State v. Shewalter: Continuous Officer‑Documented Noncompliance Can Extinguish All Elapsed “Street Time”; Detention Credit Is Mandatory and Must Be Precisely Calculated

Introduction

In State v. Shewalter, 2025 MT 202 (Mont. Sept. 9, 2025), the Supreme Court of Montana addressed a recurring trio of issues in probation‑revocation sentencing: (1) the State’s and court’s obligations to award “time served” credit for custodial detention related to the revocation; (2) whether, and on what evidentiary basis, a court may deny “elapsed” or “street time” credit for periods the defendant was on supervision in the community; and (3) whether defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not advocating for elapsed time.

The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of street‑time credit based on a supported finding of continuous noncompliance, reversed the failure to award mandatory detention credit, and remanded for a precise day‑count. It also rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for lack of prejudice. The decision clarifies that while both detention credit and street‑time credit arise from the same statute, they operate differently: detention credit is always mandatory when supported by the record, whereas street‑time credit is mandatory only for discrete periods during which the record and the probation officer’s recollection reflect no violations—continuous, officer‑substantiated violations can justify denying all street‑time credit.

Summary of the Opinion

Credit for time served: The Court held the district court erred by omitting detention credit in the revocation sentence. Detention credit under § 46‑18‑203(7)(b), MCA, is a legal mandate, not discretionary. The parties disputed 13 days across two custody episodes; the record was insufficient to resolve that dispute. The Court remanded for an amended judgment and a factual determination of the precise number of days.
Elapsed “street time” credit: Affirmed denial. Relying on the probation officer’s testimony and violation records, the Court concluded there was no period of community supervision free of violations. Under § 46‑18‑203(7)(b) and State v. Jardee, the State met its burden to identify actual violations spanning the entire relevant period; thus no elapsed time credit was due.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: Rejected for lack of prejudice. Although defense counsel did not affirmatively seek street‑time credit, the district court independently considered and denied it on the record; the outcome would not have changed even if counsel had argued for it. Under Strickland’s second prong, the claim failed.
Disposition: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to determine the disputed time‑served days and enter an amended judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background (Essentials)

2006: Shewalter pled guilty to criminal possession with intent to distribute (marijuana, cash, paraphernalia found during a stop; outstanding Flathead County warrant). He received a 10‑year DOC commitment with 8 years suspended, consecutive to a Flathead County sentence (15 years with 10 suspended).
2017–2018: While on the suspended portion, multiple noncompliance events led to revocation. In December 2018, the district court imposed 8 years DOC with 5 years suspended, and 49 days of time served. No appeal followed.
2022: While serving the suspended portion of the revocation sentence, new violations occurred (failures to report, housing/employment instability, admitted drug use, arrests in June 2022 for drug offenses and obstructing/resisting, failure to appear). Two ROV filings documented extensive noncompliance; the supervising officer testified to repeated verbal sanctions and continual issues “throughout the whole year.”
October 13, 2022: The district court revoked, imposed 5 years DOC (no suspension), recommended programming, denied street‑time credit, and—critically—failed to award detention credit.
Appeal: Shewalter challenged the absence of detention credit, the denial of street‑time credit, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State v. Risher, 2024 MT 309: Confirms that credit for time served is reviewed for legality. This channels appellate review into a de novo legal inquiry when the calculation is alleged to contravene statutory mandate.
State v. Charles, 2025 MT 58, and State v. Pennington, 2022 MT 180: Establish that calculating credit for both time served and elapsed street time is a legal mandate, not a matter of discretion, reviewed de novo. These cases frame the non‑discretionary nature of granting credit once predicate factual conditions are established.
State v. Jardee, 2020 MT 81, and State v. Johnson, 2018 MT 277: Jardee holds a court cannot deny street‑time credit based only on a generalized “pattern” of behavior; the State must identify actual violations during the specific periods at issue via records or officer recollection. Jardee also recognizes violations may be continuous if supported by the record. Johnson supplies the review template—legal questions de novo, factual findings for clear error—within revocation appeals.
State v. Crazymule, 2024 MT 58: Reiterates the mandatory nature of detention credit and addresses start‑date questions (e.g., when credit begins if a warrant issues while the defendant is already in custody). The Court cited Crazymule while noting a factual dispute over whether Shewalter was incarcerated when certain warrants issued—leading to remand for fact‑finding.
State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338 (1979), and State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17: Authorize appellate review of an illegal sentence notwithstanding the absence of a contemporaneous objection. These cases opened the door for review of the omitted detention credit.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), applied via Oliphant v. State, 2023 MT 43; State v. Bryson, 2024 MT 315; Golie v. State, 2017 MT 191; Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140: Provide the two‑prong ineffective assistance framework. The Court resolved Shewalter’s claim on the prejudice prong—because the district court independently considered and properly denied street‑time credit, counsel’s omission did not affect the outcome.

Legal Reasoning

1) Detention credit is mandatory; precision matters

Section 46‑18‑203(7)(b), MCA, provides: “Credit must be allowed for time served in a detention center or for home arrest time already served.” The Court emphasized again that detention credit is a legal mandate—when the record shows custody tied to the revocation, the days must be credited. The State conceded the district court’s omission was error.

The parties agreed on most custody days but disputed 13 days across two episodes:

June 2022 episode: Whether credit begins June 16 (warrant issuance) or June 23 (arrest and jail intake). Citing Crazymule, the Court recognized credit may run from the warrant date if the defendant was already incarcerated and the custody is attributable to the revocation, but found the record unclear here.
August–October 2022 episode: Whether custody began on August 26 (failure to appear leading to warrant) or September 1 (date of service and arrest), again turning on what actually occurred and when custody began.

Because the record could not resolve those factual questions, the Court remanded with directions to determine the precise day‑counts and issue an amended judgment. The takeaway is procedural as much as substantive: trial courts must both award detention credit and ensure the record supports the exact calculation, ideally by anchoring the credit to verified jail logs and warrant service records.

2) Elapsed “street time” credit: continuous, supported violations permit complete denial

The same statute directs that upon revocation, the judge shall “consider any elapsed time, consult the records and recollection of the probation and parole officer, and allow all of the elapsed time served without any record or recollection of violations as a credit.” This mandate comes with a condition: credit is owed only for discrete periods of compliance.

Under Jardee, denying elapsed time cannot rest on vague references to a defendant’s “pattern” of misbehavior; the State must point to actual violations within the periods for which credit is denied, using officer recollection and records. However, if violations are continuous and the officer’s recollection plus documentary record support that continuity, a court may deny street‑time credit for the entire relevant span.

The Court found that standard satisfied. The supervising officer, Linn, testified that:

He gave many verbal reprimands and lower‑level sanctions throughout the entire year of supervision;
He tried to find even one month of compliance to recommend some street‑time credit but could not identify any such period;
Documented incidents included failures to report and maintain a residence or employment; issuance of a pick‑up‑and‑hold order; admitted fentanyl and methamphetamine use; a positive test; being found hiding during a home check; arrests for drug and obstruction/resisting offenses; and a failure to appear.

On this record, the Court concluded there was no period of elapsed time “without any record or recollection of violations.” Because the statutory trigger for awarding street‑time credit was never satisfied, denial of all street‑time credit was correct. Importantly, the Court’s reasoning respects Jardee’s constraint: it did not rely on a mere “pattern,” but on the officer’s recollection of continuous noncompliance corroborated by specific, time‑anchored incidents.

3) Ineffective assistance: no prejudice where the court independently considers and correctly denies the requested relief

Even assuming counsel performed deficiently by not expressly seeking street‑time credit, the second Strickland prong was fatal to the claim. The district court raised and analyzed the issue, questioned the officer, and denied street‑time credit on a record the Supreme Court deemed sufficient under § 46‑18‑203(7)(b) and Jardee. Because advocating for street‑time credit would not have changed the result, there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome, and thus no prejudice.

Impact and Practical Implications

For trial courts

Always award detention credit for revocation‑related custody and make the precise day‑count part of both the oral pronouncement and written judgment. If the record is unclear, hold a brief evidentiary hearing or obtain jail logs and warrant service documentation before entering judgment.
When deciding street‑time credit, make explicit, period‑by‑period findings identifying any compliance windows. If none exist and the record supports continuous violations, expressly tie that conclusion to officer recollection and documented incidents.

For probation and parole (P&P) officers and the State

Maintain detailed, chronological records of contacts, sanctions (including verbal reprimands), noncompliance, and any compliance milestones. Officer testimony about “recollection” carries statutory weight; contemporaneous documentation fortifies it.
To deny street‑time credit globally, be prepared to show continuous violations or to map specific violations across all relevant periods. Generalized “patterns” will not suffice without concrete anchors.
Coordinate with jails to preserve booking and release logs, and with clerks to document warrant issuance and service dates, to support exact detention‑credit calculations.

For defense counsel

Detention credit: Verify all revocation‑related custody episodes and obtain jail records early. Ensure the judgment reflects the full credit; request an explicit day‑count on the record.
Street‑time credit: Build a “compliance calendar” that identifies discrete periods with no violations. Supporting proof can include employment records, negative UA results, verified addresses, attendance in treatment, and officer directives complied with. Absent a documented compliance window, street‑time credit is unlikely.
Preservation: Although Lenihan allows review of illegal sentences without objection, raising credit issues at sentencing can avoid remands and protect clients from unnecessary incarceration while appeals pend.

Doctrinally

The case reaffirms Montana’s bifurcated credit regime under § 46‑18‑203(7)(b), MCA: detention credit is mandatory whenever supported by the record; street‑time credit is likewise mandatory but only for discrete, violation‑free periods established by consulting records and officer recollection.
Jardee’s guardrail against generic “pattern” denials remains intact; State v. Shewalter clarifies that continuous, officer‑documented noncompliance—corroborated by concrete incidents—meets the statute’s evidentiary standard for denying street‑time credit across the board.
On IAC, Shewalter exemplifies how the absence of prejudice will often defeat claims tied to omitted sentencing arguments when the district court independently addresses and correctly rules on the point.

Complex Concepts Simplified

DOC commitment: A sentence placing the defendant under the Montana Department of Corrections’ authority, which can include prison, treatment programs, or community‑based placements.
Suspended sentence: The court imposes a sentence but suspends its execution, allowing the defendant to serve in the community subject to conditions. Violations can lead to revocation and imposition of all or part of the suspended term.
Revocation: A court proceeding to determine whether the defendant violated conditions of a suspended or deferred sentence. If revoked, the court may impose a new sentence consistent with statutory limits and must address credits.
Time served (detention credit): Days spent in jail or home arrest related to the revocation that must be subtracted from the sentence. This is automatic when supported by the record.
Elapsed “street time” credit: Credit for days on supervision in the community. The court must consult records and the officer’s recollection and grant credit for any periods with no violations; the State can defeat credit for specific periods by identifying an actual violation within those periods.
ROV (Report of Violation): A formal report by a probation/parole officer documenting alleged noncompliance, often used to support revocation.
Lenihan exception: Allows a defendant to challenge an illegal sentence on appeal even if they did not object in the district court.
Standard of review: Legal issues (like whether the law mandates credit) are reviewed de novo; factual findings (e.g., when custody began) are reviewed for clear error; the revocation decision itself is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Strickland prejudice: To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the proceeding’s outcome would have been different absent counsel’s errors.

Conclusion

State v. Shewalter delivers two practical and doctrinal clarifications. First, detention credit is both mandatory and must be precisely calculated on a developed record; when the record is incomplete, a remand is the proper remedy. Second, street‑time credit—though also non‑discretionary—is conditioned on proof of violation‑free periods. When the officer’s recollection, corroborated by records, establishes continuous noncompliance, a court may deny all street‑time credit without running afoul of Jardee’s prohibition on generic “pattern” rationales.

Finally, the ineffective assistance claim underscores a recurring theme: where the court independently considers and correctly resolves a sentencing credit issue, the absence of advocacy will often fail on Strickland’s prejudice prong. Going forward, Shewalter will likely be cited for its clear articulation of the evidentiary showing needed to deny street‑time credit across an entire supervisory period and for the insistence that detention credits be both awarded and anchored to a provable day‑count in the judgment.