State v. McLean: Plea-Agreement Waivers of Rule 35 Relief Held Non-Dispositive & High Bar for Judicial Recusal

Introduction

The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Andrew McLean, No. 2024-48-C.A. (R.I. July 2, 2025) offers important clarification on two recurring post-conviction issues: (1) whether a defendant who expressly waives Rule 35 relief in a written plea agreement is forever barred from seeking sentence reduction; and (2) whether the sentencing justice must recuse him- or herself from hearing a subsequent Rule 35 motion.

Mr. McLean, acting pro se, challenged the denial of his motion to reduce sentence and argued that the same justice who accepted his plea and imposed sentence should have stepped aside when the Rule 35 motion was heard. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, yet in doing so reaffirmed—consistent with its very recent decision in State v. Roman—that a check-the-box waiver of Rule 35 does not automatically foreclose appellate or trial-level consideration of the motion’s merits.

Summary of the Judgment

• Recusal: The Court held that the defendant failed to establish any personal bias or prejudice requiring the trial justice’s recusal. The mere fact that the same judge accepted the plea and imposed sentence did not, without more, create an appearance of partiality.
• Rule 35 Motion: Applying its traditionally deferential standard of review, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial justice’s refusal to reduce the sentence. McLean received a term below the agreed-upon “cap,” and the judge painstakingly reviewed all mitigation proffered.
• Plea-Agreement Waiver: Echoing State v. Roman, the Court again emphasized in a footnote that a written waiver of Rule 35 rights—indicated by a defendant’s checkmark on the plea form—is not, in and of itself, “dispositive.” Courts retain authority to reach the merits of a Rule 35 motion in the interest of justice.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The opinion threads together a line of Rhode Island cases addressing judicial recusal and sentencing relief:

• Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174 (R.I. 2008) & Kelly v. RIPTA, 740 A.2d 1243 (R.I. 1999) – establish the dual obligation of judges to recuse when partial and to sit when impartial.
• Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 118 R.I. 608 (1977) – defines the standard for demonstrating judicial bias: a “settled opinion” capable of seriously impairing impartiality.
• Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896 (R.I. 2008) & 219 A.3d 1288 (R.I. 2019); Ruffner, Mendoza, Davis, Farooq, Smith, and Chase – collectively set out the “extremely limited” appellate review of Rule 35 decisions and the heavy burden on defendants seeking leniency.
• State v. Roman, — A.3d —, (R.I. 2025) – most pivotal insofar as it rejects the notion that a plea-form waiver is dispositive of a Rule 35 claim.

By citing Roman, the McLean Court signals that the principle announced there is already controlling law: written waivers can be considered, but they do not eliminate judicial discretion to entertain Rule 35 requests.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Recusal

The Court applied the “objective reasonable observer” test: would a well-informed person conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned? McLean relied on the judge’s admonitory remarks during the plea colloquy—essentially a warning against post-hoc regret—as evidence of bias. The Supreme Court disagreed:

• The comments merely ensured McLean understood the plea’s consequences;
• No evidence of personal hostility, extrajudicial knowledge, or prejudgment existed;
• The sentence imposed fell below the negotiated cap, undermining any claim of animus.

b. Rule 35 Merits

For sentence-reduction motions the Court traditionally asks whether the trial justice:

1. Considered all permissible sentencing factors (nature of offense, defendant’s background, public safety, rehabilitation potential);
2. Misconceived or overlooked relevant evidence; and
3. Imposed a sentence that is grossly disparate or without justification.

Here, the trial justice expressly reviewed “every document, report, medical and psychiatric study.” McLean’s diminished capacity argument was therefore deemed fully considered. Because the ultimate sentence resided within statutory limits and below the plea cap, no abuse of discretion existed.

c. Effect of Plea-Agreement Waiver

Although the State argued McLean contractually waived Rule 35 relief, the Court—consistent with Roman—declined to treat the waiver as jurisdictionally fatal. The footnote, though brief, is doctrinally significant:

“This Court does not view the fact that the defendant placed a checkmark next to that particular provision on the plea form as dispositive of the issue presented in this case.”

The rationale echoes contract-of-adhesion concerns and the judiciary’s independent sentencing authority: public interest in fair sentencing cannot be bargained away entirely. Judges retain the power to correct unduly severe sentences notwithstanding defendant’s prior waiver.

3. Impact

• Plea Drafting: Prosecutors can no longer assume a Rule 35 waiver will foreclose later motions. Expect more explicit plea language or alternative mechanisms (e.g., stipulated sentences) to secure finality.
• Judicial Economy vs. Fairness: Trial judges are reminded that they may decide Rule 35 motions even when they handled the original sentencing, without automatic recusal.
• Defense Strategy: Defendants retain a narrow but viable post-sentencing avenue for relief despite plea-form waivers, but must still satisfy the “heavy burden” standard.
• Appellate Review: The Court’s adherence to an “extremely limited” scope signals continued deference to sentencing judges; successful appeals will remain rare.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 35 Motion: A procedural rule allowing a defendant to ask the sentencing court to correct an illegal sentence or, within 120 days, to reduce a lawful sentence. Think of it as a limited “second look” at punishment.
• Sentencing Cap: A negotiated ceiling on the potential sentence—here, 80 years with 50 to serve—providing both parties some certainty before a guilty plea.
• Recusal: When a judge steps aside because impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Requires more than dissatisfaction with prior rulings; actual bias or its appearance must be shown.
• Nonparolable Term: A fixed period of incarceration during which the defendant is ineligible for parole (early supervised release).

Conclusion

State v. McLean reinforces, and subtly extends, the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s commitment to sound sentencing discretion and judicial impartiality. The opinion:

1. Affirms that recusal is unwarranted absent demonstrable bias, even when the same judge handles plea, sentencing, and Rule 35 proceedings;
2. Clarifies—building on State v. Roman—that a standardized plea-form waiver of Rule 35 relief does not strip courts of authority to entertain the merits;
3. Reiterates the defendant’s “heavy burden” for post-sentence leniency and the appellate court’s reluctance to disturb a trial justice’s considered judgment.

Going forward, plea agreements in Rhode Island should not view boiler-plate Rule 35 waivers as a litigational panacea, and defendants should be prepared to present robust mitigation evidence to clear the high bar for sentence reduction. The decision thus balances contractual finality, judicial efficiency, and the enduring imperative of individualized justice.