State v. Oliver: Recognizing Attempted First-Degree Assault-Harm as a Cognizable Offense Under Minnesota’s General Attempt Statute

I. Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Lisa Dawn Oliver, A23‑1062 (Minn. Dec. 10, 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved a foundational question at the intersection of assault law and attempt doctrine: whether “attempted first-degree assault-harm” is a valid, cognizable crime under Minnesota law.

The case sits at the crossroads of:

the general attempt statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.17, and
the first-degree assault-harm statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1.

The Court held—over a detailed dissent—that:

An attempt, charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.17, to commit first-degree assault-harm, Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1, is a valid crime under Minnesota law.

In practical terms, the decision authorizes prosecutors to charge a defendant with “attempted first-degree assault-harm” when the defendant:

specifically intends to inflict “great bodily harm,” and
takes a substantial step toward inflicting that level of harm,

even if no great bodily harm actually occurs.

The case also clarifies the relationship between:

specific-intent attempt crimes, and
general-intent completed offenses such as first-degree assault-harm,

and narrows the earlier decision in State v. Zupetz, 322 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1982), which had cast doubt on when attempts can attach to certain offenses.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

The events arose from a family conflict involving respondent Lisa Dawn Oliver and P.L., the father of their child, B. P.L. had sole legal and physical custody of B., but B. visited Oliver on weekends.

On October 23, 2022:

B. returned to P.L.’s apartment after a weekend with Oliver.
P.L., concerned about B.’s behavior, told B. he was considering reducing her time with Oliver.
Upset, B. called Oliver and asked her to come pick her up.
Oliver and a friend took a rideshare to P.L.’s apartment, gathered B.’s belongings, and waited outside for a return ride.

While outside, P.L. stepped onto his back patio to smoke and saw Oliver walking toward him, yelling insults. The pair argued for 8–10 minutes. During this argument:

Oliver began shoving P.L.
P.L. testified that he saw Oliver reach up with “a concealed weapon” and felt a cut to his neck.
Two neighbors heard a woman shout: “I’m going to f[]ing kill you. I’m going to f[]ing stab you.”
P.L. told his son to call 911.
Oliver left, arranged for B. to return home with the friend, and fled into the neighborhood.
Later, Oliver called the friend, admitted she had sliced P.L.’s neck with a small knife, and said she had disposed of it.

Police arrived to find P.L. pressing a blood-soaked towel to his neck. At the hospital, the wound was sutured; by trial, a visible neck scar remained. Importantly, the State conceded that the injury did not rise to “great bodily harm” as statutorily defined.

B. Charges and Trial

The State initially charged Oliver with:

Attempted second-degree intentional murder (Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, 609.19, subd. 1(1)).

On the day of trial, the State amended the complaint to add:

Attempted first-degree assault-harm (Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, 609.221, subd. 1); and
Second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm (Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 2).

The jury returned mixed verdicts:

Not guilty of attempted second-degree intentional murder.
Guilty of attempted first-degree assault-harm.
Guilty of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon causing substantial bodily harm.

The district court:

Adjudicated and sentenced Oliver only on the attempted first-degree assault-harm count, imposing 45 months in prison; and
Did not adjudicate the second-degree assault count, treating it as a lesser-included offense of the attempted first-degree assault-harm conviction, consistent with State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).

C. Court of Appeals Decision

A divided Court of Appeals reversed. See State v. Oliver, 11 N.W.3d 817 (Minn. App. 2024).

The majority reasoned that:

The assault statutory scheme grades assault-harm offenses by the actual harm inflicted, not the harm intended. First-degree assault-harm requires “assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1.
Attempt is a specific-intent crime under Minn. Stat. § 609.17, whereas assault-harm is a general-intent crime under State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2012). The majority concluded these intents were “irreconcilable,” analogizing to State v. Zupetz, 322 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1982), which held that “attempted second-degree manslaughter” (a culpable-negligence crime) is logically impossible.

The Court of Appeals held that “attempted first-degree assault-harm” is not a crime under Minnesota law and directed the district court to enter judgment on the second-degree assault count.

Because it disposed of the case on that ground, the Court of Appeals did not decide:

whether there was sufficient evidence that Oliver intended to inflict great bodily harm, or
whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a downward dispositional departure.

D. Dissent at the Court of Appeals

Judge Wheelock dissented, arguing:

Attempt is its own crime, distinct from the completed offense; the analysis should focus on § 609.17, not exclusively on the assault statutes.
There is nothing logically inconsistent about specifically intending to commit a general-intent offense.
Zupetz bars only attempts to commit crimes defined by culpable negligence (a “lack of intent”), not attempts to commit general-intent offenses like assault-harm.

E. Supreme Court Review

The State petitioned for review, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review limited to the legal issue:

Is “attempted first-degree assault-harm” a valid crime under Minnesota law?

Justice Hennesy authored the majority opinion, joined by a majority of the Court. Justices Gaïtas and Moore III dissented.

The Supreme Court:

Reversed the Court of Appeals on the cognizability question.
Remanded to the Court of Appeals to decide the unresolved sufficiency and sentencing issues.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

A. Holding

The Minnesota Supreme Court held:

The general attempt statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.17, applies to first-degree assault-harm, Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1.
There is no inherent or legal conflict between:
- the specific intent required by § 609.17, and
- the general intent required for first-degree assault-harm under § 609.221 and Dorn/Fleck.
Therefore, “attempted first-degree assault-harm” is a cognizable offense in Minnesota.

B. Elements of Attempted First-Degree Assault-Harm (as Articulated)

The majority effectively defined the elements of the offense as:

Specific intent to commit first-degree assault-harm – concretely, a specific intent to inflict great bodily harm (as defined in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8).
An act constituting a substantial step toward inflicting great bodily harm—more than mere preparation. Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1.

Unlike completed first-degree assault-harm, this attempt offense does not require that great bodily harm actually occur.

C. Disposition

Because the Court’s ruling was purely legal, it did not resolve:

whether the evidence proved Oliver’s specific intent to inflict great bodily harm; or
whether the sentencing court properly denied a dispositional departure.

The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address these issues in the first instance.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework

1. Attempt Statute – Minn. Stat. § 609.17

Minnesota’s general attempt statute provides:

“Whoever, with intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1.

Key features:

Specific intent: the actor must intend to commit a particular crime.
Substantial step: conduct that goes beyond mere preparation toward completion of the intended offense.
Penalty: typically not more than one-half of the maximum term for the completed offense (subd. 4).

There is no textual limitation restricting which substantive crimes can serve as the “underlying” crime for attempt liability.

2. Definition of “Assault” – Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10

The Criminal Code defines “assault” as:

(1) an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; or
(2) the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.

Minnesota case law has long recognized:

Assault-fear: subdivision 10(1) (a specific-intent crime).
Assault-harm: subdivision 10(2) (a general-intent crime) – at least as to the “intentional infliction of bodily harm” portion. See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 308–10.

The majority further subdivides subdivision 10(2) into:

Assault-harm: “intentional infliction of bodily harm” (battery); and
Assault-attempt: “attempt to inflict bodily harm.”

The dissent rejects this as creating an unnecessary third category, but the majority views the “or” in subdivision 10(2) as creating two distinct modes of committing an assault. See State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 2000) (discussing disjunctive “or”).

3. First-Degree Assault-Harm – Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1

First-degree assault-harm occurs when a person:

“assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1.

“Great bodily harm” is defined as:

“bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8.

In Dorn, 887 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 2016), the Court held that first-degree assault-harm is a general-intent crime: the State need only prove that the defendant intended the physical act that caused the bodily harm; no proof is required that the defendant intended great bodily harm specifically.

B. The Majority’s Reasoning

1. Framing the Question: Start with the Attempt Statute

The majority first emphasizes that Oliver was convicted under the attempt statute, not under the assault statutes themselves. Citing State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2016), the Court reiterates that:

“Attempt crimes are distinct from the underlying crimes being attempted.”

Accordingly, the Court:

frames the core question as whether § 609.17’s text can apply to first-degree assault-harm,
and begins its analysis with § 609.17, rather than with the assault statutes.

The majority notes:

§ 609.17 contains no textual limitation carving out any class of offenses.
In DeGidio v. State, 289 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Minn. 1980), the Court had recognized that the Legislature “gave no indication that some substantive crimes could not serve as a foundation for attempt convictions.”

While acknowledging that in Zupetz the Court found an incompatibility between attempt and culpable negligence manslaughter, the majority treats that as a narrow exception driven by mens rea inconsistency, not by statutory text.

2. Rejecting the Surplusage / Assault-Scheme Argument

Oliver’s main textual argument was based on the structure of the assault statutes:

Because the definition of “assault” already includes “attempt to inflict bodily harm,” the Legislature, she argued, demonstrated that it meant to handle attempts internally within the assault scheme, not through the general attempt statute.
To allow § 609.17 to “attach” would, she claimed, make the “attempt to inflict bodily harm” language redundant—violating the canon against surplusage.

The majority rejects this argument by:

Treating “assault-attempt” (attempt to inflict bodily harm) as a distinct mode of committing an assault, separate from “assault-harm” (actual infliction).
Introducing the conceptual offense of first-degree assault-attempt, which the Court understands as:
- assault-attempt (attempt to inflict bodily harm) plus
- actual infliction of great bodily harm.

On this view:

Attempted first-degree assault-harm (charged under § 609.17) requires:
- specific intent to inflict great bodily harm; and
- a substantial step toward inflicting great bodily harm;
- no bodily harm need actually occur.
First-degree assault-attempt (under the assault statutes) would require:
- specific intent to inflict bodily harm (not great bodily harm),
- a substantial step toward inflicting bodily harm, and
- actual infliction of great bodily harm.

Because these hypothesized offenses differ in:

the required intent (great bodily harm vs. bodily harm), and
whether actual harm is required,

the majority concludes the “assault-attempt” language is not rendered superfluous by recognizing attempted first-degree assault-harm under § 609.17.

The majority also dismisses Oliver’s argument that a person cannot both “attempt to inflict bodily harm” and “inflict great bodily harm” in the same offense. It offers a modified hypothetical from Dorn:

If a defendant swings at a victim (attempting to hit) but misses, and the victim falls into a fire to avoid the blow and suffers great bodily harm, the defendant would have:
- attempted to inflict bodily harm (assault-attempt) and
- inflicted great bodily harm (through the chain of events),

thereby committing “first-degree assault-attempt” as the majority conceives it.

3. Dismissing Policy and Disparity Concerns

Both Oliver and the dissent highlight serious consequences of the majority’s reading:

A defendant who inflicts no physical harm could be convicted of attempted first-degree assault-harm with a higher presumptive sentence than someone convicted of second-degree assault causing substantial bodily harm.
Prosecutorial discretion could lead to geographic or case-by-case disparities.

The majority acknowledges these concerns but refuses to consider them, invoking Minn. Stat. § 645.16 and Serbus, 957 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 2021), to reiterate:

Interpretive canons relating to legislative purpose, policy, or consequences apply only when the statutory text is ambiguous.
Because the majority finds § 609.17 unambiguous in its application to all crimes, including first-degree assault-harm, it declines to address the policy implications.

4. Responding to the Dissent’s “Assault Scheme” Theory

The dissent (Justice Gaïtas, joined by Justice Moore III) argues that the degree of assault-harm is—and should remain—keyed to the actual harm inflicted, per the internal logic of the assault statutes:

First-degree assault: great bodily harm.
Third-degree assault: substantial bodily harm.
Fifth-degree assault: bodily harm, or attempt to inflict it.
Second-degree assault: dangerous weapon; degree adjusted by whether substantial bodily harm is inflicted.

Under this scheme:

A defendant who only attempts to cause harm and causes none is guilty of fifth-degree assault (unless a dangerous weapon is used, making it second-degree assault).
A defendant who causes substantial bodily harm but intends more is guilty of the degree associated with the harm actually inflicted, not the harm intended (as confirmed in Dorn).

The majority rejects this argument on two grounds:

It reiterates that Oliver’s conviction rests on § 609.17, not the internal assault scheme. Attempts are separate crimes; one cannot derive negative implications about § 609.17’s reach from the internal logic of a particular statutory subchapter.
It notes that nothing in the assault statutes explicitly states that the assault grading scheme is exclusive of other charging tools, such as the general attempt statute.

To invalidate attempted first-degree assault-harm on that basis, the Court says, would improperly “read additional language into the statute,” contrary to precedents like State v. Hill, 23 N.W.3d 824, 834 (Minn. 2025) and Energy Policy Advocates v. Ellison, 980 N.W.2d 146, 158 (Minn. 2022).

C. Mens Rea: Reconciling Specific-Intent Attempt with General-Intent Assault-Harm

1. General-Intent Assault-Harm: Fleck & Dorn

In Fleck, the Court held:

Assault-fear (causing fear of immediate harm) is a specific-intent crime (intent to cause fear).
Assault-harm (intentional infliction of bodily harm) is a general-intent crime:
- the defendant must intend the physical act; no proof of intent to cause a particular injury is necessary.

In Dorn, the Court extended this to first-degree assault-harm:

First-degree assault-harm (assault plus great bodily harm) is a general-intent offense.
The defendant is liable for the harm actually inflicted, even if he did not intend that degree of harm.

2. Specific-Intent Attempt: Zupetz

In Zupetz, the Court considered whether a person could be convicted of “attempted second-degree manslaughter,” defined by culpable negligence. The Court held:

Attempt requires specific intent to commit the underlying crime.
Second-degree manslaughter (culpable negligence) effectively involves a lack of intent—recklessness or negligence as the culpable mental state.
It is logically incoherent to intend to cause someone’s death “by being negligent.”

Thus, Zupetz stands for the proposition that:

Attempt liability does not attach to offenses whose mens rea is purely negligence or recklessness of a type that is conceptually incompatible with specific intent.

3. The Majority’s Reconciliation

The Court holds that the tension Oliver identifies is not of the Zupetz kind. Its key reasoning:

General intent (assault-harm): intent to do the physical act that causes harm.
Specific intent (attempt): intent to achieve a particular result (here, great bodily harm).

These two mental states can coexist:

A person can intend to swing a knife at another (general intent to commit a battery), and
at the same time specifically intend that this stabbing cause great bodily harm.

By contrast, in Zupetz, the mens rea required by the completed offense (culpable negligence) was functionally the absence of intent. You cannot both intentionally and negligently kill someone in the sense required by the statute. But here, there is no such incompatibility:

General intent: intent to do the harmful act.
Specific intent: intent that the act produce great bodily harm.

The Court reinforces this reasoning by analogizing to Tichich v. State, 4 N.W.3d 114 (Minn. 2024). In Tichich:

The defendant was convicted both of:
- completed third-degree criminal sexual conduct (a general-intent crime: intent to sexually penetrate), and
- attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct (requiring intent to commit that offense plus a substantial step).
The Court held that a defendant can simultaneously:
- have the general intent to sexually penetrate, and
- have the specific intent to commit the completed sex offense as defined.

By analogy, in Oliver’s case:

a defendant can generally intend to commit a battery (assault-harm) and
specifically intend that the battery cause great bodily harm.

Accordingly, the majority concludes that there is no mens rea conflict between § 609.17 and § 609.221, subd. 1.

D. The Dissent’s Counter-Analysis

1. Methodology: Start with the Assault Scheme

Justice Gaïtas criticizes the majority’s methodology as “formalistic.” Her main points:

Noggle does not require courts to begin and end with § 609.17 in all attempt cases; it merely held that attempt is a distinct offense for purposes of a sentencing enhancement question.
Wilkie and Tichich do not establish a rule that statutory interpretation must begin with § 609.17 in every attempt case; they only did so because the arguments in those cases turned on the meaning of § 609.17 itself.
By refusing to consider the structure of the assault statutes as an “intrinsic” interpretive source, the majority “bypasses the heart of Oliver’s argument.”

2. Assault Scheme: Harm Inflicted, Not Harm Intended

The dissent offers a comprehensive reading of the assault scheme:

“Assault-harm” (subd. 10(2)) is a single statutory concept that includes both:
- inflicting bodily harm; and
- attempting to inflict bodily harm.
The degree of assault-harm is pegged to the level of harm actually inflicted:
- First-degree assault: great bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1.
- Third-degree assault: substantial bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1.
- Fifth-degree assault: bodily harm or attempt. Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2).
- Second-degree assault: always involves a dangerous weapon, with or without substantial bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.222.
Under Dorn, a defendant is responsible for the harm actually inflicted, even if it exceeds what the defendant intended.

From this, the dissent reasons:

A person who merely attempts to inflict bodily harm but fails to cause any harm has committed the lowest assault-harm offense (fifth-degree) unless a dangerous weapon is used (then second-degree).
It is contrary to the statutory structure to:
- grade an offense based on intended harm, when the Legislature clearly chose to grade by actual harm.

Accordingly, the dissent concludes:

“Minnesota's assault statutes make clear that the degree of an assault-harm—regardless of whether harm is attempted or inflicted—is based on the level of harm inflicted, not the level of harm intended.”

Attempted first-degree assault-harm, which is based on intended great bodily harm without requiring that such harm actually occur, is inconsistent with this carefully calibrated scheme.

3. Critique of the Majority’s “First-Degree Assault-Attempt” Concept

The dissent strongly objects to the majority’s creation of “first-degree assault-attempt”:

Nothing in the statutory text or prior caselaw recognizes such an offense.
The majority’s effort to construct “first-degree assault-attempt” is, in the dissent’s view, an artificial device to rebut surplusage concerns and preserve its reading of § 609.17.

The dissent characterizes “first-degree assault-attempt” as an “imaginary offense,” rhetorically underscoring its lack of textual footing.

4. Mens Rea Problem: Introducing a New Intent Element

While the dissent agrees that general intent and specific intent can sometimes coexist, it argues that the majority creates an additional, extra-statutory mens rea requirement:

To prove attempted first-degree assault-harm, the State must prove a specific intent to inflict great bodily harm.
Yet, under Fleck and Dorn, assault-harm requires only general intent—the intent to perform the physical act; the defendant’s intent as to the degree of harm is irrelevant to grading.

The dissent thus sees a deeper conflict:

The majority’s approach reintroduces a “degree-of-harm intent” element that Fleck and Dorn rejected.
It effectively says: for the attempt, we look to the level of harm intended (great bodily harm), even though the completed offense’s grading framework is expressly indifferent to that intent.

In the dissent’s view, this undermines the internal coherence of the assault-harm jurisprudence, not simply supplements it.

5. Policy Concerns: Disparity and Sentencing Manipulation

The dissent flags concrete implications:

The presumptive sentence for attempted first-degree assault may be significantly higher than for second-degree assault, even when:
- the second-degree assault resulted in substantial bodily harm, but
- the attempted first-degree assault caused no harm at all.
Defendants could face dramatically different sentencing exposure based solely on charging choices about whether to invoke § 609.17 or confine charges to the assault scheme.

These concerns, in the dissent’s view, reinforce the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend the general attempt statute to be used to “up-charge” assaults beyond what the structured assault scheme itself provides.

V. Precedents and Their Influence

A. State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2016)

Noggle held that attempt is a distinct crime, not merely a sentencing modifier, and thus certain release provisions for “designated offenses” did not automatically apply to attempts.

The majority uses Noggle to support:

its premise that the analytical focus should be on § 609.17 as an independent offense,
and its view that the structural logic of the assault statutes does not constrain the scope of § 609.17.

The dissent counters that Noggle does not dictate where the Court must “start” a statutory interpretation analysis in all attempt cases.

B. State v. Zupetz, 322 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1982)

Zupetz is the key precedent about the incompatibility of attempt and certain underlying mental states. It held that there is no crime of “attempted second-degree manslaughter” because:

second-degree manslaughter is a culpable negligence crime, and
attempt requires specific intent.

The majority distinguishes Zupetz on narrow grounds:

the fatal incompatibility there was between intent and negligence/recklessness, not between specific and general intent.

The dissent agrees that Zupetz does not directly bar attempts to commit general-intent crimes, but sees Zupetz as highlighting that the Legislature did not contemplate attempts where they would distort the statutory structure and mens rea framework of the underlying offense—in this case, assault-harm.

C. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2012)

Fleck clarified the general/specific intent distinction within the assault definition:

Assault-fear = specific intent to cause fear.
Assault-harm = general intent to commit the physical act that results in bodily harm.

The majority relies on Fleck to:

affirm that assault-harm is general-intent, but
assert that this general intent is not incompatible with the specific intent required by § 609.17.

The dissent uses Fleck to argue that introducing “intent to cause great bodily harm” as a mens rea for grading is inconsistent with the fundamental principle that assault-harm grading is indifferent to the actor’s intended degree of harm.

D. Dorn v. State, 887 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 2016)

Dorn extended Fleck’s reasoning to first-degree assault-harm and confirmed that offenders are liable for the harm inflicted, not harm intended.

The majority:

accepts Dorn as describing the mens rea of the completed offense,
but distinguishes this from the intent required by § 609.17 when the offense is charged as an attempt.

The dissent, by contrast, treats Dorn as central:

It underscores that first-degree assault-harm has no “intent to inflict great bodily harm” element.
Therefore, building such a specific intent element into “attempted first-degree assault-harm” breaks the conceptual alignment between the attempt and the completed offense and departs from the Legislature’s chosen structure.

E. Tichich v. State, 4 N.W.3d 114 (Minn. 2024)

In Tichich, the Court addressed whether convictions for both completed and attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct could coexist. It held they could, emphasizing that:

attempt liability requires specific intent to commit the completed offense and a substantial step,
while the completed offense requires only general intent to commit the prohibited act (here, sexual penetration).

The majority uses Tichich as an example of:

a general-intent crime (third-degree CSC) coexisting with a specific-intent attempt to commit it, without logical inconsistency.

The dissent responds that the core problem here is different:

It is not simply coexistence of general and specific intent.
It is the introduction, via attempt, of a degree-of-harm intent element (great bodily harm) that the assault statutes and Dorn/Fleck carefully avoid.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. General Intent vs. Specific Intent

General intent: The actor intends to engage in the prohibited conduct (e.g., swinging a fist, wielding a knife).
- No requirement that the actor intend any particular result (e.g., broken nose, permanent scar).
Specific intent: The actor intends not only the conduct but a particular result (e.g., intending that the victim suffer great bodily harm or death).

In Minnesota:

Assault-harm is a general-intent crime.
Attempts under § 609.17 are specific-intent crimes.

B. “Substantial Step” in Attempt Liability

A “substantial step” is:

conduct that strongly corroborates the actor’s criminal purpose,
going beyond mere preparation but not necessarily accomplishing the final harmful act.

Examples (depending on context) can include:

lying in wait for the victim with a weapon,
lunging with a knife toward the victim,
placing poison in a drink.

C. Levels of Bodily Harm

Bodily harm: “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7.
Substantial bodily harm: temporary but substantial disfigurement, loss/impairment of function, or a fracture. Id., subd. 7a.
Great bodily harm: high probability of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or permanent/protracted loss of function, or other serious bodily harm. Id., subd. 8.

These gradations drive the degree of many assault offenses.

D. Culpable Negligence

“Culpable negligence,” as in second-degree manslaughter, involves:

creating an unreasonable risk, and
consciously taking chances of causing death or great bodily harm,

but without the specific intent to cause the harm. Because attempts require a mental state focused on achieving a result, an “attempt” to be negligent is conceptually incoherent—hence Zupetz.

VII. Likely Impact and Broader Significance

A. Charging Practices in Violent Offense Cases

The most immediate effect of Oliver is on prosecutorial charging options:

Prosecutors may now:
- charge “attempted first-degree assault-harm” in cases where the defendant’s conduct and statements suggest an intent to cause great bodily harm (e.g., “I’m going to kill you” while using a deadly weapon),
- even if the actual injury is less (substantial bodily harm) or non-existent.
This provides a higher charging ceiling than:
- second-degree assault (dangerous weapon, with or without substantial harm), or
- fifth-degree assault or lesser degrees, which are tied more strictly to harm inflicted.

This is likely to:

increase the use of attempt charges in serious but “near-miss” violence cases, and
affect plea bargaining leverage where substantial injury was avoided or mitigated.

B. Mens Rea Doctrine: Clarifying the Reach of Attempt

Oliver clarifies and limits Zupetz in a meaningful way:

Baseline rule: The general attempt statute applies to virtually all offenses unless:
- the completed offense’s mens rea is inherently incompatible with specific intent (e.g., pure negligence/recklessness crimes like culpable negligence manslaughter).
General-intent crimes (like assault-harm and third-degree CSC) can be the object of an attempt:
- the defendant must specifically intend to commit the general-intent offense (including its result elements),
- and take a substantial step toward doing so.

This may influence:

how courts treat attempts to commit other general-intent offenses (e.g., arson, criminal damage to property, some sex offenses),
future arguments that certain crimes are “non-attemptable.”

C. Sentencing Exposure and Equity Concerns

The dissent’s concerns foreshadow practical tension:

Defendants could face longer presumptive sentences for:
- unsuccessful but highly dangerous assaults (attempted first-degree assault-harm),
- than for successful but “less severe” assaults (second- or third-degree) where substantial harm actually occurred.
This result is not irrational from a dangerousness perspective—intent to cause catastrophic harm is serious—but it:
- departs from the traditional tort/assault logic of grading by harm inflicted,
- and increases the importance of prosecutorial discretion and judicial oversight in charging and sentencing.

These concerns may:

motivate defense challenges focused on proportionality or departure arguments,
spur legislative reconsideration of assault and attempt penalties if disparities prove significant in practice.

D. Guidance for Trial Courts and Juries

Trial courts must now:

instruct juries that:
- for attempted first-degree assault-harm, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to inflict great bodily harm;
- and that the defendant took a substantial step toward inflicting such harm;
- actual great bodily harm need not occur.
carefully distinguish:
- general intent to engage in a harmful act, from
- specific intent to cause a particular level of injury.

The COA’s resolution on remand of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence question regarding Oliver’s specific intent to cause great bodily harm will likely provide important practical guidance on what evidence is adequate to support this element.

E. Potential Legislative Response

If the Legislature disagrees with the Court’s approach, it has several options:

Clarify the assault statutes explicitly to:
- state whether § 609.17 applies to assault-harm offenses, and if so, under what conditions; or
- establish a distinct inchoate-assault framework with graded attempt provisions matched to harm levels.
Adjust penalties for attempts vs. completed assaults to mitigate disproportionate outcomes.

Until such action, Oliver stands as controlling authority that the general attempt statute applies to first-degree assault-harm.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Oliver is a significant decision in Minnesota criminal law. It establishes that:

“Attempted first-degree assault-harm” is a valid offense under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17 and 609.221, subd. 1.
The specific intent required for attempt can coexist with the general intent required for assault-harm.
The general attempt statute broadly applies to substantive offenses, subject only to narrow exceptions like those in Zupetz.

The majority’s approach emphasizes:

fidelity to the plain text of § 609.17,
a broad view of attempt’s applicability, and
deference to the Legislature’s role in defining crimes and penalties.

The dissent, in contrast, underscores:

the carefully structured nature of Minnesota’s assault statutes,
the primacy of harm inflicted in grading assault-harm offenses, and
the risks of creating doctrinal and sentencing distortions by layering attempt on top of that scheme.

Going forward, Oliver will guide:

how prosecutors charge high-risk, near-catastrophic assaults,
how courts instruct juries on intent in attempt cases involving general-intent crimes, and
how future litigants frame the limits of Minnesota’s general attempt statute.

It also leaves space for further development:

The Court of Appeals’ decision on remand—particularly on sufficiency of the evidence regarding intent to inflict great bodily harm—will flesh out the application of this new precedent.
The Legislature may respond if practical outcomes reveal disparities not anticipated when the criminal code was drafted.

In sum, State v. Oliver confirms that Minnesota recognizes attempts to commit even its most serious assault-harm offense, cementing a robust and expansive doctrine of criminal attempt, while inviting ongoing dialogue about proportionality, legislative design, and the proper alignment of intent and harm in the law of violent crime.