Rule 803(4) Admits Child’s Disclosure of Abuser’s “Don’t Tell or I’ll Go to Jail” Threat; Motions in Limine Do Not Preserve Unrenewed Hearsay Objections

1. Introduction

In State v. Wallace Cable (R.I. Jan. 23, 2026), the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed a life sentence for first-degree child molestation sexual assault. The complaining witness (“Maria”), the defendant’s biological daughter, disclosed sexual abuse and self-harm concerns to an after-school program director, which led to emergency care at Hasbro Children’s Hospital and a follow-up evaluation at the Aubin Child Protection Center.

The appeal centered on whether the trial justice improperly admitted, through a child-abuse pediatrician, multiple out-of-court statements Maria made during the Aubin Center medical evaluation. The defendant argued these statements were inadmissible hearsay because they were not made for medical diagnosis or treatment under Rule 803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.

The Court resolved the case largely on issue preservation: most challenged statements were deemed waived because trial counsel did not object when the testimony was offered at trial. As to the one statement properly preserved—Maria’s report that her father told her not to tell “or he would go to jail”—the Court held it was admissible under Rule 803(4) and, in any event, harmless because it was cumulative of Maria’s own in-court testimony.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Waiver/Preservation: Except for one statement, the defendant waived his hearsay challenges by failing to raise timely trial objections; opposition in motions in limine did not preserve the issue.
Rule 803(4) Holding (preserved statement): Maria’s statement that the defendant warned her not to disclose “or he would go to jail” was admissible as reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis/treatment—particularly mental health assessment, self-harm risk, and safety planning.
Alternative harmlessness: Even if inadmissible, the same “go to jail” threat came in through Maria’s testimony without objection; therefore the physician’s repetition was cumulative and nonprejudicial.
Disposition: Conviction affirmed; case remanded to Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the affirmance.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Standard of review for evidentiary rulings

State v. Benitez — Cited for the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and the principle that reversal requires both abuse and prejudice. The Court uses Benitez as the gateway authority for reviewing hearsay-exception rulings and later relies on it for “inextricably intertwined” mental-health treatment reasoning and for cumulative-evidence harmlessness.
State v. Brown and State v. Flori — Reinforce that evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed absent prejudice. These cases frame the Court’s reluctance to second-guess trial-level evidentiary management.

B. Raise-or-waive and motions in limine as “preliminary”

State v. Tavares and State v. Barros — Provide the Court’s core articulation of Rhode Island’s “staunch” raise-or-waive rule: an argument not made in the trial court cannot be advanced on appeal. The Court uses these cases to characterize the defendant’s broad hearsay appellate attack as procedurally defaulted.
State v. Mensah — The key procedural precedent: objecting to a motion in limine does not preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal. The Court applies Mensah directly, holding that the defendant needed to object during Dr. Barron’s trial testimony.
State v. Buchanan and State v. Colon — Explain why: rulings on motions in limine are not final; they are “preliminary in nature” and meant to prevent prejudicial presentation until admissibility can be assessed in the trial context. The Court relies on these to emphasize counsel’s obligation to lodge timely objections as evidence unfolds.

C. Hearsay definition and Rule 803(4) framework

State v. Lynch — Supplies the definition of hearsay and the rationale for excluding it (oath, confrontation, cross-examination). It also provides the Court’s Rule 803(4) analytical structure: the declarant’s motive must be consistent with seeking diagnosis/treatment; foundation is required; admissibility turns on reasonable pertinence to diagnosis or treatment. Lynch is also used for the household/identity-safety principle and for the proposition that hearsay repetition can be nonprejudicial when the declarant testifies.
State v. Angell — Cited through Lynch for foundational hearsay principles.
State v. Watkins — Cited (via Benitez) for the distinction between admissible medically pertinent statements and inadmissible narrative details unconnected to diagnosis/treatment, unless another exception applies.
State v. Momplaisir — Provides the “reasonably pertinent” test for whether a statement assists medical diagnosis/treatment.

D. Mental-health and child-protection medical evaluations

State v. White — Supports the Court’s view that statements made in the hospital setting can be for diagnosis/treatment even when “treatment” includes supportive medical counseling and attention to emotional condition, not merely physical intervention.
State v. Benitez (again) — Specifically supports admitting statements intertwined with examinations aimed at assessing psychological trauma and self-harm risk, especially where the child has a history of self-harm.

E. Cumulative-evidence harmless error

State v. Robinson — Supports the rule that hearsay admission is not prejudicial when cumulative and guilt is established by proper evidence.
State v. Watkins (again) — Provides the retrospective harmlessness test applied at the close of all evidence.
State v. Lynch (again) — Used for the idea that the dangers of hearsay are “greatly abated” when the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination, and the hearsay adds nothing substantive.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Preservation first: narrowing the appeal to a single statement

The Court treated the case as primarily a procedural one. Although the admissibility of Dr. Barron’s testimony was litigated through motions in limine, the Court emphasized that in limine rulings are not final determinations for appellate purposes. Because defense counsel did not object during Dr. Barron’s testimony to most of the specific hearsay statements later challenged on appeal, those claims were waived.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that he “renewed” the hearsay objection during Dr. Barron’s testimony. The record showed the sidebar objection related to whether Dr. Barron’s expert testimony would be helpful/relevant—an attempt to exclude her testimony wholesale—not a contemporaneous hearsay objection to particular statements.

B. Rule 803(4): why the “go to jail” threat was medically pertinent

The one preserved statement—Maria’s report that her father told her not to tell or he would go to jail—was treated as reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis/treatment for two linked reasons:

Mental health and self-harm risk: The Aubin Center evaluation included a mental health component. Maria arrived after disclosures of self-harm and unsafe home circumstances. The Court reasoned that understanding why Maria delayed disclosure (fear, loyalty, threats) was part of assessing psychological trauma, suicidal ideation, and ongoing self-harm risk—matters squarely within medical evaluation and treatment planning.
Safety planning and mandated reporting: Dr. Barron explained that identifying the perpetrator and the dynamics of disclosure inform whether mandated reporting is required and whether a safety plan is necessary to prevent future contact and harm. Even though the defendant did not live with Maria, he had access to her through extended periods of care, and she continued to spend time with him after the assaults. The Court treated these facts as making the information clinically relevant to ensuring a safe environment in which treatment can be effectuated.

C. Identity/fault considerations

Rule 803(4) traditionally excludes blame-oriented narratives unless tied to treatment. The Court, drawing on State v. Lynch, reiterated that in child sexual abuse cases, the perpetrator’s identity can be treatment-relevant when necessary for safety and effective treatment. Here, the “go to jail” threat functioned less as “fault” evidence and more as a clinically relevant explanation of coercion, nondisclosure, and risk—supporting mandated protective interventions.

D. Cumulative evidence as an independent basis to affirm

The Court added a belt-and-suspenders rationale: Maria testified—without objection—that the defendant told her not to tell or he would go to jail. Because the same point was already properly before the jury, Dr. Barron’s repetition was cumulative, and any error would be harmless. The Court emphasized that the classic hearsay dangers diminish when the declarant testifies and the hearsay does not add new substance.

3.3 Impact

Stronger preservation discipline in evidence appeals: The decision underscores that litigants cannot “bank” on motions in limine. In Rhode Island criminal practice, counsel must object when the evidence is offered—even if the court issued an in limine ruling—unless the trial judge clearly makes a definitive ruling that obviates the need to object (a scenario this opinion treats as not present).
Broader recognition of “treatment” in child-protection evaluations: The Court validates that medical diagnosis/treatment in child abuse settings includes mental health assessment, counseling, self-harm risk evaluation, and safety planning—not just physical examination.
Admissibility of coercion/threat context under Rule 803(4): Statements explaining delayed disclosure due to threats may be admitted when clinically relevant to trauma assessment and safety measures.
Harmlessness via cumulativeness: Where the child testifies to the same facts, appellate challenges to medical-hearsay repetition face an additional barrier: even if a hearsay exception is debatable, the error may be deemed harmless if the same evidence came in independently.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered to prove what it asserts. It is generally excluded because it was not made under oath in court and cannot be tested by contemporaneous cross-examination.
Rule 803(4): Statements for medical diagnosis or treatment: A hearsay exception allowing a patient’s statements to medical providers when made for diagnosis/treatment and reasonably relevant to that care. The idea is that patients have a strong motive to be truthful to obtain proper care.
“Reasonably pertinent”: The statement must help the clinician diagnose, treat, or manage the patient’s condition (including psychological trauma and safety risks in abuse cases), not merely narrate events for investigative or litigation purposes.
Motion in limine: A pretrial request to admit or exclude evidence. In Rhode Island, it is typically a preliminary ruling; to preserve an issue for appeal, counsel usually must object again when the evidence is actually offered at trial.
Cumulative evidence / harmless error: Evidence is cumulative when it repeats a point already established by other admitted evidence. Even if admitted in error, repetition often does not warrant reversal because it likely did not affect the verdict.

5. Conclusion

State v. Wallace Cable delivers two practical rules for Rhode Island evidence litigation. First, it reinforces that motions in limine do not preserve hearsay objections unless counsel makes timely trial objections to the specific testimony offered. Second, it confirms that in child-abuse medical evaluations with an express mental-health and safety component, a child’s disclosure that the abuser threatened consequences for reporting (here, “or he would go to jail”) can be admissible under Rule 803(4) because it is tied to trauma assessment, self-harm risk, and safety planning. Even when such evidence is contested, the Court signals that appellate relief will be difficult if the same facts were admitted through the complainant’s own testimony, rendering the medical repetition cumulative and harmless.

State v. Wallace Cable — Rule 803(4) Admits Child’s Disclosure of Abuser’s “Don’t Tell or I’ll Go to Jail” Threat; Motions in Limine Do Not Preserve Unrenewed Hearsay Objections