; or
  • a distinct, formal opportunity for the removing party to brief whether fees should be imposed, beyond the remand proceedings themselves.

In practical terms, this means:

  • Litigants contemplating removal in the Eleventh Circuit should recognize that a remand order may be accompanied by a fee award even if the opposing party does not specifically request it.
  • Counsel (and pro se litigants) must treat the risk of fees as inherent in any removal effort that borders on frivolous, especially where there is prior judicial history on point.

E. Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Context

The case also fits into a broader pattern seen in foreclosure litigation:

  • Repeated bankruptcy filings and last-minute removal attempts are classic tactics to delay foreclosure sales.
  • Federal courts, increasingly aware of such patterns, are prepared to:
    • deny improper removal or bankruptcy relief swiftly, and
    • use fee-shifting and other sanctions to curb abusive litigation behavior.

While Galvin adds no new substantive rules on foreclosure law, it illustrates how federal procedural doctrines (removal, remand, sanctions) intersect with long-running state foreclosure proceedings.

F. Precedential Status and Practical Takeaways

Because the opinion is marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” it is not binding precedent within the Eleventh Circuit. Nevertheless, it is instructive as:

  • a clear application of existing Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit doctrine on:
    • removal timing (Hill, § 1446), and
    • fee awards for frivolous removal (Martin, BP, MSP Recovery); and
  • a concrete example of:
    • how repeated, untimely removal efforts will be assessed, and
    • the circumstances under which district courts may—without a separate fee motion—shift attorney’s fees to deter misuse of the removal mechanism.

VI. Conclusion

U.S. Bank National Association v. Galvin is, formally, a modest non-precedential affirmance. Substantively, it offers a sharp reminder of several key principles:

  1. Removal deadlines are rigid. The 30‑day limits in § 1446(b) control, and attempts to revive federal jurisdiction years into a state-court case—especially on the eve of foreclosure—will be rebuffed as untimely.
  2. Civil rights rhetoric cannot evade procedural rules. Invoking historic civil rights statutes does not insulate a removal from compliance with the removal statute’s timing and procedural requirements.
  3. Fee-shifting under § 1447(c) is a real and potent tool. District courts may—and, in the Eleventh Circuit’s view, may even do so sua sponte—award attorney’s fees for frivolous removals without a separate motion or hearing, provided the record supports a finding that the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis.
  4. Pro se status does not immunize litigants from sanctions. Where parties repeatedly ignore clear legal rules and prior federal admonitions, courts will impose financial consequences to deter continued misuse of the judicial process.

In the broader legal landscape, Galvin reinforces the balance struck in Martin v. Franklin: preserving the legitimate right to remove, while empowering courts to penalize and deter removals that serve only to prolong litigation and burden courts and opposing parties. Particularly in the context of long-running foreclosure disputes, the opinion signals that federal courts will not function as a last-minute refuge from state-court judgments through procedurally defective removals.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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