Strickland at Sentencing: Counsel’s Duty to Prepare and the Narrow Scope of Cronic’s Presumed Prejudice

Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s April 3, 2025 summary order in Baker v. Conway, a habeas corpus appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petition-Appellant Sean Baker, convicted at age seventeen of second-degree murder under New York’s felony-murder statute, challenged his sentencing on the ground that his court-appointed counsel, Patrick Bruno, provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. The district court denied relief, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Key issues include: counsel’s duty to prepare and advocate at sentencing; the proper application of Strickland v. Washington to sentencing claims; and the limited circumstances in which the presumption of prejudice under Cronic applies.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit held, under the deferential standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), that:

Defense counsel’s failure to discuss the presentence report (PSR), gather mitigating evidence, or argue for a lower sentence was professionally unreasonable, but the state courts’ contrary conclusion was not an “unreasonable application” of Strickland because the court later imposed a below-maximum sentence and the sentencing judge was fully informed of the facts.
There was no basis to presume prejudice under Cronic—counsel did not entirely fail, nor was Baker denied counsel at a “critical stage.” Consequently, Baker still bore the burden of showing a reasonable probability of a different sentence absent counsel’s errors.
Because Baker could not demonstrate that the outcome “would have been different” with competent assistance, the district court’s denial of the § 2254 petition was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668, 1984): Establishes the two-prong test for ineffective assistance—deficient performance and prejudice.
United States v. Cronic (466 U.S. 648, 1984): Identifies three narrow scenarios warranting a presumption of prejudice without specific proof.
Glover v. United States (531 U.S. 198, 2001): Extends Strickland to sentencing proceedings.
Knowles v. Mirzayance (556 U.S. 111, 2009) and Burt v. Titlow (571 U.S. 12, 2013): Emphasize AEDPA’s “doubly deferential” standard in reviewing state court ineffective-assistance rulings.
Harrington v. Richter (562 U.S. 86, 2011): Defines “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law.
Second Circuit cases such as Gonzalez v. United States (722 F.3d 118, 2013) and Bell v. Cone (535 U.S. 685, 2002) illustrate the line between strategic choice and professional unreasonableness.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied AEDPA review, which requires that a state court’s decision be neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent.

1. Deficient Performance under Strickland: Although Bruno’s decision not to rehash trial facts or spotlight Baker’s troubled background could be cast as strategy, the record showed no pre-sentencing investigation, no discussion of the PSR, and no targeted mitigation argument—facts strikingly similar to Gonzalez. A strategic choice must rest on a reasonable investigation, which was lacking here.

2. Prejudice under Strickland: Even assuming deficiency, prejudice was not established. The sentencing judge (the same judge who later denied Baker’s post-conviction motion) expressly declined the prosecution’s request for a 25-to-life maximum, imposed a 20-to-life sentence, and demonstrated awareness of Baker’s youth and role in the crime. There was no “substantial likelihood” that a more fulsome mitigation presentation would have produced a materially different outcome.

3. No Presumed Prejudice under Cronic: Cronic applies only when counsel is absent or wholly fails to test the prosecution. Here, Bruno appeared, spoke briefly, and opposed the maximum sentence. Baker’s situation did not resemble the “complete breakdown” scenarios warranting automatic reversal.

Impact

Reaffirms that sentencing advocacy is subject to the same Strickland scrutiny as trial representation but that deference to strategic judgments remains robust when supported by investigation.
Clarifies that the Cronic presumption of prejudice is confined to rare circumstances—mere failure to mount mitigation does not suffice.
Guides defense counsel to (a) review PSRs thoroughly with clients, (b) develop mitigation evidence before sentencing, and (c) document strategic decisions contemporaneously.
Signals to lower courts that a below-maximum sentence and a sentencing judge’s demonstrated knowledge can preclude a finding of prejudice even if counsel’s performance was flawed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

AEDPA Deference: Federal courts may grant habeas relief only if a state court’s decision conflicts with or unreasonably applies Supreme Court law.
Strickland Two-Prong Test: (1) Counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard of reasonable professional conduct; (2) there must be a reasonable probability the outcome would differ without the errors.
Cronic Presumption: In only three scenarios—no counsel at a critical stage, total failure to test the prosecution, or a lawyer so compromised no defense is possible—does prejudice attach automatically.
Presentence Report (PSR): A probation office document assembled after conviction, containing personal history, official records, and offense details—often key to mitigation arguments.

Conclusion

Baker v. Conway underscores that defense counsel must engage in reasonable pre-sentencing investigation and client preparation. While strategic decisions are generally insulated from second-guessing, they must rest on a developed record. The Second Circuit reaffirmed Strickland as the proper framework for sentencing claims and kept Cronic’s presumption of prejudice tightly cabined to extraordinary failures. Going forward, criminal defense practitioners must diligently review PSRs, gather mitigation evidence, and advise clients on the benefits of allocutions—lest an appellate or habeas court find a professional shortfall, even if prejudice proves elusive.