State v. Price: Nebraska adopts abuse-of-discretion review for expanded news media coverage objections; clarifies Miranda waiver/invocation and reaffirms no jail‑time credit against life sentences

Court: Supreme Court of Nebraska

Citation: 320 Neb. 1 (2025)

Date: October 3, 2025

Author: Freudenberg, J. (Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, and Bergevin, JJ.)

Disposition: Convictions affirmed; sentences affirmed as modified (credit for time served removed)

Introduction

This capital-importance criminal appeal arises from the conviction of Adam L. Price for the first degree murders of his two young children in Bellevue, Nebraska. Tried to a jury, Price was convicted on both counts and sentenced to consecutive life-to-life terms. On appeal, he challenged a broad array of rulings: jury management and media exposure (including juror contacts and expanded news media coverage), admission of emotionally charged 911 calls and body-worn camera footage, the admissibility of statements to two Roman Catholic priests under California’s clergy-penitent privilege, the admissibility and voluntariness of custodial statements to California and Nebraska officers under Miranda, a midtrial seizure and the denial of a mistrial, sentencing competency, and the legality of credit for time served on life sentences. The State cross-argued that awarding credit for time served on life sentences was plain error.

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but modified the sentences to remove jail credit, creating two significant guideposts in the process: first, as a matter of first impression, it adopted an abuse-of-discretion standard of appellate review for trial court rulings on objections to expanded news media coverage; second, it provided a comprehensive application of Berghuis v. Thompkins to clarify implied Miranda waivers and the high bar for an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. The opinion also strongly reiterates preservation rules requiring timely mistrial motions when trial irregularities become known, and it reaffirms that no credit for time served may be applied to a life sentence.

Summary of the Opinion

Preservation and assignments: The Court enforced strict preservation rules. Broad references to a motion for new trial with multiple grounds do not preserve discrete issues for appeal; when a party learns of alleged trial irregularity, a timely motion for mistrial is required to preserve the issue for a new trial motion.
Expanded news media coverage: As a matter of first impression, appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on objections to expanded news media coverage is for abuse of discretion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in partially allowing coverage with restrictions, responding to an inadvertent juror-visibility incident, and denying prior restraint.
Sequestration and media exposure: Denial of pre-submission sequestration was not an abuse of discretion where jurors received repeated admonitions and no prejudice was shown. A brief instance where jurors’ faces were incidentally visible in media footage did not warrant a mistrial absent proof of actual prejudice.
911 calls and body camera footage: Admissible under Rules 401 and 403. The recordings presented a coherent, accurate depiction of the “stark reality” of the crimes; their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or cumulativeness.
Miranda and voluntariness: Price received and understood warnings; his answers created an implied waiver under Berghuis. Statements like “I’d rather not talk about that” in response to discrete topics, intermittent silence, and emotional difficulty do not constitute a clear invocation to cut off all questioning. Under the totality of the circumstances, officers did not coerce his statements.
Clergy-penitent privilege (California law): Even assuming the privilege might apply, Price expressly consented to disclosure of his statements to one priest by directing the priest to call the police (waiver under Cal. Evid. Code § 912). Any statements to the other priest were cumulative or later disclosed without coercion, making any error harmless.
Midtrial seizure and mistrial: No abuse of discretion in denying mistrial. Admonitions sufficed; the record did not show prejudice or that jurors even witnessed a prejudicial event. A later request to evaluate competency before sentencing was properly denied for lack of any reason to doubt competency.
Sentencing: Plain error to award credit for time served against life sentences; sentences modified to remove 1,075 days of credit.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Preservation of error: The Court relied on Nebraska authority (e.g., State v. Hudson; State v. Schreiner; Pearson v. Schuler) to reaffirm that defendants must both specifically assign and argue errors, and must move for a mistrial when aware of trial irregularities to preserve such claims for a new trial motion.
Expanded news media coverage: Nebraska Court Rule § 6-2003(C) grants “sole discretion” to the judicial officer to rule on expanded coverage requests. As a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court aligned appellate review with that rule’s discretionary character, adopting an abuse-of-discretion framework.
Jury sequestration and prejudice: State v. Garcia guided the prejudice requirement for reversing denial of sequestration; juror compliance with admonitions is presumed absent contrary evidence (State v. Oliveira-Coutinho).
Evidence law: The Court applied Rules 401 and 403 as explicated in State v. Boswell, State v. Oldson, State v. Rush, and State v. Vazquez. Vazquez’s “stark reality” rationale directly supported admitting emotionally intense recordings that accurately portray the crime.
Miranda waiver and invocation: The Court leaned heavily on Berghuis v. Thompkins and Nebraska cases like State v. Benson, State v. Burries, State v. Rogers, State v. Hernandez, and State v. Clifton. Berghuis underpinned the implied waiver doctrine and the requirement of a clear, unambiguous invocation to halt questioning.
Voluntariness: State v. Anthony, State v. Miller, State v. Martinez, and State v. Hernandez informed the totality-of-circumstances analysis and the necessity of coercive state action to render statements involuntary.
Clergy-penitent privilege (California): The Court applied California statutes (Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1032, 1033, 912) and People v. Johnson to conclude that Price consented to disclosure and thus waived any privilege with one priest; for the other, any privilege issue was harmless due to cumulative evidence and later voluntary disclosures.
Competency and mistrial standards: The Court cited State v. Haas, State v. Lang, State v. Dixon, and State v. Davis to define competency inquiry triggers and the high threshold for mistrial relief.
Sentencing plain error and legality: State v. Gleaton, State v. Roth, and State v. Perry confirm that credit for time served cannot reduce a life sentence; appellate courts may correct illegal sentences on direct appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1) Preservation: timely mistrial motion and specific assignments

The Court refused to entertain several complaints because Price did not preserve them. When the bailiff later disclosed a seated juror’s professed inability to be impartial, the trial court excused the juror and installed an alternate. Defense counsel did not move for a mistrial then, only raising the issue much later by generally referencing the new-trial motion. Similarly, a hallway exchange between some jurors and a courthouse-dog handler (the county attorney’s chief of staff) was not raised via a mistrial motion before the jury was sworn, so it was not preserved. Nebraska law requires litigants to make contemporaneous mistrial motions upon learning of trial irregularities; an appellant cannot “gamble on a favorable result” and complain later if the verdict is adverse.

2) Expanded news media coverage: abuse-of-discretion standard (first impression)

Adopting a standard of review as a matter of first impression, the Court held that rulings on objections to expanded news media coverage are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. This flows logically from Court Rule § 6-2003(C), which vests ruling authority in the presiding judicial officer. Applying that standard, the Court approved the district court’s measured response: it granted limited coverage (no live stream, one fixed pool camera, no stills, delay of outside filming until post-impanelment), paused photography after an inadvertent capture of jurors’ faces, individually questioned jurors, then reinstated limited coverage. Price did not demonstrate actual prejudice; notably, he later did not object to renewed media coverage with juror anonymity protections. The denial of prior restraint on the press also stood, with no plain error.

3) Sequestration and juror exposure

Whether to keep a jury together before submission lies in the trial court’s discretion. The defendant must prove prejudice from a denial. Here, jurors were repeatedly and clearly admonished not to consume media or discuss the case, and the Court presumes compliance absent contrary proof. Except for one juror who learned a friend recognized them in a clip, there was no evidence that any juror saw media. Even that juror stated they could remain impartial. Denial of sequestration was therefore proper. The same prejudice analysis defeated the contemporaneous mistrial motion over the brief, inadvertent juror footage.

4) 911 recordings and body camera footage

Under Rules 401 and 403, the Court approved admission of:

Nielsen’s 911 welfare-check calls (relevant to timeline, custody arrangement, and the “stark reality” of events),
Clark’s 911 call reporting discovery of the children (with a redaction for an extraneous third party), and
Body camera video of the first responding officer clearing the home and the arresting officer’s footage in California.

Following Vazquez, the Court recognized that emotionally intense audio or video can still be admissible when it accurately depicts the crime and helps the State present a coherent narrative. The footage was not needlessly cumulative and any prejudice was not “unfair” in the Rule 403 sense.

5) Miranda: implied waiver; unambiguous invocation; voluntariness

Waiver. Price received and understood Miranda warnings before each interview. Quoting Berghuis, the Court reiterated that Miranda does not require a formal, express waiver. A suspect who understands the rights and then answers questions gives an implied waiver. Price agreed to “chat,” answered many questions, and reengaged after pauses; this sufficed.

Invocation. To terminate interrogation, a suspect must clearly and unambiguously indicate the desire to remain silent. Statements like “I’d rather not talk about that” in response to a specific topic, intermittent silence, or difficulty speaking due to emotional distress do not trigger the duty to cut off all questioning. The Court contrasted this with unambiguous statements like “I’m not talking no more” (Rogers), which do invoke the right.

Voluntariness. Examining the totality of circumstances, the Court found no coercion. The Pacifica interview lasted roughly three hours; the Bellevue interview approximately 8.5 hours. Officers offered food, water, and breaks; Price was unrestrained or minimally restrained and often steered the discussion. Although the Bellevue officers at times raised their voices and used sharp language (calling Price “selfish,” “controlling,” and “a monster”), the Court characterized this as limited confrontational interviewing, not coercion. No promises or threats were made, and Price’s will was not overborne.

6) Clergy-penitent privilege (California law) and waiver

Applying California’s privilege scheme (Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1032, 1033, 912), the Court held Price waived any privilege with Father Foley by expressly requesting that Foley call the police so Price could report he killed his children, and by remaining present without objection as Foley made the report. This matched People v. Johnson’s waiver analysis. The Court treated statements to Father D’Aquila as either non-privileged (not sacramental confession; no duty to keep secret) or, in any event, cumulative and harmless given Price’s later non-coerced admissions to law enforcement.

7) Midtrial seizure, mistrial, and sentencing competency

Price experienced a seizure-like medical event during the defense case. The court recessed, secured medical attention, and admonished jurors that the medical issue was not evidence. The record suggested jurors might not have witnessed anything prejudicial. The Court held there was no fundamental failure requiring mistrial; admonitions typically cure any potential prejudice, and Price showed no actual prejudice. Later, Price sought a competency evaluation before sentencing, but offered only vague concerns. Because the court had no reason to doubt competency, it did not err in declining to order an evaluation. The mandatory life-to-life sentences also minimized any discretionary sentencing concerns.

8) Sentencing plain error: no jail credit against life sentences

Relying on State v. Gleaton and the general rule that illegal sentences must be corrected, the Court removed the 1,075-day jail credit the district court had awarded against Price’s life sentences. Defendants are not entitled to time-served credit on life terms.

Impact and Practice Implications

Media coverage litigation: Nebraska trial courts retain broad discretion over expanded media coverage; appellate review is now clearly abuse-of-discretion. Counsel should build a detailed record on potential prejudice, propose targeted restrictions rather than blanket bans, and be prepared for tailored remedial orders if incidents occur.
Preservation discipline: The opinion is a stern reminder: when trial counsel learns of potential irregularities (juror contacts, courtroom security lapses, media violations), they must move for mistrial immediately to preserve the issue. General assignments tied to a multi-ground new-trial motion will not suffice.
Miranda interrogations: The Court’s robust application of Berghuis heightens the need for suspects to be explicit if they wish to stop questioning. For defense counsel, training clients on unambiguous invocations is critical. For police, properly delivering warnings and refraining from coercive tactics largely insulate statements from suppression.
Clergy communications: The case illustrates how privilege may hinge on denominational practice (e.g., whether a duty of secrecy exists under church tenets) and can be waived by consent to disclosure (including directing clergy to contact law enforcement). Defense counsel should be alert to whether a true sacramental confession occurred and whether any post-conversation conduct waived protection.
Graphic or emotional evidence: Vazquez’s “stark reality” principle continues to support admission of intense 911 and bodycam media that provide a coherent narrative of the crime, so long as Rule 403’s unfair-prejudice threshold is not crossed.
Competency thresholds: Absent concrete reasons to doubt competency, courts need not hold hearings or order evaluations, including at sentencing. Mere uncertainty or generalized concerns are insufficient.
Sentencing accuracy: Life sentences cannot be reduced by jail credits. Trial courts must ensure sentencing journals reflect no credit for time served when life terms are imposed; appellate courts will correct such errors sua sponte.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Abuse of discretion: A highly deferential standard. The appellate court will not second-guess a trial judge’s choice among reasonable options unless the decision is clearly untenable and deprives a party of a substantial right.
Plain error: An obvious error not raised below that seriously affects the fairness or integrity of the proceedings. Appellate courts can correct it without a specific assignment.
Rule 403 “unfair prejudice”: Most evidence hurts the other side; “unfair” prejudice means it risks a decision based on improper emotion or bias rather than the facts (e.g., shock value untethered to probative content).
Implied Miranda waiver: If a suspect understands Miranda rights and then answers questions voluntarily, the law treats that as a waiver even without a formal statement like “I waive my rights.”
Invoking the right to remain silent: To stop questioning, the suspect must clearly say they don’t want to talk anymore. Vague statements, topic-specific reluctance (e.g., “I’d rather not talk about that”), or silence alone do not require officers to stop.
Voluntariness of statements: Courts look at everything about the interrogation to decide if the police overbore the suspect’s will (threats, promises, deprivation). Confrontational or accusatory questioning, by itself, typically is not coercion.
Clergy-penitent privilege (California): Protects confidential communications to clergy who, under their church’s rules, are duty-bound to keep such communications secret. The penitent can waive the privilege by consenting to disclosure, even implicitly (e.g., telling the priest to call the police).
Sequestration: Keeping jurors together and isolated from outside influences before deliberations. Denials are rarely reversible without proof of actual prejudice; courts rely on strong admonitions and juror compliance.
Mistrial: An extreme remedy for errors whose harmful effects cannot be cured by jury instructions. The moving party must show actual prejudice, not just a possibility.
Competency to proceed/sentencing: The court must act if there’s reason to doubt a defendant’s capacity to understand and participate. Generalized unease is not enough to trigger formal evaluations.
No jail credit on life sentences: In Nebraska, time-served credit does not reduce a life sentence; awarding such credit is illegal and will be corrected.

Conclusion

State v. Price is a multi-issue decision that will quietly but materially shape Nebraska trial practice. It provides first-impression clarity that appellate courts will review objections to expanded news media coverage for abuse of discretion, reinforcing the trial judge’s central role in balancing transparency with juror protections. It also delivers a thorough, practitioner-focused application of Berghuis v. Thompkins: implied Miranda waivers arise through voluntary answers after valid warnings, while the right to remain silent must be invoked in unmistakable terms to halt questioning. The Court’s evidentiary rulings underscore that intense but accurate 911 and bodycam recordings can be crucial to presenting the “stark reality” of a crime without running afoul of Rule 403. Its treatment of the California clergy-penitent privilege highlights the importance of denominational duties and waiver by consent, especially when a penitent directs clergy to involve law enforcement. Finally, the opinion is a reminder of the exacting preservation regime for trial irregularities, the high bar for mistrial, the limited triggers for competency evaluations, and the categorical rule that credit for time served cannot apply to life sentences.

The case thus stands as both a doctrinal anchor and a practical guidepost for counsel and courts navigating media, Miranda, privilege, and sentencing issues in high-profile criminal trials.