State v. Thorpe: Clarifying the Use of Prearrest Silence to Impeach a Self-Defense Claim under Connecticut’s Plain Error Doctrine

I. Introduction

In State v. Thorpe, SC 21004 (Conn. Dec. 23, 2025), the Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed a recurring evidentiary and constitutional boundary question: to what extent may the prosecution use a criminal defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence—specifically, the failure to contact law enforcement—to impeach a trial testimony claiming self-defense?

The defendant, Joseph Thorpe, was convicted of murder arising out of a fatal shooting during a late-night drug transaction in Hartford. At trial, he testified that he shot the victim, Roberto Vargas, in self-defense. On appeal, Thorpe argued that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him about his failure, prior to arrest, to report to the police that he had acted in self-defense.

The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. It held that, in light of existing federal and state precedent, the admission of Thorpe’s prearrest silence for impeachment was not an “obvious and readily discernable” error and thus could not satisfy the first prong of the stringent plain error standard. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed and effectively elevated to Supreme Court level the approach previously applied by the Appellate Court in State v. Boone, and it clarified how the line of cases beginning with Doyle v. Ohio and Jenkins v. Anderson interacts with Connecticut’s plain error doctrine.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Background

Thorpe lived in Hartford and sold narcotics in the area of Asylum Avenue and Laurel Street. Through this activity, he knew other dealers, including Triston Reid, Dariyan Hillson, and the victim, Roberto Vargas.

In the early morning hours of August 3, 2019, Reid asked Thorpe to meet near HFC Chicken and Pizza on Farmington Avenue for a drug purchase. Shortly before 3:00 a.m., Thorpe arrived armed with a gun in his pocket. Reid stood with Hillson, Vargas, and another individual, Taki Blizzard. According to the state’s evidence, no one other than Thorpe was armed; no gun was found on or near the victim.

A verbal altercation broke out between Thorpe and Vargas. The confrontation escalated when Vargas attempted to punch Thorpe. Before any blow landed, Thorpe drew his gun and shot Vargas, then fired five additional shots as Vargas and the others fled. Vargas sustained three gunshot wounds to the torso, ran a short distance, collapsed, and later died at the hospital.

Thorpe fled the scene and did not contact law enforcement. He did not call 911, did not seek out police, and did not otherwise report that he had shot someone allegedly in self-defense. After an investigation, he was arrested and charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a).

B. Trial and the Self-Defense Claim

At trial, the defense theory was justification: Thorpe testified that he shot Vargas in self-defense. He claimed that the earlier dispute concerned drug payment and that Vargas had pulled a gun from his hoodie, “cocked it back” and prepared to shoot, prompting Thorpe to fire first out of fear.

This account was materially contradicted by the state’s witnesses. Both Reid and Hillson testified that the victim was unarmed. Police found no firearm on Vargas’ body or at the collapse site.

During direct examination, Thorpe described his fear and explained that he fled the scene because he thought the victim might start shooting. He also stated that he did not believe he had actually shot the victim when he first ran away.

C. The Disputed Cross-Examination on Prearrest Silence

Before cross-examining Thorpe, the prosecutor asked the trial court—outside the presence of the jury—whether she could ask why Thorpe had not reported to the police that he had fired in self-defense. She cited several cases supporting the use of prearrest silence for impeachment, including:

State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 504 A.2d 480 (1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986);
State v. Ervin B., 202 Conn. App. 1, 243 A.3d 799 (2020);
State v. Lee-Riveras, 130 Conn. App. 607, 23 A.3d 1269, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 937 (2011);
and the Supreme Court’s own decision in State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262 (2009).

Defense counsel objected initially on the narrow ground that the questioning was beyond the scope of direct examination. The court overruled that objection. Counsel then asserted that Thorpe had “an absolute right to silence” and no duty to report anything to police.

After a recess to review the cited authorities, the trial court ruled that the prosecutor could cross-examine Thorpe about his prearrest silence, providing three key rationales:

By taking the stand, the defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent as to matters relevant to his testimony.
Failure to report a self-defense shooting is presumptively inconsistent with a claim of self-defense or innocence, functioning as an “admission by silence” under circumstances where one would naturally be expected to speak.
The cross-examination would be limited to prearrest, pre-Miranda silence, avoiding the constitutional concerns associated with post-Miranda silence under Doyle v. Ohio.

No further objection was raised following this ruling.

In front of the jury, the prosecutor elicited the following points on cross-examination:

Thorpe did not call 911 after the shooting;
He did not stay at the scene to explain that he had acted in self-defense;
He did not later contact the police to report that someone had pulled a gun on him;
He claimed he told only his parents about the incident, not his girlfriend, and professed not to recall certain incriminating statements attributed to him about not having done “anything.”

D. Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal

The jury found Thorpe guilty of murder. The trial court denied a motion for judgment of acquittal and imposed a fifty-year sentence.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Thorpe challenged the admissibility of the prearrest-silence cross-examination. He conceded:

The claim was unpreserved at trial; and
It did not rise to the level of a federal or state constitutional violation that would trigger review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 (2015).

Instead, Thorpe invoked the plain error doctrine under Practice Book § 60-5, arguing that the trial court’s ruling was so clearly wrong and so fundamentally unfair as to warrant reversal despite the lack of a timely objection.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Alexander, writing for a unanimous Court (Mullins, C.J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy, and Bright, JJ.), affirmed the conviction.

The Court held:

Plain error review requires the defendant to establish both:
- (a) an obvious and readily discernable error, and
- (b) an error so harmful that it resulted in manifest injustice.
Under Doyle v. Ohio and its Connecticut progeny, it is unconstitutional to impeach a defendant with post-arrest, post-Miranda silence, but the same constitutional protection does not attach to prearrest, pre-Miranda silence.
Connecticut law has long allowed the use of prearrest silence as an admission or for impeachment where circumstances are such that a person would naturally be expected to speak.
Given that prior case law—including the Appellate Court’s decision in State v. Boone—had already approved similar use of prearrest silence to impeach a self-defense claim, the trial court’s ruling was not “obvious” error.
Because the defendant failed to satisfy the first prong of the plain error test, the Court did not reach the second (prejudice) prong.

The key doctrinal result is that, in Connecticut, cross-examination on a defendant’s failure to report an alleged self-defense shooting to the police before arrest does not constitute plain error, and can be a permissible form of impeachment, especially where the defendant voluntarily testifies and advances a self-defense narrative.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. The Doyle Line: Post-Miranda Silence is Protected

The Court began by situating the issue in the well-known federal framework of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Under Doyle, the prosecution violates due process when it uses a defendant’s silence after arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony. The reasoning is:

Post-Miranda silence is “insolubly ambiguous”—it may reflect reliance on the rights just announced rather than guilt;
Although Miranda warnings do not explicitly promise that silence will carry no penalty, such a promise is implicit in the warning that the suspect has a right to remain silent;
It is therefore fundamentally unfair to allow the government to invite silence and then punish the defendant for exercising that right.

Connecticut has followed and, in some respects, extended this principle:

State v. Patrick M., 344 Conn. 565 (2022), reaffirmed that impeachment with silence after arrest and Miranda warnings violates due process under Doyle.
State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455 (1988), extended Doyle to the period after Miranda warnings but before formal arrest, on the rationale that the protection arises from the Miranda advisement, not the arrest status.

These cases draw a firm constitutional line around post-Miranda silence, which was not at issue in Thorpe because the disputed questioning concerned only prearrest, pre-Miranda conduct.

2. The Jenkins / Angel T. Line: Prearrest Silence is Generally Fair Game for Impeachment

On the other side of the line is Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), which held that using a defendant’s prearrest silence to impeach his credibility does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court reasoned that:

There is no governmental inducement or promise of protection before Miranda warnings are given;
In the absence of such a promise, the ordinary evidentiary rule that “silence may be probative of credibility” can operate; and
The use of prearrest silence is thus a matter of evidence law, not constitutional law.

Connecticut’s high court has consistently aligned with this view:

State v. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299 (1992): Because the promise of protection arises from Miranda warnings, the prosecution’s use of pre-Miranda silence does not violate due process.
State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 286 n.19 (2009): Explicitly recognizes that “evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial,” as Doyle rests on reliance on the implicit promises of the Miranda warnings.

These authorities collectively confirm that prearrest, pre-Miranda silence is not constitutionally protected in the same way, and that the central question becomes: is such silence admissible under state evidence law?

3. Leecan and the “Naturally Expected to Speak” Test

A key Connecticut decision is State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 (1986). Leecan articulated a central evidentiary principle:

Prearrest “silence under circumstances [in which] one would naturally be expected to speak may be used either as an admission or for impeachment purposes.”

This is essentially an application of the common-law doctrine of admissions by silence: when a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would ordinarily be expected to assert an exculpatory explanation, failure to do so can cast doubt on the credibility of a later, trial-time explanation.

Notably, in Leecan, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered a claim—also raised under plain error—that the trial court had improperly admitted prearrest silence. The Court found no plain error in part because, had an objection been made, the state could have laid a more complete foundation for introducing the silence. Thorpe explicitly relies on Leecan for the “naturally expected to speak” framework.

4. Boone and Self-Defense: The Key Analogue

The Supreme Court found State v. Boone, 15 Conn. App. 34 (1988), “especially instructive.” Boone is an Appellate Court case in which:

The defendant was tried for assault in the first degree and claimed self-defense;
He testified that the victim had struck him with a crowbar and that he stabbed the victim to fend off further attack;
On cross-examination, the state elicited that he:
- Fled when police arrived;
- Never reported the incident to the police; and
- Never sought medical treatment for his alleged injuries.

The Appellate Court held that, “insofar as the state… used the defendant’s prearrest silence to impeach the credibility of his self-defense claim, there is no error.” The logical premise is that a genuinely assaulted person, acting in self-defense, would reasonably be expected to seek help from law enforcement or medical care, or at least not to wholly refrain from reporting the event.

In Thorpe, the Supreme Court expressly analogizes Thorpe’s circumstances to Boone’s:

Both defendants claimed self-defense at trial;
Both fled the scene;
Both failed to report the supposed assault/self-defense encounter to law enforcement;
Both were cross-examined on that silence to undermine their credibility.

The Court concludes that, “for purposes of our plain error analysis, we see no meaningful difference between Boone and the present case,” despite Thorpe’s efforts to distinguish the two.

5. Other Supporting State and Federal Authorities

The Court further bolsters its conclusion by referencing:

State v. Reddick, 174 Conn. App. 536 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 921, cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1135 (2018): The Appellate Court found no error when a prosecutor commented on the defendant’s failure to tell a police officer before arrest that he had shot the victim in self-defense.
State v. Lee-Riveras, 130 Conn. App. 607 (2011), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 937 (2011): A claimed Doyle violation based on prearrest failure to reveal an alibi to police was held not to be of constitutional dimension and failed under the first prong of Golding.
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993): The U.S. Supreme Court approved impeachment with the defendant’s failure to report a fatal shooting as an accident. The Court reasoned that if the shooting were truly accidental, the defendant had every reason—including to clear his name and preserve corroborating evidence—to give his exculpatory account immediately.

Collectively, these authorities confirm a robust doctrinal foundation for using prearrest silence in appropriate circumstances to impeach a defendant’s later account, especially where the defendant voluntarily testifies and presents exculpatory narratives that could reasonably have been disclosed earlier.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Plain Error Framework

The Court’s analysis is structured under the plain error doctrine, codified in Practice Book § 60-5 and most recently articulated in State v. Kyle A., 348 Conn. 437, 307 A.3d 249 (2024). Under this doctrine:

Plain error is an extraordinary remedy, reserved for unpreserved errors “of such monumental proportion” that they threaten the integrity of the judicial process or result in manifest injustice.
It is a rule of reversibility, not of ordinary reviewability: it allows reversal only in exceptional cases.
The defendant bears the burden to show:
- First prong: an error that is “patent” or “readily discernable” on the face of the record and “obvious in the sense of not debatable”; and
- Second prong: that the error was so harmful or prejudicial as to cause manifest injustice.
If the first prong is not met, the court need not address prejudice.

The Supreme Court in Thorpe focuses exclusively on the first prong and concludes that the trial court’s ruling was not “obvious” error given the existing legal landscape.

2. Application to Prearrest Silence in Thorpe

Thorpe argued that the case lacked the “key fact” necessary for admissibility: he claimed he was never placed in a situation where “a response was naturally called for.” He distinguished other cases on the basis that:

He had fled an illegal drug deal and would have been incriminating himself by approaching police;
He feared that Vargas remained a threat to his life;
He had not been questioned by police before his arrest, so he never affirmatively chose silence in the face of direct accusations or inquiries.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument for several reasons:

Absence of supporting authority: Thorpe cited no case holding that these circumstances categorically remove a defendant’s prearrest silence from the “naturally expected to speak” framework or render interrogation by police a prerequisite to admissibility.
Strong case law to the contrary: Existing cases (e.g., Boone, Reddick, Brecht) already approved use of prearrest silence even when the defendant fled the scene and never contacted authorities. These cases involve precisely the kinds of situations in which a person claiming lawful justification (accident or self-defense) has powerful incentives to come forward.
Close factual analogy to Boone: In both Boone and Thorpe, the defendant:
- Claimed to be the victim of an assault;
- Used force in response, allegedly in self-defense; and
- Then fled and failed to report the incident to authorities.
Under Boone, this silence was proper impeachment; therefore, the trial court’s admission in Thorpe cannot be considered “indisputably” erroneous.
Continuity with Jenkins and Angel T.: The use of prearrest, pre-Miranda silence for impeachment is not constitutionally forbidden and has been consistently accepted in Connecticut, provided it meets the “naturally expected to speak” standard.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the relevant case law “does not provide enough support for the defendant’s claim so as to compel a conclusion that the trial court committed an obvious and egregious error.” That conclusion is dispositive under the first prong of plain error.

3. The Role of the “Naturally Expected to Speak” Concept in a Self-Defense Context

Implicit in the Court’s reasoning is a view of ordinary human behavior: if a person truly acts in lawful self-defense, one would ordinarily expect that person to:

Seek police assistance (to report the attack);
Protect themselves legally by explaining their justification (to “clear their name”); and
Preserve evidence and witnesses supporting their version of events.

The failure to do so, while not conclusive proof of guilt, is sufficiently probative of credibility to be fair ground for impeachment. In Thorpe, this meant the jury could reasonably question why someone who had shot in legitimate self-defense would flee, never seek help, and never voluntarily disclose the exculpatory circumstances, then only later—for the first time at trial—offer a self-defense narrative.

The Court does not suggest that such silence must be deemed incriminating; that is for the jury to weigh. Rather, the Court holds that existing law easily permits such cross-examination and that any contrary rule is far from “obvious,” precluding plain error relief.

4. No Need to Reach the Prejudice Prong

Because Thorpe failed to satisfy the first prong of plain error—identifying a clear, non-debatable error—the Court declined to address whether the challenged cross-examination was so prejudicial as to cause a manifest injustice. This is consistent with the structure of plain error analysis in prior cases such as State v. Blaine, 334 Conn. 298 (2019).

C. Impact and Implications

1. Doctrinal Significance

State v. Thorpe does not radically change Connecticut law; rather, it:

Confirms and elevates the Appellate Court’s approach in Boone to Supreme Court authority;
Reaffirms the distinction between constitutionally protected post-Miranda silence and evidentiary admissibility of prearrest silence;
Clarifies that use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant’s self-defense testimony is, at a minimum, not plainly erroneous.

In doing so, it tightens the window through which defendants can seek relief on appeal when trial courts admit prearrest silence, particularly when the claim is unpreserved.

2. Practical Consequences for Trial Practice

For prosecutors:

Strategic cross-examination tool: The decision reinforces that prosecutors may, in appropriate cases, highlight a defendant’s failure to report an alleged self-defense incident before arrest, as long as:
- The silence is clearly prearrest and pre-Miranda;
- The defendant has chosen to testify; and
- The circumstances are such that a reasonable person might be expected to speak.
Foundation still matters: Although Thorpe is decided under plain error (i.e., assuming no timely objection), prosecutors would be wise to build a factual record showing why a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would naturally have come forward.

For defense counsel:

Need for timely objection: Thorpe underscores the critical importance of preserving such issues at trial, with specific evidentiary and constitutional grounds. An objection limited to “scope of cross” or a general assertion of an “absolute right to silence” may be insufficient.
Consideration in advising clients to testify: Counsel must anticipate that if a client testifies and asserts self-defense, the prosecution may be allowed to explore their prearrest silence in detail.
Request for limiting instructions: In a preserved case, defense counsel should consider requesting a jury instruction that prearrest silence is not substantive proof of guilt, but only a factor in assessing credibility, to reduce potential prejudice.

3. Future Litigation and Open Questions

Because Thorpe is decided entirely on plain error grounds, it leaves some potential questions open for future, properly preserved cases:

Scope of the “naturally expected to speak” test: How far does this extend in contexts where approaching law enforcement would clearly expose the defendant to serious criminal liability (e.g., ongoing drug dealing or weapons offenses)? Thorpe suggests such exposure does not automatically negate the inference from silence, but the bounds remain fact-dependent.
Balancing probative value and unfair prejudice: On a preserved evidentiary challenge, courts might still need to conduct a balancing analysis under Connecticut’s analog of Rule 403 (weighing probative value against unfair prejudice), especially where silence may stem from fear of retaliation, immigration concerns, or deep mistrust of law enforcement.
Jury guidance: Thorpe does not discuss jury instructions on how to treat prearrest silence; a future case may address whether particular instructions are required or advisable when such evidence is admitted.

Nonetheless, Thorpe’s clear embrace of Boone and Reddick sends a strong signal that impeachment via prearrest silence in self-defense cases is generally permissible and unlikely to be reversed absent a very specific showing of error and prejudice.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Plain Error

Plain error is a narrow doctrine that allows an appellate court to correct an error that was not objected to at trial if:

The error is clear, obvious, and apparent on the face of the record; and
The error is so serious that it results in a manifest injustice or threatens the integrity of the judicial process.

It is not enough for the defendant to show that the trial court was simply wrong; the error must be indisputable and of exceptional gravity. In Thorpe, the Court concluded that—even assuming arguendo the trial court might have erred— any such error was not “obvious and readily discernable” given existing precedent.

2. Doyle Violations and Miranda Warnings

A Doyle violation occurs when the state uses a defendant’s silence after he has been given Miranda warnings to impeach his credibility or suggest guilt. Because Miranda tells suspects they have a right to remain silent, the law treats post-Miranda silence as an exercise of that right. Penalizing that silence at trial is fundamentally unfair.

Thorpe does not involve Doyle because:

The cross-examination concerned only prearrest, pre-Miranda silence; and
The defendant conceded his claim was not of constitutional dimension for Golding review.

3. Prearrest Silence as an Admission or Impeachment

Under Connecticut evidence law, a defendant’s prearrest silence may be:

Treated as an admission by silence or
Used to impeach credibility,

if the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would naturally be expected to speak. Examples include:

Failing to promptly report a claimed self-defense incident to police;
Not disclosing an exculpatory account in settings where innocence would typically be asserted;
Remaining silent in the face of accusations when an innocent person would be expected to deny them.

The jury is free to decide how much weight to give such silence in light of all surrounding circumstances.

4. Self-Defense in General Terms

Although Thorpe does not delve into the statutory details, under Connecticut law (see generally General Statutes § 53a-19), self-defense (justification) permits the use of reasonable physical force, including, in limited circumstances, deadly physical force, when a person reasonably believes such force is necessary to defend against the imminent use of unlawful physical force by another.

Because self-defense is a justification rather than an excuse, a successful self-defense claim can completely exonerate a defendant. This high-stakes nature explains why courts consider it probative whether someone alleging self-defense immediately or promptly sought police assistance or explanation, as in Thorpe and Boone.

5. Golding Review vs. Plain Error

In Connecticut, State v. Golding provides a framework for reviewing unpreserved constitutional claims on appeal. To obtain Golding review, a defendant must show, among other things, that the claim is of constitutional magnitude.

In Thorpe, the defendant explicitly conceded that his claim was not constitutional—because prearrest silence is not protected under Doyle. As a result, he could not invoke Golding and was forced to rely on the plain error doctrine, which sets a high bar and under which he ultimately failed.

VI. Conclusion

State v. Thorpe stands as a significant clarification—though not a radical alteration—of Connecticut law governing the use of a defendant’s prearrest silence. By holding that cross-examination on Thorpe’s failure to report an alleged self-defense shooting to law enforcement did not constitute plain error, the Supreme Court:

Reaffirmed the constitutional distinction between post-Miranda silence (protected under Doyle) and prearrest silence (generally admissible for impeachment);
Endorsed and elevated the Appellate Court’s reasoning in Boone regarding the impeachment of self-defense claims through evidence of prearrest silence; and
Clarified that, at the very least, the admission of such evidence is not “obvious” error under Connecticut’s stringent plain error standard.

For practitioners, Thorpe sends a clear message: when a defendant testifies and asserts self-defense, prior failure to report the incident to law enforcement is fair territory for cross-examination—especially if no timely, specific objection is made at trial. For appellate courts, it underscores the restrictive nature of plain error review and reinforces the principle that not every arguably debatable evidentiary ruling, even in a serious criminal case, will merit reversal absent preservation and a demonstrably egregious departure from established law.

In the broader legal landscape, Thorpe consolidates Connecticut’s alignment with federal doctrine on prearrest silence, while sharpening the tools available to factfinders in evaluating the credibility of self-defense claims in violent crime prosecutions.