Strategic Delay Is Not “Good-Cause” – The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Chase Russell Downey Clarifies Standards for Untimely Suppression Motions and Confirms Broad Application of Constructive Possession & Sentencing Enhancements

1. Introduction

In July 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Chase Russell Downey (No. 24-5328). The case arises from a substantial cocaine-trafficking conspiracy based in Lexington, Kentucky, with cross-border ties to Mexico and distribution hubs in Michigan.

The Government charged Chase Downey with narcotics, firearm, and money-laundering offenses. A jury convicted him on all five counts, and the district court imposed a 45-year sentence after applying multiple Guideline enhancements and classifying Downey as both an Armed Career Criminal (“ACCA”) and a career offender.

On appeal Downey mounted a four-front attack: (i) insufficiency of the evidence, (ii) two evidentiary rulings (late suppression motion & admission of text messages), (iii) sentencing enhancements, and (iv) ACCA / career-offender designations. The majority (Judge Bush, joined by Judge Nalbandian) affirmed in full, while Judge Moore dissented on the timeliness issue.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Convictions Affirmed – The panel held that a rational jury could find Downey responsible for >5 kg of cocaine, constructively possess seven firearms, launder proceeds, and participate in a multi-layered conspiracy.
• Evidentiary Rulings Upheld – The district court did not abuse its discretion in (a) denying leave to file an untimely suppression motion and (b) admitting authenticated text-message evidence under Rule 801(d)(2).
• Sentencing Enhancements Approved – Leadership (§3B1.1) and drug-premises (§2D1.1(b)(12)) enhancements were affirmed, as were Downey’s ACCA status and criminal-history category VI. Any error in the career-offender label was deemed harmless.
• Key Precedent Clarified – The opinion reinforces United States v. Walden by declaring that a defendant’s strategic decision to delay filing a suppression motion pending plea talks does not constitute “good cause” under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

i. Sufficiency of Evidence

• United States v. Sadler, 24 F.4th 515 (6th Cir. 2022) – Standard of review (Jackson-style deference) guided the panel’s analysis across all counts.
• United States v. Rosales, 990 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 2021) – Attribution of drug quantity to a defendant in a conspiracy.
• United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2015) – Definition of constructive possession of firearms.
• United States v. Tolliver, 949 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2020) – “Paradigmatic” money-laundering example adopted to show promotion-type laundering.

ii. Evidentiary Issues

• United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2010) – “Good-cause” standard for late Rule 12 motions; central to the holding.
• United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2005) & United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2005) – Low threshold for authentication based on personal knowledge.
• United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2001) – Co-conspirator hearsay exception.

iii. Sentencing

• United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2009) – Criteria for leadership roles under §3B1.1.
• United States v. Taylor, 85 F.4th 386 (6th Cir. 2023) – Drug-premises enhancement clarified.
• United States v. Faulkner, 926 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2019) – Harmless-error doctrine for Guideline misapplications that do not affect the range.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
   The majority aggregated Downey’s admissions (statements to the DEA), corroborative texts, physical evidence (large drug press, kilo-packaging unit, $70k+ cash), and border-crossing data to meet or exceed statutory thresholds for quantity, firearm possession, and money-laundering promotion. The “any-rational-trier” standard left little room for appellate reversal.
2. Untimely Motion to Suppress
   Rule 12(c)(3) permits late filings only on a showing of “good cause.” The panel found none because: (a) Downey consciously chose delay to keep plea negotiations “on track,” (b) he missed both the court’s original deadline and the extension he himself requested, and (c) he failed to articulate discovery-based reasons for lateness. Citing Walden, the court reiterated that intentional litigation strategy rarely equals good cause.
3. Authentication & Hearsay
   Detective Evans’s testimony that Downey handed over and unlocked the phones furnished adequate authentication (Rule 901(b)(1)). Downey’s own texts were admissions of a party opponent (Rule 801(d)(2)(A)), and Arellano’s texts fell under the co-conspirator exclusion (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)).
4. Sentence Enhancements
   a. Drug-premises – The combination of cocaine, cutting agent, money-counting machine, and Downey’s control over Henson’s house satisfied §2D1.1(b)(12).
   b. Leadership – Downey exercised authority over Henson (cash-counting, courier trips) and Sebastian, warranting a two-level bump under §3B1.1(c).
   c. ACCA – Three predicate “serious drug offenses,” including an 11-year Ohio trafficking count, supported mandatory-minimum status. Violence analysis was unnecessary.
   d. Career-offender – Even if erroneous, the label did not change the Guidelines range (offense level 40 / CHC VI); therefore any error was harmless.
5. Dissent
   Judge Moore argued the district court’s 30-day motion deadline effectively deprived Downey of discovery-based suppression arguments and that denial of multiple extension requests was an abuse of discretion. She would remand to allow the suppression motion to be heard.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Timeliness of Pre-Trial Motions – The case cements the Sixth Circuit’s stringent approach: strategic delay (even for plea discussions) is insufficient. Practitioners must file suppression motions by the deadline or explicitly document discovery-related obstacles before the clock runs.
• Constructive Possession Doctrine – By affirming possession of firearms located in another’s residence, the opinion reinforces expansive constructive-possession principles, especially where the defendant has physical access, photographs with the weapons, or control over the premises.
• Sentencing Enhancements – The decision illustrates the evidentiary quantum required for drug-premises and leadership enhancements and clarifies that harmless-error analysis forecloses remand where the ultimate range is unaffected.
• Appellate Strategy – Downey’s inability to particularize objections (e.g., failure to pinpoint specific hearsay) underscores the importance of precision on appeal; generalized attacks will seldom persuade.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Good Cause (Rule 12(c)(3)) – A flexible, fact-based standard that excuses late pre-trial motions only when the delay was outside the party’s control or truly unforeseeable. Conscious, strategic delay is almost never enough.
• Constructive Possession – A legal fiction allowing conviction where the defendant lacked physical custody but had the power and intent to control an item (e.g., guns in a girlfriend’s house to which defendant has unfettered access).
• Co-Conspirator Hearsay – Statements “in furtherance of” a conspiracy are treated as non-hearsay when offered against another member of the same conspiracy.
• Drug-Premises Enhancement (§2D1.1(b)(12)) – Adds two offense levels if the defendant “maintained” a location primarily to manufacture or distribute drugs, even if the property belongs to someone else.
• Armed Career Criminal (ACCA) – A federal sentencing statute imposing a 15-year mandatory minimum on felons in possession of firearms who have three prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses, each on separate occasions.
• Harmless-Error Doctrine – Even if the court erred (e.g., mislabeling a defendant a career offender), reversal is unwarranted if the error did not affect the sentencing range or the ultimate sentence.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Downey adds bite to Sixth Circuit precedent on pre-trial motion deadlines, confirming that tactical delay for bargaining leverage does not equate to “good cause.” The opinion also underscores the breadth of constructive-possession theory and illustrates how everyday evidence—texts, photos, cash, and cutting agents—can support sweeping sentencing enhancements. Future defense counsel in the circuit must move quickly, document obstacles meticulously, and recognize that even marginal admissions or photos can anchor major Guideline consequences.

Meanwhile, prosecutors gain a clarified roadmap for authenticating electronic communications and linking defendants to firearms or drug premises through circumstantial and testimonial evidence. Unless the Supreme Court intervenes, Downey will serve as a stringent benchmark governing timeliness, evidentiary sufficiency, and sentencing across the Sixth Circuit.